Guessing with negative feedback: An experiment

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control

Volumn 33, Issue 5, 2009, Pages 1123-1133

  Sutan, Angela ^a   Willinger, Marc ^b  

^a Burgundy School of Business   (France)

^b Lameta and University of Montpellier 1   (France)

Author keywords

Guessing games; Negative feedback; Strategic substitutes vs. strategic complements

Indexed keywords

EID: 63749125436     PISSN: 01651889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2009.01.005     Document Type: Article

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