Nazi-Jewish negotiations in Istanbul in mid-1944

Holocaust and Genocide Studies

Volumn 13, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 405-436

  Friling, Tuvia ^a  

^a BEN GURION UNIVERSITY OF THE NEGEV   (Israel)

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EID: 63849222902     PISSN: 87566583     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/hgs/13.3.405     Document Type: Article

References (159)

1. See the memorandum of "Joel's Remarks," June 11, 1944, General Chronological Documentation (hereinafter GCD), Ben-Gurion Archives at the Ben-Gurion Heritage Institute and Research Center (hereinafter ABG); and June 14, 1944, Protocols of the Jewish Agency Executive (hereinafter JAE), Central Zionist Archive (hereinafter CZA)
2. For a detailed analysis of Grosz's personality and the nature of his mission, see the letter of the U.S. consul in Istanbul to the State Department, June 13, 1944, 862/20200/6-1344, U.S. National Archives (hereinafter NA) Record Group 59. Regarding Grosz's missions, see: Grosz's testimony in the Kasztner case, S. Rosenfeld, Tiq Plili (Tel Aviv, 1956), pp. 81-84
3. Y. Bauer, "Shlihuto Shel Brand," Yalkut Moreshet 26 (November 1978), pp. 25, 49-52
4. and B. Vago, "The Intelligence Aspects of the Joel Brand Mission," Yad Vashem Studies 10 (1974), pp. 111-28
5. Regarding Joel Brand, see Y. Bauer, "Shlihuto Shel Brand"
6. and Y. Bauer, "Shlihuto Shel Yo'el Brand," Ha-Sho'ah - Hebetim Historiyim (Tel Aviv, 1982)
7. The Brand offer said that the Gestapo was willing to exchange 100 Jews for each truck, a total of one million Jews for 10,000 trucks. It further demanded 100 tons of coffee, 800 tons of tea, 200 tons of cocoa, and two million bars of soap. Nazi officials explained that they were willing to commit themselves to using the trucks only on the Eastern Front, apparently to appease the Western Powers. They also conditioned the deal on the transfer of the Jews to Spain and Portugal, not to Palestine
8. The connection with Haj Amin el-Husseini was established before the war broke out. This understanding was obtained with Hitler himself
9. Richard Breitman and Shlomo Aronson, "The End of the 'Final Solution?': Nazi Plans to Ransom Jews in 1944," Central European History 25: 2 (1993), p. 177
10. For more information, see Yehuda Bauer, Jews for Sale? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994)
11. Breitman and Aronson, "The End of the 'Final Solution?'"
12. Paul Rose, "Joel Brand's Interim Agreement and the Course of the Nazi-Jewish Negotiations 1944-1945," The Historical Journal 34:4 (1991), p. 910ff
13. A. Elon, Timetable (Jerusalem: Edanim Publishers, 1980)
14. Hava Eshkolu (Wagner), Silence, Mapai and the Holocaust 1939-1942 (Jerusalem: Yad Itzhak Ben-Zvi, 1994)
15. Dan Kurzman, Ben-Gurion: Prophet of Fire (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983)
16. Dina Porat, An Entangled Leadership: The Yishuv and the Holocaust, 1942-1945 (Tel-Aviv: Am Oved Publishers, 1986) pp. 380-83
17. Tom Segev, The Seventh Million: The Israelis and the Holocaust (Jerusalem: Maxwell-Macmillan-Keter Publishing House, 1991)
18. Yechaim Weitz Aware But Helpless: Mapai and the Holocaust 1943-1945 (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 1944)
19. S. B. Beit-Zvi, Post-Ugandan Zionism in the Crucible of Fire (Tel-Aviv: Bronfman Publishers, 1977)
20. Pomerantz's remarks, May 25, 1944, JAE, CZA; E. Avriel, Open the Gates! (New York, 1975), pp. 174-89
21. Decisions, May 25, 1944, JAE, CZA. The main disagreement that arose in the executive at that stage, and that continued throughout the entire episode, revolved around whether the British should be made privy to the offer. The bearer and agent of the disagreement in the executive was Yitzhak Grünbaum, the permanent acting JAE chairman for Ben-Gurion and the chairman of the Rescue Committee, an organization whose role can be understood only in a separate discussion. This argument was divorced from reality, inasmuch as the British and U.S. intelligence services already knew about the plan from several independent sources. Regarding a similar debate between the emissaries in Istanbul, see M. Bader, Shlihuyot 'Atsuvot (Tel Aviv, 1954), p. 103. Bader was opposed to disclosing the offer, because he feared it would close the door at the outset, whereas the other emissaries who were involved understood that they had no choice but to disclose the plan. Moreover, such disclosure was necessitated by the need to arrange the exit of Pomerantz as quickly as possible and to transmit the information to Jerusalem through special channels
22. See also: H. Barlas, Hatzalah Bimei Shoah (Tel Aviv, 1975), p. 113; the cable of the British Ambassador, Cable No. 794, PRO/FO 371 W8465 42758; and Barlas to "Friends" in Budapest regarding the transmission of the information to the British and the Americans, correspondence, July 5, 1944, ABG
23. A summary of Pomerantz's remarks in the JAE on May 25, 1944 was transmitted to Weizmann through Randall. See Randall to Weizmann, and George Hall to Weizmann, June 5, 1944, Weizmann Archive
24. Weizmann to Eden, June 6, 1944, Weizmann Archive
25. Ben-Gurion, June 4, 1944, JAE, CZA
26. and Hall to Weizmann, June 6, 1944, JAE, CZA
27. See also M. Kedem, "Pe'iluto ha-Medinit Shel Hayim Weizmann be-Tequfat Milhemet ha-'Olam ha-Shniya," Ph.D. dissertation, Bar-Ilan University (Ramat Gan, 1979), p. 256
28. B. Wasserstein, Britain and the Jews of Europe 1939-1945 (Oxford, 1979), pp. 251-52, 254-55
29. D. Hadar, "Yahas ha-Ma'atsamot le-Shlihut Yo'el Brand," Molad 4:19-20 (May-June 1971), p. 117
30. The desire to gain time as a way of bringing about negotiations arose in different forms throughout the affair, and talk in this vein arose in other contexts. The race against time was an open secret in all circles that engaged in covert activities, as they were well aware of the general trend in the evolution of the war
31. The Turks delayed Sharett's request because they feared entanglement of Turkey in an espionage or rescue operation that would, at the very least, entail large-scale immigration to or through its territory. Turkey saw its best course of action to be that of maintaining the status quo. Geopolitical factors contributed to this position, as did bitter memories of the dreadful events of WWI. Turkey had managed to straddle the fence during WWII, albeit with some discomfort
32. The first interim agreement provided for the following: (1) The immediate cessation of the deportations in exchange for 1,000,000 "Nathans" (Swiss francs, named after Nathan Schwalb, the representative of Hehalutz, the Pioneering Zionist Youth movement's umbrella organization, in Switzerland), which would be paid every month; (2) immigration to Palestine of persons selected by us in exchange for 400 "Stephens" (dollars, named after Stephen Wise, the president of the World Jewish Congress), per person, at each transport of 1000 persons; (3) an exit by sea to temporary camps in neutral countries (such as Spain) in exchange for 1 million Stephens per 10,000-person transport; (4) the supply of food, clothing, shoes, and medicines to the camps and ghettos (the Germans, in exchange for each train of goods transferred to the camps and ghettos, would receive a similar such train); (5) the granting of power of attorney on a temporary basis to Brand, who could enter into commitments on behalf of the Moledet (fatherland, the code name adopted by Bader for the Nazis' benefit to refer to the Jewish Agency according to Y. Bauer, Jews for Sale? [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994], p. 176) in the spirit of this protocol
33. Was the proposal transmitted for Jerusalem's approval before it was sent to Budapest? In the documentation at our disposal, we did not find any such approval. There is, however, confirmation that it was sent (May 29, 1944, CZA S26/1251)
34. A. Elon, Timetable, pp. 153-55, states that such a cable arrived from Barlas ("Steiner") to Sharett, and that he also tried to bring it before Ben-Gurion
35. Regarding the emissaries' ongoing preparation in case the proposal was accepted, see June 4, 1944, JAE, CZA
36. Regarding the dispatch of this interim agreement, see Barlas to "friends" in Budapest, correspondence, July 5, 1944, ABG
37. M. Bader, Shlihuyot 'Atsuvot, pp. 104-5
38. A. Weissberg, Desperate Mission: Joel Brand's Story (New York, 1958)
39. [J. Brand, Be-Shlihut Nidonim le-Mavet (Tel Aviv, 1960)], pp. 116-18
40. E. Avriel, Open the Gates!, pp. 175-80
41. and Bader to Pomerantz, June 10, 1944, Moreshet Archive, Giv'at-Haviva, DI, 1720
42. According to Paul L. Rose (Joel Brand's Interim Agreement, and the Course of Nazi-Jewish Negotiations, 1944-1945," The Historical Journal 34: 4 [1991], p. 910) the agreement reached Budapest only on July 7. In my estimation, the agreement to which Rose refers is the second interim agreement, which was cabled to Vienna on June 30
43. and Bader's letters to Pomerantz, May 27, 1944 and June 10, 1944
44. A. Weissberg, Desperate Mission
45. [J. Brand, Be-Shlihut Nidonim le-Mavet], pp. 159-61
46. S. Rosenfeld, Tiq Plili, pp. 155-65
47. and June 14, 1944, JAE, CZA. Bauer, Jews for Sale, p. 180
48. The new affair appeared to be a more extensive incarnation of Slovakian negotiations that had come to nothing. Wisliceny made a quick visit to Bratislava a number of days after the occupation of Hungary. He approached members of the Jewish leadership there, who were known to him from his activity with them in a ransom plan connected with their country. He pointed out to them "their ability to reap the fruits of a new Europa plan." According to the advice of Weissmandel, a leader of the community there, he was furnished with three letters of recommendation for the three currents in Hungarian Jewry. See L. Rothkirchen, "Qishrey ha-Mahteret Beyn ha-Manhigut ha-Yehudit me-Slovaqia uv-Hungarya," Hanhagat Yehudey Hungarya be-Mivhan ha-Sho'ah (Jerusalem, 1969/70), p. 129
49. About the new deployment in Hungary, see R. L. Braham, The Politics of Genocide: The Holocaust in Hungary (New York, 1981), p. 943
50. Grosz did indeed report to the English and the Americans everything he knew (June 14, 1944, JAE, CZA; June 11, 1944, GCD, ABG). See also Barton Berry's detailed report to his superiors, June 13, 1944 (NA, RG 226, Entry 94, Box 554, Folder 30, 13.6.1944)
51. The High Commissioner to the Colonial Office, with copies to the ambassador in Ankara and to the Minister Resident in Cairo, June 15, 1944, PRO/FO 371/42758. This is the most detailed source regarding the course of the meeting and the remarks of Ben-Gurion and Sharett in that meeting. The High Commissioner dispatched this report to his government on the same day (H. Barlas, Hatzalah Bimei Shoah, pp. 124-25)
52. Regarding the report of the officer who recorded the protocol, see B. Wasserstein, Britain and the Jews of Europe p. 255, note 88
53. For example Hankey, May 27, 1944, PRO/F0371/42758, W8626
54. The participants in the various discussions included, among others: Foreign Secretary Eden, Secretary of State for Colonies Oliver Stanley, and the Minister of Economic Warfare, Lord Selborne, who was also responsible for a portion of the British intelligence system. Other participants included Deputy Foreign Secretary George H. Hall and the chief of the Political Department in the Foreign Office, Alec W. G. Randall. In these discussions, a decision crystallized to refrain from discussing the German offer, which "is nothing but another, sophisticated form of warfare against the Allies." Among the arguments justifying opposition to the offer was that such an offer would be liable to beget another offer, which "would overburden Britain still further with an even larger number of Jews." Also, the mass evacuation of Jews through Turkey would be liable to result in pressure to increase immigration quotas at "an especially critical time"; Britain would not be able to change its immigration quota if, after a time, Spain and Portugal could not hold so many Jews. War Cabinet No. 71, conclusion No. 3, June 1, 1944, PRO; May 31, 1944, PRO CAB 95/15
55. The argument concerning the need to focus efforts on opening a new front and shortening the war in general was also valid with respect to the Jewish question. An unequivocal statement by the British Government immediately rejecting the offer, when the Yishuv was filled with hope, would have been liable to ignite the Yishuv. The British Government must have considered this a danger and therefore equivocated
56. For example Halifax to the Department of State in Washington, June 5, 1944, Yad Vashem P12/25
57. See D. Porat, The Blue and the Yellow Stars of David: The Zionist Leadership in Palestine and the Holocaust, 1939-1945 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 359 for reference to a memorandum John Pehle gave Stettinius of a conversation he had with the President
58. In that conversation the President agreed to keep the negotiation alive in order to gain time. Porat, however, does not cite a specific document demonstrating that Pehle met directly with the President. Pehle to Morgenthau, June 14, 1944, recalls Roosevelt's satisfaction with the affair. M. Gilbert, Auschwitz and the Allies (New York, 1981), pp. 224-25
59. D. Hadar, "Yahas ha-Ma'atsamot le-Shlihut Yo'el Brand," pp. 112-19
60. A. D. Morse, While Six Million Died (New York, 1998), pp. 355-58
61. I. A. Hirschmann, Life Line to a Promised Land (New York, 1946), pp. 106-8
62. On the one hand, the U.S. administration instructed its ambassador in the Soviet Union, Averell Harriman, to report the offer and the U.S. position on it to the Soviets. On the other hand, the U.S. administration instructed Harriman to emphasize that nothing had happened yet, and that any action regarding the matter would be taken only after consultation between, and with the consent of, the Allies. The main points of this position - i.e., that the offer was not to be completely rejected, and that it heralded the formulation of other, more reasonable offers - were also cabled on June 19 to London. Because negotiations were likely to delay the destruction of Jews, the United States was willing to clarify to the Germans that the Western Allies would grant temporary shelter to any Jew who would be released. The United States conveyed details of the offer to the Soviets a number of days before the British instructed their ambassador in Moscow, Clark Kerr, to convey the details of the German offer to the Soviets (M. Gilbert, Auschwitz and the Allies, pp. 224-25)
63. At the end of 1943, a limited, blocked fund was set up in Switzerland, against which money could be drawn in Romania to finance the immigration of 70,000 Jews from Transnistria. This fund was established under pressure exerted by Jewish groups in the United States. Henry Morgenthau, then Secretary of the Treasury, and Stephen Wise, the president of the World Jewish Congress, headed this operation. A similar fund was established in Switzerland in an attempt to rescue the Jews of Slovakia and to then advance a more comprehensive plan known as the "Europa plan." In that instance, the activity was concentrated in the hands of the JDC. See Tuvia Friling, "David Ben-Gurion ve-Sho'at Yehudey Eropa, 1939-1915," Ph.D dissertation, Hebrew University (Jerusalem, 1990), the chapters on Transnistria and Slovakia
64. The formulation of this independent option in Cairo has hitherto not been treated in the literature, perhaps because the main evidence we have found for this development is a foreign, non-Yishuv source. The tripartite meeting in Cairo. Cairo, June 28, 1944, NA/RG 226, Entry 120, Box 32, Folder 222, OSS
65. In June 1942, Pinkney Tuck, who was the U.S. chargé d'affaires in Vichy France, initiated a plan to save Jewish children who had become separated from their parents. The partners in this initiative were: JDC representatives in Europe; U.S. State Department officials; the Board to Look After Children headed by the president's wife, Eleanor Roosevelt; and others. The United States, Canada, the Dominican Republic, and other states expressed a willingness to absorb some of these children. The Yishuv also sought to absorb children. See Y. Bauer, American Jewry and the Holocaust (Detroit, 1981), pp. 259-61. Regarding Steinhardt's appeal to Tuck to prepare Hirschmann's visit and to help Hirschmann, see June 20, 1944, NA/RG84
66. Magnes was made privy. He then requested approval from his president in New York, Paul Baerwald, while the OSS branch in Palestine listened in on the entire matter (Memo, August 27, 1944, p. 4)
67. and Baerwald to Magnes, June 22, 1944, NA/RG 226, Entry 120
68. Hirschmann memo, June 22, 1944, NA/RG84
69. June 24, 1944, Saturday evening, JAE, CZA
70. "Shim'on" is one of the code names given to him by the Yishuv. Commander Saunders Wolfson [code name: Piqa'], a great friend of the Yishuv in Istanbul, was Simmonds's representative there. Jewish relations with Simmonds became closer during 1944 and 1945. Simmonds's main associates were Kollek, Zaslani, Avriel, and Tsvi Schecter (Yehi'eli)
71. This network was adopted by the Americans in the spring and early summer of 1943, sometime after an OSS branch was established in Istanbul, with the intent of obtaining intelligence on events in the networks of the Nazis and their satellites. On July 31, 1944, the OSS staff in Istanbul announced the liquidation of the Dogwood network after it was discovered that several of its central members were double agents, and that the entire network was conse-quently a grave intelligence failure. Following this failure, Lanning MacFarland, the chief of the OSS branch in Istanbul, was dismissed. However, at the time when Brand's mission developed, and at the time of the episode under discussion, the Dogwood network and its central characters were still tools in this complicated game
72. Y. Bauer, Jews for Sale?, pp. 135-41
73. B. Rubin, Istanbul Intrigues (New York, 1992), p. 179
74. B. Rubin, Istanbul Intrigues, p. 187. Kövess's U.S. code name was "Jacaranda." Although Kövess was monitored by British intelligence because of the pro-Nazi views that he expressed, and although he was a representative of the Danube Maritime Transportation Company, which was an arm of the Abwehr, he was recruited for the Dogwood network. He acknowledged to his recruiters that he had access to German intelligence, but he promised he would be very careful. He traveled a number of times on a mission for the OSS to Budapest
75. July 2, 1944, JAE, CZA
76. Bader to Pomerantz, correspondence, June 10, 1944, ABG. Cables between Budapest and Istanbul: Kasztner to the Palestine Office in Istanbul (German), correspondence, and Bader to Kasztner, Budapest, June 29, 1944, ABG
77. Cable from Zaslani to Kollek, correspondence, June 28, 1944, ABG. The message was sent from Istanbul on June 25
78. see Barlas to Grünbaum, June 25, 1944: ". . . matters are becoming more and more complicated. The tragedy is that we are conducting negotiations while the Jews of Hungary are being destroyed and deported for good. Yesterday, I received a telegram from Krausz via Geneva regarding the deportation of 400,000 Jews, and the hand of the evil one is still stretched out over the remnant in Budapest and the surrounding area . . . ," CZA, S26/1284
79. Bader to Pomerantz, correspondence, June 10, 1944, ABG. Bader assessed the new offer as follows: "Again, a new stage, and apparently not the last in this film, 'The Journey of the Jews to the End of the Night.' However, the dawn, the morning, and the sun are still very far away." Nonetheless, Bader, in responding to the offer, said, "Here we are, always ready for any negotiation to help and rescue Jews. We are ready to conduct such negotiations in a neutral country, and we are also ready to enter into the jaws of the enemy." BenGurion's instructions to Bader to wait until Kaplan arrived and to refrain from taking any action in the meantime were transmitted to Bader through various channels. Bader to Ben-Gurion, correspondence, July 8, 1944, ABG
80. For example, Bader to Pomerantz, correspondence, June 10, 1944, ABG: "The truth is that it is not difficult . . . here in Constantinople to ascertain the truth and even more than the truth."
81. For a graphic description of Istanbul as a city of spies, see I. A. Hirschmann, Life Line to a Promised Land, pp. 136-37
82. For tracking and eavesdropping from Jerusalem, see: N. Andronovitch to A. G. of S. Jerusalem, June 2, 1944, NA/RG226,; July 17, 1944 (the information from July 10), NA/RG 226, Entry 120, Box 32, Folder 221 and Box 27, Folder 174, and Entry 108, Box 65
83. A "select team" was concentrated in Istanbul: Kaplan and Avigur were about to depart; Zaslani preceded them there; and Avriel, the coordinator of the courier network, prepared to return. Since the new developments had become known, Zaslani, Kollek, and Sharett engaged the help of their associates in the U.S. and British intelligence services in Palestine, Cairo, and Istanbul to prepare the visas needed for those being sent to Turkey. Sharett himself even personally approached Col. Harold Gibson, a British intelligence chief in Turkey, to ask that he do everything in his power to ensure the return of Pomerantz and Avriel, and to ensure an entry and sojourn visa for Avigur. Ze'ev Schind was also active in Turkey regarding the same matter. The JAE decided to send Kaplan and Grünbaum to Turkey on June 18, 1944. See: June 18, 1944, JAE, CZA
84. Barlas to Grünbaum, June 25, 1944, CZA, S26/1284
85. For Grünbaum's response regarding Kaplan's visit, Sharett's mission to London, and Grünbaum's opinion of the plan, see Yitzhaq (Grünbaum) from Jerusalem to Hayim (Barlas), correspondence, June 28, 1944, ABG
86. By June 16, a place had been reserved for Avriel on a flight back to Turkey. Y. Kleinbaum to British Airways, CZA, S25/22681)
87. Similar requests went out to Kollek and Zaslani, and Schind was asked to take action with Gibson in Istanbul to expedite the matter (Eiga Shapira to Ze'ev Schind, June 22, 1994, CZA, S25/22681)
88. Cable from Ben-Gurion to Sharett, correspondence, July 2, 1944, ABG
89. cable from Ben-Gurion to Sharett, correspondence, July 2, 1944, ABG
90. Bader to Ben-Gurion, correspondence, July 8, 1944, ABG
91. Regarding the authorization of Kaplan, see also the Palestine Office in Istanbul to "friends" in Budapest, correspondence, July 5, 1944, ABG
92. Sharett and Ben-Gurion met with the High Commissioner on May 25 and on June 15, 1944. H. MacMichael to the Secretary of the Colonies, May 26, 1944, PRO/FO 371/42758
93. and the High Commissioner to the Colonial Office, with copies to the ambassador in Ankara and the Minister Resident in Cairo, June 15, 1944, PRO/FO 371/42758. See also note 19 above
94. For example D. Porat, "Ben-Gurion ve-Sho'at Yehudey Eropa," Ha-Tsiyonut 12 (1987), pp. 306-7, where surprise is expressed regarding Ben-Gurion's opposition to the offers made to Bader
95. According to Y. Bauer, Jews for Sale?, p. 184, Hirschmann was "a supporter of the Bergson group, a radical right-wing Zionist group that had managed to obtain a great deal of exposure on the plight of the Jews of Europe through aggressive advertising and the creation of committees of Gentile friends of considerable influence in American public life."
96. Weekly report of Menaliem Bader, June 25-July 1, 1944, CZA, S25/22460
97. See note 13 above regarding Moledet
98. See also Hirschmann to Magnes, CZA, S25/22460
99. Hirschmann addendum, June 22, 1944, NA/RG84
100. Hirschmann memo, June 22, 1944, NA/RG84; note 51 above
101. The delegation in Istanbul had grown and swollen due to pressures exerted by different parties, communities, and organizations in the Yishuv. This expansion resulted in the deterioration of the group's operational capability. As a result, several activist circles arose within the group. Not all of them, including the "opposition," enjoyed the same connections, information, and operational capability. This disparity more or less mirrored the Yishuv's political structure, which was based on its division into an opposition and a coalition
102. Weekly report of Menahem Bader, June 25-July 1, 1944, CZA, S25/22460 and in S25/22465
103. and Hirschmann to Magnes, June 22, 1944, CZA, S25/22460
104. See also Ehud Avriel to Eiga Shapira, June 29, 1944, CZA, S25/22681
105. Kaplan's report on his trip in Turkey, July 28, 1944, JAE, CZA, p. 1
106. See also Ha-Emet Shel Kasztner, Din ve-Heshbon Shel Va'ad ha-'Ezrah ve-ha-Hatsalah 1942-1945, reported by Dr. Yisrael Kasztner, trans. B. G. Rimon, Association to Perpetuate the Memory of Dr. Yisrael Kasztner, p. 113: Kasztner testified that the interim agreement arrived in Budapest in July. This apparently refers to the second interim agreement, not the first one
107. Barlas to "friends" in Budapest, wherein he treats at length "the offer made to Bader" and the difficulties of implementing it, correspondence, July 5, 1944, ABG
108. For another example of this logic, see Bader to Ben-Gurion, correspondence, July 8, 1944, ABG
109. Memorandum from Istanbul, July 10, 1944, ABG, GCD. For the difficulty of departing for Germany without the proper approvals, see Bader to Kasztner, correspondence, June 29, 1944, ABG, GCD
110. For subsequent details, see the report and memorandum of Magnes, July 13, 1944, ABG, GCD. For example the remarks of E. Avriel, Open the Gates!, p. 187, who dates Bader's mission as beginning only on July 9, 1944, which is a later stage as stated above. Kasztner's letter to Bader regarding Bader's mission, correspondence, July 15, 1944, ABG
111. Memorandum from Istanbul, July 8 and 10, 1944, ABG, GCD. According to the matters discussed in it, it seems that this date is incorrect. It is more likely July 12 or 13, 1944, ABG, GCD
112. Rose, "Joel Brand's 'Interim Agreement,'" pp. 909-29, discusses only one "interim agreement," the first. He ascribes to it great importance and far-reaching effects. According to him, this "interim agreement" reached Budapest only at the end of the first week of July, and only then did it begin to reverberate in Budapest and immediately thereafter in Berlin as well. These developments subsequently led to, among other things, the opening of additional channels of direct negotiations between Jewish circles and Nazis in Istanbul, Switzerland, the Iberian Peninsula, and Scandinavia
113. P. L. Rose, "Joel Brand's 'Interim Agreement,'" pp. 909-29
114. Bader to Ben-Gurion, correspondence, July 8, 1944, ABG; Barlas to "friends" in Budapest, which treats in detail "the offer made to Bader and the difficulties which have arisen so far in implementing it," July 5, 1944, ABG
115. Barlas to "friends" in Budapest, correspondence, July 5, 1944, ABG
116. P. L. Rose, "Joel Brands 'Interim Agreement,'" p. 915
117. Dobkin's report, September 21, 1944, JAE, CZA and in the Mapai Secretariat, September 24, 1944, Labor Party Archive
118. cables between Ben-Gurion and Sharett through the Head Secretary, correspondence, July 2, 4-5, and 7,1944, ABG; Sharett to Ben-Gurion, report on his activities, correspondence, July 13, 1944, ABG.
119. Menahem Bader to Ben-Gurion, correspondence, July 8, 1944, ABG
120. Dobkin to the British ambassador in Portugal, correspondence, July 12, 1944, ABG
121. Pomerantz and Bader to the executive, correspondence, July 23, 1944, ABG
122. Dobkin's report, September 21, 1944, JAE, CZA
123. Kasztner to Bader, correspondence, July 15, 1944, ABG
124. Barlas to "friends" in Budapest, July 5, 1944
125. This train, and especially the method for selecting the fortunate ones who would be included on it, would several years later become the focus of the wretched episode known as the "Kasztner affair." See J. and H. Brand, Ha'Shatan ve-ha-Necfesh (Tel Aviv, 1960)
126. A. Elon, Timetable; Ha-Emet Shel Kasztner, Din ve-Heshbon Shel Va'ad ha-'Ezrah ve-ha-Hatsalah 1942-1945
127. G. Hausner, The Chief Prosecutor of the Israeli Government against Adolf Eichmann, Testimonies, volume 2 (Jerusaelm, 1974)
128. Y. Weitz, The Man Who Was Murdered Twice (Jerusalem, 1995)
129. R. L. Braham, The Politics of Genocide
130. R. L. Braham, The Tragedy of Hungarian Jewry, (New York, 1986)
131. B. Hecht, Perfidy (New York, 1961)
132. D. Dinur and D. Kastner, Kasztner's Report (Tel Aviv, 1981); a play by Moti Lerner performed in the early 1990s by Habima, Tel Aviv
133. Regarding the meeting, see Sharett to Ben-Gurion and to Goldman, July 6, 1944, CZA, Z4/14870
134. See also the memorandum, July 6, 1944, GCD, ABG
135. CZA, Z4/14870, which also contains a protocol of the meeting, with, among other things, a request for the bombings
136. The clearest sign of this feeling is Ben-Gurion's trenchant speech of July 10, 1944, at the "Herzl Day" ceremony in Jerusalem, speeches, July 10, 1944, ABG
137. Ben-Gurion to Sharett and Ben-Gurion to Sharett through the Head Secretary and Magnes memorandum, correspondence, July 13, 1944, ABG
138. also, Magnes memorandum, CZA, S25/1682
139. For example D. Porat, "Ben-Gurion ve-Sho'at Yehudey Eropa," p. 307
140. Sharett to Randall, correspondence, July 14, 1944, ABG
141. Sharett's cable to Ben-Gurion through the head secretary on July 17, 1944, PRO/FO 371/42809. The cable is also in the correspondence, July 14, 1944
142. Ben-Gurion's report to the JAE, July 16, 1944
143. Regarding the leak, see: Sharett to Leo Cohen on Ankara as the source of the leak, correspondence, July 24, 1944, ABG; and Grünbaum's and Kaplan's remarks in the JAE meeting to the effect that the plan had been terminated in Moscow, July 23, 1944, JAE, CZA. Randall claimed that the United States was the source of the leak, but Dobkin believed the British to be the source, September 21, 1944, JAE, CZA
144. and chapter 30, "Fears of a Flood" pp. 263-70
145. R. L. Braham, The Politics of Genocide, volume 2
146. Sharett to Leo Cohen, correspondence, July 24, 1944, ABG
147. Sharett to Leo Cohen, copy to Ben-Gurion, correspondence, July 21, 1944 (received on July 23), ABG
148. Sharett to Randall, July 14, 1944, CZA Z4/14840
149. Randall to Sharett, July 15, 1944, CZA Z4/14840
150. Pomerantz and Bader to JAE, July 24, 1944, CZA Z4/14840
151. "Me'ir" (from Istanbul) to "Artsi," copy to Ben-Gurion, July 29, 1944, CZA Z4/14840
152. Pomerantz and Bader to JAE through the general consul of the Republic of Poland in Jerusalem, August 3, 1944,CZA Z4/14840
153. and Magnes to Paul Baerwald, president of the JDC, New York, JDC Archive, New York, Palestine File 748
154. For details regarding the entire episode in Portugal, see Dobkin's report, September 21, 1944, JAE, CZA
155. The cable reached Jerusalem on July 1, 1944. U.S. intelligence also intercepted this cable, NA/RG 226, Entry 120, Box 27, Folder 171, p. 5
156. Kaplan's report upon his return from Turkey, July 28, 1944, JAE, CZA; Sharett in London to Leo Cohen, the Jewish Agency, July 20, 1944, Jerusalem, quoted from a U.S. intelligence report (August 30, 1944, NA/RG226, Entry 191, Box 3, OSS)
157. Bauer, Jews for Sale?, pp. 245-50
158. Steven Koblik, The Stones Cry Out: Sweden's Response to the Persecution of the Jews, 1933-1945 (New York, 1988), pp. 124-40
159. Meredith Hindley, "Negotiating the Boundary of Unconditional Surrender: The War Refugee Board in Sweden and Nazi Proposals to Ransom Jews 1944-1945," Holocaust and Genocide Studies 10:1 (1996), pp. 67-70