Rent dissipation, free riding, and trade policy

European Economic Review

Volumn 40, Issue 3-5, 1996, Pages 795-803

  Grossman, Gene M ^a   Helpman, Elhanan ^b,c  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^c CANADIAN INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED RESEARCH   (Canada)

Author keywords

Protection; Rents

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001337211     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0014-2921(95)00088-7     Document Type: Article

References (11)

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4. Grossman, Gene M. and Elhanan Helpman, 1994b, Endogenous innovation in the theory of growth, Journal of Economic Perspectives 8, 23-44.
5. Helpman, Elhanan, 1995, Politics and trade policy, Working paper no. 30-95 (Sackler Institute for Economic Studies, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv).
6. Hillman, Arye L., 1989, The political economy of protection (Harwood, Chur).
7. Levy, Philip I., 1993, Lobbying and international cooperation in tariff setting, Unpublished manuscript.
8. Magee, Stephen P., William A. Brock and Leslie Young, 1989, Black hole tariffs and endogenous policy theory (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA).
9. Olson, Mancur, 1965, The logic of collective action (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA).
10. Olson, Mancur, 1982, The rise and decline of nations (Yale University Press, New Haven, CT).
11. Pincus, Jonathan, 1975, Pressure groups and the pattern of tariffs, Journal of Political Economy 83, 757-778.