Trade, inequality, and the political economy of institutions

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 144, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 1489-1520

  Do, Quy Toan ^a   Levchenko, Andrei A ^b,c  

^a WORLD BANK   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

^c INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND   (United States)

Author keywords

Entry barriers; Heterogeneous firms; Institutions; International trade; Political economy

Indexed keywords

EID: 67649329421     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2008.11.007     Document Type: Article

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