Aerial belligerency within a humanitarian rhetoric: exploring the theorizing of the law of war/terrorizing of civilians' rights nexus

Chinese Journal of International Law

Volumn 8, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 347-373

  St Fleur, Yvenson ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DU QUÉBEC À MONTRÉAL   (Canada)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 68349135579     PISSN: 15401650     EISSN: 17469937     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/chinesejil/jmp017     Document Type: Article

References (137)

1. A. Eide, International Law, Dominance, and the Use of Force, XI Journal of Peace Research (1974), 8.
2. See E. De Bono, La preparazione e le prime operazioni (Roma: Istituto Nazionale Fascista di Cultura, 1937);
3. A. Mockler, Haile Sellassie's War (Olive Branch Press, 2003);
4. D. Nicolle, The Italian Invasion of Abyssinia 1935-1936 (Westminster, MD: Osprey, 1997), 48.
5. Appeal of President Franklin D. Roosevelt on Aerial Bombardment of Civilian Populations, 1 September 1939.
6. Truman quoted in Robert H. Ferrell, Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman (Harper and Row, 1980), 55-56.
7. Also see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, Containing the Public Messages, Speeches and Statements of the President April 12 to December 31, 1945 (United States Government Printing Office, 1961), 212. The full text also was published in the New York Times, 10 August 1945, 12.
8. N. Krisch, Unilateral Enforcement of the Collective Will: Kosovo, Iraq, and the Security Council (1999), 3 Max Planck UNYB, 59;
9. R.-J. Dupuy, La communauté internationale entre le mythe et l'histoire (1986);
10. B. Simma and A. Paulus, The "International Community": Facing the Challenge of Globalization, 9 EJIL (1998), 266.
11. Ibid., 59-60.
12. C. Annacker, The Legal Regime of Erga Omnes Obligations in International Law, 46 Austrian JPIL (1994), 131.
13. "Casus belli" as an expression means the justification for acts of war. Casus means "incident", "rupture" or indeed "case", while belli means "of war". It is being used to refer to offenses or threats directly against a nation.
14. C. Greenwood, The Concept of War in Modern International Law, 36 ICLQ (1987), 284; McNair and Watts, The Legal Effects of War (4th edn 1996), vii.
15. Greenwood, ibid., 284.
16. W.J. Fenrick, Attacking the Enemy Civilian as Punishable Offence, 7 Duke JCIL, 539.
17. D. Kennedy, The Dark Sides of Virtue: Reassessing International Humanitarianism (2004), 242.
18. J. Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 American JIL (1993), 391-395.
19. D. Stephens and M. Lewis, The Law of Armed Conflict - A Contemporary Critique, Melbourne JIL (2005), 3.
20. J.-J. Rousseau, The Social Contract (Christopher Betts trans of Du contrat social, 1994 edn), 51.
21. Eide, above n.1, 2.
22. L.C. Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict (2nd edn, Manchester University Press, 2000), 353. We can note that it should be instinctive to have an overlook at the 1949 Geneva Convention and its Additional Protocol of 1977. Therefore, one should refer to the provisions of Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions in regard to military objectives. Art. 51(4) provides that "Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are: (a) those which are not directed at a specific military objective; (b) those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific military objective; or (c) those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol; and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction". Arts 51(5) and 57(2)(b) follow, which respectively pertain to indiscriminate attacks and the required precautions in attack.
23. The standards by which military personnel with these duties will be judged are those of simple reasonableness and honesty. The LOAC only requires military personnel to fight with the same restraint and caution. See M. Bothe, New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts (Martinus Nijhoff edn, The Hague, 1982), 323;
24. J. Holland, Military Objectives and Collateral Damage: Their Relationship and Dynamics, 7 YIHL (2004), 49.
25. See Stephens and Lewis, above n.14, 3.
26. From the French Foreign Minister: "On ne peut pas dire que leur activité soit dénudée de base légale. En effet, la résolution 1154, adoptée en mars 1998, prévoyait qu'une nouvelle violation par l'Iraq de ses engagements aurait 'les plus graves conséquences'". "Sans doute, cette résolution n'est pas aussi détaillée que d'autres mais elle est analogue à celle sur le Kosovo qui a permis, sous la menace d'une action militaire, l'intervention de l'OSCE. La base légale de l'action militaire n'est pas parfaite, mais elle est comparable à celle qui fonde notre action au Kosovo". Hearing of the French Foreign Minister before the Commission on Foreign Affairs of the Assemblée Nationale, 22 December 1998.
27. Y. Vertzberger, Risk Taking and Decisionmaking: Foreign Military Intervention Decisions (Stanford University Press, 1997), 3.
28. A.J. Coates, The Ethics of War, "Militarism" (Manchester University Press 1997), "Noncomba-tant Immunity", 235.
29. Ibid., 236.
30. J.B. Elshtain, Just War and Humanitarian Intervention, The Third Annual Grotius Lecture Presented at the American Society of International Law's 95th Annual Meeting (4-7 April 2001), 5.
31. See Eide, above n.1, 5.
32. S. El-Din Amer, The Protection of Civilian Population, in: N. Ronzitti and G. Venturini (eds), The Law of Air Warfare: Contemporary Issues (2006), 17.
33. W.H. Taft IV, The Law of Armed Conflict after 9/11: Some Salient Features, 28 Yale JIL (2003), 319.
34. E. Roucounas, Some Issues relating to War Crimes: Air and Sea Warfare, in: Y. Dinstein and M. Tabory (eds), War Crimes in International Law (Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands, 1996), 275.
35. Ibid., 275.
36. Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 1907.
37. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. Done at Geneva 17 June 1925, 94 League of Nations Treaty Series, 65.
38. M. Roscini, Target and Contemporary Aerial Bombardment, 54 ICLQ (2005), 411.
39. N. Ronzitti, The Codification of Law of Air Warfare, in: N. Ronzitti and G. Venturini (eds), The Law of Air Warfare: Contemporary Issues (2006), 3.
40. See Roucounas, above n.28, 278-279.
41. See Ronzitti, above n.33, 5 ("Air war is allowed, but on the condition that it not present the people or the properties of the peaceful population with greater dangers than do terrestrial or maritime war.").
42. Ibid., 3.
43. Ibid., 3.
44. Ibid., 4.
45. Ibid., 5.
46. See Roucounas, above n.28, 278.
47. Ibid., 279.
48. Ronzitti, above n.33, 5.
49. See Roucounas, above n.28, 278.
50. Coenca Bros. v. Allemagne, 7 MAT 683 (1927).
51. Kiriadolou v. Allemagne, 10 May 1930, vol. 10, 100.
52. District Court of Tokyo, Affaire Shimoda, 32 ILR (1963), 629-632; L. Nurick, The Distinction between Combatant and Non-Combatant in the Law of War, 39 American JIL (1945), 680-697. See Green, above n.17, 181.
53. See Roucounas, above n.28, 276;
54. See also Gardam, above n.13, 146.
55. Nicaragua v USA, ICJ Reports 1986, 98, para. 186.
56. M. Roscini, Target and Contemporary Aerial Bombardment, 54 ICLQ (2005), 411.
57. E. Jaworski, "Military Necessity" and "Civilian Immunity": Where is the Balance? 2 Chinese JIL (2003), 175.
58. The prohibition of aerial bombardment (1907-1944), the legitimacy of the use of force in the United Nations Charter (1945-1990) and the constructing norms legalizing an excessive use of force as a means of warfare in modern conflicts (1991-2008). These respective periods have marked changes in international practice regarding the legitimacy of use of force and evolution of the bombing norms.
59. S. Wrage, Compliance with Aerial Bombing Norms: A Study of Two Periods: 1939-1945 and 1990-2004.
60. See El-Din Amer, above n.26, 21.
61. Ibid., 21.
62. Covenant of The League of Nations, 28 June 1919, 225;
63. Consolidated Treaty Series 188, Art. 2; M.N. Schmitt, International Law and the Use of Force: The Jus Ad Bellum, 2 Quarterly Journal (2003), 90.
64. Ibid., Schmitt, 90.
65. Ibid.
66. See Ronzitti, above n.33, 5.
67. Ibid., 7.
68. Ibid., 8.
69. UN Charter, Art. 2(4).
70. SCOR 549th Meeting, 26 July 1951, paras 40-41.
71. Statements by the Representative of Israel to the Security Council, ibid.
72. See Schmitt, above n.55, 90.
73. See Greenwood, above n.9, 289.
74. See El-Din Amer, above n.26, 18.
75. A.C. Pierce, Just War Principles and Economic Sanctions, 10 Ethics & International Affairs (1996), 101.
76. W. Thomas, The Ethics of Destruction - Norms and Force in International Relations (Cornell University Press, 2001), 92-93.
77. Ibid., 94.
78. M. Walzer, Just and Unjust War (Basic Books, 1977), 151-159.
79. See Thomas, above n.68, 95; G. I. Mavrodes, Conventions and the Morality of War, 4 Philosophy and Public Affairs (Winter, 1975), 17.
80. H. Lauterpacht, The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War, 29 British YIL (1952), 369.
81. See Thomas, above n.68, 96-98.
82. Ibid., 90-91.
83. Ibid., 89.
84. We refer to the concept of "militarism" as an affirmation of the primacy of war over peace and martial values over civilian ones or peaceful diplomacy.
85. M. Lorell and C. Kelley, Jr, Casualties, Public Opinion, and Presidential Policy During the Vietnam War, Rand Project Air Force Study R-3060-AF (March 1985). The report examines the relationship between casualties and public support for US military intervention in Korea and Vietnam: casualties were probably the single most important factor eroding public support for each of the conflicts. . . . Poll data indicate that any US commitment of combat personnel to a sustained Third World conflict that is not perceived as a direct and immediate threat to the continental United States will in all probability provoke considerable public opposition once the brief "rally around the flag" effect dissipates. This includes situations involving threats to oil sources in the Middle East.
86. Art. 51(4) Protocol I: (a) an attack by bombardment by any method or means which treat as a single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives located in a city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects; and (b) an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. The final significant international instruments that limit targeting are a result of the Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (Convention on Use of Indiscriminate Weapons of 1980).
87. Coates, above n.22, 236.
88. H. Munkler, The Wars of the 21st Century, 85 RICR (2003), 12.
89. Ibid., 9-10.
90. Ibid., 12.
91. Ibid., 9.
92. Ibid., 8.
93. Ibid., 10.
94. C. Dunlap, Kosovo, Causality Aversion, and the American Military Ethos: A Perspective, 10 United States Air Force Academy Journal of Legal Studies (2000), 99.
95. Accordingly, any military commander is confronted with the questions of how to value human life and how to ascribe relative values to enemy lives, both civilians and combatants. Therefore, the rules of proportionality and distinction are principles which all reasonable belligerents would agree that should be "practicably" respected at all times in order to reduce or avoid human loss. All this is even truer for aerial bombardments since, unlike attacks in land warfare, aerial bombardments are rarely directed exclusively at individuals, with the exception of attacks against "leadership targets".See M. Sassoli and L. Cameron, The Protection of Civilian Objects, in: N. Ronzitti and G. Venturini (eds), The Law of Air Warfare: Contemporary Issues (2006), 35-36.
96. In some ways, it is possible to find an answer from David Kennedy. For Kennedy, it is a matter of "judgment call" from the commander in charge of the attack. The principle of proportionality necessarily requires that "value judgments" should be made as to the respective worth of attaining military objectives against the costs of securing such an objective. The "protection norm", as one may refer to it, sets this out in clear legal framework. See Kennedy, above n.12, 284;
97. M. Schmitt, The Principle of Discrimination in 21st Century Warfare, 2 Yale Human Rights and Development LJ (1998), 151;
98. See Stephens and Lewis, above n.14, 6.
99. For the United States, it is legitimate to attack the centre of gravity of an enemy or those objects which, by their nature, location, purpose or use, effectively contribute to the enemy's war-fighting or war-sustaining capability and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization would constitute a military advantage to the attacker under the circumstances at the time of the attack. See Military Commission Instruction. No. 2, para. 3. Furthermore, the "centre of gravity" usually relates to the main enemy's force or capability. The concept of centre of gravity is useful as a tool to analyse enemy strengths and vulnerabilities. By identifying and controlling decisive points, commanders gain a marked advantage over the enemy and can influence the outcome of an action. US Department of the Army, The Targeting Process, FM6-20-10, 3-11 (1996). US Department of the Army, Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations, FM 100-7, 1- 5 (1995).
100. M. Shaw, Risk-Transfer Militarism, Small Massacres and the Historic Legitimacy of War, 16 International Relations (2002), 6.
101. Ibid.
102. Ibid.
103. Ibid.
104. Ibid.
105. E. Jaworski, Military Necessity and Civilian Immunity: Where Is the Balance? 2 Chinese JIL (2003), 175.
106. See R. Grant, Altitude - Contrary to Popular Opinion, Lower Is Not Always Best, Air Magazine (October 2001), 52-57.
107. See Shaw, above n.90, 7.
108. See Munkler, above n.80, 18.
109. Ibid., 20.
110. See Horowitz and Reiter, in: Dinstein & Tabory (eds), above n.28, 148.
111. Ibid.
112. Ibid.
113. G. Douhet, The Command of the Air, transl. by Dino Ferrari (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History).
114. Ibid., 154.
115. Ibid., 151.
116. Ibid.
117. Ibid., 147.
118. T. Voon, Pointing the Finger: Civilian Casualties of NATO Bombing in the Kosovo Conflict, 16 American University ILR (2000-2001), 1097.
119. Ibid.
120. C.L. Chennault, The Role of Defensive Pursuit, Part III, 77 The Coast Artillery Journal (March- April 1934), 87-93.
121. See Voon, above n.108, 1097.
122. See Fenrick, above n.11, 546.
123. See Horowitz and Reiter, in: Dinstein & Tabory (eds), above n.28, 148.
124. Levy v. Parker, 1 Military LR (1973), 2130.
125. H. Kelsen, Principles of International Law (2nd edn). Revised and edited by Robert W. Tucker (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1966), 100-101, 114-115;
126. W.V. O'Brien, The Law of War, Command Responsibility and Vietnam, 60 Georgetown LJ (1972), 616;
127. W.G. Downey Jr, The Law of War and Military Necessity, 47 AJIL (1953), 251-265.
128. B. Grosscup, Strategic Terror: The Politics and Ethics of Aerial Bombardments (Zed Books, 2006), 17;
129. T. Wintringham, The Story of Weapons and Tactics: From Troy to Stalingrad (Free-port: Books for Libraries Press, 1943).
130. Ibid., 17.
131. C.E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (University of Nebraska Press, 1996).
132. T.W. Smith, The New Law of War: Legitimizing Hi-Tech and Infrastructural Violence, 46 International Studies Quarterly (2002), 356.
133. See Munkler, above n.80, 11.
134. Ibid., 7.
135. See Smith, above n.119, 359.
136. See Horowitz and Reiter, in: Dinstein & Tabory (eds), above n.28, 147.
137. T. Taylor, Just and Unjust War, in: M.M. Wakin (ed.), War, Morality, and the Military Profession (2nd edn, Westview Press, 1979), 236.