Chapter 19 The Movies

Handbook of the Economics of Art and Culture

Volumn 1, Issue , 2006, Pages 615-665

  De Vany, Arthur ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

adaptive optimization; contracts; extreme events; movies; uncertainty

Indexed keywords

EID: 66049085093     PISSN: 15740676     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0676(06)01019-2     Document Type: Review

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