Old wine, new wine

Public Choice

Volumn 132, Issue 1-2, 2007, Pages 3-5

  Tollison, Robert D ^a  

^a CLEMSON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547362313     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-007-9160-2     Document Type: Review

References (10)

1. Alessina, A., Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (2006). Reply to Blankart and Koester's political economics versus public choice. Kyklos, 59(2), 201-208.
2. Acemoglu, D. (2005). Constitutions, politics, and economics. Journal of Economic Literature. 43, 1025-1048.
3. Blankart, C. B., & Koester, G. B. (2006). Political economics versus public choice. Kyklos, 59(2), 170-200.
4. Brennan, H. G., & Buchanan, J. M. (1980). The power to tax. Analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
5. Buchanan, J. M., & Tullock, G. (1962). The calculus of consent. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
6. Buchanan, J. M. (1986). The constitution of economic policy. In Les Prix Nobel. Stockholm: Almquist and Wicksell International.
7. Buchanan. J. M. (2004). Constitutional political economy. In C. K. Rowley. & F. Schneider (Eds.). The encyclopedia of public choice (Vol. 1, pp. 60-66). Boston: Kluwer.
8. Council of State Governments. Book of the states. Lexington: Iron Works Pike, various issues.
9. Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (2003). The economic effects of constitutions. Boston: MIT.
10. Tiebout, C. (1956). A pure theory of local expenditures. Journal of Political Economy, 64, 416-124.