The welfare effects of tax competition reconsidered: Politicians and political institutions

Economic Journal

Volumn 119, Issue 539, 2009, Pages 1143-1161

  Janeba, Eckhard ^a   Schjelderup, Guttorm ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM   (Germany)

^b NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Norway)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPARATIVE STUDY; COMPETITION (ECONOMICS); DEMOCRACY; FISCAL POLICY; INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK; POLITICAL ECONOMY; POLITICAL SYSTEM; TAX SYSTEM; WELFARE IMPACT;

EID: 67649964543     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: 14680297     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02263.x     Document Type: Article

References (20)

1. Besley, T.J. and Smart, M. (2001). 'Does tax competition raise voter welfare?', Discussion Paper No. 2857, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
2. Brennan, G. and Buchanan, J. (1980). The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
3. Burstein, M.L. and Rolnick A.J. (1994). 'Congress should end the economic war among states', Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Annual Report Essay, available at http://minneapolisfed.org/pubs/ar/ar1994.html.
4. Diermeier, D., Keane, M.P. and Merlo, A. (2005). 'A political economy model of congressional careers', American Economic Review, vol. 95(1), pp. 347-73.
5. Edwards, J. and Keen, M. (1996). 'Tax competition and Leviathan', European Economic Review, vol. 44, pp. 113-34.
6. Eggert, W. and Sørensen, P.B. (2008). 'The effects of tax competition when politicians create rents to buy political support'. Journal of Public Economics, vol. 92(5-6), pp. 1142-63.
7. Fershtman, C. and Judd, K.L. (1987). 'Incentive equilibrium in oligopoly', American Economic Review, vol. 77, pp. 927-40.
8. Fershtman, C., Judd, K.L. and Kalai, E. (1991). 'Observable contracts: strategic delegation and cooperation', International Economic Review, vol. 32(3), pp. 551-9.
9. Holmes, T.J. (1995). 'Analyzing a proposal to ban state tax breaks to businesses', Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, vol. 19, pp. 29-39.
10. Lorz, O. (1998). 'Capital mobility, tax competition, and the lobbying for redistributive capital taxation', European Journal of Political Economy, vol. 14, pp. 265-79.
11. McLure, C.E. (1986). 'Tax competition: Is what's good for the private goose also good for the public gander', National Tax Journal, vol. 39, pp. 341-46.
12. Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (2000). Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy, Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
13. Persson, T., Roland, G. and Tabellini, G. (2000). 'Comparative politics and public finance', Journal of Political Economy, vol. 108(6), pp. 1121-61.
14. Rauscher, M. (1998). 'Leviathan and competition among jurisdictions: The case of benefit taxation'. Journal of Urban Economics, vol. 44, pp. 59-67.
15. Sklivas, S.D. (1987). 'The strategic choice of management incentives', The Rand Journal of Economics, vol. 18, pp. 452-8.
16. Vickers, J. (1985). 'Delegation and the theory of the Firm'. Economic Journal (supplement), vol. 95, pp. 138-47.
17. Wildasin, D.E. and Wilson, J.D. (2004). 'Tax competition: Bane or boon?'. Journal of Public Economics, vol. 88(6), pp. 1065-91.
18. Wilson, J.D. (1986) 'A theory of interregional tax competition', Journal of Urban Economics, vol. 19, pp. 296-315.
19. Wilson, J.D. (1999). 'Theories of tax competition', National Tax Journal, vol. 52, pp. 269-304.
20. Zodrow, G. and Mieszkowski, P. (1986). 'Pigeou, Tiebout, property taxation and the underprovision of local public goods'. Journal of Urban Economics, vol. 19, pp. 356-70.