Corporate governance mechanisms and their impact on firm value

Corporate Ownership and Control

Volumn 4, Issue 1 A, 2006, Pages 25-36

  Del Brio, Esther B ^a   Maia Ramires, Elida ^a   Perote, Javier ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SALAMANCA   (Spain)

^b UNIVERSIDAD REY JUAN CARLOS   (Spain)

Author keywords

Compliance; Corporate governance code; Director remuneration; Panel data

Indexed keywords

EID: 67049140934     PISSN: 17279232     EISSN: 18103057     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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