Moral hazard, competition and contract design: Empirical evidence from managerial, franchised and entrepreneurial businesses in Norway

Applied Economics

Volumn 32, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 349-356

  Nygaard, Arne ^a   Myrtveit, Ingunn ^a  

^a BI NORWEGIAN BUSINESS SCHOOL   (Norway)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPETITION; CONTRACTION; ENTREPRENEUR; OIL INDUSTRY;

EID: 0034688599     PISSN: 00036846     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/000368400322778     Document Type: Article

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