Public choice and constitutional political economy

Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 3-29

  Rowley, Charles K ^a,b  

^a Locke Institute   (United States)

^b GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 67349234369     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1007/978-0-387-75870-1_1     Document Type: Chapter

References (106)

1. Alesina, A. (1987). 'Macroeconomic policy in a two party system as a repeated game'. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102, 651-678.
2. Anderson, G. (2001). 'The judiciary' In W. F. Shughart and L. Razzolini (eds.) The Elgar Companion to Public Choice. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 293-309.
3. Anderson, G. A., Shughart, W. F. and Tollison, R. D. (1988). 'On the incentive of Judges to enforce legislative wealth transfers'. Journal of Law and Economics, 31, 215-228.
4. Arrow, K. J. (1950). 'A difficulty in the concept of social welfare'. Journal of Political Economy, 58, 328-346.
5. Arrow, K. J. (1951). Social Choice and Individual Values. New York: Wiley.
6. Becker, G. S. (1976). 'Comment on Peltzman'. Journal of Law and Economics, 19(2), 245-248.
7. Becker, G. S. (1983). 'A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence'. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 63, 371-400.
8. Benson, B. (2001). 'Law and economics' In W. F. Shughart and L. Razzolini (eds.) The Elgar Companion to Public Choice. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 547-589.
9. Black, D. (1948). 'On the rationale of group decision-making'. Journal of Political Economy. 56, 23-34.
10. Brennan, H. G. and Buchanan, J. M. (1980). The Power to Tax. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
11. Brennan, H. G. and Buchanan, J. M. (1985). The Reason of Rules. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
12. Brennan, H. G. and Hamlin, A. (2001). 'Constitutional choice.' In W. F. Shughart and L. Razzolini (eds.) The Elgar Companion to Public Choice. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 117-139.
13. Buchanan, J. M. (1975). The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
14. Buchanan, J. M. (1990). 'The domain of constitutional economics'. Constitutional Political Economy, 1(1), 1-18.
15. Buchanan, J. M., Rowley, C. K. and Tollison, R. D. (1987). Deficits. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
16. Buchanan, J. M. and Tullock, G. (1962). The Calculus of Consent. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
17. Buchanan, J. M. and Wagner, R. E. (1977). Democracy in Deficit: The Political Legacy of Lord Keynes. New York: Academic Press.
18. Carter, J. R. and Schap, D. (1987). 'Executive veto, legislative override and structure-induced equilibrium'. Public Choice, 52, 227-244.
19. Coase, R. H. (1960). 'The problem of social cost'. Journal of Law and Economics, 3, 1-44.
20. Caplan, B. (2007). The Myth of the Rational Voter, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
21. Crain, W. M. and Tollison, R. D. (1979a). 'Constitutional change in an interest group perspective'. Journal of Legal Studies, 8, 156-175.
22. Crain, W. M. and Tollison, R. D. (1979b). 'The executive branch in the interest-group theory of government'. Journal of Legal Studies, 8, 555-567.
23. Crew, M. A. and Rowley, C. K. (1988). 'Toward a public choice theory of regulation'. Public Choice, 57, 49-67.
24. Downs, A. (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper & Row.
25. Downs, A. (1967). Inside Bureaucracy. Boston: Little Brown.
26. Ekelund, R. B. and Tollison, R. D. (2001). 'The interest-group theory of government'. In W. F. Shughart and L. Razzolini (eds.) The Elgar Companion to Public Choice. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 357-378.
27. Enelow, J. M. and Hinich, M. J. (1984). The Spatial Theory of Voting. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
28. Fiorina, M. (1983). 'Flagellating the Federal Bureaucracy'. Society, 66-73.
29. Friedman, M. (1953). 'The methodology of positive economics.' In M. Friedman, Essays in Positive Economics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 3-43.
30. Friedman, M. (1962). Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
31. Goetz, C. J. (1991). Uncommon Common-Sense vs. Conventional wisdom: The Virginia School of Economics. Fairfax: Center for Study of Public Choice.
32. Grier, K. (1991). 'Congressional influence on US monetary policy: An empirical test'. Journal of Monetary Economics, 28, 202-220.
33. Gwartney, J. and Wagner, R. E. (1988). Public Choice and Constitutional Economics. Greenwich: JAI Press.
34. Harberger, A. C. (1954). 'Monopoly and resource allocation'. American Economic Review, 44, 77-87.
35. Hotelling, H. (1929). 'Stability in competition'. American Economic Review, 39, 41-57.
36. Kydland, F. and Prescott, E. (1977). 'Rules rather than discretion: The inconsistency of optima plans'. Journal of Political Economy, 85, 473-491.
37. Laband, D. N. and McClintock, G. C. (2001). The Transfer Society. Washington, DC: The Cato Institute.
38. Laband, D. N. and Sophocleus, J. P. (1988). 'The social cost of rent seeking: First estimates'. Public Choice, 58, 269-276.
39. Lakatos, I. (1978). The Methodology of Scientific Research Programs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
40. Landa, J. (1986). 'The political economy of swarming in honeybees: Voting-with-wings, decision-making costs, and the unanimity rule'. Public Choice, 51, 25-38.
41. Landa, J. (1998). 'Bioeconomics of schooling fishes: Selfish fish, quasi-free riders, and other fishy tales'. Environmental Biology of Fishes, 53, 353-364.
42. Landes, W. E. and Posner, R. A. (1975). 'The independent judiciary in an interest group perspective'. Journal of Law and Economics, 18, 875-902.
43. Landes, W. E. and Posner, R. A. (1987). The Economic Structure of Tort Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
44. Madison, J. (1788). The Federalist 51, Publius, February 6.
45. Madison, J. (1788). The Federalist 53, Publius, February 9.
46. McChesney, F. S. (1987). 'Rent extraction and rent creation in the economic theory of regulation'. Journal of Legal Studies, 16, 101-118.
47. McChesney, F. S. (1997). Money for Nothing: Politicians, Rent Extraction, and Political Extortion. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
48. McChesney, F. S. (2001). 'Rent seeking and rent extraction. ' In W. F. Shughart and L. Razzolini (eds.) The Elgar Companion to Public Choice. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 379-395.
49. McCormick, R. E. and Tollison, R. D. (1981). Politicians, Legislation and the Economy: An Inquiry into the Interest-Group Theory of Government. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff.
50. Mitchell, W. C. (1988). 'Virginia, Rochester and Bloomington: Twenty-five Years of public choice and political science'. Public Choice, 56, 101-120.
51. Mitchell, W. C. (1989). 'Chicago political economy: A public choice perspective'. Public Choice, 63, 282-292.
52. Mitchell, W. C. (2001). 'The old and the new public choice: Chicago vs. Virginia.' In W. F. Shughart and L. Rozzalini (eds.) The Elgar Companion to Public Choice. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 3-30.
53. Moe, T. N. (1987). 'An assessment of the positive theory of congressional dominance'. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 12, 475-520.
54. Moe, T. N. (1990). 'Political institutions: The neglected side of the story'. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 6, 213-253.
55. Mueller, D. C. (1996). Constitutional Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
56. Mueller, D. C. (ed.) (1997). Perspectives on Public Choice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
57. Niskanen, W. A. (1971). Bureaucracy and Representative Government. New York: Aldine-Atherton.
58. Niskanen, W. A. (1975). 'Bureaucrats and Politicians'. Journal of Law and Economics, 18, 617-643.
59. Niskanen, W. A. (2001). 'Bureaucracy', In W. F. Shughart and L. Razzolini (eds.) The Elgar Companion to Public Choice. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 258-270.
60. Olson, M. (1965). The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
61. Olson, M. (1982). The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation and Social Rigidities. New Haven: Yale University Press.
62. Peltzman, S. (1984). 'Constituent interest and congressional voting'. Journal of Law and Economics, 27, 181-210.
63. Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (2001). Political Economics. Cambridge: MIT Press.
64. Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (2003). The Economic Effects of Constitutions. Cambridge: MIT Press.
65. Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Belknap Press.
66. Reder, M. W. (1982). 'Chicago economics: Permanence and change'. Journal of Economic Literature, 20, 1-38.
67. Riker, M. W. (1962). The Theory of Political Coalitions. New Haven: Yale University Press.
68. Riker, M. W. (1964). Federalism: Origins, Operation Significance. Boston: Little Brown.
69. Riker, W. H. and Ordeshook, P. C. (1973). An Introduction to Positive Political Theory. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.
70. Romer, T. and Rosenthal, H. (1978). 'Political resource allocation: Controlled agendas and the status quo'. Public Choice, 33, 27-43.
71. Romer, T. and Rosenthal, H. (1979). 'The elusive median voter'. Journal of Public Economics, 12, 143-170.
72. Rowley, C. K. (1984). 'The relevance of the median voter theorem'. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 140, 104-135.
73. Rowley, C. K. (1992). The Right to Justice. Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.
74. Rowley, C. K. (1993). 'Introduction' In C. K. Rowley (ed.) Public Choice Theory, Volume 1, Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. ix-xxix.
75. Rowley, C. K. (1997). ' Donald Wittman's the myth of democratic failure', Public Choice, 92, 15-26.
76. Rowley, C. K. (2001). 'The international economy in public choice perspective' In W. F. Shughart and L. Razzolini (eds.) The Elgar Companion to Public Choice. Cheltenham UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 645-672.
77. Rowley, C. K. and Schneider, F. (eds.) (2004). The Encyclopedia of Public Choice. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
78. Rowley, C. K., Shughart, W. F. and Tollison, R. D. (1987). 'Interest groups and deficits.' In J. M. Buchanan, C. K. Rowley and R. D. Tollison (eds.) Deficits. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 263-280.
79. Rowley, C. K., Tollison, R. D. and Tullock, G. (eds.) (1988). The Political Economy of Rent Seeking. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
80. Rowley, C. K. and Vachris, M. A. (1993). 'Snake oil economics versus public choice' In C. K. Rowley (ed.) Public Choice Theory, Volume 3, Aldershot, UK.: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 573-84.
81. Rowley, C. K. and Vachris, M. A. (1994). 'Why democracy does not necessarily produce efficient results', Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice, 12, 95-111.
82. Shepsle, K. A. (1978). The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
83. Shepsle, K. A. (1982). 'The budget: Will a constitutional amendment help?' Challenge, 25, 53-56.
84. Shepsle, K. A. and Weingast, B. R. (1981). 'Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice'. Public Choice, 37, 503-520.
85. Shughart, W. F. and Razzolini, L. (eds.) (2001). The Elgar Companion to Public Choice. Cheltenham, UK.: Edward Elgar Publishing.
86. Stigler, G. J. (1971). 'The theory of economic regulation'. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 2, 137-146.
87. Stigler, G. J. (1988). Chicago Studies in Political Economy. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
88. Stigler, G. J. (1992). 'Law or economics', Journal of Law and Economics, 35, 455-468.
89. Tollison, R. D. (1982). 'Rent seeking: A survey'. Kyklos, 35, 575-602.
90. Tollison, R. D. (1988). Public choice and legislation'. Virginia Law Review, 74, 339-371.
91. Tollison, R. D. (1989). 'Chicago political economy'. Public Choice, 63(3), 293-298.
92. Tollison, R. D. (1997). 'Rent seeking.' In D. C. Mueller (ed.) Perspectives on Public Choice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 506-525.
93. Tollison, R. D. (2007). 'Old wine, new wine'. Public Choice, 132, 3-5.
94. Tullock, G. (1959). 'Problems in majority Voting'. Journal of Political Economy, 67, 571-579.
95. Tullock, G. (1965). The Politics of Bureaucracy. Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press.
96. Tullock, G. (1967). 'The welfare costs of tariffs, monopolies and theft'. Western Economic Journal, 5, 224-232.
97. Tullock, G. (1971). 'The cost of transfers'. Kyklos, 4, 629-643.
98. Tullock, G. (1975). 'The transitional gains trap'. The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 6, 671-678.
99. Tullock, G. (1976). The Vote Motive. London: Institute of Economic Affairs.
100. Tullock, G. (1980). 'Efficient rent-seeking' In J. M. Buchanan, R. D. Tollison and G. Tullock (eds.) Toward the Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society. College Station: Texas A & M University Press, pp. 97-112.
101. Tullock, G. (1981). 'Why so much stability?' Public Choice, 37, 189-202.
102. Tullock, G. (1991). 'Duncan Black: The founding father'. Public Choice, 71, 125-128.
103. Weingast, B. R. (1984). 'The Congressional Bureaucratic System: A principal-agent perspective'. Public Choice, 44, 147-191.
104. Weingast, B. R. and Moran, N. J. (1983). 'Bureaucratic discretion or congressional control?' Journal of Political Economy, 91, 765-800.
105. Wittman, D. (1989). 'Why democracies produce efficient results'. Journal of Political Economy, 97, 1395-1424.
106. Wittman, D. (1995). The Myth of Democratic Failure: Why Political Institutions are Efficient. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.