Crime and punishment: The economic burden of impunity

European Physical Journal B

Volumn 68, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 133-144

  Gordon, M B ^a   Iglesias, J R ^b   Semeshenko, V ^a   Nadal, J P ^c,d  

^a LABORATOIRE TIMC IMAG   (France)

^b FEDERAL UNIVERSITY OF RIO GRANDE DO SUL   (Brazil)

^c ECOLE NORMALE SUPÉRIEURE   (France)

^d ÉCOLE DES HAUTES ÉTUDES EN SCIENCES SOCIALES   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ACCEPTABLE LIMITS; CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES; ECONOMIC BURDENS; GINI COEFFICIENTS; WEALTH DISTRIBUTIONS;

PHASE TRANSITIONS; PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS;

LAW ENFORCEMENT;

EID: 67349273366     PISSN: 14346028     EISSN: 14346036     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1140/epjb/e2009-00066-x     Document Type: Article

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