On the benefits of party competition

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 66, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 685-707

  Bernhardt, Dan ^a   Campuzano, Larissa ^b   Squintani, Francesco ^c,d,e   Câmara, Odilon ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

^b MATHEMATICA POLICY RESEARCH   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^d UNIVERSITY OF BRESCIA   (Italy)

^e UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 67349175294     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.10.007     Document Type: Article

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