Enforcement costs, optimal sanctions, and the choice between ex-post liability and ex-ante regulation

International Review of Law and Economics

Volumn 24, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 29-48

  Innes, Robert ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

Author keywords

Enforcement costs; Ex post liability; Optimal sanctions

Indexed keywords

EID: 2542432105     PISSN: 01448188     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2004.03.003     Document Type: Article

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