Network architecture and traffic flows: Experiments on the Pigou-Knight-Downs and Braess Paradoxes

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 66, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 348-372

  Morgan, John ^a   Orzen, Henrik ^b   Sefton, Martin ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 64749113972     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.04.012     Document Type: Article

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