Profits or glory?

New Left Review

Volumn , Issue 29, 2004, Pages 47-70

  Peled, Yoav ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 6344235630     PISSN: 00286060     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (51)

1. For their very useful comments on an earlier draft of this essay, I would like to thank David Abraham, John Ehrenberg, Zeev Emmerich, Samuel Farber, Rami Kaplan, Gal Levy, Michael Shalev, Raphael Ventura, Victor Wolfenstein and, especially, Horit Herman Peled. Much of the historical information and analysis for the period before 2001 is drawn from Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled, Being Israeli: The Dynamics of Multiple Citizenship, Cambridge 2002. The views expressed in the essay, and the errors left in it, are entirely my own.
2. For a range of views on the question of state-class relations in The Eighteenth Brumaire see Bob Jessop, 'The Political Scene and the Politics of Representation: Periodizing Class Struggle and the State in The Eighteenth Brumaire'; Paul Wetherly, 'Making Sense of the "Relative Autonomy" of the State', both in Mark Cowling and James Martin, eds, Marx's 'Eighteenth Brumaire': (Post)modern Interpretations, London 2002, pp. 179-94 and 195-208, respectively.
3. For a range of views on the question of state-class relations in The Eighteenth Brumaire see Bob Jessop, 'The Political Scene and the Politics of Representation: Periodizing Class Struggle and the State in The Eighteenth Brumaire'; Paul Wetherly, 'Making Sense of the "Relative Autonomy" of the State', both in Mark Cowling and James Martin, eds, Marx's 'Eighteenth Brumaire': (Post)modern Interpretations, London 2002, pp. 179-94 and 195-208, respectively.
4. For a range of views on the question of state-class relations in The Eighteenth Brumaire see Bob Jessop, 'The Political Scene and the Politics of Representation: Periodizing Class Struggle and the State in The Eighteenth Brumaire'; Paul Wetherly, 'Making Sense of the "Relative Autonomy" of the State', both in Mark Cowling and James Martin, eds, Marx's 'Eighteenth Brumaire': (Post)modern Interpretations, London 2002, pp. 179-94 and 195-208, respectively.
5. Baruch Kimmerling, Politicide: Ariel Sharon's War Against the Palestinians, London 2003. See also his 'From Barak to the Roadmap', NLR 23, September-October 2003.
6. Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall, New York 2001; Michael Shalev, Labour and the Political Economy in Israel, Oxford 1992.
7. Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall, New York 2001; Michael Shalev, Labour and the Political Economy in Israel, Oxford 1992.
8. Michael Shalev, 'Labour, State and Crisis', Industrial Relations, vol. 23, no. 3, 1984, pp. 362-86; 'Liberalization and the Transformation of the Political Economy', in Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled, eds, The New Israel: Peacemaking and Liberalization, Boulder, co 2000, p. 132. The close temporal connection between the recession and the 1967 war calls for careful analysis of the latter's origins. Despite Israel's 30-year archive law, the relevant documents have not been declassified, which perhaps explains the neglect of the subject in revisionist Israeli historiography to date. For a very preliminary attempt, see Yagil Levy and Yoav Peled, 'The Utopian Crisis of the Israeli State', in Russell Stone and Walter Zenner, eds, Critical Essays on Israeli Social Issues and Scholarship, Albany, NY 1994, pp. 201-26.
9. Michael Shalev, 'Labour, State and Crisis', Industrial Relations, vol. 23, no. 3, 1984, pp. 362-86; 'Liberalization and the Transformation of the Political Economy', in Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled, eds, The New Israel: Peacemaking and Liberalization, Boulder, co 2000, p. 132. The close temporal connection between the recession and the 1967 war calls for careful analysis of the latter's origins. Despite Israel's 30-year archive law, the relevant documents have not been declassified, which perhaps explains the neglect of the subject in revisionist Israeli historiography to date. For a very preliminary attempt, see Yagil Levy and Yoav Peled, 'The Utopian Crisis of the Israeli State', in Russell Stone and Walter Zenner, eds, Critical Essays on Israeli Social Issues and Scholarship, Albany, NY 1994, pp. 201-26.
10. Michael Shalev, 'Labour, State and Crisis', Industrial Relations, vol. 23, no. 3, 1984, pp. 362-86; 'Liberalization and the Transformation of the Political Economy', in Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled, eds, The New Israel: Peacemaking and Liberalization, Boulder, co 2000, p. 132. The close temporal connection between the recession and the 1967 war calls for careful analysis of the latter's origins. Despite Israel's 30-year archive law, the relevant documents have not been declassified, which perhaps explains the neglect of the subject in revisionist Israeli historiography to date. For a very preliminary attempt, see Yagil Levy and Yoav Peled, 'The Utopian Crisis of the Israeli State', in Russell Stone and Walter Zenner, eds, Critical Essays on Israeli Social Issues and Scholarship, Albany, NY 1994, pp. 201-26.
11. Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, 'Going Global: Differential Accumulation and the Great U-Turn in South Africa and Israel', Review of Radical Political Economics, vol. 33, no. 1, 2001, pp. 45-7; Shalev, 'Liberalization', p. 132.
12. Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, 'Going Global: Differential Accumulation and the Great U-Turn in South Africa and Israel', Review of Radical Political Economics, vol. 33, no. 1, 2001, pp. 45-7; Shalev, 'Liberalization', p. 132.
13. Shalev, Labour and the Political Economy.
14. Shalev, 'Liberalization', p. 133.
15. In March 2004 Beilin was elected leader of Yahad, the successor party to Meretz. Beilin was not only an early promoter of neo-liberalism but also the architect of the Oslo Accords and the moving spirit behind the symbolic Geneva Accord signed in December 2003.
16. All three PMS elected under that system - Netanyahu, Barak and Sharon - became involved in campaign contribution scandals.
17. Ran Hirschl, 'The Great Economic-Juridical Shift: The Legal Arena and the Transformation of Israel's Economic Order', in Shafir and Peled, The New Israel: Peacemaking and Liberalization, Boulder, co 2000, pp. 189-215.
18. Assaf Razin and Efraim Sadka, The Economy of Modern Israel: Malaise and Promise, Chicago 1993.
19. Lautman made these remarks at the 1992 Jerusalem Business Conference, an important annual business gathering. In the interest of full disclosure, Lautman is also Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Tel Aviv University, my place of employment.
20. Gillerman was appointed UN ambassador by Sharon, and is currently defending his policies in that forum. This is a pointed illustration of the shift of the Israeli bourgeoisie away from a negotiated peace, to be discussed below.
21. Michael Shalev, 'Have Globalization and Liberalization "Normalized" Israel's Political Economy?', Israel Affairs, vol. 5, nos. 2-3, 1999, pp. 121-55.
22. After the Oslo Accords, non-citizen Palestinian workers were gradually removed from the Israeli labour market and replaced with workers from around the world.
23. Uri Ram, '"The Promised Land of Business Opportunities": Liberal Post-Zionism in the Global Age', in Shafir and Peled, The New Israel, p. 230
24. These results are not all comparable, because the 1996 and 1999 elections were conducted under the semi-presidential system, in which the prime minister was elected directly. This, paradoxically, benefited the small ideological parties at the expense of the larger catch-all ones.
25. When Ehud Barak arrived in Tel Aviv's main square to celebrate his victory in the 1999 elections he was greeted by a frenzied mob of middle-class ashkenazim yelling, 'Anyone but Shas!'
26. In an attitude survey of Jewish Israelis conducted at the beginning of 2002, 89 per cent of those indicating they would have voted Shas had an election been held on that day were opposed to a settlement with the Palestinians based on the 2000 Clinton plan, as against 60 per cent of all respondents. More than 60 per cent of Shas voters were in favour of the 'transfer' (expulsion) of non-citizen Palestinians, compared to slightly less than 46 per cent of all respondents. Mizrachim supported 'transfer' at a somewhat higher rate of 48 per cent, and ashkenazim - around a half of whom are recent immigrants from the former USSR who tend to have strongly nationalist views - at a lower rate of about 42 per cent. More than 50 per cent of Shas voters, as compared to 30 per cent of all respondents, supported the 'transfer' of citizen Palestinians. See Asher Arian, Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 2002, Tel Aviv 2002; the Shas data do not appear in Arian's published report and were kindly supplied to me by one of his collaborators, Raphael Ventura. Michael Shalev and Gal Levy report similar findings about Shas voters' attitudes towards the Palestinians in their analysis of the 2003 elections, ' The Winners and Losers of 2003: Ideology, Social Structure and Political Change', in Asher Arian and Michal Shamir, eds, The Elections in Israel: 2003, Albany, NY, forthcoming.
27. In an attitude survey of Jewish Israelis conducted at the beginning of 2002, 89 per cent of those indicating they would have voted Shas had an election been held on that day were opposed to a settlement with the Palestinians based on the 2000 Clinton plan, as against 60 per cent of all respondents. More than 60 per cent of Shas voters were in favour of the 'transfer' (expulsion) of non-citizen Palestinians, compared to slightly less than 46 per cent of all respondents. Mizrachim supported 'transfer' at a somewhat higher rate of 48 per cent, and ashkenazim - around a half of whom are recent immigrants from the former USSR who tend to have strongly nationalist views - at a lower rate of about 42 per cent. More than 50 per cent of Shas voters, as compared to 30 per cent of all respondents, supported the 'transfer' of citizen Palestinians. See Asher Arian, Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 2002, Tel Aviv 2002; the Shas data do not appear in Arian's published report and were kindly supplied to me by one of his collaborators, Raphael Ventura. Michael Shalev and Gal Levy report similar findings about Shas voters' attitudes towards the Palestinians in their analysis of the 2003 elections, ' The Winners and Losers of 2003: Ideology, Social Structure and Political Change', in Asher Arian and Michal Shamir, eds, The Elections in Israel: 2003, Albany, NY, forthcoming.
28. Sami Shalom Chetrit, The Mizrachi Struggle in Israel: Between Oppression and Liberation, Identification and Alternative, 1948-2003, Tel Aviv 2004, p. 263.
29. Jeremy Pressman, 'Visions in Collision: What Happened at Camp David and Taba?', International Security, vol. 28, no. 2, Fall 2003, p. 28.
30. Report of the State Commission of Inquiry for Investigating the Clashes between the Security Forces and Israeli Citizens in October 2000 [the Or Commission], vol. 1, Jerusalem 2003, pp. 92-101.
31. Ben Kaspit, 'Two Years of the Intifada', Maariv, 6 and 13 September 2002 supplements [Hebrew].
32. Yoram Peri, 'The Israeli Military and Israel's Palestinian Policy: From Oslo to the Al Aqsa Intifada', Washington, DC 2002, pp. 13, 35; see also pp. 32-5. It should be noted that only a few months earlier, in May 2000, Barak was able to impose his will on the IDF and force it to withdraw from southern Lebanon.
33. Pressman, 'Visions', pp. 27-8; Kaspit, 'Two Years'; Peri, 'Israeli Military', pp. 31-3, 50-1; Or Commission Report; Amos Harel, 'The IDF Will Not Withdraw Again in Defeat', Haaretz, 8 March 2004. Needless to say, the IDF high command is not made of one cloth, and many generals, in and out of uniform, have supported the peace process and, on occasion, even restrained bellicose civilian politicians. See Peri, 'Israeli Military', pp. 45-51.
34. Pressman, 'Visions', pp. 27-8; Kaspit, 'Two Years'; Peri, 'Israeli Military', pp. 31-3, 50-1; Or Commission Report; Amos Harel, 'The IDF Will Not Withdraw Again in Defeat', Haaretz, 8 March 2004. Needless to say, the IDF high command is not made of one cloth, and many generals, in and out of uniform, have supported the peace process and, on occasion, even restrained bellicose civilian politicians. See Peri, 'Israeli Military', pp. 45-51.
35. Pressman, 'Visions', pp. 27-8; Kaspit, 'Two Years'; Peri, 'Israeli Military', pp. 31-3, 50-1; Or Commission Report; Amos Harel, 'The IDF Will Not Withdraw Again in Defeat', Haaretz, 8 March 2004. Needless to say, the IDF high command is not made of one cloth, and many generals, in and out of uniform, have supported the peace process and, on occasion, even restrained bellicose civilian politicians. See Peri, 'Israeli Military', pp. 45-51.
36. Pressman, 'Visions', pp. 27-8; Kaspit, 'Two Years'; Peri, 'Israeli Military', pp. 31-3, 50-1; Or Commission Report; Amos Harel, 'The IDF Will Not Withdraw Again in Defeat', Haaretz, 8 March 2004. Needless to say, the IDF high command is not made of one cloth, and many generals, in and out of uniform, have supported the peace process and, on occasion, even restrained bellicose civilian politicians. See Peri, 'Israeli Military', pp. 45-51.
37. Pressman, 'Visions', pp. 27-8; Kaspit, 'Two Years'; Peri, 'Israeli Military', pp. 31-3, 50-1; Or Commission Report; Amos Harel, 'The IDF Will Not Withdraw Again in Defeat', Haaretz, 8 March 2004. Needless to say, the IDF high command is not made of one cloth, and many generals, in and out of uniform, have supported the peace process and, on occasion, even restrained bellicose civilian politicians. See Peri, 'Israeli Military', pp. 45-51.
38. Yoram Peri, 'Civil-Military Relations in Israel in Crisis', in Daniel Maman, Eyal Ben-Ari and Zeev Rosenhek, eds, Military, State, and Society in Israel, New Brunswick, NJ 2001, pp. 107-36.
39. Asher Arian and Michal Shamir, eds, The Elections in Israel - 2001, Albany, NY 2002, particularly the chapters by Shamir and Arian and by Jamal.
40. Shamir and Arian, 'Abstaining and Voting in 2001', in Arian and Shamir, eds, The Elections, p. 22.
41. Shlomo Swirski and Etty Konor-Attias, Social Report - 2003, Adva Centre, Tel Aviv [Hebrew], pp. 7, 13; Asher Arian, David Nachmias, Doron Navot and Danielle Shani, Democracy in Israel: 2003 Follow Up Report, Democracy Index Project, Jerusalem 2003 [Hebrew], p. 83. Changes in the Gini coefficient do not tell the whole story, of course, since it measures only wages and salaries, not capital gain income.
42. Shlomo Swirski and Etty Konor-Attias, Social Report - 2003, Adva Centre, Tel Aviv [Hebrew], pp. 7, 13; Asher Arian, David Nachmias, Doron Navot and Danielle Shani, Democracy in Israel: 2003 Follow Up Report, Democracy Index Project, Jerusalem 2003 [Hebrew], p. 83. Changes in the Gini coefficient do not tell the whole story, of course, since it measures only wages and salaries, not capital gain income.
43. Michael Shalev, 'Placing Class Politics in Context: Why is Israel's Welfare State so Consensual?', presented at the conference 'Changing European Societies - the Role for Social Policy', Copenhagen, 13-15 November 2003, p. 20, n. 14. This is in sharp contrast with the conventional wisdom (shared by Shalev and the present writer) that prevailed until the current transformation began to become apparent. In his 1999 Israel Affairs article, Shalev had noted that 'the collectivist economy that was the historical legacy of Jewish settlement and Arab-Jewish conflict in the pre-state period is difficult to dismantle precisely because conflict and settlement continue to shape state commitments'. Instead, renewed conflict and settlement have been the very factors that have enabled the reshaping of the country's political economy and retrenchment of the welfare state.
44. http://trade.walla.co.il, 16 March 2004.
45. Between 1980 and 1996 the overall tax burden in Israel fell from 42.3 per cent to 37.3 per cent. The tax rate on corporate revenues fell from 61 per cent in 1984 to 36 per cent in 1996; see Ram, 'Promised Land', p. 234.
46. Shinui was established specifically to fight Shas and represents secular middleclass ashkenazim, including many immigrants from the former USSR; see Shalev and Levy, 'Winners and Losers'.
47. Ruth Sinai, 'More than 5 per cent increase in poverty', Haaretz, 11 May 2004; Bank Hapoalim, Economic and Financial Survey, 30 March 2004, p. 1 [both Hebrew].
48. Ruth Sinai, 'More than 5 per cent increase in poverty', Haaretz, 11 May 2004; Bank Hapoalim, Economic and Financial Survey, 30 March 2004, p. 1 [both Hebrew].
49. In early 2004 Moody's rating service declared the economic policy of the present Israeli government to be the best in Israel's history: http.//news.walla.co.il, 15 March 2004.
50. Marx, Eighteenth Brumaire, pp. 131-2. The Sharon government's animosity towards the 'literary power' of the Israeli middle class is expressed in its attack on the universities, where a counter-hegemonic vision of society could potentially develop. Draconian budget cuts and forced structural changes, designed to weaken the autonomy of the faculty and strengthen the government's hand in running these institutions, were decreed in 2003.
51. If Sharon had been indicted Shinui, a party that has made much of its commitment to clean government, would have come under a lot of pressure to withdraw from his coalition. Sharon may have sought to safeguard his Knesset majority by bringing Labour back into his government with the Gaza plan, which Labour strongly supports.