Auction design and tacit collusion in FCC spectrum auctions

Information Economics and Policy

Volumn 21, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 90-100

  Bajari, Patrick ^a   Yeo, Jungwon ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

Author keywords

Auction design; Collusion; FCC spectrum auctions; Simultaneous ascending auctions

Indexed keywords

ADVANCED WIRELESS SERVICES; AUCTION DESIGN; COLLUSION; ECONOMIC THEORIES; FCC SPECTRUM AUCTIONS; FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSIONS; SIMULTANEOUS ASCENDING AUCTIONS; TACIT COLLUSIONS; TIME PERIODS;

ECONOMICS;

COMMERCE;

COMMUNICATION NETWORK; RADIO WAVE; REGULATORY FRAMEWORK; SPECTRUM; TELECOMMUNICATION;

NORTH AMERICA; UNITED STATES;

EID: 67349264093     PISSN: 01676245     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2009.04.001     Document Type: Article

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