Negotiating the boundary of unconditional surrender: The war refugee Board in Sweden and Nazi proposals to ransom Jews, 1944-1945

Holocaust and Genocide Studies

Volumn 10, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 52-77

  Hindley, Meredith ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 63849290404     PISSN: 87566583     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/hgs/10.1.52     Document Type: Review

References (70)

1. Scholars who have examined Nazi motives in extending ransom offers to the West, notably those extended by SS Reichsführer Heinrich Himmler, agree that the proposals were viewed as an opportunity to open a dialogue with Allied leadership on a separate peace. See Richard Breitman and Shlomo Aronson, "The End of the Final Solution? Nazi Plans to Ransom Jews in 1944," Central European History, 25:2, pp. 177-203
2. Yehuda Bauer, Jews for Sale? Nazi-Jewish Negotiations, 1933-1945 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994)
3. Richard Breitman, "American Rescue Activities in Sweden," Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 7:2. pp. 202-15
4. Henry L. Feingold, The Politics of Rescue: The Roosevelt Administration and the Holocaust, 1938-1945 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University, 1970)
5. and Monty N. Penkower, The Jews Were Expendable: Free World Diplomacy and the Holocaust (Chicago: University of Illinois, 1983)
6. Yehuda Bauer, Jews for Sale?
7. Gerhard Weinberg, World At Arms: A Global History of World War II (London: Cambridge, 1994) pp. 436-37
8. For a more detailed discussion of the military and strategic implications of the decision see chapters 13-14 in Michael Howard's Grand Strategy (London: H.M. Stationary Office, 1956)
9. Secret Protocol of the Tripartite Conference, Item 13, 1 November 1943. Reprinted in Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966) vol. 1, pp. 749, 753
10. The War Refugee Board was created on January 22, 1944, under Executive Order 9417. Richard Breitman and Alan M. Kraut American Refugee Policy and European Jewry, 1933-1945 (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1987), p. 191
11. Breitman and Kraut, while critical of the late timing of the Boards creation and the minimal resources it was provided, contextualize its role within the broader scope and demands of the American war effort. Other scholars are not so generous and attribute antisemitic currents within the Roosevelt administration and the American public to America's inadequate response to the plight of Jews. See Feingold, The Politics of Rescue
12. David S. Wyman, The Abandonment of the Jews: America and the Holocaust, 1941-45 (New York: Pantheon, 1984)
13. and Penkower, The Jews Were Expendable
14. Telegram, Hull to Johnson, 28 March 1944. War Refugee Board Records (hereafter WRB), Box 30, Folder: Representatives and Special Attachés: Appointments, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library (hereafter FDRL)
15. Telegram, Johnson to State, 29 April 1944; Telegram, Johnson to State, 16 May 1944; Telegram, Johnson to State, 22 May 1944; Telegram, State to Johnson, 24 May 1944; Telegram, Johnson to State, 7 June 1944. National Archives (hereafter NA), RG (Record Group) 59, CDF (Central Decimal File) 840.48 Refugees. Letter, Olsen to Pehle, 10 August 1944, WRB, Box 72, Folder: Sweden, FDRL. Report, Operations of the War Refugee Board from Sweden, 22 November. WRB, Box 72, Folder: Sweden, Iver Olsen's Reports
16. Letter, Olsen to Pehle, 12 June 1944
17. WRB, Box 72, File: "Sweden." Report, Operations of the War Refugee Board from Sweden, 20 November 1944. WRB, Box 72, Folder: Sweden, Iver Olsen's Reports, vol. I, FDRL
18. Interrogation of Peter Bruno Kleist, 7 February 1946. NA, RG 226, Entry 125, Box 29, Folder 407
19. Letter, Olsen to Pehle, 12 June 1944. WRB, Box 72, Folder: Sweden, FDRL. Many of the rescue brokers operating out of Stockholm were racketeers and ex-rum runners. They were notoriously unreliable, often taking money and never delivering the individuals they promised to rescue. Because Olsen was accountable to the Board, and to some extent the local Jewish community, using brokers would constitute a risk he preferred not to take. Also see: Report, Operations of the War Refugee Board in Sweden, 20 November 1944. WRB, Box 72, Folder: Iver Olsen's reports, vol. 1
20. Telegram, Johnson to State, 28 June 1944, WRB, Box 70, Folder: German Proposals through Sweden, FDRL
21. Olsen was originally assigned to the American Legation as its financial attaché in December 1943. When he assumed his duties as special representative of the War Refugee Board, he continued his role as attaché and as a member of OSS/Stockholm. Telegram, OSS to Taylor for Olsen (799), 23 March 1944. NA, RG 226, Entry 134, Box 144, Folder 973. Through a special licensing program, the Treasury Department made it possible for War Refugee Board funds to be converted into local currency, a transaction declared illegal during the war under the Trading with the Enemy Act. The United States wanted to prevent the Axis from securing large sums of local currency that they could use to aid their war effort
22. Telegram, Johnson to State, 3 July 1944, WRB, Box 70, Folder: German Proposals through Sweden, FDRL
23. Telegram, Johnson to State, 27 June 1944, NA, RG 59, CDF 740.0019 European War (EW)/6-2744
24. Telegram, Johnson to State, 3 July 1944. WRB, Box 70, Folder: German Proposals through Sweden, FDRL
25. Interrogation report on Peter Bruno Kleist, 7 February 1946, paragraph 11. NA, RG 226, Entry 125, Box 29, Folder: 407
26. Telegram, Johnson to State, 3 July 1944, WRB, Box 70, Folder: German proposals through Sweden, FDRL
27. Telegram, Hull to Johnson, 10 July 1944, WRB, Box 70, Folder: German Proposals through Sweden, FDRL
28. Telegram, Johnson to State, 15 July 1944, WRB, Box 70, Folder: German Proposals through Sweden, FDRL
29. Telegram, Johnson to State, 27 June 1944. NA, RG 59, CDF 740.0019 EW/6-2744
30. Memorandum, Towell (X-2) to Lesser (WRB), 31 July 1944. WRB, Box 50, Folder: Cooperation with other agencies-OSS, FDRL
31. Despite a concerted effort, OSS/Stockholm was unable to discover the contents of the letter. Johnson would not learn until October 1944 that the letter delivered to the Soviet Legation contained a suggestion that the Soviets meet with Kleist to discuss a separate peace. Johnson's source for the content of the letter is Erik Boheman, who was shown the note by the Soviets. Interestingly, it does not appear that the Soviets followed protocol, which would have required them to inform the Allies of the solicitation. The lapse may be a product of independent action by certain members of the Legation who may have been themselves interested in negotiating a separate peace. Telegram, Taylor to OSS, 16 October 1944. NA, RG 226, Entry 134, Box 304, Folder: Stockholm, August-October 1944
32. Eric Boheman, the Secretary General for the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, served as the source for the meeting. Telegram, Johnson to State, 27 June 1944. NA, RG 59, CDF 740.00119 EW/6-2744
33. OSS Flash Report, 6 June, 11 June, 12 June 1944, Report #SQ-1426. NA, RG 226, Entry 125, Box 26, Folder 360
34. OSS Dispatch, Taylor to OSS, 6 July 1944, #303. NA, RG 226, Entry 134, Box 303, Folder: Stockholm IN, October 1943-July 1944. OSS Dispatch, Taylor to OSS, 12 July 1944, #312. NA, RG 226, Entry 134, Box 304, Folder: Stockholm IN, October 1943-July 1944
35. An example of this was an approach to the Legation in June 1944 by two low-ranking SS-officers, Drs. Lienhardt and Schuddekopf. The SS officers wanted to negotiate a peace settlement with the Allies. The American Legation regarded their approach as a product of disenchantment with the course of the war. Johnson, however, approved the use of the officers for intelligence purposes. See the traffic from OSS/Stockholm for July 1944 in NA, RG 226, Entry 134, Box 304, Folder: Stockholm, May-June 1944
36. Telegram, Johnson to State, 27 June 1944. NA 59, CDF 740.0019 EW/2710. Johnson was probably unaware of the separate peace activities of Kleist and Klaus in 1942-43 when they served as intermediaries between Nazi officials and Abram Hewitt, an OSS agent who posed as a special envoy of Roosevelt in Stockholm. The Nazis were interested in negotiating a separate peace, but Hewitt's superiors in Washington had no interest in extending the talks and they subsequently collapsed. H. W. Koch, "The Spectre of a Separate Peace in the East: Russo-German 'Peace Feelers,' 1942-44," Journal of Contemporary History 10 (July 1975), pp. 531-49
37. According to Steven Koblik, Storch attributed the collapse of the negotiations to Olsen "for reasons which are not entirely clear." Johnson pulling Olsen back because of the potential political fallout would be in keeping with Storch's assessment. See Steven Koblik, The Stones Cry Out: Sweden's Response to the Persecution of the Jews, 1933-1945 (New York: Holocaust Library, 1988), p. 159
38. Koblik, Stones Cry Out, p. 250. Reprint of Memorandum from Gösta Engzell, 7 July 1944
39. Olsen and Storch had a strained relationship due in part to the Board's rescue operations into the Baltics. Storch criticized Olsen's efforts and methods, but was unwilling to share responsibilities with Olsen for rescue operations, even arguing that the Board's efforts sabotaged Storch's own projects. Storch also resented the stipulation imposed by the American government that funds provided by the World Jewish Congress and the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee for rescue and relief operations had to go through Olsen and the Board in order to be distributed. Sent to investigate the needs of Jewish refugees in Sweden, Laura Margolis of the Joint Distribution Committee characterized Storch in the following manner: "Storch is a completely disorganized person - he starts a dozen projects and carries nothing to fruition - he is tireless in his energy and stops at nothing if he wants to see an official - and he has a habit of distorting the facts when they do not suit his purpose," Personal Correspondence, Olsen to Pehle, 12 June 1944, WRB, Box 72, Folder: Sweden, FDRL. Report from Laura Margolis of the Joint Distribution Committee, 20 November 1944, WRB, Box 45, Folder: Other evacuation projects through Sweden. For a more flattering portrait of Storch see Penkower The Jews Were Expendable
40. Koblik, Stones Cry Out, p. 251
41. Telegram, State to Johnson for Olsen, 2 July 1944, WRB, Box 70, Folder: German Proposals through Sweden, FDRL
42. Telegram, British Embassy to State Department, 18 July 1944, WRB, Box 70, Folder: German Proposals through Sweden, FDRL. This evaluation is the only time that the British appear in the records of the War Refugee Board and the State Department in reference to the proposal. The Soviets were also informed of the German rescue proposal, but given their lack of support for aiding refugees, it is not surprising to find no expression of opinion from them
43. Telegram, Johnson to State, 15 July 1944. WRB, Box 70, Folder: German Proposals through Sweden, FDRL. Washington's attempt to place the burden of these German proposals on the Swedes would not have met with substantial resistance. Beginning in 1943, Sweden began to accept large numbers of refugees, especially Jews. After a series of trial and error efforts, the most successful being the harboring of Danish Jews, Sweden became a strong advocate of the rescue of Jews and other at-risk groups. Their humanitarian policy, which defied the Third Reich and jeopardized their neutral status, allowed for and contributed to the operation of the Board in Stockholm. See Steven Koblik, "Sweden's Attempt to Aid the Jews," Scandinavian Studies 56 (1984), pp. 96-98
44. For a fuller treatment of Sweden's policies and governmental response to the Jewish Question see Koblik, Stones Cry Out
45. Approximately 1,200 refugees were brought to Sweden through the Board-sponsored rescue program, but extenuating circumstances (including concentration in camps, reluctance of hidden Jews to expose themselves, and the general danger of the evacuations) prevented the rescue of Baltic Jews. Olsen's rescue crews also paid a high price in loss of equipment and fives, with one crew losing one-third of its members. By the end of September, the Board operations had to be stopped due to diminished personnel and resources. Report, Operations of the War Refugee Board from Sweden, 20 November 1944. WRB, Box 72, Folder: Sweden, Iver Olsen's Reports, vol. 1, FDRL
46. Telegram, Johnson to State, 27 September 1944. WRB, Box 70, Folder: German Proposals through Sweden, FDRL. In 1944 there were 4.2 Swedish kroner to the U.S. dollar. Leni Yahil, The Holocaust: The Fate of European Jewry (New York: Oxford, 1990), p. 662
47. Telegram, State to Bern, 6 October 1944. WRB, Box 70, Folder: German Proposals through Sweden, FDRL
48. Telegram, Johnson to State, 27 September 1944. WRB, Box 70, Folder: German Proposals though Sweden, FDRL
49. The information from the Baltic intelligence sources was in fact wrong - Nazi persecutions in the region continued. The Americans, however, believed their sources, and the information influenced their decision-making process. Telegram, Johnson to State, 11 September 1944. WRB, Box 70, Folder: German Proposals through Sweden, FDRL
50. Telegram, Johnson to State, 14 October 1944. WRB, Box 70, Folder: German Proposals through Sweden, FDRL
51. Telegram, Johnson to State, 15 August 1944. NA, RG 59, Box 2961, CDF 740.00119 EW/ 8-1544
52. Telegram, State to McClelland (Bern), 16 September 1944. WRB, Box 70, Folder: German Proposals through Sweden, FDRL. Mayer, a representative of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, attempted to interest Himmler in exchanging Jews for money. Mayer convinced the Board to deposit five million dollars into a Swiss account, but the money could be released only by Roswell McClelland, the Board's representative in Switzerland. Like Olsen, McClelland was prohibited from making ransom payments. The existence of the bank account, however, allowed Mayer to prolong discussions with Becher, who served as Himmlers proxy. Breitman and Kraut argue, "Mayer's skillful parrying of German demands at least dragged out the negotiations, temporarily protected the Jews of Budapest ghetto from deportation, which resumed in Hungary in October 1944, and produced the release of 1,700 Hungarian Jews from the concentration camp at Bergen-Belsen and the diversion of 18,000 Hungarian Jews to Vienna instead of to Auschwitz." Breitman and Kraut, American Refugee Policy, p. 217
53. Telegram, Taylor to OSS, 16 October 1944. NA, RG 226, Entry 134, Box 304, Folder: Stockholm, August 1944-October 1944
54. Telegram, Taylor to OSS, 12 July 1944. NA, RG 226, Entry 134, Box 304, Folder: Stockholm, May-July 1944
55. Telegram, Johnson to State, 13 October 1944. NA, RG 59, Box, 2962, CDF 740.00119 EW/10-1344
56. Telegram, Johnson to State, 15 August 1944. NA, RG 59, Box 2961, CDF 740.00119 EW/8-1544
57. Telegram, Johnson to State, 7 March 1945. WRB, Box 72, Folder: German Proposals through Sweden, FDRL
58. Telegram, Johnson to State, 7 March 1945. WRB, Box 70, Folder: German proposals through Sweden, FDRL
59. Telegram, Johnson to State, 9 March 1945. NA, RG 59, CDF 740.00119 EW/3-945, Confidential File, Reel 214. From 1935-1939, Fritz Hesse was the representative of the German News Agency (DNB) and press attaché in London. From 1940-1945, among other duties, he was an advisor on British affairs in the German Foreign Office. See Fritz Hesse, Hitler and the English (Norwich, UK: Allan Wingate, 1954), pp. i-ii
60. Final Report of the War Refugee Board from Sweden, Olsen to O'Dwyer, 15 June 1945. WRB, Box 72, Folder: Sweden, Iver Olsen's Reports, vol. 1, FDRL
61. Telegram, State to Johnson, 13 March 1945. WRB, Box 70, Folder: German Proposals through Sweden, FDRL
62. OSS Dispatch, Taylor to OSS, 27 July 1944. NA, RG 226, Entry 134, Box 304, Folder 5: Stockholm, May-July 1944. The memo on distribution of funds states "2,000 kronor which was paid to the Gestapo agent, Dr. Kirsten" and supposedly "this money was expended for personal medical services."
63. Telegram, Johnson to State, 10 January 1944, NA, RG 59, CDF 740.0011 EW1939/32649. Also see Raymond Palmer, "Felix Kersten and Count Bernadotte: A Question of Rescue," Journal of Contemporary History, 29 (1994), pp. 41-2
64. OSS Dispatch, Taylor to OSS, 5 May 1944, NA 226, Entry 134, Box 304, Folder: 5, Stockholm, May-June 1944. I am grateful to Richard Breitman for establishing Kersten's identity in this document
65. Penkower, Jews Were Expendable, p. 269
66. Telegram, Johnson to State, 28 March 1945. WRB, Box 70, Folder: German Proposals through Sweden, FDRL
67. The original draft of the memo read: "Department and Board do not (repeat not) approve of Storch's going to Berlin but there is no objection to a prominent and dependable neutral carrying on the discussions if this is desirable and appropriate in the opinion of the Legation." WRB Director General O'Dwyer changed the text, leaving the decision to Stockholm. Telegram (draft), State/Board to Johnson/Olsen, 3 April 1945. WRB, Box 70, Folder: German proposals through Sweden, FDRL
68. Telegram, Johnson to State, 11 April 1945. NA, RG 59, CDF 740.00119EW/4-1145, Confidential File, Reel 216
69. Telegram, Johnson to State, 11 April 1945. NA, RG 59, CDF 740.00119 EW/4-1145, Confidential File, Reel 216
70. Telegram, Johnson to State, 25 April 1945, WRB, Box 70, Folder: German Proposals through Sweden, FDRL. For a more detailed account of the conversation see Yehuda Bauer, Jews for Sale?, p. 246