The impact of firm ownership structure on voluntary disclosure: Empirical evidence from Czech annual reports

Journal of Business

Volumn 77, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 457-491

  Makhija, Anil K ^a   Patton, James M ^b  

^a OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 6344280835     PISSN: 00219398     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/386526     Document Type: Article

References (73)

1. Ajinkya, Bipin B., and Michael Gift. 1984. Corporate managers' earnings forecasts and symmetrical adjustments of market expectations. Journal of Accounting Research 22:425-44.
2. Barclay, Michael, and Clifford Holderness. 1989. Private benefits from control of public corporations. Journal of Financial Economics 25:371-95.
3. -. 1992. The law and large block trades. Journal of Law and Economics 35:265-94.
4. Bartov, Eli, and Gordon M. Bodnar. 1996. Alternative accounting methods, information asymmetry and liquidity: Theory and evidence. Accounting Review 71, no. 3:397-418.
5. Belsley, David A. 1991. Conditioning diagnostics: Collinearity and weak data in regressions. New York: Wiley.
6. Berry, William D., and Stanley Feldman. 1985. Multiple regression in practice. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
7. Chemmanur, Thomas J., and Paolo Fulgheri. 1994. Reputation, renegotiation, and the choice of bank loans and publicly traded debt. Review of Financial Studies 7:475-506.
8. Claessens, Stijn. 1997. Corporate governance and equity prices: Evidence from the Czech and Slovak Republics. Journal of Finance 52:1641-58.
9. Claessens, Stijn, Simeon Djankov, and Gerhard Pohl. 1997. Ownership and corporate governance: Evidence from the Czech Republic. Public Policy Journal (World Bank Group), no. 111 (May).
10. Coffee, John C. 1996. Institutional investors in transitional economies: Lessons from the Czech experience. In Corporate governance in Central Europe and Russia, vol. 1, ed. Roman Frydman, Cheryl W. Gray, and Andrzej Rapaczynski, pp. 111-86. Budapest: Central European Press.
11. Cooke, Terry E. 1991. An assessment of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Japanese corporations. International Accounting Journal 26:174-89.
12. -. 1992. The impact of size, stock market listing and industry type on disclosure in the annual reports of Japanese listed corporations. Accounting and Business Research 22:229-37.
13. -. 1993. Disclosure in Japanese corporate annual reports. Journal of Business Finance and Accountancy 20, no. 4:521-35.
14. Copeland, Thomas E., and Dan Galai. 1983. Information effects on the bid ask spread. Journal of Finance 36:1457-69.
15. Craswell, Allen T., and Stephen Taylor. 1992. Discretionary disclosure of reserves by oil and gas companies: An economic analysis. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 19, no. 2:295-307.
16. Czech Act on Accounting. 1991. Zakon c. 563/1991 Sb.o ucetnictvi.
17. Czech Ministry of Finance. 1992. Privatizace Kuponova. Prague: Ministry of Finance Center for Voucher Privatization.
18. Czech Ministry of Finance. 1993. Decree no. 281/50550/93.
19. Czech Ministry of Finance. 1997. Current aspects of the Czech capital market. Prague: Ministry of Finance.
20. Czech Securities Act. 1992. Zakon o cennych papirech.
21. De Angelo, Linda E. 1981. Auditor size and audit quality. Journal of Accounting and Economics 3:183-99.
22. Demsetz, Harold. 1968. The cost of transacting. Quarterly Journal of Economics 82:33-53.
23. -. 1986. Corporate control, insider trading, and rates of return. American Economic Review 76, no. 2:313-16.
24. Demsetz, Harold, and Kenneth Lehn. 1985. The structure of corporate ownership: Causes and consequences. Journal of Political Economy 93, no. 6:1155-77.
25. Dhaliwal, Dan S., Gerald L. Salamon, and E. Daniel Smith. 1982. The effect of owner versus management control on the choice of accounting methods. Journal of Accounting and Economics 4:41-53.
26. Diamond, Douglas W., and Robert E. Verrecchia. 1991. Disclosure, liquidity, and the cost of capital. Journal of Finance 46:1325-60.
27. Dyba, Karel, and Jan Svejnar. 1994. Czechoslovakia: Recent developments and prospects. American Economic Review 81, no. 2:185-90.
28. Eaton, Jonathan, and Harvey S. Rosen. 1983. Agency, delayed compensation and the structure of executive remuneration. Journal of Finance 38:1489-1505.
29. Ellerman, David. 1998. Voucher privatization with investment funds: A sure way to decapitalize industry. Transition. World Bank/Davidson Institute, December, pp. 10-13.
30. Forker, John. 1992. Corporate governance and disclosure quality. Accounting and Business Research, no. 22, pp. 111-24.
31. Frankel, Richard, Maureen McNichols, and Peter G. Wilson. 1995. Discretionary disclosure, and external financing transactions. Accounting Review (January), pp. 135-50.
32. Frydman, Roman, Katharina Pistor, and Andrzej Rapaczynski. 1995. Investing in insider-dominated firms: A study of Russian voucher privatization funds. Working Paper no. 95-31, New York University, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics.
33. Frydman, Roman, and Andrzej Rapaczynski. 1994. Privatization in Eastern Europe: Is the state withering away? London: Central European University Press.
34. Gaver, Jennifer J., and Kenneth M. Gaver. 1993. Additional evidence on the association between the investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies. Journal of Accounting and Economics 16:125-60.
35. Gibbins, Michael, Alan Richardson, and John Waterhouse. 1990. The management of corporate financial disclosures: Opportunism, ritualism, policies, and processes. Journal of Accounting Research 28:121-43.
36. Glosten, Lawrence R., and Paul R. Milgrom. 1985. Bid, ask, and transaction prices in a specialist market with heterogeneously informed traders. Journal of Financial Economics 14:71-100.
37. Green, Peter S. 2001. Czechs cracking down on fraud. New York Times, February 27.
38. Hingorani, Archana, Kenneth Lehn, and Anil K. Makhija. 1997. Investor behavior in mass privatization: The case of the Czech voucher scheme. Journal of Financial Economics 43 (June): 349-96.
39. James, Christopher. 1987. Some evidence on the uniqueness of bank loans. Journal of Financial Economics 19:217-35.
40. Jensen, Michael C., and William H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 11:5-50.
41. Judge, George G., William E. Griffith, Carter R. Hill, and Tsoung-Chao Lee. 1980. The theory and practice of econometrics. New York: Wiley.
42. Kotrba, Josef. 1995. Privatization process in the Czech Republic: Players and winners. In The Czech Republic and economic transition in Eastern Europe, ed. Jan Svejnar, pp. 159-99. San Diego: Academic Press.
43. Lang, Mark, and Russell Lundholm. 1993. Cross-sectional determinants of analyst ratings of corporate disclosures. Journal of Accounting Research 31:246-71.
44. Lees, Francis A. 1981. Public disclosure of corporate earnings forecasts. New York: The Conference Board.
45. Lev, Baruch, and Stephen Penman. 1990. Voluntary forecast disclosure, nondisclosure, and stock prices. Journal of Accounting Research 28:49-76.
46. Longworth, R. C. 1997. Czechs' economic "miracle" looking more like nightmare. Chicago Tribune, August 4.
47. Marston, Claire, and Shrives, Philip. 1996. A review of empirical research into financial disclosure. Paper presented at European Accounting Association meetings, Bergen.
48. McNichols, Maureen. 1989. Evidence of informational asymmetries from management earnings forecasts and stock returns. Accounting Review 64:1-27.
49. Meek, Gary K., Clare B. Roberts, and Sidney J. Gray. 1995. Factors influencing voluntary annual report disclosures by U.S., U.K., and Continental European multinational corporations. Journal of International Business Studies 26, no. 3:555-72.
50. Mejstrik, Michal, and James Burger. 1992. The Czechoslovak large privatization. Working paper, Charles University, Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education.
51. Myers, Stewart C., and Nicholas S. Majluf. 1984. Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics 13: 187-221.
52. Patell, James M. 1976. Corporate forecasts of earnings per share and stock price behavior: Empirical tests. Journal of Accounting Research 14:246-76.
53. Patton, James M., and Ivan Zelenka. 1997. An empirical analysis of the determinants of the extent of disclosure in annual reports of joint stock companies in the Czech Republic. European Accounting Review 6:605-27.
54. Penman, Stephen H. 1980. An empirical investigation of the voluntary disclosure of corporate earnings forecasts. Journal of Accounting Research 18:132-60.
55. Perlez, Jan. 1997. A U.S. fund manager in Prague has found privization corrupt. New York Times, December 3.
56. Raffournier, Bernard. 1995. The determinants of voluntary financial disclosure by Swiss listed companies. European Accounting Review 4:261-80.
57. Rajan, Raghuram G. 1992. Insiders and outsiders: The choice between informed and arms' length debt. Journal of Finance 47:1367-1400.
58. Robbins, Walter A., and Kenneth R. Austin. 1986. Disclosure quality in governmental financial reports: An assessment of the appropriateness of a compound measure. Journal of Accounting Research 24:412-21.
59. Ruland, William, Samuel Tung, and Nashwa E. George. 1990. Factors associated with the disclosure of managers' forecasts. Accounting Review 65:710-21.
60. Sachs, Jeffrey. 1992. Privatization in Russia: Some lessons from Eastern Europe. American Economic Review 82, no. 2:43-48.
61. Schroll, Rudolf. 1995. The new accounting system in the Czech Republic. European Accounting Review 4:827-32.
62. Shleifer, Andrzej, and Robert W. Vishny. 1986. Large shareholders and corporate control. Journal of Political Economy 94, no. 3:461-88.
63. -. 1997. A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance 52:737-83.
64. Skinner, Douglas. 1994. Why firms voluntarily disclose bad news. Journal of Accounting Research 32 (Spring): 38-60.
65. Smith, C. W., and R. L. Watts. 1992. The investment opportunity set, corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies. Journal of Financial Economics 32, no. 3:263-92.
66. Smith, E. Daniel. 1976. The effect of the separation of ownership from control on accounting policy decisions. Accounting Review 51:707-23.
67. Svejnar, Jan, and Miroslav Singer. 1994. Using vouchers to privatize an economy: The Czech and Slovak case. Economics of Transition 2, no. 1:43-69.
68. Teoh, Siew H., and T. J. Wong. 1993. Perceived auditor quality and the earnings response coefficient. Accounting Review 68:346-66.
69. Tinic, Seha M. 1972. The economics of liquidity services. Quarterly Journal of Economics 86: 79-93.
70. Warfield, Terry W., John J. Wild, and Kenneth L. Wild. 1995. Managerial ownership, accounting choices, and informativeness of earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 20:61-91.
71. Wonnacott, Ronald J., and Thomas H. Wonnacott. 1979. Econometrics. New York: Wiley.
72. Zelenka, I., W. Seal, and P. Sucher. 1996. The emerging institutional framework of accounting in the Czech and Slovak Republics. In Accounting in transition: The implications of political and economic reform in Central Europe, ed. N. Garrod and S. McLeay, pp. 93-115. London: Routledge.
73. Zingales, Luigi. 1994. The value of the voting right: A study of the Milan Stock Exchange experience. Review of Financial Studies 7:125-48.