Competing auctions

Journal of the European Economic Association

Volumn 2, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 30-66

  Ellison, Glenn ^a   Möbius, Markus ^b   Fudenberg, Drew ^b  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 4544294055     PISSN: 15424766     EISSN: 15424774     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/154247604323015472     Document Type: Article

References (17)

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