Adam Smith's reconstruction of practical reason

Review of Metaphysics

Volumn 58, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 81-116

  Carrasco, Maria Alejandra ^a  

^a PONTIFICIA UNIVERSIDAD CATÓLICA DE CHILE   (Chile)

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References (196)

1. Henceforth, "TMS." Smith first published this work in 1759 and reedited it five times before his death. In the sixth edition (1790) he incorporates a new chapter and develops some topics only alluded to in previous versions. I believe that this last revision contains the most solid evidence for including him in the "practical reason" tradition, in contrast to the sentimentalist school of his time. My references to the book are taken from this last edition (Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. David Daiches Raphael and Alec Lawrence Macfie [Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1976]). Numerical references are to parts, sections, chapters, and, following a colon, paragraphs, as given in this edition. For example, "TMS 2.1.3:4" refers to part 2, section 1, chapter 3, paragraph 4.
2. Henceforth, "TMS." Smith first published this work in 1759 and reedited it five times before his death. In the sixth edition (1790) he incorporates a new chapter and develops some topics only alluded to in previous versions. I believe that this last revision contains the most solid evidence for including him in the "practical reason" tradition, in contrast to the sentimentalist school of his time. My references to the book are taken from this last edition (Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. David Daiches Raphael and Alec Lawrence Macfie [Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1976]). Numerical references are to parts, sections, chapters, and, following a colon, paragraphs, as given in this edition. For example, "TMS 2.1.3:4" refers to part 2, section 1, chapter 3, paragraph 4.
3. Henceforth, "TMS." Smith first published this work in 1759 and reedited it five times before his death. In the sixth edition (1790) he incorporates a new chapter and develops some topics only alluded to in previous versions. I believe that this last revision contains the most solid evidence for including him in the "practical reason" tradition, in contrast to the sentimentalist school of his time. My references to the book are taken from this last edition (Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. David Daiches Raphael and Alec Lawrence Macfie [Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1976]). Numerical references are to parts, sections, chapters, and, following a colon, paragraphs, as given in this edition. For example, "TMS 2.1.3:4" refers to part 2, section 1, chapter 3, paragraph 4.
4. See TMS 7.3.3.
5. Among others, see David Daiches Raphael, "Adam Smith and the Infection of David Hume's Society," Journal of the History of Ideas 30 (1969); Stephen Darwall, "Sympathetic Liberalism: Recent Work on Adam Smith," Philosophy and Public Affairs 28 (1999); Richard Kleer, "Final Causes in Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments," Journal of the History of Philosophy 33 (1995); and James Otteson, Adam Smith's Marketplace of Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002).
6. Among others, see David Daiches Raphael, "Adam Smith and the Infection of David Hume's Society," Journal of the History of Ideas 30 (1969); Stephen Darwall, "Sympathetic Liberalism: Recent Work on Adam Smith," Philosophy and Public Affairs 28 (1999); Richard Kleer, "Final Causes in Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments," Journal of the History of Philosophy 33 (1995); and James Otteson, Adam Smith's Marketplace of Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002).
7. Among others, see David Daiches Raphael, "Adam Smith and the Infection of David Hume's Society," Journal of the History of Ideas 30 (1969); Stephen Darwall, "Sympathetic Liberalism: Recent Work on Adam Smith," Philosophy and Public Affairs 28 (1999); Richard Kleer, "Final Causes in Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments," Journal of the History of Philosophy 33 (1995); and James Otteson, Adam Smith's Marketplace of Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002).
8. Among others, see David Daiches Raphael, "Adam Smith and the Infection of David Hume's Society," Journal of the History of Ideas 30 (1969); Stephen Darwall, "Sympathetic Liberalism: Recent Work on Adam Smith," Philosophy and Public Affairs 28 (1999); Richard Kleer, "Final Causes in Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments," Journal of the History of Philosophy 33 (1995); and James Otteson, Adam Smith's Marketplace of Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002).
9. Nonetheless, as will become clearer from what follows, I do not believe that Adam Smith was an Aristotelian. Rather, following Gloria Vivenza's classification of Smith's influences as direct/indirect and conscious/ unconscious (Adam Smith and the Classics [New York: Oxford University Press, 2001], 2), I believe Aristotle's influence was indirect and unconscious. My analysis will only focus on this neglected issue, leaving aside the discussion of other possible, and no less important, influences in this theory (Stoic, Epicurean, Humean, and so forth).
10. Laurence Berns, "Aristotle and Adam Smith on Justice: Cooperation between Ancients and Moderns?" Review of Metaphysics 48 (1994): 71-90; Samuel Fleischacker, A Third Concept of Liberty: Judgment and Freedom in Kant and Adam Smith (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); Charles Griswold, Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); and Gloria Vivenza in Adam Smith and the Classics, respectively.
11. Laurence Berns, "Aristotle and Adam Smith on Justice: Cooperation between Ancients and Moderns?" Review of Metaphysics 48 (1994): 71-90; Samuel Fleischacker, A Third Concept of Liberty: Judgment and Freedom in Kant and Adam Smith (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); Charles Griswold, Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); and Gloria Vivenza in Adam Smith and the Classics, respectively.
12. Laurence Berns, "Aristotle and Adam Smith on Justice: Cooperation between Ancients and Moderns?" Review of Metaphysics 48 (1994): 71-90; Samuel Fleischacker, A Third Concept of Liberty: Judgment and Freedom in Kant and Adam Smith (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); Charles Griswold, Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); and Gloria Vivenza in Adam Smith and the Classics, respectively.
13. Laurence Berns, "Aristotle and Adam Smith on Justice: Cooperation between Ancients and Moderns?" Review of Metaphysics 48 (1994): 71-90; Samuel Fleischacker, A Third Concept of Liberty: Judgment and Freedom in Kant and Adam Smith (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); Charles Griswold, Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); and Gloria Vivenza in Adam Smith and the Classics, respectively.
14. In Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment, 141, Griswold affirms that TMS's agent-relative point of view helps to overcome some of modern ethics's counterintuitive conclusions. I agree, but I go one step further: Modern elements in TMS, such as impartiality and universality, also supplement and help its ancient motives in order jointly to give a plausible, complete, and renewed account of ethics.
15. Besides specific studies on Aristotle, only around the 1960s was this ethics reconsidered in the philosophical debate, mainly through the German intellectual movement that has now become famous under the title of "The Rehabilitation of Practical Reason."
16. For the originality of Smith's characterization of the impartial spectator, see Samuel Fleischacker, "Philosophy in Moral Practice: Kant and Adam Smith," Kant Studien 82 (1991): 249-69.
17. See TMS 1.1.3. For example, in 1.1.3:1: "Upon all occasions his own sentiments are the standards and measures by which he judges of mine."
18. TMS 7.3.intr.:3.
19. TMS 7.3.intr.:2.
20. Ralph Cudworth (1617-88) was an English scholar and a leading member of the Cambridge Platonists.
21. TMS 7.3.2:7. He accepts the role of reason in the induction of general rules of morality, though.
22. TMS 7.3.2:5.
23. See, for instance, TMS 7.2.1:35, 39 and 43.
24. See TMS 7.2.1:14.
25. TMS 4.1:9.
26. TMS 4.2:2.
27. See, for instance, Jack J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1973).
28. Marie A. Martin, in "Utility and Morality: Adam Smith's Critique of Hume," Hume Studies 16 (1990): 107-20, affirms that one of Smith's main oppositions to his friend's system was precisely the role of reason. If good and evil were to depend on utility, they would depend on the calculation of reason.
29. See TMS 7.3.1. Smith has discarded this system before talking of rationalism. However, since it exceeds the boundaries my topic, I have bypassed it.
30. Although Smith uses something like this discarding method in part 7, the real justification of this system, expounded in the previous six parts, relies on empirical observation.
31. TMS 7.3.2:7.
32. TMS 3.3:22.
33. TMS 3.3:28 (my emphasis).
34. TMS 7.2.intr.:2.
35. See TMS 3, chap. 1. Charles Griswold (Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment, 46) contrasts "moral" to intellectual sentiments (wonder, surprise, and admiration). Without rejecting that distinction, I believe that it is also correct, and particularly useful, to compare moral with nonmoral or premoral sentiments. Indeed, it would even be possible to draw an analogy between this contrast and Kant's will and good will, where the latter is informed and justified by reason, and thus, properly moral. On the other hand, by grounding moral conduct on sentiments (though informed sentiments), Smith correctly suggests that the simple intellectual recognition of the good is not enough for ethical praxis.
36. See TMS 3, chap. 1. Charles Griswold (Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment, 46) contrasts "moral" to intellectual sentiments (wonder, surprise, and admiration). Without rejecting that distinction, I believe that it is also correct, and particularly useful, to compare moral with nonmoral or premoral sentiments. Indeed, it would even be possible to draw an analogy between this contrast and Kant's will and good will, where the latter is informed and justified by reason, and thus, properly moral. On the other hand, by grounding moral conduct on sentiments (though informed sentiments), Smith correctly suggests that the simple intellectual recognition of the good is not enough for ethical praxis.
37. TMS 1.1.3:1.
38. TMS 7.4:33.
39. Griswold, Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment, 88.
40. Charles Griswold, "Nature and Philosophy: Adam Smith on Stoicism, Aesthetic Reconciliation and Imagination," in Adam Smith, ed. Knud Haakonssen (Brookfield: Ashgate, Darthmouth, 1998), 30. Nonetheless, Griswold does not believe that there is a coincidence between Smith and Aristotle in this point, for he seems to fear that this interpretation would lead one to say that Smith's theory is intuitionist. He supports this claim by saying: "It would be tempting to infer (as many have in discussing Aristotle) that 'perception' should be understood as immediate apprehension or intuition, especially in light of Smith's remark that 'it belongs to feeling and sentiment only to judge'.... This would be a mistake, for even quite simple cases of moral perception or feeling involve, for Smith, reflection and interpretation"; Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment, 192. However, I do not know of, and Griswold makes no reference to, any Aristotelian scholar who defends the idea that Aristotle was an intuitionist. Moral perception in Aristotle, just as in Adam Smith, involves at least habitual reflection and interpretation. If this were not the case, moral education would be useless and Aristotle would not have stressed so much the importance of experience in giving content to practical wisdom, contrasting practical insight to scientific or mathematical understanding. See Nichomachean Ethics 6.8.1142a12-21. On the other hand, Martha C. Nussbaum in "The Discernment of Perception: An Aristotelian Conception on Private and Public Rationality," in Aristotle's Ethics: Critical Essays, ed. Nancy Sherman (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), 145-81, emphasizes the role of emotion in Aristotelian moral perception. She says: "I believe ... that perception is not merely aided by emotion but it is also in part constituted by appropriate response.... And it isn't just that sometimes we need the emotions to get to the right (intellectual) view of the situation; this is true, but is not the entire story.... The emotions are themselves modes of vision, or recognition. Their responses are part of what knowing, that is truly recognizing or acknowledging, consist in" (170-1).
41. Charles Griswold, "Nature and Philosophy: Adam Smith on Stoicism, Aesthetic Reconciliation and Imagination," in Adam Smith, ed. Knud Haakonssen (Brookfield: Ashgate, Darthmouth, 1998), 30. Nonetheless, Griswold does not believe that there is a coincidence between Smith and Aristotle in this point, for he seems to fear that this interpretation would lead one to say that Smith's theory is intuitionist. He supports this claim by saying: "It would be tempting to infer (as many have in discussing Aristotle) that 'perception' should be understood as immediate apprehension or intuition, especially in light of Smith's remark that 'it belongs to feeling and sentiment only to judge'.... This would be a mistake, for even quite simple cases of moral perception or feeling involve, for Smith, reflection and interpretation"; Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment, 192. However, I do not know of, and Griswold makes no reference to, any Aristotelian scholar who defends the idea that Aristotle was an intuitionist. Moral perception in Aristotle, just as in Adam Smith, involves at least habitual reflection and interpretation. If this were not the case, moral education would be useless and Aristotle would not have stressed so much the importance of experience in giving content to practical wisdom, contrasting practical insight to scientific or mathematical understanding. See Nichomachean Ethics 6.8.1142a12-21. On the other hand, Martha C. Nussbaum in "The Discernment of Perception: An Aristotelian Conception on Private and Public Rationality," in Aristotle's Ethics: Critical Essays, ed. Nancy Sherman (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), 145-81, emphasizes the role of emotion in Aristotelian moral perception. She says: "I believe ... that perception is not merely aided by emotion but it is also in part constituted by appropriate response.... And it isn't just that sometimes we need the emotions to get to the right (intellectual) view of the situation; this is true, but is not the entire story.... The emotions are themselves modes of vision, or recognition. Their responses are part of what knowing, that is truly recognizing or acknowledging, consist in" (170-1).
42. Charles Griswold, "Nature and Philosophy: Adam Smith on Stoicism, Aesthetic Reconciliation and Imagination," in Adam Smith, ed. Knud Haakonssen (Brookfield: Ashgate, Darthmouth, 1998), 30. Nonetheless, Griswold does not believe that there is a coincidence between Smith and Aristotle in this point, for he seems to fear that this interpretation would lead one to say that Smith's theory is intuitionist. He supports this claim by saying: "It would be tempting to infer (as many have in discussing Aristotle) that 'perception' should be understood as immediate apprehension or intuition, especially in light of Smith's remark that 'it belongs to feeling and sentiment only to judge'.... This would be a mistake, for even quite simple cases of moral perception or feeling involve, for Smith, reflection and interpretation"; Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment, 192. However, I do not know of, and Griswold makes no reference to, any Aristotelian scholar who defends the idea that Aristotle was an intuitionist. Moral perception in Aristotle, just as in Adam Smith, involves at least habitual reflection and interpretation. If this were not the case, moral education would be useless and Aristotle would not have stressed so much the importance of experience in giving content to practical wisdom, contrasting practical insight to scientific or mathematical understanding. See Nichomachean Ethics 6.8.1142a12-21. On the other hand, Martha C. Nussbaum in "The Discernment of Perception: An Aristotelian Conception on Private and Public Rationality," in Aristotle's Ethics: Critical Essays, ed. Nancy Sherman (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), 145-81, emphasizes the role of emotion in Aristotelian moral perception. She says: "I believe ... that perception is not merely aided by emotion but it is also in part constituted by appropriate response.... And it isn't just that sometimes we need the emotions to get to the right (intellectual) view of the situation; this is true, but is not the entire story.... The emotions are themselves modes of vision, or recognition. Their responses are part of what knowing, that is truly recognizing or acknowledging, consist in" (170-1).
43. Charles Griswold, "Nature and Philosophy: Adam Smith on Stoicism, Aesthetic Reconciliation and Imagination," in Adam Smith, ed. Knud Haakonssen (Brookfield: Ashgate, Darthmouth, 1998), 30. Nonetheless, Griswold does not believe that there is a coincidence between Smith and Aristotle in this point, for he seems to fear that this interpretation would lead one to say that Smith's theory is intuitionist. He supports this claim by saying: "It would be tempting to infer (as many have in discussing Aristotle) that 'perception' should be understood as immediate apprehension or intuition, especially in light of Smith's remark that 'it belongs to feeling and sentiment only to judge'.... This would be a mistake, for even quite simple cases of moral perception or feeling involve, for Smith, reflection and interpretation"; Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment, 192. However, I do not know of, and Griswold makes no reference to, any Aristotelian scholar who defends the idea that Aristotle was an intuitionist. Moral perception in Aristotle, just as in Adam Smith, involves at least habitual reflection and interpretation. If this were not the case, moral education would be useless and Aristotle would not have stressed so much the importance of experience in giving content to practical wisdom, contrasting practical insight to scientific or mathematical understanding. See Nichomachean Ethics 6.8.1142a12-21. On the other hand, Martha C. Nussbaum in "The Discernment of Perception: An Aristotelian Conception on Private and Public Rationality," in Aristotle's Ethics: Critical Essays, ed. Nancy Sherman (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), 145-81, emphasizes the role of emotion in Aristotelian moral perception. She says: "I believe ... that perception is not merely aided by emotion but it is also in part constituted by appropriate response.... And it isn't just that sometimes we need the emotions to get to the right (intellectual) view of the situation; this is true, but is not the entire story.... The emotions are themselves modes of vision, or recognition. Their responses are part of what knowing, that is truly recognizing or acknowledging, consist in" (170-1).
44. See NE 6.12.1144a29. Once more, this "immediate perception" involves reflection and can only be "immediate" because it is a virtue, an acquired habit.
45. See TMS 3.3:2.
46. Vivenza makes a similar point: "Some scholars have seen a connection between Aristotle's phronimos (man of practical wisdom) and the impartial spectator; rightly enough, to my mind, though Smith's concept is much more complex and elaborate, and therefore, in the end, different"; Adam Smith and the Classics, 48. Griswold makes the same analogy, although in a looser way (Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment, 190). However, I do not see the necessity of humanizing the impartial spectator, for it seems to be enough, and even better supported than the connection with the Aristotelian virtue of prudence (it is acquired through exercising and it disposes one to choose the good in every occasion). Still, like Vivenza, I think that the impartial spectator is a much more complex and elaborate concept, hence I do not want to push too far on the similarities with prudence.
47. Vivenza makes a similar point: "Some scholars have seen a connection between Aristotle's phronimos (man of practical wisdom) and the impartial spectator; rightly enough, to my mind, though Smith's concept is much more complex and elaborate, and therefore, in the end, different"; Adam Smith and the Classics, 48. Griswold makes the same analogy, although in a looser way (Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment, 190). However, I do not see the necessity of humanizing the impartial spectator, for it seems to be enough, and even better supported than the connection with the Aristotelian virtue of prudence (it is acquired through exercising and it disposes one to choose the good in every occasion). Still, like Vivenza, I think that the impartial spectator is a much more complex and elaborate concept, hence I do not want to push too far on the similarities with prudence.
48. TMS 1.1.3:10.
49. See Wolfgang Wieland, "Aporien der praktischen Vernunft," in Wissenschaft und Gegenwart, Geisteswissenschaftliche Reihe (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989), 65; and "Praxis und Urteilskraft," Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 28 (1974): 17-42.
50. See Wolfgang Wieland, "Aporien der praktischen Vernunft," in Wissenschaft und Gegenwart, Geisteswissenschaftliche Reihe (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989), 65; and "Praxis und Urteilskraft," Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 28 (1974): 17-42.
51. Robert Sokolowski, "What is Moral Action?" New Scholasticism 63 (1989): 26.
52. NE 1.3.1094b13-14.
53. See Douglas S. Hutchinson, The Virtues in Aristotle (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), 4: "So Aristotle has two reasons to believe that ethics is not primarily a matter of enumerating principles of conduct. First the mere acquisition of such principles is ineffective, except under special circumstances, when we already have the virtues, and, second, such principles are necessarily defective in the face of the irregularity and individuality of practical matters, which means that they must be supplemented by a sort of perceptual ability, which comes only with the virtues."
54. See John McDowell, "Virtue and Reason," in Sherman, Aristotle's Ethics, 122.
55. Arash Abizadeh, "The Passions of the Wise: Phronesis, Rhetoric, and Aristotle's Passionate Practical Deliberation," Review of Metaphysics 56 (2002): 287.
56. Sokolowski, "Moral Action," 28.
57. Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 10.
58. See Nagel, Equality, 10-14.
59. Nagel, Equality, 17. The same idea is developed in "The Fragmentation of Value," in Mortal Questions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 128-41.
60. Nagel, Equality, 17. The same idea is developed in "The Fragmentation of Value," in Mortal Questions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 128-41.
61. TMS 3.3:2.
62. Abizadeh, "The Passions," 279.
63. Ibid., 287.
64. See TMS 7.4:3. For Aristotle's account of this point, see Nussbaum, "The Discernment," 157-8.
65. See TMS 7.4:3. For Aristotle's account of this point, see Nussbaum, "The Discernment," 157-8.
66. In TMS 6.2.1:22, he asserts: "[There are] differences and distinctions which, though not imperceptible, are, by their nicety and delicacy, often altogether indefinable." Similarly, Nussbaum, 161, says: "In the NE V passage [1137b13-32], and implicitly in the one of Book II [1109b18-23], Aristotle alludes to a second feature of the practical, its indeterminate or indefinite character (to aoriston)."
67. See TMS 7.3.2:8. For Aristotle's account, see NE 6.8.1142a28.
68. See TMS 7.3.2:8. For Aristotle's account, see NE 6.8.1142a28.
69. For instance, in TMS 6.2.1:22 he says: "We shall stand in need of no casuistic rules to direct our conduct. These it is often impossible to accommodate to all the differences and gradations of circumstance, character and situation."
70. See TMS 3.3:3, where he asserts: "Habit and experience have taught us to do this so easily and readily, that we are scarce sensible that we do it."
71. See Vivenza, Adam Smith and the Classics, 6.
72. See Fleischacker, A Third Concept.
73. See, for instance, Thomas Campbell and Ian Ross, "The Utilitarianism of Adam Smith's Policy Advice," Journal of the History of Ideas 42 (1981): 73-92.
74. For the explanation of teleology, I rely on Alejandro Vigo, Zeit und Praxis bei Aristoteles (Freiburg: Karl Alber Verlag, 1996), chap. 3. See also John Cooper, Reason and Human Good in Aristotle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), 15-18 and 93-7. Although Cooper does not use the word "teleology" for this feature, he acknowledges that Aristotle's construction of practical reason is end-oriented.
75. For the explanation of teleology, I rely on Alejandro Vigo, Zeit und Praxis bei Aristoteles (Freiburg: Karl Alber Verlag, 1996), chap. 3. See also John Cooper, Reason and Human Good in Aristotle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), 15-18 and 93-7. Although Cooper does not use the word "teleology" for this feature, he acknowledges that Aristotle's construction of practical reason is end-oriented.
76. See James Opie Urmson, "Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean," American Philosophical Quarterly 10 (1973): 223.
77. See Terence H. Irwin, "The Metaphysical and Psychological Basis of Aristotle's Ethics," in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, ed. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 46-7.
78. This is true even when there is no actual deliberation. About this topic, Cooper says: "In so far as those are one's reasons, it is as if one had deliberated and decided accordingly (even if one did not deliberating at all)"; Reason and Human Good, 9-10.
79. See NE 1.8.1099a32-b7.
80. See NE 1.10.1101a67.
81. See Vigo, Zeit, chap. 3.
82. See Myles F. Burnyeat, "Aristotle on Learning to be Good," in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, 83, where he describes the akratic man as he who has a reasoned desire to do one thing yet under the influence of a contrary desire actually does another.
83. For this topic, see Harold Baillie, "Learning the Emotions," New Scholasticism 62 (1988): 221; and Nancy Sherman, "The Habituation of Character," in Aristotle's Ethics, 238, who describes emotions in Aristotle as intentional and cognitive.
84. For this topic, see Harold Baillie, "Learning the Emotions," New Scholasticism 62 (1988): 221; and Nancy Sherman, "The Habituation of Character," in Aristotle's Ethics, 238, who describes emotions in Aristotle as intentional and cognitive.
85. Sherman, "The Habituation," 235, says: "The desiderative part of the non-rational soul (appetites, emotions and feelings) does not engage in reasoning but can listen to reason, be shaped by it."
86. See NE 2.6.1106b36-1107a3.
87. See Burnyeat, "Aristotle," 111.
88. See Sherman, "The Habituation," 238.
89. In making this point I would like to highlight the similarities between Aristotle's and Adam Smith's accounts of moral education, regardless of the formal differences that are due to their styles and level of discussion. See especially TMS 3.3:14, 21, and 22; also TMS 6.3:25; and for Aristotle, see Sherman, "The Habituation," 257.
90. In making this point I would like to highlight the similarities between Aristotle's and Adam Smith's accounts of moral education, regardless of the formal differences that are due to their styles and level of discussion. See especially TMS 3.3:14, 21, and 22; also TMS 6.3:25; and for Aristotle, see Sherman, "The Habituation," 257.
91. In making this point I would like to highlight the similarities between Aristotle's and Adam Smith's accounts of moral education, regardless of the formal differences that are due to their styles and level of discussion. See especially TMS 3.3:14, 21, and 22; also TMS 6.3:25; and for Aristotle, see Sherman, "The Habituation," 257.
92. In NE 6.8.1141b24-25, Aristotle also says: "Political wisdom and practical wisdom are the same state of mind, but to be them is not the same." Cooper explains that in this passage, "Aristotle's point is that political wisdom and practical intellect are the same capacity but, in effect, put to use in different relations"; Reason and Human Good, 34-5.
93. In NE 6.8.1141b24-25, Aristotle also says: "Political wisdom and practical wisdom are the same state of mind, but to be them is not the same." Cooper explains that in this passage, "Aristotle's point is that political wisdom and practical intellect are the same capacity but, in effect, put to use in different relations"; Reason and Human Good, 34-5.
94. Norbert Waszek, "Two Concepts of Morality: A Distinction of Adam Smith's Ethics and its Stoic Origin," Journal of the History of Ideas 45 (1984): 591-606.
95. For instance, Charles Griswold, James Otteson, and Vivienne Brown.
96. TMS 1.1.5:6.
97. TMS 1.1.5:9. See also TMS 6.3:19.
98. TMS 1.1.5:9. See also TMS 6.3:19.
99. TMS 1.1.1:5.
100. See Michel Malherbe, "Adam Smith et l'Idée d'une Science Morale," Revue de Philosophie de la France et l'Étranger 4 (2000): 418.
101. Darwall, "Sympathetic, 144. See TMS 1.1.1:10: "Sympathy, therefore, does not arise so much from the view of the passion, as from that of the situation which excites it."
102. Darwall, "Sympathetic, 144. See TMS 1.1.1:10: "Sympathy, therefore, does not arise so much from the view of the passion, as from that of the situation which excites it."
103. See TMS 1.3.1:9, where in a footnote, replying to his friend David Hume, Smith indicates this same distinction.
104. Griswold, Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment, 121.
105. Ibid., 122.
106. Otteson, Adam Smith's Marketplace of Life, 84.
107. See Griswold, Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment, 88.
108. See TMS 3.3:1.
109. TMS 1.3.2:1. See also Adam Smith, An Inquiry concerning the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, ed. Roy H. Campbell, Andrew S. Skinner, and William B. Todd (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1981), 2.3:28 and 3.3:12.
110. TMS 1.3.2:1. See also Adam Smith, An Inquiry concerning the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, ed. Roy H. Campbell, Andrew S. Skinner, and William B. Todd (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1981), 2.3:28 and 3.3:12.
111. However infrequent this interpretation may be, it is perfectly consistent with the text. Every time Smith uses the expression "to better our condition," he specifies that "for the bulk of mankind" it is "to improve wealth and honors." On the other hand, when he talks about the wise and virtuous, he clearly states that their motivation is the praiseworthy rather than simple praise.
112. TMS 3.3:14.
113. See Poetics 4.1448b5-23; Rhetoric 1.11.1371b5-10, and Sherman's explanation in "The Habituation," 240-1. Griswold has also identified several similarities on this subject (see Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment, 210).
114. See Poetics 4.1448b5-23; Rhetoric 1.11.1371b5-10, and Sherman's explanation in "The Habituation," 240-1. Griswold has also identified several similarities on this subject (see Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment, 210).
115. See Poetics 4.1448b5-23; Rhetoric 1.11.1371b5-10, and Sherman's explanation in "The Habituation," 240-1. Griswold has also identified several similarities on this subject (see Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment, 210).
116. See Poetics 4.1448b5-23; Rhetoric 1.11.1371b5-10, and Sherman's explanation in "The Habituation," 240-1. Griswold has also identified several similarities on this subject (see Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment, 210).
117. TMS 3.3:21.
118. TMS 3.3:22.
119. Compare Sherman, "The Habituation," 238-9: "According to Aristotle, right education is to teach children to find pleasure and pain as it is appropriate (1104b11-13)"; and, "Cultivating the dispositional capacities to feel fear, anger, goodwill, compassion or pity appropriately will be bound up with learning how to discern the circumstances that warrant these responses."
120. TMS 6.concl.:3.
121. TMS 6.concl.:4.
122. TMS 3.2:2.
123. TMS 3.2:8.
124. Griswold, Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment, 130.
125. TMS 3.1:3.
126. See TMS 3.
127. Griswold says: "The impartial spectator is a logical development ... of traits of actual spectators"; Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment, 138.
128. See Vivienne Brown, Adam Smith's Discourse: Canonicity, Commerce and Conscience (New York: Routledge, 1994), 24.
129. In Nagel's sense, again. See section 2. See also Griswold, Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment, 68, where he compares the impartial spectator's perspective to drama critics' objectivity, which "is achieved through relative, though not complete, detachment."
130. See Griswold, Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment, 77.
131. See, for instance, TMS 2.2.2:1.
132. TMS 2.2.2:1.
133. TMS 3.3:2.
134. See Nagel, Equality, 12.
135. Naturally, in these cases the impartial spectator is no longer "impartial," hence it might be more precise to say that the impartial spectator does not really err but simply disappears. However, psychologically, we may be unable to notice his absence, and rather convince ourselves that those judgments are his impartial judgments instead of what we want to hear.
136. See TMS 3, chap. 2.
137. TMS 3.2:1.
138. See TMS 6.3:25.
139. TMS 3.2:16.
140. TMS 3.2:8.
141. See Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. Knud Haakonssen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), xxii. In his introduction, Haakonssen says, "It is clear that Smith gets to greater clarity, especially in the last edition, about our tendency to transpose the impartial social spectator to become an idealized judge."
142. See Eric Miller, "Sympathetic Exchange: Adam Smith and Punishment," Ratio Juris 9, no. 2 (1996): 194.
143. See Griswold, Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment, 225.
144. See The Encyclopedia of Ethics, ed. Laurence Becker and Charlotte Becker (Garland: Hamden, 1992), corresponding to the definition of " Impartiality" by Bernard Gert, 599-600.
145. See The Encyclopedia of Ethics, ed. Laurence Becker and Charlotte Becker (Garland: Hamden, 1992), corresponding to the definition of " Impartiality" by Bernard Gert, 599-600.
146. See TMS 3.4:6.
147. See Fleischacker, "Philosophy," 256.
148. Ibid., 261.
149. See section 2.
150. TMS 6.3:19.
151. TMS 6.3:25 (my emphasis).
152. Ibid. (my emphasis).
153. See TMS 3.3:28.
154. See TMS 6.3:1.
155. In TMS 3.5:1, referring to the virtuous man, he says: "None but those of the happiest mould are capable of suiting, with exact justness, their sentiments and behaviour to the smallest difference of situation." However, Smith does not believe that virtues warrant happiness, for in "paroxysms of distress" his "own natural feelings" press hard upon him, and he requires a great effort to preserve his equanimity. Despite Nature's recompensing him with the pleasure of complete self-approbation, "he still suffers; and the recompense she bestows, though very considerable, is not sufficient completely to compensate the sufferings which those (inalterable) laws (of Nature) inflict" (TMS 3.3-28). This is an important difference with the Stoic sage, and a similarity with Aristotle's phronimos. See also TMS 3.2:3, 1.3.2:5, and 6.concl.:6.
156. In TMS 3.5:1, referring to the virtuous man, he says: "None but those of the happiest mould are capable of suiting, with exact justness, their sentiments and behaviour to the smallest difference of situation." However, Smith does not believe that virtues warrant happiness, for in "paroxysms of distress" his "own natural feelings" press hard upon him, and he requires a great effort to preserve his equanimity. Despite Nature's recompensing him with the pleasure of complete self-approbation, "he still suffers; and the recompense she bestows, though very considerable, is not sufficient completely to compensate the sufferings which those (inalterable) laws (of Nature) inflict" (TMS 3.3-28). This is an important difference with the Stoic sage, and a similarity with Aristotle's phronimos. See also TMS 3.2:3, 1.3.2:5, and 6.concl.:6.
157. In TMS 3.5:1, referring to the virtuous man, he says: "None but those of the happiest mould are capable of suiting, with exact justness, their sentiments and behaviour to the smallest difference of situation." However, Smith does not believe that virtues warrant happiness, for in "paroxysms of distress" his "own natural feelings" press hard upon him, and he requires a great effort to preserve his equanimity. Despite Nature's recompensing him with the pleasure of complete self-approbation, "he still suffers; and the recompense she bestows, though very considerable, is not sufficient completely to compensate the sufferings which those (inalterable) laws (of Nature) inflict" (TMS 3.3-28). This is an important difference with the Stoic sage, and a similarity with Aristotle's phronimos. See also TMS 3.2:3, 1.3.2:5, and 6.concl.:6.
158. TMS 6.1:14.
159. TMS 6, section 1 (my emphasis).
160. TMS 1.3.3:2.
161. See TMS 1.3.3:1.
162. See TMS 1.3.3:2.
163. Taking this expression in the broad sense just explained.
164. See TMS 3.3:30: "Happiness consists in tranquility and enjoyment."
165. TMS 4.1:8.
166. TMS 4.1:9.
167. TMS 6.2.1:20.
168. See TMS 6.2.1:46.
169. See TMS 6.2.2:15-18. Vivienne Brown opposes this thesis, stressing the "apolitical" character of Smith's "man of public spirit" (Adam Smith's Discourse, 138). I admit that Smith's notion of "state" is substantially different from and may even be opposed to Aristotle's polis. Nonetheless, from this evidence I rather infer that their respective ideas of the political sphere are different, and hence the concepts of "public spirit" and great statesman or legislator, within Smith's political theory, should not be measured, at least materially, by Aristotelian standards.
170. See TMS 6.2.2:15-18. Vivienne Brown opposes this thesis, stressing the "apolitical" character of Smith's "man of public spirit" (Adam Smith's Discourse, 138). I admit that Smith's notion of "state" is substantially different from and may even be opposed to Aristotle's polis. Nonetheless, from this evidence I rather infer that their respective ideas of the political sphere are different, and hence the concepts of "public spirit" and great statesman or legislator, within Smith's political theory, should not be measured, at least materially, by Aristotelian standards.
171. See TMS 1.3.3 and 6.3:28.
172. See TMS 1.3.3:8.
173. Charles Griswold and Douglas Den Uyl, "Adam Smith on Friendship and Love," Review of Metaphysics 49 (1996): 616. See also Griswold, Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment, 316.
174. Charles Griswold and Douglas Den Uyl, "Adam Smith on Friendship and Love," Review of Metaphysics 49 (1996): 616. See also Griswold, Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment, 316.
175. See Griswold, "Nature and Philosophy," 192.
176. See TMS 6.3:18.
177. See Knud Haakonssen, "What Might Properly Be Called Natural Jurisprudence?" in Adam Smith, ed. Knud Haakonssen, 206.
178. See Griswold, Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment, 105.
179. Leonidas Montes, "Smith on Virtues: Vir Virtutis Discourse and Civic Humanism," in Adam Smith in Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 94.
180. See Griswold, Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment, 138, and Nussbaum, "The Discernment," 170, respectively. Nussbaum asserts: "Aristotle does not make a sharp split between the cognitive and the emotive."
181. See Griswold, Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment, 138, and Nussbaum, "The Discernment," 170, respectively. Nussbaum asserts: "Aristotle does not make a sharp split between the cognitive and the emotive."
182. See Griswold, Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment, 192.
183. See TMS 6.3:14. On the other hand, according to Nussbaum, moral perception in Aristotle is "some sort of complex responsiveness to the salient features of one's concrete situation" ("The Discernment," 146).
184. See TMS 6.3:14. On the other hand, according to Nussbaum, moral perception in Aristotle is "some sort of complex responsiveness to the salient features of one's concrete situation" ("The Discernment," 146).
185. See TMS 7.2.3:21. Recall exactly the same idea for Aristotle's phronimos, in NE 2.6.1113a32-3.
186. See TMS 7.2.3:21. Recall exactly the same idea for Aristotle's phronimos, in NE 2.6.1113a32-3.
187. See José Luis Tasset, "La Ética de Adam Smith: Hacia un Utilitarismo de la Simpatía," Themata 6 (1989): 205.
188. Vivenza, Adam Smith and the Classics, 81.
189. Ibid., 41.
190. Smith himself points out some of these coincidences. For example, while expounding the nature of virtue in different moral systems, he praises Aristotle's "opinion that no conviction of understanding was capable of getting the better of inveterate habits, and that good morals arose not from knowledge but from action" (TMS 7.2:14), in contrast to Plato's and the Stoics' intellectualism. He also admits that his account of virtue corresponds very much to Aristotle's (TMS 7.2:12), for whom it "consists of the habit of mediocrity according to right reason" (TMS 7.2.1:12). Another important similarity is that moral judgment is only possible in particular instances.
191. Smith himself points out some of these coincidences. For example, while expounding the nature of virtue in different moral systems, he praises Aristotle's "opinion that no conviction of understanding was capable of getting the better of inveterate habits, and that good morals arose not from knowledge but from action" (TMS 7.2:14), in contrast to Plato's and the Stoics' intellectualism. He also admits that his account of virtue corresponds very much to Aristotle's (TMS 7.2:12), for whom it "consists of the habit of mediocrity according to right reason" (TMS 7.2.1:12). Another important similarity is that moral judgment is only possible in particular instances.
192. Smith himself points out some of these coincidences. For example, while expounding the nature of virtue in different moral systems, he praises Aristotle's "opinion that no conviction of understanding was capable of getting the better of inveterate habits, and that good morals arose not from knowledge but from action" (TMS 7.2:14), in contrast to Plato's and the Stoics' intellectualism. He also admits that his account of virtue corresponds very much to Aristotle's (TMS 7.2:12), for whom it "consists of the habit of mediocrity according to right reason" (TMS 7.2.1:12). Another important similarity is that moral judgment is only possible in particular instances.
193. Regarding the Stoics' influence, which along with Hume's is the most explicit and obvious, Vivienne Brown affirms that there is "simultaneous dependence on, yet ultimate rejection of, the Stoic philosophy in TMS" (Adam Smith's Discourse, 5). Griswold and Vivenza share this diagnosis.
194. Berns, "Aristotle and Adam Smith on Justice: Cooperation between Ancients and Moderns?" 74-5.
195. I particularly refer to universality and impartiality. For his possible influence on Kant and the deontological elements present in TMS, see Fleischacker, A Third Concept.
196. I am much indebted to the Research Department of Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, DIPUC, for their financial support, and to Leonidas Montes and Alejandro Vigo for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.