Persistent gaps and default traps

Journal of Development Economics

Volumn 89, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 271-284

  Catão, Luis A V ^a,b   Fostel, Ana ^c   Kapur, Sandeep ^d  

^a INTER AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK   (United States)

^b INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND   (United States)

^c GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^d UNIVERSITY OF LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Default premium; Emerging market bond spreads; Output persistence; Serial default; Sovereign Debt

Indexed keywords

CREDIT PROVISION; DATA SET; DEBT; DEBT CRISIS; INCOME; INTEREST RATE; MODEL; SOVEREIGNTY; THEORETICAL STUDY; VULNERABILITY;

EID: 67349144373     PISSN: 03043878     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2008.06.013     Document Type: Article

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