Micro-offsets and macro-transformation: An inconvenient view of climate change justice

Harvard Environmental Law Review

Volumn 33, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 303-348

  Vandenbergh, M P ^a   Ackerly, B A ^a   Forster, F E ^b  

^a VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Climate Change Research Network   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CARBON SEQUESTRATION; CLIMATE CHANGE; CONFERENCE PROCEEDING; EMISSION CONTROL; ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE; NATION STATE; POLICY APPROACH; POLLUTION POLICY; RESOURCE ALLOCATION;

HARNESS;

EID: 69649085226     PISSN: 01478257     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (339)

1. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96 Geo. L. J. 1565, 1611-12 (2008);
2. Daniel A. Farber, The Moral Case for Climate Compensation: Doing Justice in a Complex World, 2008 Utah L. Rev. 377;
3. Matthew D. Adler, Corrective Justice and Liability for Global Warming, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1859, 1861-62 (2007). Climate justice issues arise in several ways.
4. See Michael P. Vandenbergh and Brooke A. Ackerly, Climate Change: The Equity Problem, 26 Va. Envtl. L. J. 55, 75-76 (2007) (noting that the costs of climate change and climate change mitigation are likely to be inequitably distributed);
5. Brooke Ackerly and Michael P. Vandenbergh, Climate Change Justice: The Challenge for Global Governance, 20 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 553, 555-56 (2008) (noting the global justice concern associated with the ceiling on economic activity that may occur because of carbon constraints).
6. See Joseph E. Aldy and Robert N. Stavins, Designing the Post-Kyoto Climate Regime: Lessons from the Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements (Nov. 24, 2008) (unpublished interim report), available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/ Interim%20Report%20081203%20Akiko%20v6.pdf (identifying principles).
7. See Cass R. Sunstein, The World vs. the United States and China? The Complex Climate Change Incentives of the Leading Greenhouse Gas Emitters, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 1675, 1676 (2008);
8. Jonathan B. Wiener, Climate Change Policy and Policy Change in China, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 1805, 1823-24 (2008);
9. Scott Barrett, Why Cooperate?: The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods 93, 162-64 (2007) (discussing importance of incentives).
10. See, e.g., Valentina Bosetti et al., Modeling Economic Impacts of Alternative International Climate Policy Architectures: A Quantitative and Comparative Assessment of Architectures for Agreement (Harvard Project on Int'l Climate Agreements, Discussion Paper 08-20, 2008), available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/CarraroWeb3.pdf (examining eight "policy architectures").
11. See, e.g., Jing Cao, Reconciling Human Development and Climate Protection: Perspectives from Developing Countries on Post-2012 International Climate Change Policy (Harvard Project on Int'l Climate Agreements, Discussion Paper 08-25, 2008), available at http://belfer center.ksg.harvard.edu/files/ CaoWeb2.pdf (proposing allocation that allows substantial growth in per capita income in developing countries);
12. Jeffrey Frankel, An Elaborated Proposal For Global Climate Policy Architecture: Specific Formulas and Emission Targets for All Countries in All Decades (Harvard Project on Int'l Climate Agreements, Discussion Paper 08-08, 2008), available at http://ksghome.harvard.edu/-jfrankel/ SpecificTargets2008HPICA.pdf (proposing allocation that allows business as usual emissions for developing countries for decades before requiring reductions).
13. See discussion infra notes 56, 92-96, and accompanying text.
14. 2 eq level is supported by a number of sources.
15. 2 eq atmospheric concentration range of 445 to 490 ppm, which is associated with a temperature range of 2.0 to 2.4°C)
16. 2 eq);
17. 2 eq is the combination of the six most important greenhouse gases.
18. IPCC, Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC, Climate Change 2007: The Physical Basis 210-16 (2007) [hereinafter IPCC AR4 WG I], available at http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-wgl.htm.
19. 2 eq there is an 18% likeli-hood of a 3°C temperature increase, a 3% likelihood of a 4°C increase, and a 1% likelihood of a 5°C increase).
20. See, e.g., Martin L. Weitzman, On Modeling and Interpreting the Economics of Cata-strophic Climate Change, 91 Rev. Econ. and Stat. 1, 18 (2009) (noting that "[o]ne might try to compare numbers on, say, a homeowner buying fire insurance... with cost-benefit estimates of the world buying an insurance policy going some way toward mitigating the extreme high-temperature possibilities")
21. see also infra notes 70-75 (discussing likelihood of catastrophic climate change).
22. See Bosetti et al., supra note 4, at 11 fig. 3.
23. Id.
24. See discussion infra notes 86-110 and accompanying text;
25. see also Stern, supra note 7, at 23.
26. See Nathan S. Lewis, Professor, Cal. Inst, of Tech., Talk: Chemical Challenges in Renewable Energy 2-8 (transcript available at http://nsl.caltech. edu/files/energy-notes.pdf). Lewis's global energy demand estimate for 2050 of twenty-eight terawatts ("TW") assumes substantial demand-side energy efficiency and conservation efforts.
27. 2 would require=20 TW of carbon-free power." Id. at 7. The nuclear 20 TW calculation is 20, 000 plants (up from 400 today), each with 1000 megawatt ("MW) capacity, installed over a period of fifty years.
28. 2 eq, based on the Category IV stabilization range.
29. See IPCC AR4 WG III, supra note 7, at 39 tbl. TS. 2.
30. 2 of panels per day. Note that producing 3 TW in the United States would require 1.7% of the country's land, and "covering every home rooftop in the entire U. S. Would generate only 0.25 TW of power."
31. Id.
32. See discussion infra notes 20-22 and accompanying text;
33. see also Frankel, supra note 5, at 7.
34. 2 eq emissions are based on data for 2005 from World Resources Institute, Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) version 6.0 (2009), available at http://cait.wri.org/cait.php?page=yearly&mode=view.
35. See Miles R. Allen and David J. Frame, Call off the Quest, 318 Science 582, 582 (2007) (noting that "[o]nce the world has warmed by 4 [degrees] C, conditions will be so different from anything we can observe today... That it is inherently hard to say when the warming will stop")
36. Richard Posner, Catastrophe: Risk and Response, (discussing the challenges posed by abrupt climate change). Although improvements in other aspects of life (e.g., disease reduction, increases in consumer goods) achieved through allocations of resources to areas other than emissions reductions may enhance welfare, truly catastrophic climate change would make these other welfare-enhancing developments difficult to achieve
37. See Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, Should Greenhouse Gas Permits Be Allocated on a Per Capita Basis?, 97 Cal. L. Rev. 51 (2009) [hereinafter Posner and Sunstein, Per Capita];
38. Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, Global Warming and Social Justice, Regulation, Spring 2008, at 14, 17-20 [hereinafter Posner and Sunstein, Social Justice].
39. See Ackerly and Vandenbergh, supra note 1, at 554.
40. United Nations, The Millennium Development Goals Report 5 (2008), available at http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/ The%20Millennium%20Development%20Goals% 20Report%202008.pdf (noting the "multiple dimensions of poverty").
41. See, e.g., Jing Cao, supra note 5, at 14 (adjusting emissions allocations to account for personal incomes).
42. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Climate Change: The China Problem, 81 S. Cal. L. Rev. 905, 919 (2008) (discussing research on the Kuznets Curve and GHG emissions).
43. See discussion infra notes 154-58 and accompanying text.
44. See generally Bosetti et al., supra note 4. David Victor points out that the ultimate resolution may involve a collection of regional agreements with limited connections.
45. See David G. Victor, Fragmented Carbon Markets and Reluctant Nations: Implications for the Design of Effective Architectures, in Architectures for Agreement: Addressing Global Climate Change in the Post-Kyoto World 133 (Joseph E. Aldy and Robert N. Stavins eds., 2007).
46. 2 eq), the emissions source categories included (e.g., industry-only or all sources), the timing and amount of emissions reductions that will achieve particular atmospheric targets, the benchmark year for calculating emissions reductions, the atmospheric targets that will achieve desired temperature targets, whether peak values or values at stabilization should be used, the probabilities and magnitudes of climate harms and costs that may arise from those harms, the impact of various allocations of burdens and benefits on the incentives of developed and developing countries, and the impacts of those allocations on climate and justice goals.
47. See, e.g., Bosetti et al., supra note 4, at 5 tbl. 1 (noting that some policy architectures identify GHG targets and others do not);
48. see also Joseph E. Aldy et al., Thirteen Plus One: A Comparison of Global Climate Policy Architectures, 3 Climate Poly 373 (2003) (reviewing a number of climate change policy architectures).
49. See Martin L. Weitzman, Reactions to the Nordhaus Critique (Feb. 9, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review). Weitzman suggests mat testing intuitive plausibility is not necessarily an "airtight or rigorous" approach, but on an intuitive basis "it should be sufficiently convincing to make a plausible presumptive case that there may be a serious mistreatment of uncertainty in the 'standard' [cost-benefit analysis] of climate change."
50. Id. at 2.
51. See William D. Nordhaus and Joseph Boyer, Warming the World: Economic Models of Global Warming (2000);
52. William D. Nordhaus, The Challenge of Global Warming: Economic Models and Environmental Policy 166 (July 24, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://nordhaus.econ.yale.edu/dice-mss-072407-all.pdf);
53. Robert Mendelsohn, Chapter 8: Robert Mendelsohn, Yale University, in Yale Symposium on the Stern Review 93, 95 (2007), available at www.ycsg.yale.edu/ climate/stem.html. The Nordhaus approach has been enormously influential in the academic and policy realms.
54. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, From Montreal to Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 31 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 1 (2007) (comparing costs and benefits of efforts to reduce GHGs and ozone-depleting chemicals).
55. See, e.g., Weitzman, supra note 9;
56. see also Stern, supra note 7, at 3. The implication for policymakers is that reductions should be larger and occur earlier than suggested by the Nordhaus approach.
57. See, e.g., Martin L. Weitzman, Some Basic Economics of Extreme Climate Change 3-4 (Working Paper, Feb. 19, 2009), available at http://www.economics. harvard.edu/faculty/weitzman/files/Cournot%2528Weitzman%2529.pdf.
58. Compare William D. Nordhaus, An Analysis of the Dismal Theorem (Cowles Found, for Research in Econ., Discussion Paper No. 1686, 2009), available at http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d16b/d 1686.pdf, with Weitzman, supra note 26. The effect of the debate on policy-makers is reflected in a recent article by Peter Orszag, who is now White House Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") Director. Peter R. Orszag and Terry M. Dinan, Response, Comment on Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 38 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10, 579-81 (2008);
59. see also Melinda Kimble and Letha Tawney, The Tale of the Fat Tail, Envtl. F., forthcoming May/June 2009.
60. Weitzman, supra note 9, at 2.
61. Weitzman, supra note 26, at 14-15 (noting that "economists make a living from plugging rough numbers into simple models and reaching specific conclusions (more or less) on the basis of these numbers.... The public has little tolerance for ambiguity and craves some kind of an answer...."). Economic climate models are sophisticated and opaque to the non-expert, yet yield enormously influential, precise values or ranges of values for the optimal expenditures to reduce GHG emissions
62. See, e.g., Nordhaus and Boyer, supra note 27 at 69-74.
63. See, e.g., John H. Lienhard, Engines of Our Ingenuity No. 1742: Accuracy as Precision, http://www.uh.edu/engines/epil742.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2009) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review) (discussing difference between precision and accuracy, using the example of digital and analog watches).
64. See, e.g., David Segal, In Letter, Warren Buffett Concedes a Tough Year, N. Y. Times, Mar. 1, 2009, at A16 (quoting Warren Buffett for the proposition that "'[t]he stupefying losses in mortgage-related securities came in large part because of flawed, history-based models'" and noting that Buffett recently criticized "the perils of relying on mathematical models devised without worst-case situations in mind").
65. See, e.g., Michael Lewis, The End, Portfolio, Dec. 2008, at 114 (describing how Steve Eisman profited by betting against how rating agencies were assessing subprime loans and noting that he "called Standard and Poor's and asked what would happen to default rates if real estate prices fell. The man at S&P couldn't say; its model for home prices had no ability to accept a negative number").
66. See IPCC AR4 WG III, supra note 7, at 205-06 (noting percentage impact on GDP ranging from single-digit losses to slight gains). The language used by the Framework Convention on Climate Change is to avoid "dangerous anthropogenic interference" ("DAI") with the climate, and the avoidance DAI goal is a focus of the IPCC economic analysis
67. Id. at 194
68. 2 eq ppm target);
69. 2 eq).
70. 2, or a range from 440 to 485 ppm. Id.
71. 2 eq examined by the Stern Review.
72. 2 eq would require global emissions to peak in the next twenty years.
73. Id. at 7
74. IPCC AR4 WG III, supra note 7, at 198 tbl. 3.5, 227, 229 tbl. 3.10.
75. Id. at 205-06. The Stern Review GDP loss estimate for roughly the same atmospheric concentration is between -2% and +5%.
76. Id. at 206
77. 2 eq.
78. See Stern, supra note 7, at 6 (citing Nordhaus, supra note 27, at 166, and Mendelsohn, supra note 27, at 95).
79. 2.
80. Id. at 198
81. Id. at 205-06.
82. See Bosetti et al., supra note 4, at 4-5 (reviewing recent models).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 10, 13.
85. See Robert Engelman, Sealing the Deal to Save the Climate, in State of the World 2009: Into a Warming World 169, 184 (Linda Starke ed., 2009);
86. Stern, supra note 7, at 28-31. In 1997, Brazil proposed allocation based on stocks, or historical contributions. See Proposed Elements of a Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Presented by Brazil in Response to the Berlin Mandate, (submitted May 28, 1997), available at http://unfccc.int/cop4/resource/docs/1997/agbm/misc01a3.htm.
87. See Jing Cao, supra note 5, at 10, 11.
88. See Frankel, supra note 5, at 16 fig. 2. By participate, we mean both to enter into and comply with an agreement to reduce GHG emissions.
89. See, e.g., Jing Cao, supra note 5, at 11 (citing Paul Baer et al., The Right to Development in a Climate Constrained World: The Greenhouse Development Rights Framework (2007));
90. see also Aldy and Stavins, supra note 2, at 9, 19.
91. See Engelman, supra note 47, at 185-86. EcoEquity and Stockholm Env't Inst., Executive Summary, The Right to Development in a Climate Constrained World: The Greenhouse Development Rights Framework 2-3 (2d ed. 2008), available at www.ecoequity.org/GDRs/GDRs-ExecSummary.html.
92. See, e.g., Posner and Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1582 (noting that "[n]ations are not people; they are collections of people, ranging from very rich to very poor").
93. See Jing Cao, supra note 5, at 11.
94. 2 eq, the largest emitting nations must substantially reduce emissions by 2050, including 80% reductions by the United States and slower emission growth rates by China. Even in this scenario, the planet is likely to be 4 to 6°C warmer.
95. 2 eq, one scenario would require that the eight largest industrialized nations and the biggest rapidly industrializing nations, including China and India, each reduce emissions by 5% per year, and would require stable emissions from the rest of the world. The costs would be in the tens of trillions of dollars. Id.
96. In 1990, the WMO/ICSU/UNEP Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases ("AGGG") concluded that 2°C was "an upper limit beyond which the risks of grave damage to ecosystems, and of non-linear responses, are expected to increase rapidly." AGGG, Stockholm Envtl. Inst., Report of Working Group II of the AGGG, Targets and Indicators of Climate Change (1990);
97. see also IPCC AR4 WG III, supra note 7, at 99. The European Union adopted the 2°C target on November 15, 2007, in a European Parliament Resolution. Resolution on Limiting Global Climate Change to 2°Celsius - The Way Ahead for the Bali Conference on Climate Change and Beyond, Eur. Parl. Doc. (COP 13 and COP/MOP3) 1-2 (2007), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/ DownloadSP.do?id=14318&num-rep=7021&language=en.
98. For example, after adopting the 2°C target in 2007, the European Parliament adopted the "Florenz report," which calls for the European Union to reduce GHG emissions to 80% below 1990 levels by 2050.
99. See 2050: The Future Begins Today - Recommendations for the EU's Future Integrated Policy on Climate Change, Eur. Parl. Doc. 2008/2105 (INI) (2009), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP// TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2009-0042+0DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN. AR4 Category I atmospheric concentrations, which would achieve a 2.0 to 2.4°C temperature target, would require 80% to 95% emissions reductions from developed countries by 2050.
100. See IPCC AR4 WG III, supra note 7, at 776 box 13.7.
101. For example, California has set emissions reductions targets for all GHGs to 2000 levels by 2012, 1990 levels by 2020, and 80% below 1990 levels by 2050. Cal. Exec. Order No. S-3-05 (2005), available at http://www.dot.ca.gov/hq/ energy/ExecOrderS-3-05.htm. Florida has set emissions reduction targets for all GHGs to 2000 levels by 2017, 1990 levels by 2025, and 80% below 1990 levels by 2050. Fla. Exec. Order No. 07-127, at 2 (2007), available at http://www.flgov.com/pdfs/orders/07-127-emissions.pdf. The New Jersey Global Warming Response Act limits the level of statewide GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2020, and 80% below 2006 levels by 2050. Assem. 3301, 212th Leg., § 2 (N. J. 2007), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2006/Bills/A35O0/3301- R2.PDF.
102. The members of the U. S. Conference of Mayors adopted a resolution calling for reduction of all GHG emissions 80% below 1990 levels by 2050. 76th U. S. Conference of Mayors, City Priorities for a Cap and Trade System (2008), available at http://www.us mayors.org/resolutions/76th-conference/energy-11.asp.
103. As of January 2009, the members of the United States Climate Action Partnership ("USCAP"), including more than two dozen large corporations, have supported a GHG emissions goal of 97 to 102% of 2005 levels by 2012, 80 to 86% of 2005 levels by 2020, 58% of 2005 levels by 2030, and 20% of 2005 levels by 2050.
104. See U. S. Climate Action P'ship, A Blueprint for Legislative Action 5 (2009), available at http://www.us-cap.org/pdf/USCAP-Blueprint.pdf.
105. The signatories to the American College and University Presidents Climate Commitment have called for an 80% reduction in emissions of all GHGs by 2050, although the commitment does not specify a baseline. Am. Coll. and Univ. Presidents Climate Commitment, American College and University Presidents Climate Commitment 1 (2008), available at http://www. presidentsclimatecommitment.org/html/commitment.pdf. Hundreds of college and university presidents have signed the commitment. American College and University Presidents Climate Commitment, Signatories of the ACUPCC, http://www.presidentsclimatecommitment.org/html/signatories.php (last visited Apr. 26, 2009) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
106. 2 eq, but the group has not proposed a policy architecture for achieving this target. See Understanding 350, http://www.350.org/understanding-350 (last visited Apr. 17, 2009) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review) (identifying a strategy of political activism to encourage international consensus that would "put a high enough price on carbon that we stop using so much" and to effectively reduce "carbon 80% by 2050," and mentioning that thiswould entail a switch to non-coal energy, better land-use, and waste reduction);
107. 2 eq).
108. 2 eq and are increasing by over 2 ppm per year.
109. See Stern, supra note 7, at 4;
110. see also W. L. Hare, A Safe Landing for the Climate, in State of the World 2009: Into a Warming World, supra note 47, at 13.
111. 63IPCC AR4 WG III, supra note 7, at 229 tbl. 3.10.
112. Id.
113. "Bosetti et al., supra note 4, at 11 fig. 3, 11-12, 15. The lowest likely temperature increase in the eight policy architectures examined by Bosetti et al. is over 2.5°C.
114. Id. at 11 fig. 3.
115. 2 eq, at the low end of the Category III levels, will leave an 80% risk that warming will exceed 3°C. The risk will be much higher at Category IV levels.
116. See IPCC AR4 WG III, supra note 7, at 227 tbl. 3.9
117. 2 eq still generates a 50% risk that warming will exceed 2°C).
118. 2 eq levels).
119. 2 eq at 445 to 490 ppm. IPCC AR4 WG III, supra note 7, at 198 tbl. 3.5, 229 tbl. 3.10.
120. see also Hare, supra note 62, at 28 (noting that it is unlikely that this scenario will stabilize temperatures at 2°C or less).
121. Hare, supra note 62, at 19 (noting that "[a] warming of 2 degrees Celsius is clearly not 'safe' and would not prevent, with high certainty, dangerous interference with the climate system").
122. Stern, supra note 7, at 5 tbl. 1 (citing work of the Hadley Center as published in the Stern Review).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 6. The Garnaut Climate Change Review concluded that temperature increases above 5.1°C would "result in a severe" reduction in human welfare. "Their impacts on human civilisation and most ecosystems are likely to be catastrophic." Garnaut, supra note 7, at 263.
125. Garnaut, supra note 7, at 263
126. Martin L. Weitzman, A Review of The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change, 45 J. Econ. Literature 703, 716 (2008).
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., Cameron Hepburn and Nicholas Stern, A New Global Deal on Climate Change, 24 Oxford Rev. Econ. Pol Y. 259, 265 (2008);
129. see also D. A. Stainforth et al., Letter, Uncertainty in Predictions of the Climate Response to Rising Levels of Greenhouse Gases, 433 Nature 403 (2005);
130. Malte Meinshausen, What Does a 2°C Target Mean for Greenhouse Gas Concentrations? A Brief Analysis Based on Multi-Gas Emission Pathways and Several Climate Sensitivity Uncertainty Estimates, in Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change 265 (Hans Joachim Schellnhuber et al. Eds., 2006).
131. Susan Solomon et al., Irreversible Climate Change Due to Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 106 Proc. Nat'l Acad. Sci. 1704, 1704 (2009).
132. For an overview of recent scientific developments, see Michael D. Lemonick, As Effects of Warming Grow, U. N. Report Is Quickly Dated, Yale Envt 360, Feb. 12, 2009, http://www.e360.yale.edu/content/print.msp?id=2120 (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
133. Emissions over die last several years have increased at rates depicted by the very aggressive IPCC A1F1 scenario.
134. See Hepburn and Stern, supra note 76, at 265. Additionally, atmospheric concentrations of GHGs are increasing faster than many models predict.
135. See Peter Tans, Earth System Research Laboratory, Trends in Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide - Global (2008), available at http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/ trends/index.html#global.
136. See Julienne Stroeve et al., Arctic Sea Ice Extent Plummets in 2007, 89 Eos 13 (2008).
137. See Lemonick, supra note 77, at 2.
138. See Timothy M. Lenton et al., Tipping Elements in the Earth's Climate System, 105 Proc. Nat'l Acad. Sci. 1786, 1789 (2008) (discussing loss of ice);
139. Andrew Shepherd and Duncan Wingham, Recent Sea-Level Contributions of the Antarctic and Greenland Ice Sheets, 315 Science 1529 (2007) (regarding Greenland and Antarctic ice);
140. Tad Pfeffer et al., Kinematic Constraints on Glacier Contributions to 21st-century Sea Level Rise, 321 Science 1340 (2008) (regarding sea level rise within 100 years);
141. David M. Lawrence et al., Accelerated Arctic Land Warming and Permafrost Degradation During Rapid Sea Ice Loss, Geophysical Res. Letters (March 7, 2008) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review) (referring to 100 year time span).
142. See Eric Rignot et al., Letter, Recent Antarctic Ice Mass Loss from Radar Interferometry and Regional Climate Modelling, 1 Nature Geoscience 106, 106-07 (2008);
143. see also Eric J. Steig et al., Letter, Warming of the Antarctic Ice-Sheet Surface Since the 1957 International Geophysical Year, 457 Nature 459, 460 (2009) (reporting that new Antarctic temperature model, using more data sources and improved statistical methods, demonstrates "more significant temperature change in Antarctica... Than reported in some previous [temperature] reconstructions").
144. 2 eq.
145. 2 eq is justified by several cost-benefit analyses)
146. 2 eq. Hepburn and Stern, supra note 76, at 277. Hansen has argued that, based on the current science, 2°C is too high if the goal is to reduce the risk of substantial long-term sea level increases, and that we have already exceeded the desired atmospheric GHG concentrations.
147. 2:Where Should Humanity Aim?, 2 Open Atmospheric Sci. J. 217, 217-18, 226 (2008);
148. see also James Hansen et al., Dangerous Human-Made Interference with Climate: A GISS Modele Study, 7 Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics 2287, 2304-08 (2007).
149. IPCC AR4 WG III, supra note 7, at 204.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 202-03.
152. Stern, supra note 7, at 7-8.
153. IPCC AR4 WG III, supra note 7, at 216 (citing Reina Kawase et al., Natt. Inst, for Envtl. Studies, Japan, CGER-D038-2006, Greenhouse Gas Emission Scenarios Database and Regional Mitigation Analysis (2006)). According to the IPCC, "[m]ost of the scenarios with drastic C02 reductions for the USA and the UK assume the introduction of CCS."
154. Id. at 217
155. Id. at 218.
156. Stephen Pacala and Robert Socolow, Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate Problem for the Next 50 Years with Current Technologies, 305 Science 968, 968-69 (2004).
157. "Id. at 968 (concluding that "revolutionary technologies" need to be developed to achieve reductions above leveling off emissions growth).
158. Hepburn and Stern, supra note 76, at 264.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 263.
161. IPCC AR4 WG III, supra note 7, at 199.
162. 2eq. Stem, supra note 7, at 7.
163. 97Hare, supra note 62, at 28.
164. Id. at 29.
165. Id. at 23-25.
166. 2 eq as "far higher" than the atmospheric stabilization concentrations necessary to achieve a high likelihood of limiting warming to 2°C or less.
167. Id. at 28
168. Id. at 26.
169. By making optimistic assumptions about baselines, some cost estimates project GDP losses by 2030 of only 3% or less, with a 2050 GDP loss that is generally less than 5.5%. IPCC AR4 WG III, supra note 7, at 205-06. The Stern Review cost estimate for roughly the same atmospheric concentration was for a GDP loss of between -2% and +5%.
170. Id at 206. Too few assessments have been done of Category I costs in 2100 for analysis by the IPCC in AR4.
171. Id. at 198.
172. Id. at 199.
173. Bosetti et al., supra note 4, at 20 (concluding that "the 2°C temperature target as envisaged by the IPCC and the European Commission requires more drastic measures than those indicated in all the policy architectures considered in this paper").
174. Id.
175. Pacala and Socolow, supra note 90, at 968.
176. Hepburn and Stern, supra note 76, at 264.
177. Stern has recognized the difficulty of providing sufficient over-allocation of allowances to developing countries. Stem, supra note 7, at 31.
178. See, e.g., id. at 28;
179. see also Garnaut, supra note 7, at 202-03;
180. Posner and Sunstein, Per Capita, supra note 18, at 52-53 (noting the importance of per capita analyses in climate negotiations);
181. Vandenbergh, supra note 22, at 916-17 (noting that "the 2050 target will require global per capita emissions to be far below current Chinese levels").
182. See, e.g., Pacala and Socolow, supra note 90, at 969 fig. 1 (identifying business-as-usual emissions projections for 2050.
183. Stern, supra note 7, at 29.
184. Id. at 7-9.
185. See id. at 28.
186. Id. at 4-5.
187. Dean Scott, China: Top Priority Remains Economic Growth, Not Curbing Emissions, Ambassador Says, 40 Env't Rep. (BNA) 326 (2009).
188. World Bank, Poverty Data: A Supplement to World Development Indicators 2008, at 19 tbl. S. 2 (2008), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ DATASTATISTICS/Resources/WDI08supplement 1216.pdf.
189. Posner and Sunstein have noted the importance of addressing the equity arguments of poor countries in efforts to induce them to enter into a post-Kyoto treaty with substantial, binding commitments.
190. See Posner and Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1608.
191. 119World Bank, supra note 117, at 19 tbl. S. 2.
192. We refer to China as a developing country in this Article, although we recognize that China and several other developing countries are rapidly industrializing. See, e.g., Stern, supra note 7, at 22 (discussing China as a part of the "developing world");
193. Posner & Sunstein, Per Capita, supra note 18, at 54 (noting that China, India, and Brazil are "developing countries that are, or will soon be, industrial powers"). The totals exclude emissions from land use and forestry, for which only data from 2000 are available and the reliability of the data is unclear. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change ("UNFCCC") has cautioned that "[p]arties reported difficulties in obtaining activity data for the time series needed for the LUCF sector, as requested by the IPCC methodology. National data on land use and forest cover were often outdated or not in a suitable format." UNFCCC, Subsidiary Body for Implementation, Sixth Compilation and Synthesis of Initial Communications from Parties Not Included in Annex I to the Convention, ¶ 87, U. N. Doc. FCCC/SBI/2005/18 (Oct. 25, 2005), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/ 2005/sbi/eng/18.pdf. Nevertheless, it is clear that Indonesia and Brazil accounted for a large share of global land-use carbon emissions.
194. See Richard Houghton, Data Note, Emissions (and Sinks) of Carbon from Land-Use Change 1 (Report to the World Resources Institute from the Woods Hole Research Center, 2003), available at http://cait.wri.org/downloads/DN-LUCF.pdf. For an analysis for major emitting countries
195. see Sunstein, supra note 3.
196. WRI-CAIT, supra note 16. The WRI-CAIT data include and rank the European Union ("EU") for comparison purposes. Since other EU member countries are ranked as well, we have removed the EU ranking and adjusted the rankings of the other countries to reflect this change.
197. See Energy Info. Admin., U. S. Dept of Energy, International Energy Outlook 2008, at 93 fig. 77 (Mexico), 94 fig. 79 (Asian countries) (2008). All data are country-specific, except for Indonesia, which reflects "Other Asia."
198. Int'l Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2008 Fact Sheet: Global Energy Trends (2008), available at http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/docs/weo2008/fact- sheets-08.pdf. As Posner and Sunstein note based on country-level GHG data, "[i]t should be clear, from these figures, why developing countries are most unlikely to be sympathetic to an approach that allocates emissions rights on the basis of existing emissions levels." Posner & Sunstein, Per Capita, supra note 18, at 61.
199. IPCC AR4 WG III, supra note 7, at 29 fig. TS. 2b.
200. 2 at a safe level without addressing emissions from the forest sector").
201. See Thomas Wiedmann et al., Examining the Global Environmental Impact of Regional Consumption Activities - Part 2: Review of Input-Output Models for the Assessment of Environmental Impacts Embodied in Trade, 61 Ecological Econ. 1, 15-16 (2007).
202. See Michael P. Vandenbergh & Anne C. Steinemann, The Carbon-Neutral Individual, 82 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1673, 1691-95 (2007);
203. 2);
204. 2 in its global warming effects).
205. See Stern, supra note 7, at 7.
206. See, e.g., Bosetti et al., supra note 4, at 6-7 (discussing cap and trade scheme without REDD).
207. World Bank, supra note 117, at 19-20 tbl. S. 2.
208. If global emissions must be reduced by 50% or more, the rest of the world would have to approach zero emissions just to allow these five developing countries, which currently emit nearly 30% of total emissions, to continue to emit at current levels, much less increase emissions to fuel economic growth. See WRI-CAIT, supra note 16.
209. On average, 420 lights, 102 color TVs, 64 washers, 59 fans, 44 DVD players, and 28 refrigerators were owned for every 100 households in China in 2005. He Yongxiu et al., Residential Load Forecast in China 688 tbl. 2 (2007) (Eighth International Power Engineering Conference), available at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/starnp. jsp?arnumber=4510114&isnumber= 4509990.
210. VIRGINIE E. LETSCHERT & MICHAEL A. McNeil, COPING WITH RESIDENTIAL ELECTRICITY Demand in India's Future 6 figs. 3 & 4 (2007), available at http://eetd.1bl.gov/ea/ies/iespubs/63199.pdf. A study of older data showed similar statistics, including those for lighting.
211. See Rangan Banerjee et al., Electricity Demand for Village Electrification 2 tbl. 1, 3 fig. 2 (proceedings of National Renewable Energy Conference, ITT Bombay, 2000), available at http://www.me.iitb.ac.in/~rangan/ publication/Papers-Proceedings/nrecpaper2.pdf.
212. Letschert & McNeil, supra note 133, at 6 fig. 3 (estimates from graph). Note that though adopting TVs before more utilitarian appliances may seem counterintuitive, this consumption pattern is common.
213. See Zhao Rong & Yang Yao, Public Service Provision and the Demand for Electric Appliances in Rural China, 14 China Econ. Rev. 131, 131 (2003);
214. see also Michael Sivak, Potential Energy Demand for Cooling in the 50 Largest Metropolitan Areas of the World: Implications for Developing Countries, 37 Energy Pol'y 1382, 1382-83 (2009) (noting that "increasing personal income is likely to lead to an unprecedented increase in energy demand in many developing countries. For example, the potential cooling demand in metropolitan Mumbai [a city with 18.2 million people] is about 24% of the demand for the entire United States").
215. 2 emissions from consumption in China
216. 2 emissions from urban households and other consumption have outpaced gains from efficiency).
217. World Bank, supra note 117, at 11 tbl. 3.
218. The total of 530 million households is based on population figures in World Bank, supra note 117. A regionally-weighted average family size of 4.84 was calculated using statistics for China, India, and parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, which represent the majority of populations living on less than $2 per day. The totals on a per-country basis include China, estimated median household size of 3.7, based on a 2002 average of rural and urban households.
219. Alberto Nogales, World Bank, China: Transport Sector Brief, at app. "Transport Sector Measures" (2004), available at http://www.worldbank. org/transport/transportresults/regions/eap/eap-china-output.pdf. India has an estimated median household size of 5.8, using "demographics of the poor."
220. Rinku Murgai & Martin Ravallion, Is a Guaranteed Living Wage a Good Anti-Poverty Policy? 13 (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, WPS 3640, 2005), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/extemal/default/ WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2005/06/16/000016406-20050616103635/Rendered/PDF/ wps3640.pdf. Zambia has an estimated median household size of 5.3 and was used as a substitute for much of sub-Saharan Africa.
221. World Bank, Report No. 32573-ZM, Zambia Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment 68 tbl. 3.1 (2007), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/ external/defaultAVDSContentServerAVDSP/IB/2007/10/04/000020439-20071004094458/ Rendered/PDF/325730ZM.pdf
222. 2 per MW) using data from Carbon Monitoring for Action ("CARMA"), http://carma.org/dig (last visited Apr. 26, 2009) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review). CARMA data were converted at a rate of 0.907 metric tons per short ton.
223. According to the EIA Emissions of Greenhouse Gases Report, electricity, as a subset of residential sector energy consumption, accounted for the emission of 903.7 metric tons of carbon dioxide in the United States in 2007.
224. Energy Info. Admin., Emissions of Greenhouse Gases Report (2008), http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/ggrpt/carbon.html#residential (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
225. 2 for the year 2000, which excludes land-use change. See WRI-CAIT, supra note 16.
226. Id.
227. Aldy & Stavins, supra note 2, at 1.
228. See, e.g., Lesley Wroughton, World Bank Approves Funds for Coal-Fired Power Plant, Reuters AlertNet, Apr. 8, 2008, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/ newsdesk/N08412737.htm (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review) (discussing International Finance Corporation ("IFC") funding of the Ultra Mega plant, and noting that it will be more efficient than many coal-fired power plants in India);
229. 2 per year, but that "[t]he I. F. C., along with the Asian Development Bank, Korea, and other backers, sees the need to bring electricity to one of the world's poorest regions as more pressing man limiting carbon dioxide from fuel burning").
230. In addition, if developing countries achieve poverty alleviation using the fossil-fuel intensive path taken by developed countries, when they turn to calculate the costs and benefits of making emissions reductions several decades down the road, the costs will be much higher than if the lock-in effects were minimized along the way.
231. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1602.
232. See, e.g., Sunita Narain, Editorial, The Right Right, Down to Earth, Apr. 15, 2009, available at http://www.downtoearth.org.in/editor.asp?foldemame= 20090415&filename=Editor&sec-id=2&sid=l (discussing subsidies for the Nano car and the need to reframe arguments about rights to modern transportation).
233. For example, according to the World Bank, if measures of poverty took into account the increase in food prices, global estimates in 2009 "might show a reversal of the steady decline in poverty rates of the previous few years." For many, the fall below poverty can be traced to changes in global food prices due to biofuel policies in the United States and Europe.
234. World Bank, World Bank Development Report 2010: Development in a Changing Climate: Concept Note 6 (2008).
235. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 Stan. L. Rev. (1985) (proposing a cap-and-trade approach for stationary air pollution sources).
236. See Leo Peskett et al., Poverty Environment Partnership Report: Making REDD Work for the Poor 5 (2008);
237. Arild Angelsen et al., Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD):An Options Assessment Report (2009), available at http://www.redd-oar.org/links/REDD-OAR-en.pdf;
238. Larry Lohmann, Carbon Trading: A Critical Conversation on Climate Change, Privatisation and Power, 48 Dev. Dialogue 5 (2006).
239. See generally Douglas A. Kysar & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Introduction: Climate Change and Consumption, 38 Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10, 825 (2008) (discussing the importance of examining the relationship between consumption and GHG emissions).
240. See, e.g., Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 127, at 1715-16 (discussing limits of price signals on individual environmentally significant behaviors).
241. See Vandenbergh, supra note 22, at 911, 945-46.
242. 2 emissions arise from production of goods for export);
243. 2 emissions from 1997 through 2003).
244. See, e.g., Mark A. Cohen & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Consumption, Happiness, and Climate Change, 38 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10, 834, 10, 835-37 (2008) (reviewing the happiness literature);
245. Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (1999) (discussing human capabilities). For a discussion of the multidimensionality of capability and its measurement
246. see Sabina Alkire & James Foster, Counting and Multidimensional Poverty Measurement (Oxford Poverty & Human Dev. Inst., Working Paper No. 7, 2008), available at http://www.ophi.org.uk/pubs/OPHI-WP7.pdf
247. The connections between formal and informal labor and well-being have been explored in a vast literature beginning in the 1980s. See Lourdes Benería & Gita Sen, Class and Gender Inequalities and Women's Role in Economic Development: Theoretical and Practical Implications, 8 Feminist Studies 157, 160-76 (1982);
248. Martha Chen et al., Progress of the World's Women 2005: Women, Work and Poverty ch. 4 (2005).
249. Sabina Alkire, Subjective Quantitative Studies of Human Agency, 74 Soc. Indicators Res. 217 (2005) (offering an empirical approach to the quantitative study of human agency).
250. See Cohen & Vandenbergh, supra note 154, at 10, 835-37.
251. The conception of well-being we use is amenable to estimating the monetary equivalence of changes in well-being that are conferred through non-market labor and consumption. For an example of efforts to improve measures of well-being, see Amartya Sen, Weil-Being, Agency and Freedom: The Dewey Lectures, 82 J. Phil. 169 (1985) (setting out the importance of attending to well-being and agency);
252. Sabina Alkire, Valuing Freedoms: Sen's Capability Approach and Poverty Reduction (2002) (offering an empirical approach to measuring capability). Our approach could accommodate these efforts but does not depend on them.
253. See Vandenbergh & Ackerly, supra note 1, at 75-76 (discussing domestic equity offsets);
254. Ackerly & Vandenbergh, supra note 1, at 565 (discussing a global role for equity offsets).
255. Katherine Hamilton et al., The Katoomba Group's Ecosystem Marketplace, Forging a Frontier: State of the Voluntary Carbon Markets 2008, at 7 (2008), available at http://ecosystemmarketplace.com/documents/cms-documents/2008- StateofVoluntaryCarbonMarket.4.pdf
256. Press Release, New Carbon Fin., Carbon up 84% in 2008 at $118b (Jan. 8, 2008) available at http://newcarbonfinance.com/download.php?n=20090108- PR-Carbon-Markets-Q42008.pdf&f=fileName&t=NCF-downloads.
257. Total is based on 2005, the most recent year with complete data. WRI-CAIT, supra note 16.
258. See Hamilton et al., supra note 160, at 26 tbl. 2.
259. Id. The total includes $72.4 million CCX and $258.4 million OTC.
260. Id. Preliminary data indicate that transactions in the voluntary market rose to $499 million in 2008. Press Release, New Carbon Fin., supra note 161.
261. Of the 42.1 MMtCO 2eq of credits traded on the OTC market in 2007, respondents were only able to confirm that 10.7 MMtCO2eq were directly destined for retirement. Hamilton et al., supra note 160, at 6.
262. See id. at 29. Prices for carbon credits vary significantly based on the source of emission reduction (e.g. forestation, methane capture, energy efficiency), the standard the credit is based on (e.g. CDM VER, VCS, etc.), as well as normal supply/demand dynamics. A participant's position in the supply chain (e.g. developer, wholesaler, broker, trader, final buyer) also affects a credit's selling price.
263. See, e.g., U. S. Gov't Accountability Office, Carbon Offsets: The U. S. Market is Growing, but Quality Assurance Poses Challenges for Market Participants (2008) (report to congressional requesters), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d081048.pdf
264. Hamilton et al., supra note 160, at 52 fig. 22.
265. The Gold Standard, Annexes to Toolkit, Annex A (2008) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
266. Social Carbon, How it Works, http://www.socialcarbon.com/en/?page=How-It- Works (last visited Apr. 16, 2009) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
267. Id.
268. New Carbon Fin., Voluntary Carbon Index (VCI) 2 (2008), available at http://newcarbonfinance.com/download.php?n=NCF-NA-VoluntaryCarbonIndex-2008-082. pdf&f=FileName&t=NCF-downloads.
269. Id. (noting "demand from pre-compliance buyers willing to pay above average prices").
270. See Brooke A. Ackerly, Feminist Theory, Global Gender Justice, and the Evaluation of Grant-Making, 37 Phil. Topics 2, pts. I & II (forthcoming 2009) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review)
271. Anja Kollmuss et al., Making Sense of the Voluntary Carbon Market: A Comparison of Carbon Offset Standards (2008), available at http://assets.panda. org/downloads/vcm-report-final.pdf
272. See Ackerly, supra note 173 (manuscript at 7-8).
273. One such scenario would create a social justice credit by comparing improvements to targets established by the Millennium Development Goals ("MDG"). See United Nations, Millennium Development Goals 2015, http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/(last visited Apr. 26, 2009) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review). For example, if the EMO funds are transferred in the form of a loan to a woman, as is common in microfinance, it could receive direct recognition for its contribution to the MDG of gender equity.
274. Mark M. Pitt et al., Empowering Women with Micro Finance: Evidence from Bangladesh, 54 Econ. Dev. & Cultural Change 791 (2006);
275. MDG Monitor, Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women, http://www.mdgmonitor.org/goal3.cfm (last visited Apr. 26, 2009) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review) (referring to share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector).
276. The Consultative Group to Assist the Poor ("CGAP"), The Poverty Audit 8 (2003), available at http://www2.ids.ac.uk/impact/files/reviews/CGAP- poverty-audit.pdf
277. see also CGAP, Advancing Financial Access for the World's Poor, http://www.cgap.org/(last visited Apr. 15, 2009) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review). For additional information about social performance assessment tools
278. see The Microfinance Gateway, MicroFinance Initiatives, Social Performance Assessment Tools, http://www.microfinancegate way.com/resource- centers/socialperformance/article/35397 (last visited April 15, 2009) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
279. See United Nations, supra note 176;
280. G. A. Res 60/1, U. N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005) (resolution revising the eight MDGs);
281. MDG, Official List of MDG Indicators, http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Host. aspx?Content=Indicators/OfficialList.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2009) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review) (noting that MDG goals are to (1) eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; (2) achieve universal primary education; (3) promote gender equality and empower women; (4) reduce child mortality; (5) improve maternal health; (6) combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; (7) ensure environmental sustainability; and (8) develop global partnership for development).
282. For data by series, see MDG Indicators, Data Availability by Series and MDG Region, http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Data Availability.aspx (last visited Apr. 15, 2009) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review). The indicators of the poverty goal do not focus on raising overall GDP per capita, but rather on raising the well-being of the least well off.
283. The Converging World is an NGO that uses donations to finance wind turbines. Those turbines are used to generate revenue via the sale of electricity and carbon credits, and the profits are donated to the charity Social Change and Development, which applies the funds toward education, health, and environmental projects in the developing world. The Converging World, About Us, http://www.theconvergingworld.org/document-1.aspx?id=0:37374 (last visited Apr. 15, 2009) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
284. See Vandenbergh & Ackerly, supra note 1, at 68-69;
285. 2 eq, amounting to less than $30/house/year) and must be combined with other funding sources.
286. See Vandenbergh & Ackerly, supra note 1, at 14 & n. 59.
287. Deutsche Bank Research, Microfinance: An Emerging Investment Opportunity 7, 18 (2007), available at http://www.dbresearch.de/PROD/CIB-INTERNET-EN-PROD/ PROD0000000000219174.PDF
288. Robert Cull et al., Microfinance Meets the Market 34 tbl. 4 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 4630, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/ abstract=1149133.
289. See discussion supra note 177.
290. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (noting that increasing income in poor populations in India and China leads to increasing appliance and electricity usage);
291. see also Shahidur R. Khandker, Microfinance and Poverty: Evidence Using Panel Data from Bangladesh, 19 World Bank Econ. Rev. 263, 266 (2005) (noting that "[i]ncome or consumption poverty can be reduced through interventions such as microfinance that help the poor become self-employed and generate income").
292. See Kollmuss et al., supra note 174, at 22.
293. ICS distribution has been helped by both carbon finance and microfinance. See, e.g., Climatecare, Uganda Efficient Stoves, http://www. jpmorganclimatecare.com/projects/countries/Uganda-efficient-stoves/(last visited Apr. 19, 2009) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review) (noting role of voluntary carbon finance and microfinance in ICS distribution). A Gold Standard Methodology has been established for carbon credits based on ICS.
294. See Gold Standard Foundation, Methodology for Improved Cook-Stoves and Kitchen Regimes V. 01, http://www.cdmgoldstandard.org/uploads/file/V01%2010-05- 08%20GS%20 Cook-stove%20Methodology.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2009) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
295. See Ramanathan & Carmichael, supra note 127, at 221-22;
296. see also Rosenthal, supra note 127, at A1, A12 (noting that according to Stanford professor Mark S. Jacobson, it is "bizarre" that black carbon is not a part of proposed policy architectures);
297. JP Morgan, ClimateCare, Uganda Efficient Wood Cook Stoves (n. d.), available at http://www.jpmorganclimatecare.com/media/documents/pdf/PIN-Uganda- 0015B-Wood%20Stoves.pdf (noting project that "involves the dissemination of efficient wood cook stoves to institutions and families in and around Kampala, Uganda").
298. See Min Bikram Malla et al., Presentation to the 136th Annual Meeting and Expo of the American Public Health Association: Climate Change, Cook Stoves, and Coughs & Colds: Evidence from Rural Nepal on Thinking Global, and Acting Local (Oct. 29, 2008), available at http://apha.confex.com/apha/136am/ techprogram/paper-185626.htm (reporting that implementing ICS technology led to reductions in PM concentration (10 to 70%), acute respiratory illnesses (10 to 30%), medical costs (10 to 50%), cooking and collection time (20%), fuelwood consumption (25%), and GHG emissions (25%));
299. see also M. I. Howells et al., A Model of Household Energy Services in a Low-Income Rural African Village, 33 Energy Pol'y 1833 (2005).
300. Initial activity in this area has already begun. See ClimateCare, supra note 187.
301. IPCC AR4 WG I, supra note 7, at 212 tbl. 2.14.
302. See Guozhu Li et al., Assessment of Environmental and Economic Costs of Rural Household Energy Consumption in Loess Hilly Region, Gansu Province, China, 34 Renewable Energy 1438, 1441 (2009).
303. See Elizabeth Israel et al., Note from India: Greening Microfinance to Turn Waste Into Wealth, http://www.microlinks.org/ev-en. php?ID=28405- 201&ID2=DO-TOPIC (last visited Apr. 19, 2009) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review);
304. see also Sunderasan Srinivasan, Positive Externalities of Domestic Biogas Initiatives: Implications for Financing, 12 Renewable & Sustainable Energy Revs. 1476, 1478 (2008).
305. The Gold Standard Found., Indicative Programme, Baseline, and Monitoring Methodology for Small Scale Biodigester: Voluntary Gold Standard (2007), available at http://www.cdmgoldstandard.org/uploads/file/ GS%20biodigester%20methodology%20301007%20Final.pdf
306. For a discussion of the relationship between private and public environmental governance, see Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 543, 551-56 (2000);
307. Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 2029, 2037-41 (2005). A recent example of a movement of a climate governance regime from the private to the public arena is the regulatory adoption by states of reporting protocols established by the California Climate Action Registry, a private non-profit organization.
308. See Carbon Positive, CCAR Forest Protocol, http://www.carbonpositive.net/ viewarticle.aspx?articleID=1367 (last visited Apr. 26, 2009) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
309. Not surprisingly, a recent comparison of economic agreement structures concludes that distributional justice issues, as measured by income distribution across regions, improves when REDD is added to cap-and-trade, as does efficiency. Bosetti et al., supra note 4, at 15 (noting that "the inclusion of avoided deforestation among the mitigation options leads to an improvement in the distribution of income across regions"). Our proposal incorporates REDD concepts, but it goes beyond REDD to include households and small businesses even when their carbon impact is not associated with deforestation or land use.
310. To change the amount of well-being produced by any GHG-emitting behavior, we need other transformations: economic, financial, infrastructural, and political. See World Bank, supra note 147, for emphasis on "political economy considerations and the role of institutions and governance since these issues are more often than not the binding constraints to progress."
311. See, e.g., Peskett et al., supra note 149 (reviewing the range of transformational impacts of programs for reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation);
312. Ctr. for Org. Research & Educ., Provisional Agenda Item 3: Special Theme: Climate Change, Bio-Cultural Diversity and Livelihoods: The Stewardship Role of Indigenous Peoples and New Challenges 2 (2008), available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/E-C19-2008-CRP-5.pdf
313. Michael Johnson et al., Quantification of Carbon Savings from Improved Biomass Cookstove Projects, 43 Envtl. Sci. Tech. 2456, 2456 (2009);
314. see also Solar Cookers International, Where Solar Cook?, http://solarcookers.org/basics/where.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2009) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review). These initiatives can also be targeted at people who are in or near poverty in the developed world as well. Vandenbergh & Ackerly, supra note 1, at 61-62.
315. Solar Cookers International, Why Solar Cook?, http://solarcookers.org/ basics/why.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2009) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
316. See discussion supra notes 120-29 and accompanying text (discussing projected emissions growth in developing countries).
317. See Solar Cookers International, supra note 199 (listing twenty nations with highest solar cooking potential, including India, China, and Brazil).
318. Id.
319. See Johnson et al., supra note 199, at 2456;
320. see also JP Morgan, supra note 188.
321. In 2002 3.5 million people died as a result of water-related diseases, making waterborne diseases a leading health concern. A. Prüss- Üstün et al., World Health Org., Safer Water, Better Health: Costs, Benefits and Sustainability of Interventions to Protect and Promote Health 12 (2008), available at http://www.who.int/water-sanitation-health/publications/ safer-water/en/;
322. Annette Pruss et al., Estimating the Burden of Disease from Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene at a Global Level, 110 Envtl. Health Persp. 537 (2002).
323. Ctr. for Sci. & Env't, CSE Draft Dossier on Health and Environment: Vulnerable Groups 15-20 (draft for conference, Mar. 24-25, 2006), available at http://www.cseindia.org/programme/health/pdf/conf2006/b 1 women.pdf
324. See Mieko Nishimizu, Energy, Health, and Gender - Thinking Differently About What We Do, Keynote Speech at the Regional Workshop on Household Energy, Indoor Health Pollution and Health, New Delhi, India (May 9, 2002), available at http://www.cleanairnet.org/caiasia/1412/articles-35922-recurso-1.pdf (discussing a range of health and environmental hazards of development including head-loading);
325. Jerome Nriagu et al., Environmental Risks and Disease Burdens in Developing Countries, in Environmental Health: From Global to Local 310 (Howard Frumkin ed., 2005).
326. See, e.g., Green Belt Movement, Green Belt Movement/World Bank Biocarbon Project. Description of Green Belt Movement's Carbon Credit Project (2006), available at http://www.greenbeltmovement.org/a.php?id=197 (providing description of the project).
327. For descriptions of similar projects, see The Equilibrium Fund, Reforestation, Food Forests and Carbon Offsets (2007), available at http://www.theequilibriumfund.org/page.cfm?pageid=5494;
328. Joshi Gopa, The Chipko Movement and Women (Sept. ed. 1982), available at http://www.pucl.org/from-archives/Gender/chipko.htm.
329. For other programs and models, see Lorena Aguilar et al., Reforestation, Afforestation, Deforestation, Climate Change and Gender (2007);
330. Boyd, supra note 125, at 4-9.
331. See Press Release, World Bank, World Bank & Greenbelt Movement Project to Reforest Regions of Kenya (Nov. 15, 2006), available at http://www.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0.contentMDK:21133046~pagePK: 34370-piPK:34424-theSitePK:4607.00.html;
332. Frederick Najau & Irene Muthuka, Kenya Green Belt Movement Reforestation Project BIOCF Project (2008), available at http://www.whrc.org/ Africa/assets/NjauandMuthuka-GBM%20Reforestation%20CDM%20Project.pdf
333. Jason McKenney, Artificial Fertility: The Environmental Costs of Industrial Fertilizers, in Fatal Harvest: The Tragedy of Industrial Agriculture 239 (Andrew Kimbrell ed., 2002) ("The production of nitrogenous fertilizers consumes more energy than any other aspect of the agricultural process."). In addition, as Tilman et al. anticipate, Should past dependences of the global environmental impacts of agriculture on human population and consumption continue, 109 hectares of natural ecosystems would be converted to agriculture by 2050. This would be accompanied by 2.4- to 2.7-fold increases in nitrogen- and phosphorus-driven eutrophication of terrestrial, freshwater, and near-shore marine ecosystems, and comparable increases in pesticide use. This eutrophication and habitat destruction would cause unprecedented ecosystem simplification, loss of ecosystem services, and species extinctions.
334. David Tilman et al., Forecasting Agriculturally Driven Global Environmental Change, 292 Science 281, 281 (2001).
335. For examples of organic and integrated agriculture, see descriptions of projects in Vietnam, Heifer International, http://www.heifer.org/site/c. edJRKQNiFiG/b.201470/(last visited Apr. 26, 2009) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review);
336. in India, Navdanya, http://www.navdanya.org/(last visited Apr. 26, 2009) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
337. Nadia El-Hage Scialabba, Conference on Organic Agriculture and Food Security, Oslo, Norway, Can Africa Feed Itself? Organic Agriculture and Food Security in Africa 5 (June 6-8, 2007).
338. See id. (concluding that "[r]ecent models of a hypothetical global food supply grown organically indicates that organic agriculture could produce enough food on a global per capita basis for the current world population: 2640 and 4380 kcal/person/day, depending on the model used" (citations omitted) (emphasis in original)).
339. For example, benefits may arise from increased consumption of fruits and vegetables and reduced exposure of farmers to pesticides.