Governance structures in the hotel industry

Journal of Business Research

Volumn 62, Issue 8, 2009, Pages 841-847

  Dahlstrom, Robert ^a,b   Haugland, Sven A ^c   Nygaard, Arne ^b   Rokkan, Aksel I ^d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY   (United States)

^b BI NORWEGIAN BUSINESS SCHOOL   (Norway)

^c NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Norway)

^d Institute for Research in Economics and Business Administration   (Norway)

Author keywords

Agency theory; Franchising; Hotel industry; Monitoring; Service industry; Voluntary chains

Indexed keywords

EID: 67349105676     PISSN: 01482963     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbusres.2007.07.033     Document Type: Article

References (55)

1. Anderson E. The salesperson as outside agent or employee: a transaction cost analysis. Mark Sci 4 3 (1995) 234-254
2. Barney J. Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. J Manage 17 1 (1991) 99-120
3. Baum J., and Mezias S.J. Localized competition and organizational failure in the Manhattan hotel industry, 1898-1990. Adm Sci Q 37 4 (1992) 580-604
4. Bergen M., Dutta S., and Walker Jr. O.C. Agency relationships in marketing: a review of the implications and applications of agency and related theories. J Mark 56 3 (1992) 1-24
5. Bradach J.L., and Eccles R.G. Price, authority, and trust: from ideal types to plural forms. Am Rev Soc 15 (1989) 97-118
6. Brickley J.A., and Dark F.H. The choice of organizational form: the case of franchising. J Financ Econ 18 (1987) 401-420 (July)
7. Brickley J.A., Dark F.H., and Weisbach M.S. The economic effects of franchise termination laws. J Law Econ 34 (1991) 101-132 (April)
8. Brown J.R., Dev C.S., and Brown D.-J.L. Managing marketing channel opportunism: the efficacy of alternative governance mechanisms. J Mark 64 (2000) 51-65 (April)
9. Carney M., and Gedajlovic E. Vertical integration in franchise systems: agency theory and resource explanations. Strateg Manage J 12 (1991) 607-629
10. Chung W., and Kalnins A. Agglomeration effects and performance: a test of the Texas lodging industry. Strateg Manage J 22 10 (2001) 969-988
11. Combs J.G., and Ketchen Jr. D.J. Can capital scarcity help agency theory explain franchising? Revisiting the capital scarcity hypothesis. Acad Manage J 42 2 (1999) 196-207
12. Conner K. A historical comparison of resource-based theory and five schools of thought within industrial economics: do we have a new theory of the firm?. J Manage 17 1 (1991) 121-154
13. Conner K., and Prahalad C.K. A resource-based theory of the firm: knowledge versus opportunism. Organ Sci 7 5 (1996) 477-501
14. Contractor F.J., and Kundu S.K. Modal choice in a world of alliances: analyzing organizational forms in the international hotel sector. J Int Bus Stud 29 2 (1998) 325-358
15. Contractor F.J., and Kundu S.K. Franchising versus company-run operations: modal choice in the global hotel sector. J Int Mark 6 2 (1998) 28-53
16. Corriveau G., and Tamilia R.D. Comparing transactional forms in administered, contractual and corporate systems in grocery distribution. J Bus Res 55 (2002) 771-773
17. Coughlan A., Anderson E., Stern L., and El-Ansary A. Marketing Channels (2001), Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.
18. Dahlstrom R., and Nygaard A. An empirical investigation of ex post transaction costs in franchised distribution channels. J Mark Res 36 2 (1999) 160-170
19. Dahlstrom R., and Nygaard A. A preliminary investigation of franchised oil distribution in Norway. J Retail 70 2 (1994) 171-183
20. Eisenhardt K.M. Agency theory: an assessment and review. Acad Manage Rev 14 1 (1989) 57-74
21. Goldberg S.M., Green P.E., and Wind Y. Conjoint analysis of price premiums for hotel amenities. J Bus 57 1 (1984) 111-132
22. Granovetter M.S. Economic action and social structure: the problem of embeddedness. Am J Soc 91 (1985) 481-510
23. Gulati R. Alliances and networks. Strateg Manage J 19 (1998) 293-317
24. Harrigan K.R. Formulating vertical integration strategies. Acad Manage Rev 9 (1984) 638-652 (December)
25. Hart O. The market mechanism as an incentive scheme. Bell J Econ 14 (1983) 366-382 (Autumn)
26. Holmstrom B. Moral hazard and observability. Bell J Econ 10 1 (1979) 74-91
27. Ingram P., and Baum J.A.C. Chain affiliation and the failure of Manhattan hotels, 1898-1980. Adm Sci Q 42 1 (1997) 68-102
28. Ingram P., and Inman G. Institutions, intergroup competition, and the evolution of hotel populations around Niagara Falls. Adm Sci Q 41 4 (1996) 629-658
29. Ingram P., and Roberts P.W. Friendships among competitors in the Sydney hotel industry. Am J Sociol 106 2 (2000) 387-423
30. Kwoka J.E. The Herfindahl index in theory and practice. Antitrust Bull 30 (1985) 915-947 (Winter)
31. Lafontaine F., and Kaufinann P.J. The evolution of ownership patterns in franchise systems. J Retail 70 2 (1994) 97-115
32. Larson A. Network dyads in entrepreneurial settings: a study of the governance of exchange relationships. Adm Sci Q 37 1 (1992) 76-104
33. Machlup F. Theories of the firm: marginalist, behavioral, managerial. Am Econ Rev 57 (1967) 1-33 (March)
34. Marshall A. Principles of economics (1920), Macmillan, London
35. Michael S.C. Do franchised chains advertise enough?. J Retail 75 4 (1999) 467-478
36. Milgrom P., and Roberts J. Economics, organization and management (1992), Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ
37. Mohr J.J., Fisher R.J., and Nevin J.R. Collaborative communication in interfirm relationships: moderating effects of integration and control. J Mark 60 (1996) 103-115 (July)
38. Muller C.C. Endorsed branding: the next step in restaurant-brand management. Cornell Hotel Restaur Adm Q 39 3 (1998) 90-95
39. Norton S.W. An empirical look at franchising as an organizational form. J Bus 61 2 (1988) 197-218
40. Norwegian Travel Book (2000), Norsk Reiseinformasjon AS, Oslo
41. Nygaard A., and Myrtveit I. Moral Hazard, competition and contract design: empirical evidence from managerial, franchised and entrepreneurial businesses in Norway. App Econ 32 3 (2000) 349-356
42. Oberschall A., and Leifer E.M. Efficiency and social institutions: uses and misuses of economic reasoning in sociology. Annu Rev Sociol 12 (1986) 233-253
43. Pak Y.S.P. The effect of strategic motives on the choice of entry modes: an empirical test of international franchisers. Multinatl Bus Rev 10 1 (2002) 28-36
44. Perrow C. Complex organizations: A critical essay (1987), McGraw-Hill, New York, NY
45. Poppo L., and Zenger T. Testing alternative theories of the firm: transaction cost, knowledge-based, and measurement explanations for make-or-buy decisions in information services. Strateg Manage J 19 9 (1998) 853-877
46. PricewaterhouseCoopers. Hospitality Directions U.S. Edition (2000), PricewaterhouseCoopers, New York
47. Rubin P.H. The theory of the firm and the structure of the franchise contract. J Law Econ 21 (1978) 223-233 (April)
48. Scherer F.M. Industrial market structure and economic performance (1980), Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston
49. Shepard A. Contractual form, retail price, and asset characteristics in gasoline retailing. Rand J Econ 24 1 (1993) 58-77
50. Shook C., and Shook R.L. Franchising: The business strategy that changed the world (1993), Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ
51. Stanworth J., and Kaufmann P.J. The decision to purchase a franchise: a study of prospective franchisees. J Small Bus Manage 33 4 (1995) 22-31
52. Statistics Norway. Statistisk Årbok (Statistical Yearbook) (1998), Statistisk sentralbyrå, Oslo, Norway
53. Walker G., and Weber D. A transaction cost approach to make-or-buy decisions. Adm Sci Q 29 3 (1984) 373-392
54. Walsh J.P. Companies extend brands' development throughout the world. Hotel Motel Manage 219 5 (2004) 26-27
55. Wernerfelt B. A resource-based view of the firm. Strateg Manage J 5 2 (1984) 171-180