Strengthening the rule of law, but fragmenting international law: The Kadi decision of the ECJ from the perspective of human rights

Human Rights Law Review

Volumn 9, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 288-305

  Ziegler, Katja S ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 67649514886     PISSN: 14617781     EISSN: 17441021     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/hrlr/ngp010     Document Type: Article

References (126)

1. Joined Cases C-402P and C-415/05P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities [2008] ECR I-myr) ('Kadi).
2. Council Regulation (EC) 881/2002 of 27 May 2002, [2002] 0J L 139/9.
3. SC Res. 1267, 15 October 1999, S/RES/1267 (1999); SC Res. 1333, 19 December 2000, S/RES/1333 (2000); and SC Res. 1390 of 28 January 2002, S/RES/1390 (2002).
4. T-315/01 Kadi v Council of the European Commission and Commission of the European Communities [2005] ECR II-3649 ('CFI Kach')
5. and T-306/01, Yusuf and Al Barakaat v Council and Commission of the European Communities [2005] ECR II-3533 ('CFI Yusuf').
6. See annotation by Hinarejos, 'Recent Human Rights Developments in the EU Courts: The Charter of Fundamental Rights, the European Arrest Warrant and Terror Lists', (2008) 7 Human Rights Law Review 793
7. and Eeckhout, 'Community Terrorism Listings, Fundamental Rights, and UN Security Council Resolutions: In Search of the Right Fit', (2007) 3 European Constitutional Law Review 183.
8. For example, Al Barakaat was relisted by Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1190/2008 of 28 November 2008, [2008] OJ L 322/25.
9. There also was a cross appeal by the UK challenging the CFI's ruling that it had jurisdiction to review a Security Council resolution for breaches of ius cogens. See text infra n. 33 and 42.
10. In addition, Al Barakaat argued that Article 249 EC was infringed through the choice of form of a regulation for what in effect amounted to a decision. The ECJ dismissed the argument by pointing to the general nature of the rule prohibiting the holding of funds - 'whoever might actually hold the funds' (Kadi, supra n. 1 at paras 237 ff., 244). The listing of individual names clearly fulfils all criteria of a decision 'in the form of a regulation' (Article 230(4) EC) as demonstrated by the fact that the question of the applicants' standing was uncontroversial. However, it might be added that the classification of the measure is secondary as long as the applicants' rights are not curtailed (i.e. the substance of the measure is decisive, not the form). However, this issue returns as a boomerang in the form of the challenge that rights of defence/rights to be heard are violated: See infra n. 85.
11. For an analysis of the competence in detail, see Cremona, 'EC/EU Competence and EU Counter-terrorism Measures, EUI Working Paper 2009 (forthcoming).
12. Kadi, supra n. 1 at para. 123
13. and CFI Yusuf, supra n. 4 at para. 160.
14. It replaced therefore the legal basis on which the Commission based the Regulation originally, namely only Articles 60 and 301 EC. In the same vein, see Opinion of AG Maduro of 16 January 2008 in Kadi, supra n. 1 at para 12.
15. Welcoming this approach, see Tomuschat,'Case T-306/01, Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission; Case T-315/01, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council and Commissiorf (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 537 at 540.
16. Cf. AG Maduro supra n. 9 at para. 15.
17. Kadi, supra n. 1 at para. 202.
18. Ibid. at para. 203.
19. The ECJ also considered that the second condition of Article 308 - a sufficient link with the common market - was met, ibid. at paras 226 and 235.
20. The question of competence would be resolved by the Lisbon Treaty. Article 215(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides an explicit legal basis for sanctions against individuals.
21. Article 105(1), UN Charter provides: 'The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfilment of its purposes.
22. See generally in this regard Bethlehem, 'International Law, European Community Law, National Law: Three Systems in Search of a Framework', in Koskennimi (ed), International Law Aspects of the European Union (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1998) 165.
23. CFI Kadi, supra n. 4 at para. 209.
24. CFI Kadi, ibid. at para. 211.
25. CFI Kadi, ibid. at para. 181 ff., 189.
26. CFI Kadi, ibid. at para. 197.
27. CFI Kadi, ibid. at para. 204.
28. In that sense, it makes clear its view that the effect of international law in the EC legal order is determined by the latter, and adopts a dualist approach, along the lines of Fitzmaurice, 'The General Principles of International Law considered from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law', (1957-II) 92 Recueil des Cours 1 at 68 ff.
29. Kadi, supra n. 1 at para. 79
30. CFI Kadi, supra n. 4 at para. 196 ff., 203
31. and CFI Yusuf, supra n. 4 at para. 253.
32. CFI Kadi, supra n. 4 at para. 195.
33. See also CFI Kadi, supra n. 4 at para. 193
34. and CFI Yusuf, supra n. 4 at para. 243.
35. CFI Kadi, ibid. at para. 176.
36. Ibid. at para. 181.
37. Ibid. at para. 192.
38. Ibid. at para. 208.
39. Ibid. at para. 212 [emphasis added].
40. See, however, also the reference to the need to interpret EC law in the light of international law as resulting from the obligation to respect international law, albeit not in itself conclusive of a monist conception (at para. 199, last sentence).
41. Kadi, supra n. 1 at para. 317.
42. Ibid. at para. 287.
43. This approach is criticised by Cardwell, French, and White,'Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission (Joined Cases C-402/05P and C-415/05P) Judgment of 3 September 2008', (2009) 58 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 229 at 237.
44. Ibid. at para. 299 ff.
45. Ibid. at para. 291.
46. Ibid. at para. 292.
47. Ibid. at para. 296.
48. Ibid. at para. 297.
49. Ibid. at paras 281-2 [emphasis added].
50. Ibid. at paras 283-4 [emphasis added].
51. Ibid. at para. 285.
52. Ibid. at para. 231.
53. Ibid. at para. 287. In a sense, the ECJ begs the question in this point when it says, at para. 286, that it only reviews the implementing act and not the Security Council Resolution itself and that the latter could not be reviewed, not even by the standards of ius cogens. The CFI did not do anything else, but it limits its review of the EC Regulations out of deference to the Security Council Resolution. It does not purport to review the Resolution directly, not even for breaches of ius cogens.
54. C-162/96, Racke v Hauptzollamt Mainz [1998] ECR I-3655 at paras 37 ff., 44 ff., and 47.
55. The ECJ finds that the case did not concern the direct effect of customary international law in EC law (but that of treaties). For a criticism of this approach, see Eeckhout, External Relations of the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) 332.
56. Lowe, 'Can the European Community Bind Member States on Questions of Customary International Law?', in Koskennimi (ed.), International Law Aspects of the European Union (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1998) at 149 and 164 ff.
57. Supra n. 1 at para. 308.
58. For example, in France, Greece and Spain.
59. It compares favourably with countries that accord incorporated treaties only equal rank with a statute, such as in the UK (apart from the EC Treaty), the USA, Germany and South Africa.
60. Supra n. 39 and n. 41.
61. C-16/62, Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1
62. 6/64, Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585
63. and Opinion 1/91 on the FEA Agreement I [1991] ECR 6079.
64. For this approach, see already Opinion 1/91, supra n. 50.
65. See also Opinion 1/00, on the establishment of a European Common Aviation Agreement [2002] ECR 1-3493.
66. See, however, the problematic'precedents'set by another international court, the ECtHR, infra n. 62.
67. Supra n. 1 at para. 281.
68. For an example of the same approach at national level, see (2004) 111 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 307.
69. In addition also where the criteria and procedure of Article 7 EU are met.
70. See in this respect, C-459/03, Commission v Ireland [2006] ECR I-4635 at para. 125 ff.
71. and C-84/98, Commission v Portugal [2000] ECR 1-5215 at para. 61. Article 307 EC in connection with Article 103 of the UN Charter, even if not directly applicable in the EC legal order, may, however, provide a justification or excuse for Member States vis-a-vis the Community/Union for breaches of obligations from EC (or EU) law.
72. This scenario resembles somewhat the situation where Member States are bound be EC human rights when they derogate from the market freedoms, cf., for example, C-112100, Schmidberger v Austria [2003] ECR 1-5659 at para. 73 ff.
73. and C-36/02, Omega Spielhallen- and Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR I-9609.
74. See in this regard, C-303/05, Advocaten voor de Wereld v Leden van de Ministerraad [2007] ECR I-3633 at para. 45.
75. Supra n. 1 at para. 303.
76. Ibid.
77. Orakhelashvili,'The Acts of the Security Council: Meaning and Standards of Review', (2007) 11 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 143 at 149 f., 175, and 179 ff.; for a wide interpretation of the content of ius cogens at 181 ff.
78. In this regard Cardwell, French, and White, supra n. 33 at 236 ff. and 239 ff.
79. See also Gattim, 'Joined Cases C-402/05P and C-415/05F, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, judgment of the Grand Chamber of 3 September 2008, nyr, (2009) 46 Common Market Law Review 213, at 231 ff.
80. Behrami and another v France; Saramati v France et al 45 EHRR SEIO (Grand Chamber)
81. and Bosphorus Airways v Ireland 42 EHRR 1 (Grand Chamber).
82. Bosphorus Airways, ibid. at para. 150.
83. Matthews v United Kingdom 28 EHRR 361
84. and T.I. v United Kingdom Application No. 43844/98, Admissibility, 7 March 2000.
85. UNTS 103; ETS 5.
86. This had a direct impact on the human rights protection in the UK - cf. R (Al-jedda) v Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 58, because the ECHR is applied concomitantly (through the Human Rights Act 1998) rather than autonomously at domestic level.
87. See, for example, R (on the application of Al-Skeini) v Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 26
88. and R (on the application of Gentle) v Prime Minister [2008] UKHL 20.
89. Internationale Handelsgesellsehaft mbH v Finfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel (1974) 2 CMLR 540 at 549-50 ('Solange I')
90. and Re the Application of Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft (1987) 3 CMLR 225, at 265 ('Solanqe II').
91. See also Bosphorus Airways supra n. 62.
92. Supra n. 1 at para. 256.
93. Ibid. at para. 318.
94. Ibid. at para. 319.
95. Ibid. at para. 316 ff.
96. Ibid. at para. 326 and repeated at para. 330.
97. See in this context also AG Maduro, supra n. 9 at para. 44 ff.
98. Supra n. 1 at para. 317.
99. Ibid. at para. 321.
100. Ibid. at para. 322.
101. Ibid. at para. 326 [emphasis added].
102. Cf. also Tomuschat, supra n. 10 at 551.
103. See for breaches of ius cogens: Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie [1992] ICJ Rep 114, at 126
104. and the overview by Merrills, International Dispute Settlement, 4th edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 268-72.
105. Orakhelashvili, supra n. 60 at 183 ff., is critical of this narrow construction, describing ius cogens as the non-derogable core-content of a wider catalogue of rights than commonly considered to qualify as ius cogens.
106. Supra n. 1 at para. 333 ff.
107. Ibid. at paras 336 ff. and 343 f.
108. Ibid. at para. 348.
109. Cf. in this context Klass and others v Germany A 28 (1978)
110. EHRR 214 at paras 67 ff. and 70 with regard to ex post control.
111. Ibid. at paras 357 ff. and 360.
112. Ibid at para. 364.
113. Ibid. at para. 368.
114. Orakelashvili is critical of this self-construction of the EC, see Orakhelashvili, 'The Idea of European International Law', (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 315 at 344-6.
115. See, however, the amendment envisaged by the Lisbon Treaty (Article 275(2), TFEU) with regard to restrictive measures against natural and legal persons, see supra n. 15.
116. See Article 46 EU, which does not include provisions of Title V (CFSP).
117. See also Eeckhout, supra n. 44 at 418.
118. de Baere, Constitutional Principles of EU External Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 181 f.
119. See also C-355/04F, Segi et al. v Council of the European Union [2007] ECR I-1657 at paras 52 ff. for a review of a Third Pillar Common Position through a reference for a preliminary ruling (where available in the relevant Member State) for reasons of a right to an effective remedy, but not in an action for annulment brought by individuals.
120. For example, if a Member State, such as the Netherlands, adopts a monist approach even to acts of international organisations, that is, UN resolutions.
121. See supra n. 55.
122. Cf. also AG Maduro, supra n. 9 at para. 44.
123. Cf. also ibid. at para. 45.
124. For an overview of tentative trends, see Thallinger,'Sense and Sensibility of the Human Rights Obligations of the United Nations Security Council', (2007) 67 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 1015.
125. Fears of a 'Texasizatiorf of the EU have been raised, alluding to the US Supreme Court's decision in Medellin v Texas, 552 US (nyr), judgment of 25 March 2008.
126. See Thomas Franck in a discussion of the Kadi case at the NYU Institute of International Law and justice, available at: http://globaladminlaw.blogspot.com/2008/10/ nyu-kadi-panel-discussion-in-full.htmi [last accessed 16 April 2009].