Ambition and party loyalty in the U.S. senate

American Politics Research

Volumn 37, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 449-464

  Treul, Sarah A ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA   (United States)

Author keywords

Legislative behavior; Party loyalty; Political ambition; Progressive ambition; U.S. Senate

Indexed keywords

EID: 65149093143     PISSN: 1532673X     EISSN: 15523373     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1532673X08322260     Document Type: Article

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