The effects of loss aversion on trade policy: Theory and evidence

Journal of International Economics

Volumn 78, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 154-167

  Tovar, Patricia ^a  

^a BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Anti trade bias; Lobby formation; Loss aversion; Protection; Trade policy

Indexed keywords

ESTIMATION METHOD; INTERNATIONAL TRADE; PROFITABILITY; PROTECTIONISM; REGRESSION ANALYSIS; TRADE PERFORMANCE; TRADE POLICY;

EID: 67349158060     PISSN: 00221996     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2009.01.012     Document Type: Article

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