Interacting? Yes. But, of what kind and on what basis?

Consciousness and Cognition

Volumn 18, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 543-546

  Hutto, Daniel D ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HERTFORDSHIRE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; HUMAN; INDIVIDUALITY; PERCEPTION; PSYCHOLOGY; SOCIAL COGNITIVE THEORY; SOCIAL INTERACTION;

EID: 67349262477     PISSN: 10538100     EISSN: 10902376     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2008.12.006     Document Type: Note

References (26)

1. De Jaegher H. Social understanding through direct perception? Yes, by interacting. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2009) 535-542
2. De Jaegher H., and Di Paolo E. Participatory sense-making: An enactive approach to social cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (2007) 485-507
3. Fodor JA. LOT 2: The language of thought revisited (2008), Oxford University Press, Oxford
4. Gallagher S. How the body shapes the mind (2005), Oxford University Press, Oxford
5. Gallagher S. Simulation trouble. Social Neuroscience 2 (2007) 353-365
6. Gallagher S., and Zahavi D. The phenomenological mind: An introduction to philosophy of mind and cognitive science (2007), Routledge, London
7. Gallese V. Before and below 'theory of mind': Embodied simulation and the neural correlates of social cognition. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society Biological Sciences 362 (2007) 659-669
8. Goldman AI. Simulating minds: The philosophy, psychology and neuroscience of mindreading (2006), Oxford University Press, New York
9. Gordon RM. Beyond mindreading. Philosophical Explorations 11 (2008) 219-222
10. Hobson P. The cradle of thought (2002), Palgrave Macmillian, Basingstoke
11. Hurley S. Consciousness in action (1998), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
12. Hutto DD. Knowing what?: Radical versus conservative enactivism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (2005) 389-405
13. Hutto D.D. Unprincipled engagements: Emotional experience, expression and response. In: Menary R. (Ed). Radical Enactivism: Focus on the philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto (2006), Jon Benjamins, Amsterdam/Philadelphia 13-38
14. Hutto DD. The narrative practice hypothesis: Origins and applications of folk psychology. Narrative and Understanding Persons: Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82 (2007) 43-68
15. Hutto D.D. Folk psychological narratives: The sociocultural basis of understanding reasons (2008), MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
16. Hutto D.D. Limited engagements and narrative extensions. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (2008) 419-444
17. Jacob P. What do mirror neurons contribute to human social cognition?. Mind and Language 23 (2008) 190-223
18. Ramsey WM. Representation reconsidered (2007), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
19. Reddy V., and Morris P. Participants don't need theories: Knowing mind in engagement. Theory and Psychology 14 (2004) 647-665
20. Rizzolatti G., and Sinigaglia C. Mirrors in the brain: How our minds share actions and emotions (2006), Oxford University Press, Oxford
21. Rowlands M. Body language (2007), MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
22. Seager W. Theories of consciousness (2001), Routledge, London
23. Sinigaglia C. Mirror neurons: This is the question. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (2008) 70-92
24. Wheeler M. Reconstructing the cognitive world (2005), MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
25. Wilson RA. Boundaries of the mind: The individual in the fragile sciences (2004), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
26. Zawidzki T. The function of folk psychology: Mind reading or mind shaping?. Philosophical Explorations 11 (2008) 193-210