Selfish routing in the presence of network uncertainty

Parallel Processing Letters

Volumn 19, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 141-157

  Georgiou, Chryssis ^a   Pavlides, Theophanis ^a   Philippou, Anna ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CYPRUS   (Cyprus)

Author keywords

Incomplete information; Nash Equilibrium; Selfish routing; User specific cost

Indexed keywords

CONGESTION GAMES; INCOMPLETE INFORMATION; INCOMPLETE NETWORKS; NASH EQUILIBRIUM; NETWORK LINKS; NEW MODELS; NON EXISTENCES; OPEN PROBLEMS; PARALLEL LINKS; POLYNOMIAL-TIME ALGORITHMS; PRICE OF ANARCHIES; PURE NASH EQUILIBRIUM; SELFISH ROUTING; SOCIAL COSTS; UPPER BOUNDS; USER-SPECIFIC COST;

COSTS; METALS; PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS;

TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS;

EID: 65249098243     PISSN: 01296264     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1142/S0129626409000122     Document Type: Article

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