Least-cost avoidance: The tragedy of common safety

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Volumn 25, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 235-261

  Dari Mattiacci, Giuseppe ^a,c   Garoupa, Nuno ^b  

^a TINBERGEN INSTITUTE   (Netherlands)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 64749111099     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: 14657341     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewm052     Document Type: Article

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