Taking a hard look at agency science: Can the courts ever succeed?

Ecology Law Quarterly

Volumn 36, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 317-354

  Clark, Sara A ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 69249244283     PISSN: 00461121     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (260)

1. Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 988 (9th Cir. 2008).
2. Hat 981.
3. See. e.g, Or. Natural Res. Council Fund v. Goodman, 505 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 2007);
4. Lands Council v. Martin, 479 F.3d 636 (9th Cir. 2007)
5. Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 442 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2006);
6. Ecology Ctr. v. Austin, 430 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2005);
7. Lands Council v. Powell, 379 F.3d 738 (9th Cir. 2004); Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 351 F.3d 1291 (9th Cir. 2003);
8. Idaho Sporting Cong. v. Rittenhouse, 305 F.3d 957,970 (9th Cir. 2002).
9. See, e.g., National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1604(b) (2006) (requiring the use of a "systematic interdisciplinary approach to achieve integrated consideration of physical, biological, economic and other science").
10. See infra Part II.
11. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(b).
12. Throughout this Note, I use the term "policy judgment" or "policy decision" broadly. Following Wendy Wagner, the term is used here to include virtually every type of decision that is not based on the results of one or more experiments in the natural sciences. 'Policy' considerations thus include not only the reasoned weighing of various economic and social outcomes, but also could include the conscious or subconscious biases, guesses, and intuition of decisionmakers. Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1622 n.28 (1995);
13. see also Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions under the Endangered Species Act: Why Better Science Isn't Always Better Policy, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029, 1064 (1997) ("Scientific information is also distinct from value or policy judgments, which are determined by the preferences and ethical beliefs of the individual. Information is scientific only if its validity does not depend on the individual preferences of the beholder, that is only if it is supportable in theory if not in fact by universally repeatable observations.").
14. See Wagner, supra note 7, at 1617.
15. For an excellent overview, see CHARLES F. WILKINSON & H. MICHAEL ANDERSON, LAND AND RESOURCE PLANNING IN THE NATIONAL FORESTS 296 (1987).
16. -26 Stat. 1103 (1891) (Congress passed an amendment to the General Revision Act that authorized the president to "set part and reserve, in any State or territory ... any part of the public land wholly or in part covered with timber and undergrowth.").
17. See GERALD W. WILLIAMS, THE FOREST SERVICE: FIGHTING FOR PUBLIC LANDS 10 (2007).
18. See Forest Service Organic Act of 1897, ch. 2, 30 Stat. 34 (1897) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 475 (2006)).
19. See also DENNIS C. LE MASTER, DECADE OF CHANGE: THE REMAKING OF FOREST SERVICE STATUTORY AUTHORITY DURING THE 1970s 4 (1984).
20. Pub. L. No. 86-517, 74 Stat. 215 (1960) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § § 528-31 (2006)).
21. See also WILKINSON, supra note 9, at 29-30.
22. See 16 U.S.C. § 528 (2006).
23. Erin Madden, Seeing the Science for the Trees: Employing Daubert Standards to Assess the Adequacy of National Forest Management Under the National Forest Management Act, 18 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 321, 325 (2003) (citing H.R. REP. No. 86-1551 (1960), as reprinted in 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2377, 2380).
24. See 16 U.S.C. § 531(a) (2006).
25. Timber sales increased from 9.4 billion board feet in 1959 to 13.4 billion board feet in 1970. Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 41 (citing U.S FOREST SERVICE, 1970-71 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CHIEF 20(1972)).
26. WILKINSON, supra note 9, at 119, 141-42 (citing "Clear-cutting" Practice on National Tim- berlands: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands of the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971)).
27. Id.
28. Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (1976) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1600-14 (2006)).
29. Other environmental statutes enacted in the 1970s also require natural resource management based in science. For example, the Endangered Species Act of 1973 requires that listing decisions be made solely on the basis of "best scientific and commercial data available." 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (2006).
30. See Madden, supra note 15, at 330 ("The mandated use of an interdisciplinary scientific approach to forest management is one of the strongest examples of Congress's attempt to regulate Forest Service discretion.");
31. WILKINSON, supra note 9, at 155-58 (noting that the congressional intent in enacting NFMA was to rein in some of the discretion previously granted to the Forest Service).
32. -16 U.S.C. § 1604(b) (2006).
33. See Federico Cheever, Four Failed Forest Standards: What We Can Learn from the History of the National Forest Management Act's Substantive Timber Management Provisions, 77 OR. L. REV. 601,634-35(1998).
34. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(h).
35. -16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B). See Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 988-994 (9th Cir. 2008).
36. See Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d at 987.
37. WILKINSON, supra note 9, at 296.
38. George Hoberg, Science, Politics, and U.S. Forest Service Law: The Battle over the Forest Service Planning Rule, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 6 (2004) (quoting Arthur Cooper, Writing the Regulations: Using Scientists to Link Law and Policy 68 (1996) (unpublished manuscript)).
39. To protect biodiversity, the 1982 regulations required the Forest Service to assess the impact of actions on Management Indicator Species (MIS), believing that population changes to MIS would provide a gauge on other species as well. See 36 C.F.R. § 219.19(a);
40. Andrew Orlemann, Do the Proposed Forest Service Regulations Protect Biodiversity? An Analysis of the Continuing Viability of "Habitat Viability Analysis, " 20 J. land resources & envtl. L. 357, 361 (2000). In 2000, the Clinton Administration revised the regulations to incorporate ecosystem science, but generally removed requirements that specific populations be monitored.
41. See id. at 382 (citing 64 Fed. Reg. 54,104 § 219.20(a)(8)(i)). In 2005, the Bush administration further gutted the monitoring requirements, requiring only that the Forest Service maintain biological diversity at the ecosystem level, taking into account the "best available science." See National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning, 36 C.F.R. § 219 (2008). For a review of the 2008 regulations, see Katy Lum, In Brief, In One Acorn: The Fate of the 2008 NFMA Planning Rule under the Obama Administration, 36 ecology L.Q. 605 (2009).
42. See, e.g., Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do: How to Deal with the Dysfunctions of Multiple- Goal Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2009); Michael C. Blumm, Public Choice Theory and the Public Lands: Why "Multiple Use" Failed, 18 harv. envtl. L. Rev. 405, 412-15 (1994).
43. See 16 U.S.C. 1604(g) (2006).
44. RANDAL O'TOOLE, REFORMING THE FOREST SERVICE (1988).
45. Id. at 11.
46. Wat 27.
47. Id. at 104-07.
48. Cf. id. at 224-27 (discussing the impacts to jobs and local economies that reform would cause).
49. Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 442 F.3d 1147,1178 (9th Cir. 2006).
50. Biber, supra note 31, at 4.
51. See id. at 18.
52. See id. at 11.
53. This inability stems from the difficulty of scientifically assessing whether biodiversity has been adequately protected, the time lag between harm or benefit to a species and our ability to measure those changes, and the influence of third parties, such as adjacent landowners or far-off polluters, on species survival. See id. at 18-19.
54. See Blumm, supra note 31, at 415. Public choice theory takes a critical view of public policymaking in a democracy, asserting that "legislators are self-serving individuals whose chief interest is not the fostering of the public's interests, but rather of their own reelection."
55. Id. at 415-16. The special interest groups that can help legislators get reelected are more likely to win in the policy-making process, rather than the general public.
56. See id. at 415.
57. Id. at 407 (citing DANIEL a. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: a CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991)).
58. Id. at 415.
59. Hanna J. Conner & Dennis L. Schweitzer, Institutional Limits and Legal Implications of Quantitative Models in Forest Planning, 13 envtl. L. 493,499 (1983).
60. See HERBERT KAUFMAN, THE FOREST RANGER: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR (spec, reprint ed. 2006).
61. see CHARLES f. WLLKENSEN, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER AND THE FUTURE OF THE WEST 168-69 (1992).
62. See, e.g., Or. Natural Res. Council Fund v. Goodman, 505 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 2007); Lands Council v. Martin, 479 F.3d 636, 641-43 (9th Cir. 2007);
63. Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 442 F.3d 1147, 1175 (9th Cir. 2006);
64. Native Ecosystems Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 428 F.3d 1233, 1250 (9th Cir. 2005);
65. Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 351 F.3d 1291, 1304 (9th Cir. 2003);
66. Idaho Sporting Cong. v. Rittenhouse, 305 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2002);
67. Idaho Sporting Cong. v. Thomas, 137 F.3d 1146, 1154 (9th Cir. 1998);
68. Inland Empire Pub. Lands Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 88 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 1996);
69. Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 1995).
70. -323 U.S. 135, 140 (1994) (holding that a statutory interpretation by an agency official was "entitled to respect"). The justifications that underpin deference afforded to agencies in interpreting their own statutes are established in Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (noting both agency expertise and political accountability). These justifications are also given for deference to agency decision making when applying their own regulations as well. In timber sales such as those in Lands Council v. McNair, the decision is primarily quasi-adjudicative, given that the Forest Service makes site- specific determinations. The agency is supposed to apply facts to rules set out by federal statutes, Forest Service regulations, and forest-specific plans. Deference in quasi-adjudicative settings is still given, so long as the agency does not obviously act counter to these specific rules, because the agency is interpreting the application of its own regulations and statutes.
71. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 457 (1997). Because many of the rules established to protect biodiversity are vague and general, the Forest Service retains significant deference even in the quasi-adjudicative stage.
72. Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. at 865.
73. See, e.g., Colorado Envtl. Coal. v. Dombeck, 185 F.3d 1162, 1170 (10th Cir. 1999);
74. Friends of Boundary Waters Wilderness v. Dombeck, 164 F.3d 1115, 1130 (8th Cir. 1999);
75. Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep't Agric, 116 F.3d 1482 (7th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision); Inland Empire, 88 F.3d at 760.
76. See Marsh v. Oregon Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 (1989) (noting that judges must defer to agencies when the dispute involves a high level of expertise).
77. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,43 (1983).
78. Baltimore Gas and Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983).
79. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006) ("The reviewing court shall ... (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.").
80. See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390,410 n.21 (1976) ("The only role for a court is to insure that the agency has taken a 'hard look' at environmental consequences ....") (quoting Natural Res. Def. Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
81. See, e.g., Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1701 etseq. (2006);
82. National Environmental Policy Act, 42. U.S.C. § 4321-t347 (2006); 33 U.S.C. § 1251 etseq. (2006); Clean Air Act of 1970, Pub. L. N. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676-1713 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § § 7401-7671(q)).
83. -5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
84. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,416 (1971).
85. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,43 (1983).
86. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1,36 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
87. -42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (2006).
88. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976) (quoting Natural Res. Def. Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
89. These challenges, however, focus on the procedures required by NEPA.
90. See, e.g., Marsh v. Oregon Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 375-77 (1989).
91. -40 C.F.R. § 1500.1 (b) (2008).
92. Patricia Smith King, Applying Daubert to the "Hard Look" Requirement of NEPA: Scientific Evidence before the Forest Service in Sierra Club v. Marita, 2 Wis. envtl. l.J. 147, 156 (1995).
93. Doremus, Listing Decisions, supra note 7, at 1038.
94. See Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 995 (9th Cir. 2008).
95. See id. at 995-997.
96. Wagner, supra note 7, at 1617.
97. See WILKINSON, supra note 9, at 19-29.
98. Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Science, Judgment, and Controversy in Natural Resource Regulation, 26 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 1, 6 (2005).
99. See Doremus, Listing Decisions, supra note 7, at 1069 (discussing biology generally).
100. See Cortner, supra note 46, at 497 (pointing out that the Forest Service planning regulations require more data than the Forest Service has available).
101. Wagner, supra note 7, at 1619 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Alvin m. Weinberg, Science and Trans-Science, 10 MINERVA 209, 209 (1972)).
102. -16 U.S.C. § 1531(c)(1) (2006).
103. Ann Clarke, Seeing Clearly: Making Decisions under Conditions of Scientific Controversy and Incomplete and Uncertain Scientific Information, 46 NAT. RESOURCES j. 571, 598 (2006).
104. See Wagner, supra note 7, at 1627.
105. Id.
106. Madden, supra note 15, at 345.
107. See Conner, supra note 46, at 495.
108. -16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B) (2006).
109. U.S. FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC, FOREST PLAN: IDAHO PANHANDLE NATIONAL FORESTS 11-28 (1987), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/ipnf/eco/manage/forestplan/.
110. In prior cases questioning the habitat proxy-on-proxy approach, plaintiffs also challenged the habitat proxy-on-proxy methodology as inconsistent with 36 C.F.R. § 219.19 (2000), which required the Forest Service to manage wildlife habitat "to maintain viable populations of existing ... species" and to designate management indicator species to monitor and evaluate wildlife viability.
111. See Indiana Forest Alliance v. U.S. Forest Serv., 325 F.3d 851 (7th Cir. 2003);
112. Sierra Club v. Martin, 168 F.3d 1 (11th Cir. 1999);
113. Inland Empire Pub. Lands Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 88 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 1996). Challenges under this regulation resulted in the circuit split referenced supra note 123. Section 219.19 is no longer in effect.
114. See Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 451 F.3d 1005, 1017 n.8 (9th Cir. 2006). While 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(b) (2008), which requires the Forest Service to "provid[e] appropriate ecological conditions to support diversity of native . . . animal species," is related, it does not provide any additional regulation beyond the Forest Plan.
115. See Robert L. Glicksman, Bridging Data Gaps through Modeling and Evaluation of Surrogates: Use of the Best Available Science to Protect Biological Diversity under the National Forest Management Act, 83 Ind. L.J. 465,497 (2008).
116. Id. at 495.
117. Id. For example, the 1982 Forest Service regulations required the agency to identify management indicator species that were representative of the health of the ecosystem as a whole. See 36 C.F.R. § 219.19(a)(1) (2000) (no longer in effect).
118. See Glicksman, supra note 86, at 496.
119. See id. at 497.
120. Greg D. Corbin, The United States Forest Service's Response to Biodiversity Science, 29 Envtl.L. 377,397(1999).
121. Id. at 496-97.
122. See, e.g., JOSHUA J. MLLLSPAUGH & FRANK R. THOMPSON, III, MODELS FOR PLANNING WILDLIFE CONSERVATION IN LARGE LANDSCAPES 58 (2008) (noting that with each proxy step, a habitat model's accuracy declines, rendering habitat proxy-on-proxy approaches insufficient for effective mul- tispecies conservation);
123. Corbin, supra note 91, at 397, 401 (noting that "extrapolation from environmental effects on one species to an entire community or ecosystem," the first level of proxy, "raises serious questions of uncertainty" and that the Forest Service's methodology "violates the most basic understanding that to determine population viability of individual species requires data on the population's status.");
124. R. Edward Grumbine, Viable Populations, Reserve Size, and Federal Lands Management: A Critique, 4 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 127-29 (1990) (noting that models that designate a minimum habitat quantity to maintain species viability, the second level of proxy, often do not adequately take into account uncertainty, and that this inadequacy leads to higher extinction probabilities within shorter time frames than expected).
125. Glicksman, supra note 86, at 466 (emphasis added).
126. See supra note 103 (case holding that Congress has delegated policy-making authority to the Forest Service).
127. See e.g., Idaho Sporting Congress v. Thomas, 137 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir 1998); Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Moseley, 80 F.3d 1401 (9th Cir. 1996);
128. Inland Empire Public Lands Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 88 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 1996).
129. Rebecca Smith, Lands Council v. Powell and the Ninth Circuit's Refusal to Blindly Defer to Unreliable Forest Service Science, 28 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 65, 68 (2007) (citing Ecology Ctr. v. Austin, 430 F.3d 1057, 1061-71 (9th Cir. 2005) and Earth Island v. U.S. Forest Serv., 442 F.3d 1147, 1159-76 (9th Cir. 2006)).
130. Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 1995).
131. Hat 610.
132. See id. at 618.
133. Hat 620.
134. Hat 621.
135. See id. ("And to the extent the Service's final choice did not promote 'natural diversity' above all else, the Service acted well within its regulatory discretion.
136. See Sierra Club v. Espy, 38 F.3d 795, 800 (5th Cir. 1994) ('That [NFMA diversity] protection means something less than the preservation of the status quo but something more than eradication of species suggests that this is just the type of policy oriented decision Congress wisely left to the discretion of the experts-here, the Forest Service.')" (emphasis added)).
137. -88F.3d754 (9th Cir. 1996).
138. The technique contested in Inland Empire is known as "habitat proxy-on-proxy" or "habitat viability analysis."
139. Id. at 759.
140. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
141. Inland Empire, 88 F.3d at 761.
142. Id. at 760.
143. See, e.g., Native Ecosystems Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 428 F.3d 1233, 1250 (9th Cir. 2005) ("Our case law permits the Forest Service to meet the wildlife species viability requirements by preserving habitat") (citing Idaho Sporting Cong. v. Thomas, 137 F.3d 1146, 1154 (9th Cir. 1998));
144. Indiana Forest Alliance v. U.S. Forest Serv., 325 F.3d 851, 863 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding Forest Service decision based on habitat availability data, rather than "going into the field and actually counting all of the birds.");
145. Idaho Sporting Cong., 137 F.3d at 1154 ("So like Inland Empire, the LMP issue at state is one of scientific methodology, i.e., how best to track trout populations. Therefore, as in Inland Empire, we find that the Forest Service's decision to use habitat as a proxy for fish populations was not arbitrary and capricious." (internal citations omitted)).
146. Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491, 508 (1992).
147. See, e.g., Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 351 F.3d 1291 (9th Cir. 2003).
148. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Martin, 168 F.3d 1 (11 th Cir. 1999).
149. See, e.g, Ecology Ctr. v. Austin, 430 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 1999).
150. See, e.g., Or. Natural Res. Council Fund v. Goodman, 505 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 2007).
151. -16 U.S.C. § 1604(a) (2006).
152. Id. § 1604(i).
153. See, e.g., Or. Natural Res. Council Fund, 505 F.3d at 891 (9th Cir. 2007) ("[G]iven the dearth of information about the local fisher population generally and the Forest Service's failure to explain adequately how it identified suitable fisher habitat, we hold that the Forest Service's habitat analysis was insufficient to satisfy the demands of the Rogue River LRMP Biological Evaluation process, and is in violation of the NFMA.");
154. Lands Council v. Martin, 479 F.3d 636, 641-43 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that an interpretation of "live" trees to exclude dying, as well as dead, trees violated the Forest Plan requirement to maintain all live trees);
155. Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 351 F.3d 1291, 1304 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[W]e cannot agree that the Forest Service complied with the forest plan when it ignored the confirmed presences of owls and de-listed PAC075.");
156. Idaho Sporting Cong. v. Rittenhouse, 305 F.3d 957, 970 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[W]e hold that the Forest Service failed to comply with the Forest Plan standard for maintaining the viability of old growth dependent species because the Forest Service failed to re- dedicate acres of old growth lost to fire and failed to take adequate steps to insure that compartments identified as containing dedicated old growth do, in fact, contain it.").
157. Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 442 F.3d 1147, 1173-1175 (9th Cir. 2006).
158. Mat 1175.
159. See id. at 1176.
160. Sierra Club v. Martin, 168 F.3d 1, 6-7 (11 th Cir. 1999).
161. Id. at 6. 36 C.F.R. § 219.19 was subsequently omitted from the regulations when the Bush Administration revised them in 2002,
162. see Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 451 F.3d 1005, 1017 n.8 (9th Cir. 2006), and is not at issue in Lands Council v. McNair.
163. See id. at 6-7. Other courts, however, interpreted section 219.19 more broadly, leading to a circuit split on this issue. Compare Inland Empire Pub. Lands Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 88 F.3d 754, 761 (9th Cir. 1996) and Indiana Forest Alliance v. U.S. Forest Serv., 325 F.3d 851, 863 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding the use of habitat proxy-on-proxy approaches under section 219.19) with Utah Envtl. Cong, v. Bosworth, 372 F.3d 1219, 1225-26 (10th Cir. 2004) (rejecting the use of habitat proxy-on-proxy approaches under section 219.19).
164. Sierra Club v. Martin, 168 F.3d at 7.
165. Or. Natural Res. Council Fund v. Goodman, 505 F.3d 884, 892 (9th Cir. 2007).
166. Id. at 892.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. -430 F.3d 1057,1067 (9th Cir. 2005).
170. See Lands Council v. Powell, 379 F.3d 738, 749-50 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that failure to disclose known shortcomings of a model violated NEPA), amended by 395 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2005).
171. Id.
172. See, e.g., Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 442 F.3d 1147, 1166-67 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the Forest Service abused its discretion by using methodology that relied on misunderstood or concealed data).
173. Idaho Sporting Cong. v. Rittenhouse, 305 F.3d 957,972 (9th Cir. 2002).
174. Hat 972-73.
175. Lands Council v. Powell, 379 F.3d at 752.
176. Id.
177. Ecology Ctr. v. Austin, 430 F.3d 1057, 1064 (9th Cir. 2005).
178. Id. at 1064-65 (quoting Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989)).
179. Id. at 1065.
180. Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
181. Ecology Ctr. v. Austin, 430 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2005), cert, denied, Mineral County v. Ecology Ctr., 549 U.S. 1111 (2007).
182. Id. at 1064-65.
183. Id.
184. Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d at 986.
185. fs44 144. Id. at 985.
186. See id. The court also noted that, in addition to fire suppression, past logging practices and disease contributed to this forest composition. Id.
187. Id.
188. See id. at 986.
189. See id. at 986,987 n.4.
190. See id. at 986.
191. See Lands Council v. McNair, 494 F.3d 711 (9th Cir. 2007), rev'd, Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d981 (9th Cir. 2008).
192. Lands Council v. McNair, 512 F.3d 1204, 1204 (9th Cir. 2008).
193. -16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B) (2006).
194. Lands Council v. McNair, 573 F.3d at 990.
195. See Ecology Ctr. v. Austin, 430 F.3d 1057, 1971 (9th Cir. 2005).
196. Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d at 988.
197. Id. at 991.
198. Id. at 991-92.
199. Id. at 993-94.
200. W. at 996-97. Habitat proxy-on-proxy approaches are discussed supra Part I1I.C.
201. See supra note 123.
202. See Lands Council v. McNair, 537 f.3d at 987-88; see also u.s. forest serv., supra note 84, at 11-29.
203. Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d at 999-1000.
204. Id. at 999.
205. Id. at 1000.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1002.
208. Id. a/1001.
209. Id. at 1002.
210. Id. at 1004.
211. Wagner, supra note 7, at 1650-51.
212. See generally Native Ecosystems Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 428 F.3d 1233 (9th Cir. 2005);
213. Indiana Forest Alliance v. U.S. Forest Serv., 325 F.3d 851 (7th Cir. 2003);
214. Idaho Sporting Cong. v. Thomas, 137 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 1998); Inland Empire Pub. Lands Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 88 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 1996);
215. Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 1995).
216. See Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d at 996-997.
217. See Doremus, Science, Judgment, and Controversy, supra note 73, at 15; Wagner, supra note 7, at 1627.
218. Conner, supra note 46, at 503.
219. Cf. Wagner, supra note 7, at 1673 (describing this nondisclosure in agency reports more generally).
220. For a similar view on the ESA, see Doremus, Listing Decisions, supra note 7, at 1035.
221. The Endangered Species Act, as one example, requires that listing decisions be made solely on the basis of "best scientific and commercial information available." 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (2006).
222. See id. § 1604(e).
223. See Glicksman, supra note 86, at 495.
224. Cf. Corbin, supra note 91, at 381-83 (describing the advantages of the non-MIS monitoring system).
225. See Glicksman, supra note 86, at 497.
226. Adaptive management involves "the systematic acquisition of reliable information," which is then is used to make informed decisions. George F. Wilhere, Adaptive Management in Habitat Conservation Plans 16 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 20, 21-22 (2002). Management activities are conducted as deliberate experiments to establish cause-and-effect relationships between management activities and changes in ecological conditions. See id.
227. This litigation technique is seen in Lands Council v. McNair, where plaintiffs relied on their own reports in an attempt to show that the Forest Service science was incomplete or misleading.
228. See Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 999, 1002 (9th Cir. 2008).
229. See also Rick Weiss, 'Data Quality' Law is Nemesis of Regulation, WASH. pOST, Aug. 16, 2004, at Al (discussing how industry uses the Data Quality Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 app at 153 (2000), to challenge the scientific validity of decisions made by agencies aimed at protecting the environment or human health).
230. Doremus, Science, Judgment, and Controversy, supra note 73, at 17.
231. See, e.g., Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981; Inland Empire Pub. Lands Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 88 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 1996);
232. Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 1995).
233. See infra Part VII.A.2.
234. Wagner, supra note 7, at 1665-66.
235. For example, listing decisions under the Endangered Species Act must be made "solely on the basis of the best scientific and commercial data available." 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (2006).
236. See United States Forest Service, History, http://www.fs.fed.us/ aboutus/history (last visited April 18, 2009);
237. United States Forest Serv., Recreational Activities: Find a Forest By State, http://wwwfs.fed.us/recreation/map/state-list (last visited April 18, 2009).
238. Sierra Forest Legacy v. Rey, 526 F.3d 1228, 1236 (9th Cir. 2008) (Noonan, J., concurring). Accord Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 442 F.3d 1147, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (Noonan, J., concurring), Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 351 F.3d 1291, 1309 (9th Cir. 2003) (Noonan, J., concurring).
239. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510,532-34 (1927).
240. See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579 (1973).
241. This extension of reasoning may prove problematic. Executive agencies such as the Forest Service perform legislative, executive and judicial functions. While the case law is clear that judicial functions cannot be biased,
242. see Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532-34, it is less obvious that legislative or executive functions must stand up to the same rigor. While Judge Noonan argues that the connection between adjudicative and legislative functions is tight enough to warrant a finding that a legislative decision is invalid, it is unclear that this reasoning will hold up.
243. Sierra Forest Legacy, 526 F.3d at 1236 (Noonan, J., concurring). Bias enters the legislative process at many steps, perhaps rightfully so, as the use of incentives and persuasion seems to be a fundamental part of the democratic process. Judge Noonan's opinions offer no clear limit on where invalidating agency legislative action should stop.
244. See Sierra Forest Legacy, 526 F.3d at 1236 (Noonan, J., concurring);
245. Earth Island Inst., 442 F.3d at 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (Noonan, J., concurring),
246. Earth Island Inst., 351 F.3d at 1309 (9th Cir. 2003) (Noonan, J., concurring).
247. Wagner, supra note 7, at 1711-12.
248. A reconvening of the Committee of Scientists is authorized under NFMA, 16 U.S.C. § 1604(h) (2006). The Committee must also comply with the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), 5 U.S.C. App. 2 § § 1-15 (2006), which requires the Committee to be "utilized solely for advisory functions." Id. § 9(b).
249. See supra note 26-28 and accompanying text.
250. In most cases involving review of agency decisions under the APA, the court is constrained to reviewing the record before the agency. See S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt, 425 F.3d 735, 750 (10th Cir. 2005). This standard serves a useful purpose, in that it allows the court to focus more narrowly on reviewing the agency decision-making process, rather than on attempting to find the substantively correct answer. However, extra-record information may play an important role in reviewing compliance with policy disclosure. One of the distinct problems with the science charade is that policy decisions are hidden within the administrative record and cannot be seen by the court or the general public without a deep understanding of the science involved. The Committee of Scientists report may contain useful information, but plaintiffs also should be allowed to introduce extra-record evidence that helps illustrate for the court how the agency failed to properly disclose their policy judgments.
251. Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 988 (9th Cir. 2008).
252. NEPA, a fundamental federal environmental law, is based entirely on procedural review.
253. See Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980) ("[Ojnce an agency has made a decision subject to NEPA's procedural requirements, the only role for a court is to insure that the agency has considered the environmental consequences; it cannot 'interject itself within the area of discretion of the executive as to the choice of the action to be taken.'" (quoting Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390,410, n.21 (1976))).
254. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring).
255. See Doremus, Science, Judgment, and Controversy, supra note 73, at 29.
256. See Doremus, Listing Decisions, supra note 7, at 1130-31.
257. See, e.g., Dept. of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 754 (2004) (noting that one of the purposes of NEPA is to ensure the agency has sufficient information to make a decision).
258. Smith, supra note 97, at 85 (2007).
259. See Doremus, Science, Judgment, and Controversy, supra note 73, at 29.
260. Cortner, supra note 46, at 514.