Predatory reputation in US airline markets

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 27, Issue 5, 2009, Pages 592-604

  Kim, Sung Hwan ^a  

^a Ajou University   (South Korea)

Author keywords

Airline market; Discrete choice model; Entry; Learning; Predatory reputation

Indexed keywords

AIRLINE MARKET; DISCRETE CHOICE MODEL; ENTRY; LEARNING; PREDATORY REPUTATION;

AIR TRANSPORTATION; COMMERCE; MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION;

SIMULATED ANNEALING;

EID: 67849130121     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2009.02.002     Document Type: Article

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