Expressive-Assertivism

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly

Volumn 89, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 169-203

  Boisvert, Daniel R ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHARLOTTE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 63449119631     PISSN: 02790750     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2008.00315.x     Document Type: Article

References (38)

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2. Stevenson, C. L. (1963). Facts and Values. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, pp. 10-31, 55-70
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4. Hare, R. M. (1997). Sorting out Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press
5. Barker, S. (2002). 'Is Value Content a Component of Conventional Implicature?,' Analysis 60, pp. 268-279
6. Ridge, M. (2006). 'Ecumenical Expressivism: Finessing Frege,' Ethics 116, pp. 302-336
7. Ridge, M. (2007). 'Ecumenical Expressivism: The Best of Both Worlds,' in R. ShaferLandau (ed.) Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. II. Oxford: Oxford University Press
8. Ridge, M. (forthcoming). 'The Truth in Ecumenical Expressivism,' in David Sobel (ed.) Reasons for Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
9. Hare, J. (2001). God's Call: Moral Realism, God's Commands, and Human Autonomy. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co.
10. Swan, K. (2006). 'A Metaethical Option for Theists,' Journal of Religious Ethics 34, pp. 3-20
11. I also leave aside Steve Finlay's conversational implicature theory and Dorit Bar-On and Matthew Chrisman's neo-expressivism, since neither holds that the expressive content of an utterance of a moral sentence is a part of that sentence's conventional meaning. See Bar-on, D. and Chrisman, M. (forthcoming). 'Ethical Neo-Expressivism,' in R. Shafer-Landau (ed.) Oxford Studies in Metaethics IV. Oxford: Oxford University Press
12. Finlay, S. (2005). "Value and Implicature,' Philosophers' Imprint 5, pp. 1-20
13. Here, I follow Mark Schroeder's identification of several features with respect to which expressivist theories can differ. See Schroeder, M. (in preparation). 'Hybrid Expressivism: Virtues and Vices.' I also follow Schroeder's suggestion of adopting Kaplan's 'dthat' convention for rigidly designating what Barker's and Ridge's theories respectively take moral properties to be
14. Geach, P. T. (1965). 'Assertion,' Philosophical Review 74, pp. 449-465
15. Blackburn, S. (1984). Spreading the Word. Oxford: Oxford University Press
16. Blackburn, S. (1988). 'Attitudes and Contents,' Ethics 98, pp. 501-517
17. Blackburn, S. (1993). Essays in Quasi-Realism. New York: Oxford University Press
18. Blackburn, S. (1998). Ruling Passions. Oxford: Oxford University Press
19. Austin, J. L. (1975). How to Do Things with Words
20. Searle, J. (1969). Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
21. Searle, 1979, 'A Taxonomy of Illoeutionary Acts.'
22. See Searle, 1979, 'A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts.'
23. Ayer, A. J. (1952). Language, Truth, and Logic. New York: Dover Publications
24. Gibbard, A. (1990). Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
25. Gibbard, A. (2003). Thinking How to Live. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
26. Moore, G. E. (1903). Principia Ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
27. Brink, D. O. (1989). Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
28. Boyd, R. (1988). 'How to Be a Moral Realist,' in G. Sayre-McCord (ed.) Essays on Moral Realism. Cornell, NY: Cornell University Press
29. Shafer-Landau, R. (2005). Moral Realism: A Defence. Oxford: Oxford University Press
30. If tormenting the cat is bad, getting your little brother to torment the cat is bad; Tormenting the cat is bad; Therefore, getting your little brother to torment the cat is bad. See Geach, 1965
31. Dreier, J. (2004). 'Lockean and Logical Truth Conditions,' Analysis 64, pp. 84-91
32. For example, Frege, G. (1918). 'Negation,' in M. Beaney (ed.) The Frege Reader. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 348-349
33. Geach, P. T. (1958). 'Imperative and Deontic Logic,' Analysis 18, pp. 49-56
34. Geach, P. T. (1960). 'Ascriptivism,' Philosophical Review 69, pp. 221-225
35. Simiott-Armstrong argues otherwise. See Sinnott Armstrong, W. (2000). 'Expressivism and Embedding,' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61, pp. 677-693
36. This objection is raised by David Copp. Objecting to Gibbard's Norm Expressivism, he writes, Gibbard's account implies that various sentential contexts in which a sentence p can be embedded are ambiguous, with their semantics depending on whether p is normative. A cognitivist theory could avoid this kind of complexity. For example, if p is not normative, a sentence of the form 'S knows that p' expresses a relation between S and the proposition expressed by p. Similarly, a sentence of the form 'It is possible that p' expresses a proposition about the proposition expressed by p. And a sentence of the form, 'If p then q,' expresses a proposition concerning a relation between the propositions expressed by p and q. But if p is normative, matters are otherwise, for p does not express a proposition. A variety of complex constructions give rise to problems, since it appears that a non-cognitivist theory must treat them differently, depending on whether an embedded sentence is or is not one that would standardly be used to make a normative claim. (Copp, D. (1995). Morality, Normativity, & Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 17.)
37. Kaplan discusses similar scope phenomena with quantified noun phrases used in discourse reports. See Kaplan, D. (1989). 'Demonstratives,' in J. Almog, J. Perry and H. Wettstein (eds) Themes from Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 555, fn. 571
38. Dreier, J. (1990). 'Internalism and Speaker Relativism,' Ethics 101, 6-25, at pp. 23-24