Coordinating creditors

American Economic Review

Volumn 95, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 388-392

  Wright, Mark L J ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33747441515     PISSN: 00028282     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1257/000282805774670437     Document Type: Article

References (6)

1. Bulow, Jeremy and Rogoff, Kenneth. "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt." Journal of Political Economy, 1989a, 97(1), pp. 155-78.
2. Bulow, Jeremy and Rogoff, Kenneth. "Sovereign Debt: Is To Forgive To Forget?" American Economic Review, 1989b, 79(1), pp. 43-50.
3. Kletzer, Kenneth M. and Wright, Brian D. "Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter." American Economic Review, 2000, 90(3), pp. 621-39.
4. Kocherlakota, Narayana. "Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment." Review of Economic Studies, 1996, 63(4), pp. 595-609.
5. Wright, Mark L. J. "Reputations and Sovereign Debt." Working Paper, Stanford University, 2004a.
6. Wright, Mark L. J. "Creditor Coordination and Sovereign Risk." Working Paper, Stanford University, 2004b.