Chapter 58 Emergent Conventions in Evolutionary Games

Handbook of Experimental Economics Results

Volumn 1, Issue C, 2008, Pages 520-530

  Van Huyck, John ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 67349215204     PISSN: 15740722     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0722(07)00058-3     Document Type: Review

References (14)

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