Peace and power sharing in Africa: A not so obvious relationship

African Affairs

Volumn 108, Issue 432, 2009, Pages 453-473

  Mehler, Andreas ^a  

^a GIGA GERMAN INSTITUTE OF GLOBAL AND AREA STUDIES   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

GEOPOLITICS; PEACEKEEPING; POWER RELATIONS; REGIONAL SECURITY;

AFRICA;

EID: 67649446308     PISSN: 00019909     EISSN: 14682621     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/afraf/adp038     Document Type: Article

References (49)

1. Anna Jarstad, 'Power sharing for peace and democracy?' (Paper presented at the 47th annual meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego, 22-25 March 2006), p. 9.
2. Barbara Walter, 'The critical barrier to civil war', International Organization 51, 3 (1997), pp. 335-64.
3. Matthew Hoddie and Caroline Hartzell, 'Power sharing in peace settlements: Initiating the transition from civil war' in Philip G. Roeder and Donald Rothchild (eds), Sustainable Peace: Power and democracy after civil war (Cornell University Press, New York, NY, 2005), p. 103.
4. Ibid.
5. Stephan John Stedman, 'Spoiler problems in peace processes', International Security 22, 2 (1997), pp. 5-53.
6. Denis Tull and Andreas Mehler, 'The hidden costs of power sharing: reproducing insurgentviolence in Africa', African Affairs 104 416 (2005), p. 375.
7. Tull and Mehlerwere criticized by René Lemarchand ('Consociationalism and power sharing in Africa: Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic ofthe Congo', African Affairs 106, 422 (2007), pp. 1-20) for allegedly not wanting to take into account rebel organizations' grievances, in particular those that were excluded and had spoiling capacities. This was not our argument, as we primarily wanted to show that peace agreements fail to take into account civilian opposition's grievances, voiced in peacetime, and end up sidelining those more constructive forces in peace negotiations.
8. Roeder and Rothchild, Sustainable Peace, p. 3. These peace settlements include Azerbaijan (1991), Croatia (1991), Slovenia (1991), Eritrea (1993), South Africa (1993), Rwanda (1993), Burundi (1994), Bosnia (1995), Sierra Leone (1996), Northern Ireland (1998), Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001), Burundi (2001), Macedonia (2001-2), Burundi (2002), Congo (2002), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (2002), East Timor (2002), DRC (2003), Cote d'Ivoire (2003), Iraq (2003), and Sudan (2004). Some gaps may be noted here (Djibouti, 2000; Angola, 1991).
9. Caroline Hartzell, Matthew Hoddie , and Donald Rothchild, 'Stabilizing the peace after civil war: An investigation of some key variables', International Organization 55, 1 (2001), p. 195. They calculated that peace agreements on average lasted three and a half years before conflict re-escalated.
10. The big exception is obviously the Casamance conflict between separatist rebels and the central government of Senegal. Here, numerous peace agreements have failed to have any sustainable effects, but maybe not because of the absence of power-sharing devices. Failure is more probably linked to the amorphous nature of the MFDC rebel movement and the fact that their historical leader Abbé Senghor (1928-2007) could not sign on behalf of the different scattered wings.
11. David Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone (James Currey, Oxford, 2005), p. 273;
12. Michael Kargbo, British Foreign Policy and the Conflict in Sierra Leone, 1991-2001 (Lang, Bern, 2006), p. 320.
13. Akosombo included major power-sharing arrangements: Taylor, Kromah, and the commander of the Armed Forces of Liberia, Hezekiah Bowen, should have become members of a Council of State (five members). The text of the agreement can be accessed at (29 December 2008). The agreement was co-signed by Rawlings and a UN representative.
14. Dorina A. Bekoe, 'Toward a theory of peace agreement implementation: The case of Liberia' in Rose M. Kadende-Kaiser and Paul J. Kaiser (eds), Phases of Conflict in Africa (de Sitter Publications, Toronto, 2005), p. 113, counts 16 peace and ceasefire agreements between 1990 and 1997. She details all power-sharing arrangements and gives an inside view of motivations of different armed factions to accept or refuse arrangements. She concludes that the incremental steps taken by warring factions count most as they are seen as a concession by the other parties, who may then match them (p. 131). This may explain the relative success of the final Abuja arrangements.
15. Text available from (29 December 2008).
16. Amos Sawyer, 'Violent conflicts and governance challenges in West Africa: The case of the Mano River basin area', Journal of Modern African Studies 42, 3 (2004), p. 454.
17. Ibid., p. 451. Jarstad, 'Power sharing for peace and democracy?', p. 23, recalls that in the case of Sierra Leone the Lom6 accord of 1999 simply reflected the enhanced bargaining position of the RUF rebel group due to its military capacity. Consequently, the vice-presidency was allotted to its leader, Foday Sankoh. Only in 2002 could the war be declared over.
18. (29 December 2008).
19. International Crisis Group, 'Liberia: Security challenges' (International Crisis Group Africa Report No. 71, Brussels, 3 November 2003), p. 4.
20. Sawyer, 'Violent conflicts and governance challenges', p. 454.
21. Festus Aboagye and Alhaji Bah, 'Liberia at a crossroads: A preliminary look at the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the protection of civilians' (ISS Paper 95, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 2004).
22. For an account of the ECOWAS negotiation attempts see 'Report of the Secretary-General on Côte d'Ivoire' (UN Security Council, S/2003/374, 26 March 2003) p. 3ff.
23. MPIGO and MJP surfaced in late 2002 in the western part of the country; in 2003 they merged with MPCI to become the so-called Forces Nouvelles.
24. ote d'Ivoire' (Centre for Applied Studies in International Negotiations, Geneva, August 2003), (29 December 2008).
25. (29 December 2008).
26. Peacekeepers can claim a far less positive balance sheet than in Liberia; see Andreas Mehler, 'Positive, ambiguous or negative? Peacekeeping in the local security fabric', Critical Currents 5 (2008), pp. 41-65.
27. French text of the agreement from 12 May 2009.
28. Background reports can be found in Jeune Afrique, 11-17 March 2007, 25-31 March 2007.
29. See also Le Monde, 13 March 2007.
30. See Jeune Afrique, 20-26 May 2007;
31. Africa Research Bulletin, 1-30 June 2007, pp. 17-122;
32. March'es Tropicaux et M'editerranéens, 6 July 2007, p. 48.
33. (29 December 2008). ODM officially recorded 47.1 percent of the votes at the legislative elections (PNU 20.5), but Odinga just 44 percent at the presidential contest (Kibaki 47, the third candidate Kalonzo 9).
34. Recent analyses have attributed the post-electoral violence to a large extent to elite fragmentation and elite struggles; see Gabrielle Lynch, 'Courting the Kalenjin: The failure of dynasticism and the strength of the ODM wave in Kenya's Rift Valley Province', African Affairs 107, 429 (2008), pp. 541-68;
35. and Daniel Branch and NicCheeseman, 'Democratization, sequencing, and state failure in Africa: Lessons from Kenya', African Affairs 108, 430 (2009), pp. 1-26.
36. The Guardian, 'Kenya government forces out key mediator in political talks', 4 February 2008, (29 December 2008).
37. Pambazuka News, 'How Annan magic worked to seal Kibaki-Raila deal' (29 December 2008).
38. For the text of the agreements, see (29 December 2008).
39. United States Institute of Peace, 'Kenya: Setting the stage for durable peace?' (United States Institute of Peace, April 2008), (29 December 2008).
40. Ibid.
41. , (29 December 2008), p. 2.
42. (29 December 2008).
43. (29 December 2008).
44. (29 December 2008).
45. Links, 'Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions: Power-sharing deal "a far cry" from expectations', (29 December 2008).
46. Sawyer, 'Violent conflicts and governance challenges'.
47. Walker Connor, 'A few cautionary notes on the history and future of ethnonational conflicts' in Andreas Wimmer et al. (eds), Facing Ethnic Conflicts: Toward a new realism (Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, MD, 2004), pp. 23-33.
48. See the text of the final parliament-endorsed agreement (29 December 2008).