Adam Smith on friendship and love

Review of Metaphysics

Volumn 49, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 609-637

  Den Uyl, Douglas J ^b   Griswold Jr , Charles L ^a  

^a Boston University   (United States)

^b BELLARMINE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 0041729825     PISSN: 00346632     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (85)

1. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. George Lawrence and ed. Jacob P. Mayer (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), 2:565.
2. Nicomachean Ethics (hereafter, NE) 1169a19-25, trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1985), 256.
3. For example, Smith says in his own voice "the chief part of human happiness arises from a consciousness of being beloved"; Adam Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments (hereafter, TMS) I.ii.5.2, ed. David D. Raphael and Alec L. Macfie (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1982). The centrality of love to Smith's moral theory did not escape Thomas Reid, whose lecture notes on Smith show him to have remarked, by way of explaining the teaching of the Theory of Moral Sentiments: "Sympathy seems to me to be inseparably connected with Love Affection and Esteem. I cannot possibly love a Man without being pleased with every good that befals him and uneasy at his misfortune[.] If you ask me why I take so much concern in his good or bad fortune it is because I love him"; cited by J. C. Stewart-Robertson and David F. Norton in "Thomas Reid on Adam Smith's Theory of Morals," Journal of the History of Ideas 45 (1984): 309-21.
4. For example, Smith says in his own voice "the chief part of human happiness arises from a consciousness of being beloved"; Adam Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments (hereafter, TMS) I.ii.5.2, ed. David D. Raphael and Alec L. Macfie (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1982). The centrality of love to Smith's moral theory did not escape Thomas Reid, whose lecture notes on Smith show him to have remarked, by way of explaining the teaching of the Theory of Moral Sentiments: "Sympathy seems to me to be inseparably connected with Love Affection and Esteem. I cannot possibly love a Man without being pleased with every good that befals him and uneasy at his misfortune[.] If you ask me why I take so much concern in his good or bad fortune it is because I love him"; cited by J. C. Stewart-Robertson and David F. Norton in "Thomas Reid on Adam Smith's Theory of Morals," Journal of the History of Ideas 45 (1984): 309-21.
5. At Wealth of Nations V.i.b.2, for example, Smith speaks of the tremendous importance to human life of our "love of present ease and enjoyment"; and at III.ii.10, of our "love to domineer" and the importance of that to the phenomenon of slavery. Of course sexual desire and procreation have important economic consequences that are discussed at various junctures throughout the book. See Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, 2 vols., ed. Roy H. Campbell, Andrew S. Skinner, and William B. Todd (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1981).
6. TMS VII.ii.3.
7. We grant that our use here of the terms 'ancient', 'classical', and 'modern' is imprecise but not, we trust, without utility for the purposes of our discussion. We occasionally run together the views of Aristotle and Plato, for example, recognizing that in a paper of a different sort we would start by distinguishing between those views. We do note that Smith is virtually silent about Christian love, and that he enthusiastically endorses various teachings of Plato and Aristotle (as at TMS VII.ii.1.11; VII.ii.1.12). Smith is very critical of Hutcheson's restriction of virtue to benevolence and rejects his moral sense theory. Smith's admiration of Hume and Voltaire is indicative of his hostility to Christian theology and virtue theory, as well as to some of their political consequences.
8. NE 1155a5-6.
9. NE 1157a30-33.
10. NE 1156b6-7.
11. NE 1157a18-19.
12. NE 1157a19-20.
13. NE 1159b7-9.
14. In antiquity such an argument is made by Cicero in De Amicita, for example. See Other Selves: Philosophers on Friendship, ed. Michael Pakaluk (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991), 89-92; and in modernity a version can be found in Kant's Lecture on Friendship; see also Other Selves, 213. We shall see shortly that Smith also uses a version of this argument.
15. In antiquity such an argument is made by Cicero in De Amicita, for example. See Other Selves: Philosophers on Friendship, ed. Michael Pakaluk (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991), 89-92; and in modernity a version can be found in Kant's Lecture on Friendship; see also Other Selves, 213. We shall see shortly that Smith also uses a version of this argument.
16. In antiquity such an argument is made by Cicero in De Amicita, for example. See Other Selves: Philosophers on Friendship, ed. Michael Pakaluk (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991), 89-92; and in modernity a version can be found in Kant's Lecture on Friendship; see also Other Selves, 213. We shall see shortly that Smith also uses a version of this argument.
17. NE 1166b15-29.
18. NE 1166a1-2.
19. In De Amicitia Cicero notes: "Now the men who are worthy of friendship are those who possess within themselves something that causes men to love them. . . . Unless this same principle [love of self] is transferred to friendship, a man will never find a true friend, for the true friend is, so to speak, a second self"; as quoted in Other Selves, 108.
20. See Douglas Den Uyl, "Prudence and Sociality," in The Virtue of Prudence (Bern: Peter Lang, 1991), for a further discussion of these lower forms of friendships.
21. See the chapter on "affection" and pp. 64-5 in the chapter on friendship in C. S. Lewis's The Four Loves (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Jovanovich, 1991).
22. Lewis himself does not link friendship to morality and in this he is unwittingly modern, despite his claim to classical leanings. The moral component must be brought in from outside oneself which, in this case, means Christianity (see the last few pages of the essay on friendship in The Four Loves). It is possible to be classical and Christian (for example, Aquinas is), but Lewis's essay on friendship does not show us how to be so.
23. There is of course a great body of literature and controversy surrounding the meaning and nature of "happiness" or eudaimonia in Aristotle. For example, see Den Uyl, The Virtue of Prudence (esp. chaps 1-2). Eudaimonia is not a psychological state per se for Aristotle, but rather an activity. Smith tends to use "happiness" in keeping with its ordinary sense in English to mean a state of feeling pleased. While this is an important difference when it comes to discussing friendships of virtue, for present purposes we have not thought it necessary to focus our attention on it. For some general discussion see Charles Griswold's "Happiness, Tranquillity, and Philosophy," in In Pursuit of Happiness, vol. 16 of Boston University Studies in Philosophy and Religion, ed. L. Rouner (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), 13-37. It should be noted that we adopt the inclusive end interpretation of Aristotle on the nature of eudaimonia. Hence we speak in the plural of "ends" in this section.
24. There is of course a great body of literature and controversy surrounding the meaning and nature of "happiness" or eudaimonia in Aristotle. For example, see Den Uyl, The Virtue of Prudence (esp. chaps 1-2). Eudaimonia is not a psychological state per se for Aristotle, but rather an activity. Smith tends to use "happiness" in keeping with its ordinary sense in English to mean a state of feeling pleased. While this is an important difference when it comes to discussing friendships of virtue, for present purposes we have not thought it necessary to focus our attention on it. For some general discussion see Charles Griswold's "Happiness, Tranquillity, and Philosophy," in In Pursuit of Happiness, vol. 16 of Boston University Studies in Philosophy and Religion, ed. L. Rouner (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), 13-37. It should be noted that we adopt the inclusive end interpretation of Aristotle on the nature of eudaimonia. Hence we speak in the plural of "ends" in this section.
25. For example, see Francis Bacon's Essay on Friendship. As one might expect from an Utilitarian approach, this is also the essence of Elizabeth Telfer's contribution to Other Selves, 250-67. Many of the contrasts discussed below can be seen in Telfer's essay.
26. C. S. Lewis, The Four Loves, 60.
27. Kant, "Lecture on Friendship," in Other Selves, 215, 216.
28. TMS VI.ii.2.4.
29. TMS VI.i.3.
30. What is said here is not conceived as settling the debate over whether Smith is a Utilitarian. There are sophisticated defenses to that effect, as in David Levy's "The Partial Spectator in the Wealth of Nations: A Robust Utilitarianism," European Journal of the History of Economic Thought 2 (1995): 299-326. Rather, the point is that even if such a defense of Smith as a Utilitarian can be made, he would not look exactly like modern Utilitarians and the route to such a defense would certainly be circuitous.
31. It is true that the TMS has sections devoted to topics other than propriety, such as merit and duty, but we would argue that all these things are themselves dependent upon propriety (which is why that section opens the book and, we believe, grounds the theory).
32. One may want to argue that the moral theorist would care little about the "intermediary" step of propriety if all eventually resolves into the degree to which social cooperation is enhanced. However, this objection betrays what might be called the "Utilitarian fallacy," namely, supposing that the connection between consequences and moral propriety is isomorphic; see TMS IV. Moreover, Smith is more like Aristotle, and unlike Mill, in holding that it is the perspective of the agent (whether as spectating agent or not) rather than the philosopher that ultimately matters in ethics. From that perspective it is the appropriateness of the action, not its consequences, that determines moral worth.
33. In TMS VII.ii.12-13 Smith links Aristotle's theory of virtue to propriety of conduct, but also notes that for Aristotle "Virtue may be considered either as a quality of an action, or as the quality of a person." Smith has a great deal to tell us about virtue in the latter sense in TMS VI, entitled "Of the Character of Virtue." He introduces his history of earlier treatments of virtue by stating that "the different accounts which have been given of the nature of virtue, or of the temper of mind which constitutes the excellent and praise-worthy character, may be reduced to three different classes. . . . According to these authors [of the first class], therefore, virtue consists in propriety"; TMS VII.ii.intro.1.
34. TMS I.iii.2.1. Aristotle mentions something similar at NE 1124a17-20.
35. TMS I.iii.2.1. Aristotle mentions something similar at NE 1124a17-20.
36. TMS III.2.
37. The desire not to appear blameworthy is also included here, and it may even be a stronger desire. So as to retain the parallelism of our argument, however, we shall focus on praiseworthiness.
38. TMS III.2.1.
39. TMS III.2.7.
40. Of course, what is likely to be actually approved in the long run is probably what is conducive to social cooperation (for example, TMS V.2.16), although here again dread of blame may complicate the picture.
41. TMS III.2.3.
42. That Smith does not think the two are the same is clear from passages such as the following: "The judgments of the man within the breast, however, might be a good deal affected by those reasonings [that of philosophers]"; TMS VII.ii.47.
43. TMS III.3.4.
44. TMS III.6.13.
45. TMS III.2.7.
46. TMS VII.ii.3.13.
47. TMS III.3.26.
48. TMS III.6.13. The Theory of Moral Sentiments actually concludes with a Part VII, but that is a critical assessment of other theories that presupposes Smith's own. Consequently, it is fair to say that Part VI ends the positive portion of Smith ethical theorizing.
49. TMS VI.ii.1.18.
50. NE 1124a1-2. Megalopsychia is sometimes translated as 'pride'. Smith, however, is quite clear that both pride and vanity are vices, at least to some degree (see TMS VI.iii.34-53), though he also notes that occasionally, as in Aristotle's doctrine of megalopsychia, the term can have a good sense; TMS VI.iii.44. This virtually leaves us without another term to apply to the self-approbating individual. Perhaps the other translation often applied to megalopsychia - namely, "great souled" - would be suitable for both our authors.
51. NE 1124a1-2. Megalopsychia is sometimes translated as 'pride'. Smith, however, is quite clear that both pride and vanity are vices, at least to some degree (see TMS VI.iii.34-53), though he also notes that occasionally, as in Aristotle's doctrine of megalopsychia, the term can have a good sense; TMS VI.iii.44. This virtually leaves us without another term to apply to the self-approbating individual. Perhaps the other translation often applied to megalopsychia - namely, "great souled" - would be suitable for both our authors.
52. NE 1124a1-2. Megalopsychia is sometimes translated as 'pride'. Smith, however, is quite clear that both pride and vanity are vices, at least to some degree (see TMS VI.iii.34-53), though he also notes that occasionally, as in Aristotle's doctrine of megalopsychia, the term can have a good sense; TMS VI.iii.44. This virtually leaves us without another term to apply to the self-approbating individual. Perhaps the other translation often applied to megalopsychia - namely, "great souled" - would be suitable for both our authors.
53. See TMS, p. 109.
54. TMS III.1.7.
55. For example, in Part I alone see TMS I.i.3, 5; I.i.4.9; I.ii.2.5; I.ii.4.1, 3; and I.iii.1.11-12.
56. TMS VI.ii.I.1-17.
57. TMS VII.iv.4.
58. TMS I.ii.4.1.
59. TMS II.ii.3.1.
60. TMS I.ii.1.1-2.
61. TMS I.ii.2.2.
62. TMS I.ii.2.1.
63. TMS I.ii.2.2-5.
64. A somewhat similar point about love and spectatorship in Smith is made by Martha Nussbaum in Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 344.
65. Love thus understood is what classical writers would have thought of as perfect friendship. One is also reminded of Montaigne's description in Of Friendship of his relationship with La Boétie. The two were so self-enclosed that Montaigne liked to cite the phrase attributed to Aristotle "O my friends, there is no friend" (Other Selves, 194) to indicate how much beyond the ordinary was his relationship as well as the extent to which two had become one.
66. TMS I.ii.2.6.
67. TMS III.6.12.
68. TMS IV.I.11.
69. TMS III.3.43.
70. TMS IV.1.11.
71. TMS IV.2.12.
72. TMS VII.ii.2.14.
73. TMS VII.ii.1.41.
74. TMS VII.iii.1.2.
75. TMS VII.ii.i.34.
76. Were this an essay on classical friendship, we would draw distinctions between Plato and Aristotle here, calling attention to passages such as NE 9.7 on the love towards one's works, 8.9 on community as the essence of friendship, and of course the issue of the self-sufficiency of the wise described in 10.7.
77. 256b-e; 249c-e.
78. As if in confirmation of Smith's worries, the famous account of eros in the Symposium is delivered by a priestess (Diotima), referred to as an initiation into mysteries, and cast as a narrative about a beloved's induction into mysterious secrets barely intelligible even to Socrates, who is Diotima's student.
79. TMS VI.ii.3.6.
80. For discussion of Smith's Sceptical outlook, see Charles Griswold's "Rhetoric and Ethics: Adam Smith on Theorizing about the Moral Sentiments," in Science, Politics and Social Practice, ed. K. Gavrolu et al. (Dordrecht Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995), 295-320.
81. A similar point about the metaphor of the invisible hand is noted by Vivienne Brown in Adam Smith's Discourse: Canonicity, Commerce, and Conscience (London: Routledge, 1994), 26.
82. Smith remarks that Mandeville's system "seems to take away altogether the distinction between vice and virtue" (TMS VII.ii.4.6); and that Mandeville sought "to prove that there was no real virtue, and that what pretended to be such, was a mere cheat and imposition upon mankind; and . . . that private vices were public benefits"; TMS VII.ii.4.12. For further discussion see Charles Griswold, "Nature and Philosophy: Adam Smith on Stoicism, Aesthetic Reconciliation, and Imagination," forthcoming in Man and World 29, no. 2 (1996).
83. Smith remarks that Mandeville's system "seems to take away altogether the distinction between vice and virtue" (TMS VII.ii.4.6); and that Mandeville sought "to prove that there was no real virtue, and that what pretended to be such, was a mere cheat and imposition upon mankind; and . . . that private vices were public benefits"; TMS VII.ii.4.12. For further discussion see Charles Griswold, "Nature and Philosophy: Adam Smith on Stoicism, Aesthetic Reconciliation, and Imagination," forthcoming in Man and World 29, no. 2 (1996).
84. Smith remarks that Mandeville's system "seems to take away altogether the distinction between vice and virtue" (TMS VII.ii.4.6); and that Mandeville sought "to prove that there was no real virtue, and that what pretended to be such, was a mere cheat and imposition upon mankind; and . . . that private vices were public benefits"; TMS VII.ii.4.12. For further discussion see Charles Griswold, "Nature and Philosophy: Adam Smith on Stoicism, Aesthetic Reconciliation, and Imagination," forthcoming in Man and World 29, no. 2 (1996).
85. This is consistent with Smith's talk (quoted above) of our natural "love of what is honourable and noble" (TMS III.3.4), given his conjoining of honor and nobility and thus the implied restriction of the noble to the socially approved.