Principal agent theory and artificial information asymmetry: Research and analysis

Politics

Volumn 29, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 137-144

  Poth, Stephan ^a   Selck, Torsten J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ASYMMETRY; INFORMATION; POLITICS; RESEARCH; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 65349127574     PISSN: 02633957     EISSN: 14679256     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9256.2009.01349.x     Document Type: Article

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