Assessing the applicability of strategic theory to explain decision making on the courts of appeals

Political Research Quarterly

Volumn 62, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 393-407

  Barnes Bowie, Jennifer ^a   Songer, Donald R ^b  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA   (United States)

Author keywords

Courts of appeals; Judge interviews; Judicial decision making; Reversal; Strategic decisions

Indexed keywords

EID: 67651027596     PISSN: 10659129     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1065912908319253     Document Type: Article

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