Corrigendum to "Preemptive collusion among corruptible law enforcers" [Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Volume (71/2), 441-450] (DOI:10.1016/j.jebo.2009.04.013);Preemptive collusion among corruptible law enforcers

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 71, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 441-450

  Samuel, Andrew ^a  

^a LOYOLA UNIVERSITY MARYLAND   (United States)

Author keywords

Bribery; Collusion; Corruption; Crime prevention; Moral hazard

Indexed keywords

EID: 67349194270     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2009.09.004     Document Type: Erratum

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