Visions in Collision: What Happened at Camp David and Taba?

International Security

Volumn 28, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 5-43

  Pressman, Jeremy ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347622492     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/016228803322761955     Document Type: Review

References (253)

1. The Israeli version refers to the recounting of events since the end of the Camp David summit by Ehud Barak, the Israeli prime minister, and his senior negotiators such as Shlomo Ben-Ami and Gilead Sher; it is also reflected in official statements by the Israeli ministry of foreign affairs and the Israel Defense Forces. The U.S. version is similar to the Israeli one and refers to events as seen by President Bill Clinton, U.S. special envoy to the Middle East Dennis Ross, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs Martin Indyk, and major U.S. newspapers such as the New York Times. The Palestinian version describes events in the eyes of negotiators such as Mohammed Dahlan, Akram Haniyah, and Ahmed Qorei; it is also reflected in official statements of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority, the governing entity of the semiautonomous Palestinian areas in Gaza and the West Bank, as well as Robert Malley (a member of President Clinton's National Security Council staff) and Deborah Sontag (writing for the New York Times). These labels are not absolute: Israelis may support the Palestinian version and vice versa. This illustrative list also does not capture the internal disagreements among officials who worked together on the same team.
2. This imbalance is also reflected in the structure of this article in that it devotes more space to the Israeli/U.S. version.
3. Gilead Sher, "An Israeli View: Comments on the Negotiating Strategies of Israel and the Palestinians," June 17, 2002, edition 22, http://www.bitterlemons.org/previous/bl170602ed22.html.
4. Hussein Agha and Robert Malley, "Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors," New York Review of Books, August 9, 2001, p. 62.
5. Israel offered the Palestinians 91 percent of the West Bank plus the equivalent of 1 percent of the West Bank in land from pre-1967 Israel.
6. Palestinian refugees from 1948 include those expelled and their descendants. As of June 30, 2003, there were just under 4.1 million Palestinian refugees registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. See "UNRWA in Figures," August 2003, http://www.un.org/unrwa/publications/pdf/uif-june03.pdf.
7. The figure of 97 percent is based on a Palestinian state in 94-96 percent of the West Bank plus the equivalent of 1-3 percent of the West Bank in land from pre-1967 Israel. For instance, the Palestinian state might be composed of 94 percent of the West Bank and 3 percent of swapped land for a total of 97 percent.
8. For one version of the Clinton plan, see Bill Clinton, "Proposals for a Final Settlement," Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Spring 2001), pp. 171-173. The issue also lists the citations for several other publications where the Clinton plan is reproduced, including "Clinton Minutes," Ha'aretz, December 31, 2000, pp. 1, 3.
9. For one version of the Clinton plan, see Bill Clinton, "Proposals for a Final Settlement," Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Spring 2001), pp. 171-173. The issue also lists the citations for several other publications where the Clinton plan is reproduced, including "Clinton Minutes," Ha'aretz, December 31, 2000, pp. 1, 3.
10. The Moratinos summary was published in Akiva Eldar, "The Peace That Nearly Was at Taba," Ha'aretz, February 14, 2002, pp. 4, 9.
11. "Israeli-Palestinian Joint Statement at Taba," January 27, 2001, http://mondediplo.com/focus/mideast/a3275.
12. For examples of the official Israeli version on many of these points, see "Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee: First Statement of the Government of Israel," December 28, 2000, http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0jcb0; and "Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-finding Committee: Second Statement of the Government of Israel," March 20, 2001, http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0jrb0.
13. For examples of the official Israeli version on many of these points, see "Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee: First Statement of the Government of Israel," December 28, 2000, http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0jcb0; and "Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-finding Committee: Second Statement of the Government of Israel," March 20, 2001, http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0jrb0.
14. Ehud Barak, "Israel Needs a True Partner for Peace," New York Times, July 30, 2001, p. 17. See also Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Answers to Frequently Asked Questions," updated August 2002, http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0i9o0.
15. Ehud Barak, "Israel Needs a True Partner for Peace," New York Times, July 30, 2001, p. 17. See also Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Answers to Frequently Asked Questions," updated August 2002, http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0i9o0.
16. Deborah Sontag, "Quest for Mideast Peace: How and Why It Failed," New York Times, July 26, 2001, p. A1.
17. Benny Morris, "Camp David and After: An Exchange (1. An Interview with Ehud Barak)," New York Review of Books, June 13, 2002, pp. 42-45 at p. 42.
18. "President William J. Clinton Statement on the Middle East Peace Talks at Camp David," July 25, 2000, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/mid027.htm.
19. Thomas Friedman, "The Best of Enemies," New York Times, February 16, 2001, p. 19; and Thomas Friedman, "Arafat's War," New York Times, October 13, 2000, p. 33. See also William Safire, "Hamas vs. Abbas," New York Times, May 1, 2003, p. 35.
20. Thomas Friedman, "The Best of Enemies," New York Times, February 16, 2001, p. 19; and Thomas Friedman, "Arafat's War," New York Times, October 13, 2000, p. 33. See also William Safire, "Hamas vs. Abbas," New York Times, May 1, 2003, p. 35.
21. Thomas Friedman, "The Best of Enemies," New York Times, February 16, 2001, p. 19; and Thomas Friedman, "Arafat's War," New York Times, October 13, 2000, p. 33. See also William Safire, "Hamas vs. Abbas," New York Times, May 1, 2003, p. 35.
22. Thomas Friedman, "It Only Gets Worse," New York Times, May 22, 2001, p. 19.
23. Ehud Barak interviewed by Lally Weymouth, "Barak: Die or Separate," Newsweek, July 23, 2001, p. 28. See also Ron Pundak, "From Oslo to Taba: What Went Wrong?" Survival, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Autumn 2001), pp. 31-45 at p. 39.
24. Ehud Barak interviewed by Lally Weymouth, "Barak: Die or Separate," Newsweek, July 23, 2001, p. 28. See also Ron Pundak, "From Oslo to Taba: What Went Wrong?" Survival, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Autumn 2001), pp. 31-45 at p. 39.
25. Barak, "Israel Needs a True Partner for Peace." See also Shimon Peres, "Why Security Must Be Globalized," New York Times, June 16, 2002, p. 13; and interview with Israeli negotiator Oded Eran, CNN Morning News, July 26, 2000, http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0ho30.
26. Barak, "Israel Needs a True Partner for Peace." See also Shimon Peres, "Why Security Must Be Globalized," New York Times, June 16, 2002, p. 13; and interview with Israeli negotiator Oded Eran, CNN Morning News, July 26, 2000, http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0ho30.
27. Barak, "Israel Needs a True Partner for Peace." See also Shimon Peres, "Why Security Must Be Globalized," New York Times, June 16, 2002, p. 13; and interview with Israeli negotiator Oded Eran, CNN Morning News, July 26, 2000, http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0ho30.
28. Dennis Ross interviewed by Brit Hume, "Transcript: Dennis Ross, Former U.S. Special Envoy to the Middle East," FOX News Sunday, April 21, 2002, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,50830,00.html. See also Raviv Drucker, Harakiri (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth Books, 2002), pp. 379-380; Sher, "An Israeli View"; Sher (summary of remarks prepared by Liat Radcliffe), "The Brink of Peace? An Inside Look from Camp David to Taba," Peacewatch, No. 318, April 18, 2001, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/watch/Peacewatch/peacewatch2001/318.htm; and Shlomo Ben-Ami interviewed by Ari Shavit, "End of a Journey," Ha'aretz (magazine), September 14, 2001, pp. 10-15, 29.
29. Dennis Ross interviewed by Brit Hume, "Transcript: Dennis Ross, Former U.S. Special Envoy to the Middle East," FOX News Sunday, April 21, 2002, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,50830,00.html. See also Raviv Drucker, Harakiri (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth Books, 2002), pp. 379-380; Sher, "An Israeli View"; Sher (summary of remarks prepared by Liat Radcliffe), "The Brink of Peace? An Inside Look from Camp David to Taba," Peacewatch, No. 318, April 18, 2001, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/watch/Peacewatch/peacewatch2001/318.htm; and Shlomo Ben-Ami interviewed by Ari Shavit, "End of a Journey," Ha'aretz (magazine), September 14, 2001, pp. 10-15, 29.
30. Dennis Ross interviewed by Brit Hume, "Transcript: Dennis Ross, Former U.S. Special Envoy to the Middle East," FOX News Sunday, April 21, 2002, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,50830,00.html. See also Raviv Drucker, Harakiri (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth Books, 2002), pp. 379-380; Sher, "An Israeli View"; Sher (summary of remarks prepared by Liat Radcliffe), "The Brink of Peace? An Inside Look from Camp David to Taba," Peacewatch, No. 318, April 18, 2001, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/watch/Peacewatch/peacewatch2001/318.htm; and Shlomo Ben-Ami interviewed by Ari Shavit, "End of a Journey," Ha'aretz (magazine), September 14, 2001, pp. 10-15, 29.
31. Dennis Ross interviewed by Brit Hume, "Transcript: Dennis Ross, Former U.S. Special Envoy to the Middle East," FOX News Sunday, April 21, 2002, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,50830,00.html. See also Raviv Drucker, Harakiri (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth Books, 2002), pp. 379-380; Sher, "An Israeli View"; Sher (summary of remarks prepared by Liat Radcliffe), "The Brink of Peace? An Inside Look from Camp David to Taba," Peacewatch, No. 318, April 18, 2001, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/watch/Peacewatch/peacewatch2001/318.htm; and Shlomo Ben-Ami interviewed by Ari Shavit, "End of a Journey," Ha'aretz (magazine), September 14, 2001, pp. 10-15, 29.
32. Dennis Ross interviewed by Brit Hume, "Transcript: Dennis Ross, Former U.S. Special Envoy to the Middle East," FOX News Sunday, April 21, 2002, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,50830,00.html. See also Raviv Drucker, Harakiri (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth Books, 2002), pp. 379-380; Sher, "An Israeli View"; Sher (summary of remarks prepared by Liat Radcliffe), "The Brink of Peace? An Inside Look from Camp David to Taba," Peacewatch, No. 318, April 18, 2001, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/watch/Peacewatch/peacewatch2001/318.htm; and Shlomo Ben-Ami interviewed by Ari Shavit, "End of a Journey," Ha'aretz (magazine), September 14, 2001, pp. 10-15, 29.
33. Ben-Ami interviewed by Ari Shavit, "End of a Journey," p. 29. See also Barak, "Israel Needs a True Partner for Peace," p. 17.
34. Ben-Ami interviewed by Ari Shavit, "End of a Journey," p. 29. See also Barak, "Israel Needs a True Partner for Peace," p. 17.
35. Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "The Conclusion of the Camp David Summit: Key Points," July 25, 2000, http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0hnm0.
36. Quoted in Morris, "Camp David and After," p. 42.
37. Ben-Ami interviewed by Shavit, "End of a Journey," p. 14.
38. Dennis Ross, "Camp David: An Exchange," New York Review of Books, September 20, 2001, p. 9.
39. Morris, "Camp David and After," p. 42.
40. Ehud Barak interviewed by Ari Shavit, "Eyes Wide Shut," Ha'aretz (magazine), September 6, 2002, pp. 8-12, 14, at p. 11.
41. Ben-Ami interviewed by Shavit, "End of a Journey." See also Sher, "An Israeli View."
42. Ben-Ami interviewed by Shavit, "End of a Journey." See also Sher, "An Israeli View."
43. David Makovsky, "Taba Mythchief," National Interest, Spring 2003, pp. 119-129 at p. 128.
44. Morris, "Camp David and After," p. 43. See also Martin S. Indyk, "Is Yasser Arafat a Credible Partner for Peace?" testimony before the U.S. House Armed Services Committee, Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism, 107th Cong., 2d sess., June 6, 2002.
45. Morris, "Camp David and After," p. 43. See also Martin S. Indyk, "Is Yasser Arafat a Credible Partner for Peace?" testimony before the U.S. House Armed Services Committee, Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism, 107th Cong., 2d sess., June 6, 2002.
46. Morris, "Camp David and After," p. 43.
47. Sher, "An Israeli View." For a view from the Israeli right, see Dore Gold, "Only Buffer Zones Can Protect Israel," New York Times, February 27, 2002, p. 21.
48. Sher, "An Israeli View." For a view from the Israeli right, see Dore Gold, "Only Buffer Zones Can Protect Israel," New York Times, February 27, 2002, p. 21.
49. See article 15 of the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles (Oslo 1) and article 31 of the Oslo 2 agreement. Oslo 1 and 2 are available at http://www.mideastweb.org/meoslodop.htm and http://www.mideastweb.org/meosint.htm.
50. "Overview of the Violence in the Territories, 29 September-9 November 2000," http://www.idf.il/english/news/background_20nov00.stm.
51. Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Answers to Frequently Asked Questions: Palestinian Violence and Terrorism - The International War against Terrorism," January 2002. For the August 2002 version, see http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0i9o0.
52. Friedman, "Arafat's War." See also Ross, "Camp David: An Exchange."
53. Friedman, "Arafat's War." See also Ross, "Camp David: An Exchange."
54. Barak interviewed by Weymouth, "Barak: Die or Separate." See also Morris, "Camp David and After."
55. Barak interviewed by Weymouth, "Barak: Die or Separate." See also Morris, "Camp David and After."
56. William Safire, "Not Arafat's Fault?" New York Times, July 30, 2001, p. 17.
57. Benny Morris, "Peace? No Chance," Guardian (magazine), February 21, 2002, pp. 2, 4 of G2. See also Thomas Friedman, "Nine Wars Too Many," New York Times, May 15, 2002, p. 23; Akiva Eldar, "How to Solve the Palestinian Refugee Problem," Ha'aretz, May 29, 2001, p. 4; Ari Shavit, "The Right of Return at Taba," Ha'aretz, July 11, 2002, p. 5; Ari Shavit, "The Security Umbrella of Victory," Ha'aretz, August 8, 2002, p. 5; and Uzi Benziman, "Rolling to Where?" Ha'aretz, March 31, 2002, p. 5.
58. Benny Morris, "Peace? No Chance," Guardian (magazine), February 21, 2002, pp. 2, 4 of G2. See also Thomas Friedman, "Nine Wars Too Many," New York Times, May 15, 2002, p. 23; Akiva Eldar, "How to Solve the Palestinian Refugee Problem," Ha'aretz, May 29, 2001, p. 4; Ari Shavit, "The Right of Return at Taba," Ha'aretz, July 11, 2002, p. 5; Ari Shavit, "The Security Umbrella of Victory," Ha'aretz, August 8, 2002, p. 5; and Uzi Benziman, "Rolling to Where?" Ha'aretz, March 31, 2002, p. 5.
59. Benny Morris, "Peace? No Chance," Guardian (magazine), February 21, 2002, pp. 2, 4 of G2. See also Thomas Friedman, "Nine Wars Too Many," New York Times, May 15, 2002, p. 23; Akiva Eldar, "How to Solve the Palestinian Refugee Problem," Ha'aretz, May 29, 2001, p. 4; Ari Shavit, "The Right of Return at Taba," Ha'aretz, July 11, 2002, p. 5; Ari Shavit, "The Security Umbrella of Victory," Ha'aretz, August 8, 2002, p. 5; and Uzi Benziman, "Rolling to Where?" Ha'aretz, March 31, 2002, p. 5.
60. Benny Morris, "Peace? No Chance," Guardian (magazine), February 21, 2002, pp. 2, 4 of G2. See also Thomas Friedman, "Nine Wars Too Many," New York Times, May 15, 2002, p. 23; Akiva Eldar, "How to Solve the Palestinian Refugee Problem," Ha'aretz, May 29, 2001, p. 4; Ari Shavit, "The Right of Return at Taba," Ha'aretz, July 11, 2002, p. 5; Ari Shavit, "The Security Umbrella of Victory," Ha'aretz, August 8, 2002, p. 5; and Uzi Benziman, "Rolling to Where?" Ha'aretz, March 31, 2002, p. 5.
61. Benny Morris, "Peace? No Chance," Guardian (magazine), February 21, 2002, pp. 2, 4 of G2. See also Thomas Friedman, "Nine Wars Too Many," New York Times, May 15, 2002, p. 23; Akiva Eldar, "How to Solve the Palestinian Refugee Problem," Ha'aretz, May 29, 2001, p. 4; Ari Shavit, "The Right of Return at Taba," Ha'aretz, July 11, 2002, p. 5; Ari Shavit, "The Security Umbrella of Victory," Ha'aretz, August 8, 2002, p. 5; and Uzi Benziman, "Rolling to Where?" Ha'aretz, March 31, 2002, p. 5.
62. Benny Morris, "Peace? No Chance," Guardian (magazine), February 21, 2002, pp. 2, 4 of G2. See also Thomas Friedman, "Nine Wars Too Many," New York Times, May 15, 2002, p. 23; Akiva Eldar, "How to Solve the Palestinian Refugee Problem," Ha'aretz, May 29, 2001, p. 4; Ari Shavit, "The Right of Return at Taba," Ha'aretz, July 11, 2002, p. 5; Ari Shavit, "The Security Umbrella of Victory," Ha'aretz, August 8, 2002, p. 5; and Uzi Benziman, "Rolling to Where?" Ha'aretz, March 31, 2002, p. 5.
63. This is not to say that Israel's position was six to twenty-one years. Rather, Ze'ev Schiff, Ha'aretz's senior military correspondent, claimed that it was twenty-one years; Jerome Slater, an American academic, claimed six to twelve. Ze'ev Schiff, "Drawing a New Red Line," Ha'aretz, January 5, 2001, p. A4; and Jerome Slater, "What Went Wrong? The Collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 116, No. 2 (Summer 2001), pp. 171-199 at p. 183. At Camp David on July 16, 2000, Charles Enderlin quoted Gilead Sher as proposing twenty years during which Israel would gradually withdraw from the valley. Enderlin, Shattered Dreams: The Failure of the Peace Process in the Middle East, 1995-2002 (New York: Other Press, 2003), pp. 208, 213.
64. This is not to say that Israel's position was six to twenty-one years. Rather, Ze'ev Schiff, Ha'aretz's senior military correspondent, claimed that it was twenty-one years; Jerome Slater, an American academic, claimed six to twelve. Ze'ev Schiff, "Drawing a New Red Line," Ha'aretz, January 5, 2001, p. A4; and Jerome Slater, "What Went Wrong? The Collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 116, No. 2 (Summer 2001), pp. 171-199 at p. 183. At Camp David on July 16, 2000, Charles Enderlin quoted Gilead Sher as proposing twenty years during which Israel would gradually withdraw from the valley. Enderlin, Shattered Dreams: The Failure of the Peace Process in the Middle East, 1995-2002 (New York: Other Press, 2003), pp. 208, 213.
65. This is not to say that Israel's position was six to twenty-one years. Rather, Ze'ev Schiff, Ha'aretz's senior military correspondent, claimed that it was twenty-one years; Jerome Slater, an American academic, claimed six to twelve. Ze'ev Schiff, "Drawing a New Red Line," Ha'aretz, January 5, 2001, p. A4; and Jerome Slater, "What Went Wrong? The Collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 116, No. 2 (Summer 2001), pp. 171-199 at p. 183. At Camp David on July 16, 2000, Charles Enderlin quoted Gilead Sher as proposing twenty years during which Israel would gradually withdraw from the valley. Enderlin, Shattered Dreams: The Failure of the Peace Process in the Middle East, 1995-2002 (New York: Other Press, 2003), pp. 208, 213.
66. The land was designated as such in the 1949 Israeli-Jordanian armistice talks.
67. Applied Research Institute-Jerusalem, "The Withdrawal Percentages: What Do They Really Mean?" January 2001, http://www.poica.org/casestudies/Withdrawal-Percentages1-1-2001/index.htm.
68. Clyde Haberman, "Israeli Cabinet Rules Out Idea of Exchange of Territory," New York Times, July 16, 2001, p. 6.
69. Morris, "Camp David and After," p. 44. Enderlin, Shattered Dreams, p. 201, quoted Clinton as noting this line.
70. Morris, "Camp David and After," p. 44. Enderlin, Shattered Dreams, p. 201, quoted Clinton as noting this line.
71. The map produced by Palestinians at the Orient House, the unofficial headquarters of the Palestine Liberation Organization in Jerusalem, after the Camp David summit included two divisions (and thus the Palestinian share of the West Bank would have been in three parts). The map was intended to be a reconstruction of what Israel had proposed at the summit. See http://www.orienthouse.org/dept/images/Maps/ecartediplo.eng.html. Amira Hass echoed this charge in "The Compromise That Wasn't Found at Camp David," Ha'aretz, November 14, 2000, p. 4. This second salient through Ariel could have been a single salient under Israeli sovereignty. It also could have been a combination of two elements: an Israeli salient from pre-1967 Israel to Ariel combined with Israeli control of the neighboring Jordan Valley.
72. The map produced by Palestinians at the Orient House, the unofficial headquarters of the Palestine Liberation Organization in Jerusalem, after the Camp David summit included two divisions (and thus the Palestinian share of the West Bank would have been in three parts). The map was intended to be a reconstruction of what Israel had proposed at the summit. See http://www.orienthouse.org/dept/images/Maps/ecartediplo.eng.html. Amira Hass echoed this charge in "The Compromise That Wasn't Found at Camp David," Ha'aretz, November 14, 2000, p. 4. This second salient through Ariel could have been a single salient under Israeli sovereignty. It also could have been a combination of two elements: an Israeli salient from pre-1967 Israel to Ariel combined with Israeli control of the neighboring Jordan Valley.
73. Yossi Beilin, then the Israeli minister of justice, concurred and also added Qalandiya. See report on an interview with Beilin by Walid Abu-al-Zuluf and Mahir al-Shaykh, al-Quds (Jerusalem), August 2, 2000, pp. 1, 22, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), August 4, 2000. One Israeli media account mentioned al-Ram and Anata in this category. See Ben Kaspit, "Jerusalem's Partition Plan," Ma'ariv, July 27, 2000, p. 2, in FBIS, July 31, 2000.
74. Akram Haniyah, "Camp David Papers," al-Ayyam, August 3, 2000, 4th installment, in FBIS, August 28, 2000. An abridged version of Haniyah's writings appear in "The Camp David Papers," Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Winter 2001), pp. 75-97. An Israeli account added Jabal al-Mukabbir and described the proposed Palestinian powers as "local administrative rights, such as autonomy." Kaspit, "Jerusalem's Partition Plan." See also Robert Malley, "Fictions About the Failure at Camp David," New York Times, July 8, 2001, p. 11.
75. Akram Haniyah, "Camp David Papers," al-Ayyam, August 3, 2000, 4th installment, in FBIS, August 28, 2000. An abridged version of Haniyah's writings appear in "The Camp David Papers," Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Winter 2001), pp. 75-97. An Israeli account added Jabal al-Mukabbir and described the proposed Palestinian powers as "local administrative rights, such as autonomy." Kaspit, "Jerusalem's Partition Plan." See also Robert Malley, "Fictions About the Failure at Camp David," New York Times, July 8, 2001, p. 11.
76. Akram Haniyah, "Camp David Papers," al-Ayyam, August 3, 2000, 4th installment, in FBIS, August 28, 2000. An abridged version of Haniyah's writings appear in "The Camp David Papers," Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Winter 2001), pp. 75-97. An Israeli account added Jabal al-Mukabbir and described the proposed Palestinian powers as "local administrative rights, such as autonomy." Kaspit, "Jerusalem's Partition Plan." See also Robert Malley, "Fictions About the Failure at Camp David," New York Times, July 8, 2001, p. 11.
77. Morris, "Camp David and After," p. 44.
78. An interview with Muhammad Dahlan, "A Palestinian View - Nothing Tangible Was on the Table," July 15, 2002, edition 26, http://www.bitterlemons.org/previous/bl150702ed26.html. Yossi Beilin, who was not at Camp David, concurs in Madrikh Le-Yonah Petsuah [Manual for a wounded dove] (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth Books, 2001), p. 130.
79. An interview with Muhammad Dahlan, "A Palestinian View - Nothing Tangible Was on the Table," July 15, 2002, edition 26, http://www.bitterlemons.org/previous/bl150702ed26.html. Yossi Beilin, who was not at Camp David, concurs in Madrikh Le-Yonah Petsuah [Manual for a wounded dove] (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth Books, 2001), p. 130.
80. Kaspit, "Jerusalem's Partition Plan." The prayer corner is also mentioned by Slater, "What Went Wrong?" p. 186.
81. Kaspit, "Jerusalem's Partition Plan." The prayer corner is also mentioned by Slater, "What Went Wrong?" p. 186.
82. Ben-Ami interviewed by Shavit, "End of a Journey," p. 15.
83. Enderlin, Shattered Dreams, pp. 281-282; Akram Haniyah, "Camp David Papers," al-Ayyam, August 6, 2000, 5th installment, and August 10, 2000, 7th installment, in FBIS, August 28-29, 2000; Janine Zacharia, "Ross to 'Post': Palestinians Missed Historic Opportunity," Jerusalem Post, January 19, 2001, pp. A1, A14; and Morris, "Camp David and After."
84. Enderlin, Shattered Dreams, pp. 281-282; Akram Haniyah, "Camp David Papers," al-Ayyam, August 6, 2000, 5th installment, and August 10, 2000, 7th installment, in FBIS, August 28-29, 2000; Janine Zacharia, "Ross to 'Post': Palestinians Missed Historic Opportunity," Jerusalem Post, January 19, 2001, pp. A1, A14; and Morris, "Camp David and After."
85. Enderlin, Shattered Dreams, pp. 281-282; Akram Haniyah, "Camp David Papers," al-Ayyam, August 6, 2000, 5th installment, and August 10, 2000, 7th installment, in FBIS, August 28-29, 2000; Janine Zacharia, "Ross to 'Post': Palestinians Missed Historic Opportunity," Jerusalem Post, January 19, 2001, pp. A1, A14; and Morris, "Camp David and After."
86. Enderlin, Shattered Dreams, pp. 281-282; Akram Haniyah, "Camp David Papers," al-Ayyam, August 6, 2000, 5th installment, and August 10, 2000, 7th installment, in FBIS, August 28-29, 2000; Janine Zacharia, "Ross to 'Post': Palestinians Missed Historic Opportunity," Jerusalem Post, January 19, 2001, pp. A1, A14; and Morris, "Camp David and After."
87. For more on the connection between Jerusalem and the ancient Jewish Temple, see Israel Finkelstein and Neil Asher Silberman, The Bible Unearthed: Archaeology's New Vision of Ancient Israel and the Origin of Its Sacred Texts (New York: Free Press, 2001).
88. Dennis Ross, "From Oslo to Camp David to Taba: Setting the Record Straight," August 8, 2001, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/ross/ross.htm.
89. Barak interviewed by Shavit, "Eyes Wide Shut," p. 11. See the main elements of Israel's reservations to the Clinton plan in Gilead Sher, B'Merchak Negia [Just beyond reach] (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth Books, 2001), pp. 372-374. In a private interview, one U.S. diplomat noted differences in how the Israeli government and the PA handled their responses to the Clinton plan. Israel quickly accepted the plan and presented its serious reservations separately. The PA responded more slowly and coupled its acceptance with the presentation of significant reservations.
90. Barak interviewed by Shavit, "Eyes Wide Shut," p. 11. See the main elements of Israel's reservations to the Clinton plan in Gilead Sher, B'Merchak Negia [Just beyond reach] (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth Books, 2001), pp. 372-374. In a private interview, one U.S. diplomat noted differences in how the Israeli government and the PA handled their responses to the Clinton plan. Israel quickly accepted the plan and presented its serious reservations separately. The PA responded more slowly and coupled its acceptance with the presentation of significant reservations.
91. Bill Clinton, "Speech on Middle East Policy," Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Spring 2001), pp. 173-175 at p. 174.
92. "Israeli-Palestinian Joint Statement at Taba."
93. Ross, "From Oslo to Camp David to Taba." Ross, however, was not at the Taba talks. Menachem Klein, a professor at Bar Ilan University and an adviser to the Israeli delegation to the Camp David summit, agrees. See Klein, Shovrim Tabu: ha-maga'im le-hesder keva bi-Yerushalayim, 1994-2001 [Shattering a taboo: The contacts toward a permanent status agreement in Jerusalem, 1994-2001] (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 2001), p. 75.
94. Ross, "From Oslo to Camp David to Taba." Ross, however, was not at the Taba talks. Menachem Klein, a professor at Bar Ilan University and an adviser to the Israeli delegation to the Camp David summit, agrees. See Klein, Shovrim Tabu: ha-maga'im le-hesder keva bi-Yerushalayim, 1994-2001 [Shattering a taboo: The contacts toward a permanent status agreement in Jerusalem, 1994-2001] (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 2001), p. 75.
95. Eldar, "The Peace That Nearly Was at Taba," p. 4.
96. Qorei's statement to al-Ayyam on January 29, 2001, and in Sher, B'Merchak Negia, p. 398, are cited in Makovsky, "Taba Mythchief," p. 122. See also Sher, B'Merchak Negia, p. 406.
97. Qorei's statement to al-Ayyam on January 29, 2001, and in Sher, B'Merchak Negia, p. 398, are cited in Makovsky, "Taba Mythchief," p. 122. See also Sher, B'Merchak Negia, p. 406.
98. Qorei's statement to al-Ayyam on January 29, 2001, and in Sher, B'Merchak Negia, p. 398, are cited in Makovsky, "Taba Mythchief," p. 122. See also Sher, B'Merchak Negia, p. 406.
99. See section 1.1 of the Moratinos summary in Eldar, "The Peace That Nearly Was at Taba," p. 4. See also Enderlin, Shattered Dreams, pp. 341-343, 352; and David Matz, "One Effort to Understand One Negotiation," University of Massachusetts, Boston, December 2002. Matz interviewed seventeen of the twenty-eight negotiators and professional staff who had been at Taba. Ben-Ami presented a different map to the Palestinians with 5 percent Israeli annexation. Israel's 8 percent figure may have been Barak's bottom line, or it may have been a bargaining tactic. See Drucker, Harakiri, p. 400; and Sher, B'Merchak Negia, p. 404.
100. See section 1.1 of the Moratinos summary in Eldar, "The Peace That Nearly Was at Taba," p. 4. See also Enderlin, Shattered Dreams, pp. 341-343, 352; and David Matz, "One Effort to Understand One Negotiation," University of Massachusetts, Boston, December 2002. Matz interviewed seventeen of the twenty-eight negotiators and professional staff who had been at Taba. Ben-Ami presented a different map to the Palestinians with 5 percent Israeli annexation. Israel's 8 percent figure may have been Barak's bottom line, or it may have been a bargaining tactic. See Drucker, Harakiri, p. 400; and Sher, B'Merchak Negia, p. 404.
101. See section 1.1 of the Moratinos summary in Eldar, "The Peace That Nearly Was at Taba," p. 4. See also Enderlin, Shattered Dreams, pp. 341-343, 352; and David Matz, "One Effort to Understand One Negotiation," University of Massachusetts, Boston, December 2002. Matz interviewed seventeen of the twenty-eight negotiators and professional staff who had been at Taba. Ben-Ami presented a different map to the Palestinians with 5 percent Israeli annexation. Israel's 8 percent figure may have been Barak's bottom line, or it may have been a bargaining tactic. See Drucker, Harakiri, p. 400; and Sher, B'Merchak Negia, p. 404.
102. See section 1.1 of the Moratinos summary in Eldar, "The Peace That Nearly Was at Taba," p. 4. See also Enderlin, Shattered Dreams, pp. 341-343, 352; and David Matz, "One Effort to Understand One Negotiation," University of Massachusetts, Boston, December 2002. Matz interviewed seventeen of the twenty-eight negotiators and professional staff who had been at Taba. Ben-Ami presented a different map to the Palestinians with 5 percent Israeli annexation. Israel's 8 percent figure may have been Barak's bottom line, or it may have been a bargaining tactic. See Drucker, Harakiri, p. 400; and Sher, B'Merchak Negia, p. 404.
103. See section 1.1 of the Moratinos summary in Eldar, "The Peace That Nearly Was at Taba," p. 4. See also Enderlin, Shattered Dreams, pp. 341-343, 352; and David Matz, "One Effort to Understand One Negotiation," University of Massachusetts, Boston, December 2002. Matz interviewed seventeen of the twenty-eight negotiators and professional staff who had been at Taba. Ben-Ami presented a different map to the Palestinians with 5 percent Israeli annexation. Israel's 8 percent figure may have been Barak's bottom line, or it may have been a bargaining tactic. See Drucker, Harakiri, p. 400; and Sher, B'Merchak Negia, p. 404.
104. Enderlin, Shattered Dreams, p. 343.
105. Drucker, Harakiri, p. 400.
106. Eldar, Enderlin, Alain Gresh (Le Monde), Matz, and Pundak all believe that, based on what transpired at Taba, an agreement could have been attained with more time. Makovsky claims that the parties were still far apart.
107. See, for instance, Mustafa Barghouti, "Generous to Whom?" al-Ahram Weekly On-line, May 10-16, 2001, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2001/533/op2.htm.
108. For a brief review of Palestinian concessions at Camp David, see Malley, "Fictions About the Failure at Camp David." See also Hasan Asfour, "Right of Reply/Ben-Ami's Occupation Syndrome," Ha'aretz (magazine), October 19, 2001, p. 23. On Jerusalem, see Beilin, Madrikh Le-Yonah Petsuah, p. 132.
109. For a brief review of Palestinian concessions at Camp David, see Malley, "Fictions About the Failure at Camp David." See also Hasan Asfour, "Right of Reply/Ben-Ami's Occupation Syndrome," Ha'aretz (magazine), October 19, 2001, p. 23. On Jerusalem, see Beilin, Madrikh Le-Yonah Petsuah, p. 132.
110. For a brief review of Palestinian concessions at Camp David, see Malley, "Fictions About the Failure at Camp David." See also Hasan Asfour, "Right of Reply/Ben-Ami's Occupation Syndrome," Ha'aretz (magazine), October 19, 2001, p. 23. On Jerusalem, see Beilin, Madrikh Le-Yonah Petsuah, p. 132.
111. Ben-Ami interviewed by Shavit, "End of a Journey," p. 13. See Ross interviewed by Hume, "Transcript: Dennis Ross"; and Morris, "Camp David and After," p. 44. For Klein's view, see Akiva Eldar, "A Million Israelis, One Consultant, and a Researcher," Ha'aretz, May 2, 2002, p. 4. At Taba, on the issue of border control at the border of Palestine with Jordan, Israel still called for an Israeli presence. See Sher, B'Merchak Negia, p. 403.
112. Ben-Ami interviewed by Shavit, "End of a Journey," p. 13. See Ross interviewed by Hume, "Transcript: Dennis Ross"; and Morris, "Camp David and After," p. 44. For Klein's view, see Akiva Eldar, "A Million Israelis, One Consultant, and a Researcher," Ha'aretz, May 2, 2002, p. 4. At Taba, on the issue of border control at the border of Palestine with Jordan, Israel still called for an Israeli presence. See Sher, B'Merchak Negia, p. 403.
113. Ben-Ami interviewed by Shavit, "End of a Journey," p. 13. See Ross interviewed by Hume, "Transcript: Dennis Ross"; and Morris, "Camp David and After," p. 44. For Klein's view, see Akiva Eldar, "A Million Israelis, One Consultant, and a Researcher," Ha'aretz, May 2, 2002, p. 4. At Taba, on the issue of border control at the border of Palestine with Jordan, Israel still called for an Israeli presence. See Sher, B'Merchak Negia, p. 403.
114. Ben-Ami interviewed by Shavit, "End of a Journey," p. 13. See Ross interviewed by Hume, "Transcript: Dennis Ross"; and Morris, "Camp David and After," p. 44. For Klein's view, see Akiva Eldar, "A Million Israelis, One Consultant, and a Researcher," Ha'aretz, May 2, 2002, p. 4. At Taba, on the issue of border control at the border of Palestine with Jordan, Israel still called for an Israeli presence. See Sher, B'Merchak Negia, p. 403.
115. Ben-Ami interviewed by Shavit, "End of a Journey," p. 13. See Ross interviewed by Hume, "Transcript: Dennis Ross"; and Morris, "Camp David and After," p. 44. For Klein's view, see Akiva Eldar, "A Million Israelis, One Consultant, and a Researcher," Ha'aretz, May 2, 2002, p. 4. At Taba, on the issue of border control at the border of Palestine with Jordan, Israel still called for an Israeli presence. See Sher, B'Merchak Negia, p. 403.
116. The Palestinians presented a map at Camp David. See Ben-Ami interviewed by Shavit, "End of a Journey," p. 15; and Enderlin, Shattered Dreams, p. 242. For a copy of the Taba map, see Enderlin, Shattered Dreams; see also Drucker, Harakiri, p. 400; and Sher, B'Merchak Negia, pp. 405-406.
117. The Palestinians presented a map at Camp David. See Ben-Ami interviewed by Shavit, "End of a Journey," p. 15; and Enderlin, Shattered Dreams, p. 242. For a copy of the Taba map, see Enderlin, Shattered Dreams; see also Drucker, Harakiri, p. 400; and Sher, B'Merchak Negia, pp. 405-406.
118. The Palestinians presented a map at Camp David. See Ben-Ami interviewed by Shavit, "End of a Journey," p. 15; and Enderlin, Shattered Dreams, p. 242. For a copy of the Taba map, see Enderlin, Shattered Dreams; see also Drucker, Harakiri, p. 400; and Sher, B'Merchak Negia, pp. 405-406.
119. The Palestinians presented a map at Camp David. See Ben-Ami interviewed by Shavit, "End of a Journey," p. 15; and Enderlin, Shattered Dreams, p. 242. For a copy of the Taba map, see Enderlin, Shattered Dreams; see also Drucker, Harakiri, p. 400; and Sher, B'Merchak Negia, pp. 405-406.
120. The Palestinians presented a map at Camp David. See Ben-Ami interviewed by Shavit, "End of a Journey," p. 15; and Enderlin, Shattered Dreams, p. 242. For a copy of the Taba map, see Enderlin, Shattered Dreams; see also Drucker, Harakiri, p. 400; and Sher, B'Merchak Negia, pp. 405-406.
121. Matz, "One Effort to Understand One Negotiation."
122. See, for instance, PLO Negotiations Affairs Department, "Memorandum: Lessons Learned Concerning U.S. Involvement in the Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process over the Last Seven Years," January 20, 2001, http://www.nad-plo.org/eye/news19.html; Asfour, "Right of Reply"; and Ben Kaspit's interview with Marwan Barghouti, "Assassinate Me. So What? You'll Miss Me Yet: The Intifada Will Continue Even after Me," Ma'ariv, November 9, 2001, pp. 2-3.
123. See, for instance, PLO Negotiations Affairs Department, "Memorandum: Lessons Learned Concerning U.S. Involvement in the Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process over the Last Seven Years," January 20, 2001, http://www.nad-plo.org/eye/news19.html; Asfour, "Right of Reply"; and Ben Kaspit's interview with Marwan Barghouti, "Assassinate Me. So What? You'll Miss Me Yet: The Intifada Will Continue Even after Me," Ma'ariv, November 9, 2001, pp. 2-3.
124. See, for instance, PLO Negotiations Affairs Department, "Memorandum: Lessons Learned Concerning U.S. Involvement in the Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process over the Last Seven Years," January 20, 2001, http://www.nad-plo.org/eye/news19.html; Asfour, "Right of Reply"; and Ben Kaspit's interview with Marwan Barghouti, "Assassinate Me. So What? You'll Miss Me Yet: The Intifada Will Continue Even after Me," Ma'ariv, November 9, 2001, pp. 2-3.
125. For more on the evolution of the Palestinian position, see Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
126. See Marwan al-Barghuthi, "Want Security? End the Occupation," Washington Post, January 16, 2002, p. A19; Mohammed Dahlan, "Our Partners in Life in This Land," Ha'aretz, January 31, 2002, p. 5; and Yasser Arafat, "The Palestinian Vision of Peace," New York Times, February 3, 2002, p. 15.
127. See Marwan al-Barghuthi, "Want Security? End the Occupation," Washington Post, January 16, 2002, p. A19; Mohammed Dahlan, "Our Partners in Life in This Land," Ha'aretz, January 31, 2002, p. 5; and Yasser Arafat, "The Palestinian Vision of Peace," New York Times, February 3, 2002, p. 15.
128. See Marwan al-Barghuthi, "Want Security? End the Occupation," Washington Post, January 16, 2002, p. A19; Mohammed Dahlan, "Our Partners in Life in This Land," Ha'aretz, January 31, 2002, p. 5; and Yasser Arafat, "The Palestinian Vision of Peace," New York Times, February 3, 2002, p. 15.
129. Stephen Van Evera brought this point to my attention. Ross agreed that Arafat's behavior did not fit with a staged approach to Israel's destruction. See interview with Ross, "From Oslo to Camp David to Taba."
130. Questions on fundamental issues include those that address whether the other side has a right to exist in an independent state and whether force and violence are the best means to achieve one's ends.
131. Amira Hass, "Most Palestinians Want to 'Liberate All of Historic Palestine,'" Ha'aretz, June 13, 2002, p. 2; and Deutsche Presse-Agentur, "Most Palestinians Favor Cease-Fire," Ha'aretz, December 26, 2001. See also Danny Rubinstein, "Compromise Still Exists-In the Polls," Ha'aretz, January 27, 2003.
132. Amira Hass, "Most Palestinians Want to 'Liberate All of Historic Palestine,'" Ha'aretz, June 13, 2002, p. 2; and Deutsche Presse-Agentur, "Most Palestinians Favor Cease-Fire," Ha'aretz, December 26, 2001. See also Danny Rubinstein, "Compromise Still Exists-In the Polls," Ha'aretz, January 27, 2003.
133. Amira Hass, "Most Palestinians Want to 'Liberate All of Historic Palestine,'" Ha'aretz, June 13, 2002, p. 2; and Deutsche Presse-Agentur, "Most Palestinians Favor Cease-Fire," Ha'aretz, December 26, 2001. See also Danny Rubinstein, "Compromise Still Exists-In the Polls," Ha'aretz, January 27, 2003.
134. An additional 12.6 percent thought there was no solution. The margin of error was 3 percent. See question 12 in "On Palestinian Attitudes towards the Palestinian Situation and the Second Anniversary of the Intifada," Jerusalem Media & Communication Centre Public Opinion Poll No. 46, September 21-25, 2002, http://www.jmcc.org/publicpoll/results/2002/no46.htm.
135. For a related discussion, see Ze'ev Schiff, "Frozen in Place," Ha'aretz, April 30, 2003.
136. Fatah, led by Arafat, is the dominant faction within the PLO. Fatah, a secular nationalist organization, is the reverse acronym for the Movement for the National Liberation of Palestine (Harekat at-Tahrir al-Wataniyyeh al-Falastiniyyeh).
137. Ben Kaspit, "Israel Is Not a State That Has an Army but Rather an Army That Has a State Attached to It," Ma'ariv, September 6, 2002, pp. 8-11, 32 of Rosh Hashanah supplement; Ben Kaspit, "The Army Will Decide and Approve," Ma'ariv, September 13, 2002, pp. 6-10 of the Sabbath supplement; Yezid Sayigh, "Arafat and the Anatomy of a Revolt," Survival, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Autumn 2001), pp. 47-60; Khalil Shikaki, "Palestinians Divided," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 1 (January/February 2002), pp. 89-105; Aluf Benn, "In Israel, Too Much to Leave to the Generals," Washington Post, August 18, 2002, p. B1; Jeremy Pressman, "The Second Intifada: Background and Causes of Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," Journal of Conflict Studies, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 2003); and Menachem Klein, "The Origins of Intifada II and Rescuing Peace for Israelis and Palestinians," Foundation for Middle East Peace Current Analysis, October 2, 2002.
138. Ben Kaspit, "Israel Is Not a State That Has an Army but Rather an Army That Has a State Attached to It," Ma'ariv, September 6, 2002, pp. 8-11, 32 of Rosh Hashanah supplement; Ben Kaspit, "The Army Will Decide and Approve," Ma'ariv, September 13, 2002, pp. 6-10 of the Sabbath supplement; Yezid Sayigh, "Arafat and the Anatomy of a Revolt," Survival, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Autumn 2001), pp. 47-60; Khalil Shikaki, "Palestinians Divided," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 1 (January/February 2002), pp. 89-105; Aluf Benn, "In Israel, Too Much to Leave to the Generals," Washington Post, August 18, 2002, p. B1; Jeremy Pressman, "The Second Intifada: Background and Causes of Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," Journal of Conflict Studies, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 2003); and Menachem Klein, "The Origins of Intifada II and Rescuing Peace for Israelis and Palestinians," Foundation for Middle East Peace Current Analysis, October 2, 2002.
139. Ben Kaspit, "Israel Is Not a State That Has an Army but Rather an Army That Has a State Attached to It," Ma'ariv, September 6, 2002, pp. 8-11, 32 of Rosh Hashanah supplement; Ben Kaspit, "The Army Will Decide and Approve," Ma'ariv, September 13, 2002, pp. 6-10 of the Sabbath supplement; Yezid Sayigh, "Arafat and the Anatomy of a Revolt," Survival, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Autumn 2001), pp. 47-60; Khalil Shikaki, "Palestinians Divided," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 1 (January/February 2002), pp. 89-105; Aluf Benn, "In Israel, Too Much to Leave to the Generals," Washington Post, August 18, 2002, p. B1; Jeremy Pressman, "The Second Intifada: Background and Causes of Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," Journal of Conflict Studies, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 2003); and Menachem Klein, "The Origins of Intifada II and Rescuing Peace for Israelis and Palestinians," Foundation for Middle East Peace Current Analysis, October 2, 2002.
140. Ben Kaspit, "Israel Is Not a State That Has an Army but Rather an Army That Has a State Attached to It," Ma'ariv, September 6, 2002, pp. 8-11, 32 of Rosh Hashanah supplement; Ben Kaspit, "The Army Will Decide and Approve," Ma'ariv, September 13, 2002, pp. 6-10 of the Sabbath supplement; Yezid Sayigh, "Arafat and the Anatomy of a Revolt," Survival, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Autumn 2001), pp. 47-60; Khalil Shikaki, "Palestinians Divided," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 1 (January/February 2002), pp. 89-105; Aluf Benn, "In Israel, Too Much to Leave to the Generals," Washington Post, August 18, 2002, p. B1; Jeremy Pressman, "The Second Intifada: Background and Causes of Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," Journal of Conflict Studies, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 2003); and Menachem Klein, "The Origins of Intifada II and Rescuing Peace for Israelis and Palestinians," Foundation for Middle East Peace Current Analysis, October 2, 2002.
141. Ben Kaspit, "Israel Is Not a State That Has an Army but Rather an Army That Has a State Attached to It," Ma'ariv, September 6, 2002, pp. 8-11, 32 of Rosh Hashanah supplement; Ben Kaspit, "The Army Will Decide and Approve," Ma'ariv, September 13, 2002, pp. 6-10 of the Sabbath supplement; Yezid Sayigh, "Arafat and the Anatomy of a Revolt," Survival, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Autumn 2001), pp. 47-60; Khalil Shikaki, "Palestinians Divided," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 1 (January/February 2002), pp. 89-105; Aluf Benn, "In Israel, Too Much to Leave to the Generals," Washington Post, August 18, 2002, p. B1; Jeremy Pressman, "The Second Intifada: Background and Causes of Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," Journal of Conflict Studies, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 2003); and Menachem Klein, "The Origins of Intifada II and Rescuing Peace for Israelis and Palestinians," Foundation for Middle East Peace Current Analysis, October 2, 2002.
142. Ben Kaspit, "Israel Is Not a State That Has an Army but Rather an Army That Has a State Attached to It," Ma'ariv, September 6, 2002, pp. 8-11, 32 of Rosh Hashanah supplement; Ben Kaspit, "The Army Will Decide and Approve," Ma'ariv, September 13, 2002, pp. 6-10 of the Sabbath supplement; Yezid Sayigh, "Arafat and the Anatomy of a Revolt," Survival, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Autumn 2001), pp. 47-60; Khalil Shikaki, "Palestinians Divided," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 1 (January/February 2002), pp. 89-105; Aluf Benn, "In Israel, Too Much to Leave to the Generals," Washington Post, August 18, 2002, p. B1; Jeremy Pressman, "The Second Intifada: Background and Causes of Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," Journal of Conflict Studies, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 2003); and Menachem Klein, "The Origins of Intifada II and Rescuing Peace for Israelis and Palestinians," Foundation for Middle East Peace Current Analysis, October 2, 2002.
143. Ben Kaspit, "Israel Is Not a State That Has an Army but Rather an Army That Has a State Attached to It," Ma'ariv, September 6, 2002, pp. 8-11, 32 of Rosh Hashanah supplement; Ben Kaspit, "The Army Will Decide and Approve," Ma'ariv, September 13, 2002, pp. 6-10 of the Sabbath supplement; Yezid Sayigh, "Arafat and the Anatomy of a Revolt," Survival, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Autumn 2001), pp. 47-60; Khalil Shikaki, "Palestinians Divided," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 1 (January/February 2002), pp. 89-105; Aluf Benn, "In Israel, Too Much to Leave to the Generals," Washington Post, August 18, 2002, p. B1; Jeremy Pressman, "The Second Intifada: Background and Causes of Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," Journal of Conflict Studies, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 2003); and Menachem Klein, "The Origins of Intifada II and Rescuing Peace for Israelis and Palestinians," Foundation for Middle East Peace Current Analysis, October 2, 2002.
144. Report of the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee, full text of the report completed on April 30, 2001 and published on May 20, 2001, http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rpt/3060.htm, p. 7.
145. On Arafat's decision to capitalize on the violence, see Sayigh, "Arafat and the Anatomy of a Revolt," p. 49. See also Marwan Barghouti interviewed by Kaspit, "Assassinate Me. So What?" p. 3. In this discussion, I do not address Hamas and the Islamist role in the early days of the second intifada.
146. On Arafat's decision to capitalize on the violence, see Sayigh, "Arafat and the Anatomy of a Revolt," p. 49. See also Marwan Barghouti interviewed by Kaspit, "Assassinate Me. So What?" p. 3. In this discussion, I do not address Hamas and the Islamist role in the early days of the second intifada.
147. Shikaki, "Palestinians Divided," p. 97.
148. Report of the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee, p. 7.
149. In general, see Akiva Eldar, "How to Solve the Palestinian Refugee Problem"; and Akiva Eldar, "Sir, If You Please, Tear Down Your House," Ha'aretz, May 31, 2001, p. 4. See also the Clinton plan; Yossi Beilin, "An Israeli View: Solving the Refugee Problem," December 31, 2001, edition 5, http://www.bitterlemons.org/previous/bl311201ed5.html; Eldar, "The Peace That Nearly Was at Taba"; and Alain Gresh, "The Middle East: How the Peace Was Lost," Le Monde, September 2001, http://mondediplo.com/2001/09/01middleeastleader. Le Monde published what it claimed to be an Israeli non-paper, "Private Response to Palestinian Refugees," January 23, 2001, http://mondediplo.com/focus/mideast/a3277. Barak told Shavit this was a "bad document" and was "not a document of the State of Israel." Le Monde also published "Palestinian Paper on Refugees," January 22, 2001, http://mondediplo.com/focus/mideast/a3276. See also Drucker, Harakiri, p. 397; and Matz, "One Effort to Understand One Negotiation."
150. In general, see Akiva Eldar, "How to Solve the Palestinian Refugee Problem"; and Akiva Eldar, "Sir, If You Please, Tear Down Your House," Ha'aretz, May 31, 2001, p. 4. See also the Clinton plan; Yossi Beilin, "An Israeli View: Solving the Refugee Problem," December 31, 2001, edition 5, http://www.bitterlemons.org/previous/bl311201ed5.html; Eldar, "The Peace That Nearly Was at Taba"; and Alain Gresh, "The Middle East: How the Peace Was Lost," Le Monde, September 2001, http://mondediplo.com/2001/09/01middleeastleader. Le Monde published what it claimed to be an Israeli non-paper, "Private Response to Palestinian Refugees," January 23, 2001, http://mondediplo.com/focus/mideast/a3277. Barak told Shavit this was a "bad document" and was "not a document of the State of Israel." Le Monde also published "Palestinian Paper on Refugees," January 22, 2001, http://mondediplo.com/focus/mideast/a3276. See also Drucker, Harakiri, p. 397; and Matz, "One Effort to Understand One Negotiation."
151. In general, see Akiva Eldar, "How to Solve the Palestinian Refugee Problem"; and Akiva Eldar, "Sir, If You Please, Tear Down Your House," Ha'aretz, May 31, 2001, p. 4. See also the Clinton plan; Yossi Beilin, "An Israeli View: Solving the Refugee Problem," December 31, 2001, edition 5, http://www.bitterlemons.org/previous/bl311201ed5.html; Eldar, "The Peace That Nearly Was at Taba"; and Alain Gresh, "The Middle East: How the Peace Was Lost," Le Monde, September 2001, http://mondediplo.com/2001/09/01middleeastleader. Le Monde published what it claimed to be an Israeli non-paper, "Private Response to Palestinian Refugees," January 23, 2001, http://mondediplo.com/focus/mideast/a3277. Barak told Shavit this was a "bad document" and was "not a document of the State of Israel." Le Monde also published "Palestinian Paper on Refugees," January 22, 2001, http://mondediplo.com/focus/mideast/a3276. See also Drucker, Harakiri, p. 397; and Matz, "One Effort to Understand One Negotiation."
152. In general, see Akiva Eldar, "How to Solve the Palestinian Refugee Problem"; and Akiva Eldar, "Sir, If You Please, Tear Down Your House," Ha'aretz, May 31, 2001, p. 4. See also the Clinton plan; Yossi Beilin, "An Israeli View: Solving the Refugee Problem," December 31, 2001, edition 5, http://www.bitterlemons.org/previous/bl311201ed5.html; Eldar, "The Peace That Nearly Was at Taba"; and Alain Gresh, "The Middle East: How the Peace Was Lost," Le Monde, September 2001, http://mondediplo.com/2001/09/01middleeastleader. Le Monde published what it claimed to be an Israeli non-paper, "Private Response to Palestinian Refugees," January 23, 2001, http://mondediplo.com/focus/mideast/a3277. Barak told Shavit this was a "bad document" and was "not a document of the State of Israel." Le Monde also published "Palestinian Paper on Refugees," January 22, 2001, http://mondediplo.com/focus/mideast/a3276. See also Drucker, Harakiri, p. 397; and Matz, "One Effort to Understand One Negotiation."
153. In general, see Akiva Eldar, "How to Solve the Palestinian Refugee Problem"; and Akiva Eldar, "Sir, If You Please, Tear Down Your House," Ha'aretz, May 31, 2001, p. 4. See also the Clinton plan; Yossi Beilin, "An Israeli View: Solving the Refugee Problem," December 31, 2001, edition 5, http://www.bitterlemons.org/previous/bl311201ed5.html; Eldar, "The Peace That Nearly Was at Taba"; and Alain Gresh, "The Middle East: How the Peace Was Lost," Le Monde, September 2001, http://mondediplo.com/2001/09/01middleeastleader. Le Monde published what it claimed to be an Israeli non-paper, "Private Response to Palestinian Refugees," January 23, 2001, http://mondediplo.com/focus/mideast/a3277. Barak told Shavit this was a "bad document" and was "not a document of the State of Israel." Le Monde also published "Palestinian Paper on Refugees," January 22, 2001, http://mondediplo.com/focus/mideast/a3276. See also Drucker, Harakiri, p. 397; and Matz, "One Effort to Understand One Negotiation."
154. In general, see Akiva Eldar, "How to Solve the Palestinian Refugee Problem"; and Akiva Eldar, "Sir, If You Please, Tear Down Your House," Ha'aretz, May 31, 2001, p. 4. See also the Clinton plan; Yossi Beilin, "An Israeli View: Solving the Refugee Problem," December 31, 2001, edition 5, http://www.bitterlemons.org/previous/bl311201ed5.html; Eldar, "The Peace That Nearly Was at Taba"; and Alain Gresh, "The Middle East: How the Peace Was Lost," Le Monde, September 2001, http://mondediplo.com/2001/09/01middleeastleader. Le Monde published what it claimed to be an Israeli non-paper, "Private Response to Palestinian Refugees," January 23, 2001, http://mondediplo.com/focus/mideast/a3277. Barak told Shavit this was a "bad document" and was "not a document of the State of Israel." Le Monde also published "Palestinian Paper on Refugees," January 22, 2001, http://mondediplo.com/focus/mideast/a3276. See also Drucker, Harakiri, p. 397; and Matz, "One Effort to Understand One Negotiation."
155. In general, see Akiva Eldar, "How to Solve the Palestinian Refugee Problem"; and Akiva Eldar, "Sir, If You Please, Tear Down Your House," Ha'aretz, May 31, 2001, p. 4. See also the Clinton plan; Yossi Beilin, "An Israeli View: Solving the Refugee Problem," December 31, 2001, edition 5, http://www.bitterlemons.org/previous/bl311201ed5.html; Eldar, "The Peace That Nearly Was at Taba"; and Alain Gresh, "The Middle East: How the Peace Was Lost," Le Monde, September 2001, http://mondediplo.com/2001/09/01middleeastleader. Le Monde published what it claimed to be an Israeli non-paper, "Private Response to Palestinian Refugees," January 23, 2001, http://mondediplo.com/focus/mideast/a3277. Barak told Shavit this was a "bad document" and was "not a document of the State of Israel." Le Monde also published "Palestinian Paper on Refugees," January 22, 2001, http://mondediplo.com/focus/mideast/a3276. See also Drucker, Harakiri, p. 397; and Matz, "One Effort to Understand One Negotiation."
156. In general, see Akiva Eldar, "How to Solve the Palestinian Refugee Problem"; and Akiva Eldar, "Sir, If You Please, Tear Down Your House," Ha'aretz, May 31, 2001, p. 4. See also the Clinton plan; Yossi Beilin, "An Israeli View: Solving the Refugee Problem," December 31, 2001, edition 5, http://www.bitterlemons.org/previous/bl311201ed5.html; Eldar, "The Peace That Nearly Was at Taba"; and Alain Gresh, "The Middle East: How the Peace Was Lost," Le Monde, September 2001, http://mondediplo.com/2001/09/01middleeastleader. Le Monde published what it claimed to be an Israeli non-paper, "Private Response to Palestinian Refugees," January 23, 2001, http://mondediplo.com/focus/mideast/a3277. Barak told Shavit this was a "bad document" and was "not a document of the State of Israel." Le Monde also published "Palestinian Paper on Refugees," January 22, 2001, http://mondediplo.com/focus/mideast/a3276. See also Drucker, Harakiri, p. 397; and Matz, "One Effort to Understand One Negotiation."
157. In general, see Akiva Eldar, "How to Solve the Palestinian Refugee Problem"; and Akiva Eldar, "Sir, If You Please, Tear Down Your House," Ha'aretz, May 31, 2001, p. 4. See also the Clinton plan; Yossi Beilin, "An Israeli View: Solving the Refugee Problem," December 31, 2001, edition 5, http://www.bitterlemons.org/previous/bl311201ed5.html; Eldar, "The Peace That Nearly Was at Taba"; and Alain Gresh, "The Middle East: How the Peace Was Lost," Le Monde, September 2001, http://mondediplo.com/2001/09/01middleeastleader. Le Monde published what it claimed to be an Israeli non-paper, "Private Response to Palestinian Refugees," January 23, 2001, http://mondediplo.com/focus/mideast/a3277. Barak told Shavit this was a "bad document" and was "not a document of the State of Israel." Le Monde also published "Palestinian Paper on Refugees," January 22, 2001, http://mondediplo.com/focus/mideast/a3276. See also Drucker, Harakiri, p. 397; and Matz, "One Effort to Understand One Negotiation."
158. Clinton, "Proposals for a Final Settlement," p. 172.
159. Ross, "From Oslo to Camp David to Taba." See also Malley, "Fictions About the Failure at Camp David"; Gresh, "The Middle East: How the Peace Was Lost"; and Hussein Agha and Robert Malley, "Camp David and After: An Exchange (2. A Reply to Ehud Barak)," New York Review of Books, June 13, 2002.
160. Ross, "From Oslo to Camp David to Taba." See also Malley, "Fictions About the Failure at Camp David"; Gresh, "The Middle East: How the Peace Was Lost"; and Hussein Agha and Robert Malley, "Camp David and After: An Exchange (2. A Reply to Ehud Barak)," New York Review of Books, June 13, 2002.
161. Ross, "From Oslo to Camp David to Taba." See also Malley, "Fictions About the Failure at Camp David"; Gresh, "The Middle East: How the Peace Was Lost"; and Hussein Agha and Robert Malley, "Camp David and After: An Exchange (2. A Reply to Ehud Barak)," New York Review of Books, June 13, 2002.
162. Ross, "From Oslo to Camp David to Taba." See also Malley, "Fictions About the Failure at Camp David"; Gresh, "The Middle East: How the Peace Was Lost"; and Hussein Agha and Robert Malley, "Camp David and After: An Exchange (2. A Reply to Ehud Barak)," New York Review of Books, June 13, 2002.
163. Arafat, "The Palestinian Vision of Peace."
164. Ben-Ami interviewed by Shavit, "End of a Journey."
165. Matz, "One Effort to Understand One Negotiation."
166. See Clinton, "Proposals for a Final Settlement," pp. 172-173. See also Yossi Sarid, leader of Meretz (a party to the left of Barak's Labor Party), quoted in Gresh, "The Middle East: How the Peace Was Lost."
167. See Clinton, "Proposals for a Final Settlement," pp. 172-173. See also Yossi Sarid, leader of Meretz (a party to the left of Barak's Labor Party), quoted in Gresh, "The Middle East: How the Peace Was Lost."
168. Ben-Ami interviewed by Shavit, "End of a Journey," pp. 11-12.
169. Drucker, Harakiri, pp. 398-399. Beilin confirmed the 25,000 figure in Yossi Beilin interviewed by Akiva Eldar, "The Refugee Problem at Taba," Palestine-Israel Journal, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2002), pp. 12-13.
170. Drucker, Harakiri, pp. 398-399. Beilin confirmed the 25,000 figure in Yossi Beilin interviewed by Akiva Eldar, "The Refugee Problem at Taba," Palestine-Israel Journal, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2002), pp. 12-13.
171. Ben-Ami interviewed by Shavit, "End of a Journey."
172. Moshe Amirav, "Soul of a Politician," Ha'aretz, October 12, 2001, p. 19. Amirav teaches at the University of Haifa.
173. Sontag, "Quest for Mideast Peace: How and Why It Failed," p. A11; and Drucker, Harakiri, p. 398. Beilin mentioned this in a later op-ed as well. See Yossi Beilin, "What Really Happened at Taba," Ha'aretz, July 15, 2002, p. 5.
174. Sontag, "Quest for Mideast Peace: How and Why It Failed," p. A11; and Drucker, Harakiri, p. 398. Beilin mentioned this in a later op-ed as well. See Yossi Beilin, "What Really Happened at Taba," Ha'aretz, July 15, 2002, p. 5.
175. Sontag, "Quest for Mideast Peace: How and Why It Failed," p. A11; and Drucker, Harakiri, p. 398. Beilin mentioned this in a later op-ed as well. See Yossi Beilin, "What Really Happened at Taba," Ha'aretz, July 15, 2002, p. 5.
176. Private discussion with Palestinian nongovernmental leader, April 2002; and Drucker, Harakiri, p. 397.
177. Drucker, Harakiri, p. 398.
178. Amirav, "Soul of a Politician."
179. See Ross interviewed by Hume, "Transcript: Dennis Ross"; and Eldar, "A Million Israelis, One Consultant, and a Researcher."
180. See Ross interviewed by Hume, "Transcript: Dennis Ross"; and Eldar, "A Million Israelis, One Consultant, and a Researcher."
181. Shavit, "The Right of Return at Taba"; and Shavit, "The Security Umbrella of Victory," Ha'aretz, August 8, 2002.
182. Shavit, "The Right of Return at Taba"; and Shavit, "The Security Umbrella of Victory," Ha'aretz, August 8, 2002.
183. The document also calls for Israeli sovereignty in the Jewish Quarter and over the Wailing (but not Western) Wall. For the text of the June 15, 2002 document, see http://www.mopic.gov.ps/key_decuments/ Palestinian_Vision_for_the-Outcome_of_permanent_Status_Negotiations.asp.
184. Sari Nusseibah, excerpts from a speech delivered at Hebrew University, October 15, 2001, as quoted in Joel Greenberg, "Palestinian Offers Idea: Get Israelis on Our Side," New York Times, October 17, 2001, p. 7. Nusseibah told the Associated Press that "the refugees should be resettled in a future Palestinian state, 'not in a way that would undermine the existence of the state of Israel as a predominantly Jewish state.'" Quoted in Dan Perry, "Palestinians' Jerusalem Envoy: Insisting on Right of Return Was a Key Error," Associated Press, October 23, 2001. For a discussion of the debate as well as the claim that the Fatah youth organization endorsed Nusseibah's position, see Sari Hanafi, "Opening the Debate on the Right of Return," Middle East Report, No. 222 (Spring 2002), http://www.merip.org/mer/mer222/222_hanafi.html. See also "Ziyad Abu Zayad's Statement of Principles," Ha'aretz, July 23, 2002, p. 4.
185. Sari Nusseibah, excerpts from a speech delivered at Hebrew University, October 15, 2001, as quoted in Joel Greenberg, "Palestinian Offers Idea: Get Israelis on Our Side," New York Times, October 17, 2001, p. 7. Nusseibah told the Associated Press that "the refugees should be resettled in a future Palestinian state, 'not in a way that would undermine the existence of the state of Israel as a predominantly Jewish state.'" Quoted in Dan Perry, "Palestinians' Jerusalem Envoy: Insisting on Right of Return Was a Key Error," Associated Press, October 23, 2001. For a discussion of the debate as well as the claim that the Fatah youth organization endorsed Nusseibah's position, see Sari Hanafi, "Opening the Debate on the Right of Return," Middle East Report, No. 222 (Spring 2002), http://www.merip.org/mer/mer222/222_hanafi.html. See also "Ziyad Abu Zayad's Statement of Principles," Ha'aretz, July 23, 2002, p. 4.
186. Sari Nusseibah, excerpts from a speech delivered at Hebrew University, October 15, 2001, as quoted in Joel Greenberg, "Palestinian Offers Idea: Get Israelis on Our Side," New York Times, October 17, 2001, p. 7. Nusseibah told the Associated Press that "the refugees should be resettled in a future Palestinian state, 'not in a way that would undermine the existence of the state of Israel as a predominantly Jewish state.'" Quoted in Dan Perry, "Palestinians' Jerusalem Envoy: Insisting on Right of Return Was a Key Error," Associated Press, October 23, 2001. For a discussion of the debate as well as the claim that the Fatah youth organization endorsed Nusseibah's position, see Sari Hanafi, "Opening the Debate on the Right of Return," Middle East Report, No. 222 (Spring 2002), http://www.merip.org/mer/mer222/222_hanafi.html. See also "Ziyad Abu Zayad's Statement of Principles," Ha'aretz, July 23, 2002, p. 4.
187. Sari Nusseibah, excerpts from a speech delivered at Hebrew University, October 15, 2001, as quoted in Joel Greenberg, "Palestinian Offers Idea: Get Israelis on Our Side," New York Times, October 17, 2001, p. 7. Nusseibah told the Associated Press that "the refugees should be resettled in a future Palestinian state, 'not in a way that would undermine the existence of the state of Israel as a predominantly Jewish state.'" Quoted in Dan Perry, "Palestinians' Jerusalem Envoy: Insisting on Right of Return Was a Key Error," Associated Press, October 23, 2001. For a discussion of the debate as well as the claim that the Fatah youth organization endorsed Nusseibah's position, see Sari Hanafi, "Opening the Debate on the Right of Return," Middle East Report, No. 222 (Spring 2002), http://www.merip.org/mer/mer222/222_hanafi.html. See also "Ziyad Abu Zayad's Statement of Principles," Ha'aretz, July 23, 2002, p. 4.
188. Akiva Eldar, "Marwan Barghouti's New Year's Wishes," Ha'aretz, September 5, 2002, p. 4; and Nabil Sha'ath interviewed by Akiva Eldar, "The Refugee Problem at Taba," Palestine-Israel Journal, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2002), p. 22.
189. Akiva Eldar, "Marwan Barghouti's New Year's Wishes," Ha'aretz, September 5, 2002, p. 4; and Nabil Sha'ath interviewed by Akiva Eldar, "The Refugee Problem at Taba," Palestine-Israel Journal, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2002), p. 22.
190. Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) press release, "Results of PSR Refugees' Polls in the West Bank/Gaza Strip, Jordan, and Lebanon on Refugees' Preferences and Behavior in a Palestinian-Israeli Permanent Refugee Agreement," July 18, 2003, http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2003/refugeesjune03.html. See also James Bennet, "Palestinian Mob Attacks Pollster," New York Times, July 14, 2003, p. 1.
191. Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) press release, "Results of PSR Refugees' Polls in the West Bank/Gaza Strip, Jordan, and Lebanon on Refugees' Preferences and Behavior in a Palestinian-Israeli Permanent Refugee Agreement," July 18, 2003, http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2003/refugeesjune03.html. See also James Bennet, "Palestinian Mob Attacks Pollster," New York Times, July 14, 2003, p. 1.
192. Malley, "Fictions About the Failure at Camp David"; Sontag, "Quest for Mideast Peace"; Agha and Malley, "Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors"; Akiva Eldar, "What Went Wrong at Camp David - The Official Palestinian Version," Ha'aretz, July 24, 2001, p. 4; and Lee Hockstader, "A Different Take on Camp David Collapse," Washington Post, July 24, 2001, p. A17. See also Graham E. Fuller, "Start with Palestinian Statehood," Los Angeles Times, April 18, 2002, p. B15; Ewen MacAskill, "The Real Deal," Guardian, April 14, 2001, p. 20; and Robert Wright, "Was Arafat the Problem?" Slate, April 18, 2002, http://slate.msn.com/?id?2064500.
193. Malley, "Fictions About the Failure at Camp David"; Sontag, "Quest for Mideast Peace"; Agha and Malley, "Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors"; Akiva Eldar, "What Went Wrong at Camp David - The Official Palestinian Version," Ha'aretz, July 24, 2001, p. 4; and Lee Hockstader, "A Different Take on Camp David Collapse," Washington Post, July 24, 2001, p. A17. See also Graham E. Fuller, "Start with Palestinian Statehood," Los Angeles Times, April 18, 2002, p. B15; Ewen MacAskill, "The Real Deal," Guardian, April 14, 2001, p. 20; and Robert Wright, "Was Arafat the Problem?" Slate, April 18, 2002, http://slate.msn.com/?id?2064500.
194. Malley, "Fictions About the Failure at Camp David"; Sontag, "Quest for Mideast Peace"; Agha and Malley, "Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors"; Akiva Eldar, "What Went Wrong at Camp David - The Official Palestinian Version," Ha'aretz, July 24, 2001, p. 4; and Lee Hockstader, "A Different Take on Camp David Collapse," Washington Post, July 24, 2001, p. A17. See also Graham E. Fuller, "Start with Palestinian Statehood," Los Angeles Times, April 18, 2002, p. B15; Ewen MacAskill, "The Real Deal," Guardian, April 14, 2001, p. 20; and Robert Wright, "Was Arafat the Problem?" Slate, April 18, 2002, http://slate.msn.com/?id?2064500.
195. Malley, "Fictions About the Failure at Camp David"; Sontag, "Quest for Mideast Peace"; Agha and Malley, "Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors"; Akiva Eldar, "What Went Wrong at Camp David - The Official Palestinian Version," Ha'aretz, July 24, 2001, p. 4; and Lee Hockstader, "A Different Take on Camp David Collapse," Washington Post, July 24, 2001, p. A17. See also Graham E. Fuller, "Start with Palestinian Statehood," Los Angeles Times, April 18, 2002, p. B15; Ewen MacAskill, "The Real Deal," Guardian, April 14, 2001, p. 20; and Robert Wright, "Was Arafat the Problem?" Slate, April 18, 2002, http://slate.msn.com/?id?2064500.
196. Malley, "Fictions About the Failure at Camp David"; Sontag, "Quest for Mideast Peace"; Agha and Malley, "Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors"; Akiva Eldar, "What Went Wrong at Camp David - The Official Palestinian Version," Ha'aretz, July 24, 2001, p. 4; and Lee Hockstader, "A Different Take on Camp David Collapse," Washington Post, July 24, 2001, p. A17. See also Graham E. Fuller, "Start with Palestinian Statehood," Los Angeles Times, April 18, 2002, p. B15; Ewen MacAskill, "The Real Deal," Guardian, April 14, 2001, p. 20; and Robert Wright, "Was Arafat the Problem?" Slate, April 18, 2002, http://slate.msn.com/?id?2064500.
197. Malley, "Fictions About the Failure at Camp David"; Sontag, "Quest for Mideast Peace"; Agha and Malley, "Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors"; Akiva Eldar, "What Went Wrong at Camp David - The Official Palestinian Version," Ha'aretz, July 24, 2001, p. 4; and Lee Hockstader, "A Different Take on Camp David Collapse," Washington Post, July 24, 2001, p. A17. See also Graham E. Fuller, "Start with Palestinian Statehood," Los Angeles Times, April 18, 2002, p. B15; Ewen MacAskill, "The Real Deal," Guardian, April 14, 2001, p. 20; and Robert Wright, "Was Arafat the Problem?" Slate, April 18, 2002, http://slate.msn.com/?id?2064500.
198. Malley, "Fictions About the Failure at Camp David"; Sontag, "Quest for Mideast Peace"; Agha and Malley, "Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors"; Akiva Eldar, "What Went Wrong at Camp David - The Official Palestinian Version," Ha'aretz, July 24, 2001, p. 4; and Lee Hockstader, "A Different Take on Camp David Collapse," Washington Post, July 24, 2001, p. A17. See also Graham E. Fuller, "Start with Palestinian Statehood," Los Angeles Times, April 18, 2002, p. B15; Ewen MacAskill, "The Real Deal," Guardian, April 14, 2001, p. 20; and Robert Wright, "Was Arafat the Problem?" Slate, April 18, 2002, http://slate.msn.com/?id?2064500.
199. Malley, "Fictions About the Failure at Camp David"; Sontag, "Quest for Mideast Peace"; Agha and Malley, "Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors"; Akiva Eldar, "What Went Wrong at Camp David - The Official Palestinian Version," Ha'aretz, July 24, 2001, p. 4; and Lee Hockstader, "A Different Take on Camp David Collapse," Washington Post, July 24, 2001, p. A17. See also Graham E. Fuller, "Start with Palestinian Statehood," Los Angeles Times, April 18, 2002, p. B15; Ewen MacAskill, "The Real Deal," Guardian, April 14, 2001, p. 20; and Robert Wright, "Was Arafat the Problem?" Slate, April 18, 2002, http://slate.msn.com/?id?2064500.
200. Quoted in Haniyah, "Camp David Papers," al-Ayyam, August 6, 2000, fifth installment, in FBIS, August 28, 2000.
201. Haniyah, "Camp David Papers," al-Ayyam, August 3, 2000, fourth installment, in FBIS, August 28, 2000. See also Negotiations Affairs Department of the PLO, "Camp David Peace Proposal of July 2000: Frequently Asked Questions," n.d., http://www.nad-plo.org/eye/news38.html; Eldar, "What Went Wrong at Camp David - The Official Palestinian Version"; and Gideon Levy,. "Dahlan's Complaint," Ha'aretz (magazine), April 13, 2001, pp. 6-8.
202. Haniyah, "Camp David Papers," al-Ayyam, August 3, 2000, fourth installment, in FBIS, August 28, 2000. See also Negotiations Affairs Department of the PLO, "Camp David Peace Proposal of July 2000: Frequently Asked Questions," n.d., http://www.nad-plo.org/eye/news38.html; Eldar, "What Went Wrong at Camp David - The Official Palestinian Version"; and Gideon Levy,. "Dahlan's Complaint," Ha'aretz (magazine), April 13, 2001, pp. 6-8.
203. Haniyah, "Camp David Papers," al-Ayyam, August 3, 2000, fourth installment, in FBIS, August 28, 2000. See also Negotiations Affairs Department of the PLO, "Camp David Peace Proposal of July 2000: Frequently Asked Questions," n.d., http://www.nad-plo.org/eye/news38.html; Eldar, "What Went Wrong at Camp David - The Official Palestinian Version"; and Gideon Levy,. "Dahlan's Complaint," Ha'aretz (magazine), April 13, 2001, pp. 6-8.
204. Haniyah, "Camp David Papers," al-Ayyam, August 3, 2000, fourth installment, in FBIS, August 28, 2000. See also Negotiations Affairs Department of the PLO, "Camp David Peace Proposal of July 2000: Frequently Asked Questions," n.d., http://www.nad-plo.org/eye/news38.html; Eldar, "What Went Wrong at Camp David - The Official Palestinian Version"; and Gideon Levy,. "Dahlan's Complaint," Ha'aretz (magazine), April 13, 2001, pp. 6-8.
205. Ghassan Khatib, "A Palestinian View - Camp David: An Exit Strategy for Barak," July 15, 2002, edition 26, http://www.bitterlemons.org/previous/bl150702ed26.html. Khatib was not a member of the PA leadership during Camp David, but he was minister of labor in the PA when he wrote this article.
206. Barghouti interviewed by Kaspit, "Assassinate Me. So What?" p. 3. See also Levy, "Dahlan's Complaint," pp. 7-8; Tanya Reinhart, Israel/Palestine: How to End the War of 1948 (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2002); Khatib, "A Palestinian View - Camp David"; and "Preliminary Submission of the Palestine Liberation Organization to the International Commission of Inquiry," December 8, 2000, p. 10. For links to all the Palestinian submissions to the Mitchell Committee (the International Commission of Inquiry), see http://www.nad-plo.org/mitchel%20report%20docs/mitchel%20report%20documents. html.
207. Barghouti interviewed by Kaspit, "Assassinate Me. So What?" p. 3. See also Levy, "Dahlan's Complaint," pp. 7-8; Tanya Reinhart, Israel/Palestine: How to End the War of 1948 (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2002); Khatib, "A Palestinian View - Camp David"; and "Preliminary Submission of the Palestine Liberation Organization to the International Commission of Inquiry," December 8, 2000, p. 10. For links to all the Palestinian submissions to the Mitchell Committee (the International Commission of Inquiry), see http://www.nad-plo.org/mitchel%20report%20docs/mitchel%20report%20documents. html.
208. Barghouti interviewed by Kaspit, "Assassinate Me. So What?" p. 3. See also Levy, "Dahlan's Complaint," pp. 7-8; Tanya Reinhart, Israel/Palestine: How to End the War of 1948 (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2002); Khatib, "A Palestinian View - Camp David"; and "Preliminary Submission of the Palestine Liberation Organization to the International Commission of Inquiry," December 8, 2000, p. 10. For links to all the Palestinian submissions to the Mitchell Committee (the International Commission of Inquiry), see http://www.nad-plo.org/mitchel%20report%20docs/mitchel%20report%20documents. html.
209. Barghouti interviewed by Kaspit, "Assassinate Me. So What?" p. 3. See also Levy, "Dahlan's Complaint," pp. 7-8; Tanya Reinhart, Israel/Palestine: How to End the War of 1948 (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2002); Khatib, "A Palestinian View - Camp David"; and "Preliminary Submission of the Palestine Liberation Organization to the International Commission of Inquiry," December 8, 2000, p. 10. For links to all the Palestinian submissions to the Mitchell Committee (the International Commission of Inquiry), see http://www.nad-plo.org/mitchel%20report%20docs/mitchel%20report%20documents. html.
210. Barghouti interviewed by Kaspit, "Assassinate Me. So What?" p. 3. See also Levy, "Dahlan's Complaint," pp. 7-8; Tanya Reinhart, Israel/Palestine: How to End the War of 1948 (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2002); Khatib, "A Palestinian View - Camp David"; and "Preliminary Submission of the Palestine Liberation Organization to the International Commission of Inquiry," December 8, 2000, p. 10. For links to all the Palestinian submissions to the Mitchell Committee (the International Commission of Inquiry), see http://www.nad-plo.org/mitchel%20report%20docs/mitchel%20report%20documents. html.
211. Barghouti interviewed by Kaspit, "Assassinate Me. So What?" p. 3. See also Levy, "Dahlan's Complaint," pp. 7-8; Tanya Reinhart, Israel/Palestine: How to End the War of 1948 (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2002); Khatib, "A Palestinian View - Camp David"; and "Preliminary Submission of the Palestine Liberation Organization to the International Commission of Inquiry," December 8, 2000, p. 10. For links to all the Palestinian submissions to the Mitchell Committee (the International Commission of Inquiry), see http://www.nad-plo.org/mitchel%20report%20docs/mitchel%20report%20documents. html.
212. Executive summary, "Third Submission of the Palestine Liberation Organization to the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee," April 3, 2001, p. 8. See also Levy, "Dahlan's Complaint," p. 7; and "Third Submission of the Palestine Liberation Organization to the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee," April 3, 2001, pp. 48-49.
213. Executive summary, "Third Submission of the Palestine Liberation Organization to the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee," April 3, 2001, p. 8. See also Levy, "Dahlan's Complaint," p. 7; and "Third Submission of the Palestine Liberation Organization to the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee," April 3, 2001, pp. 48-49.
214. Executive summary, "Third Submission of the Palestine Liberation Organization to the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee," April 3, 2001, p. 8. See also Levy, "Dahlan's Complaint," p. 7; and "Third Submission of the Palestine Liberation Organization to the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee," April 3, 2001, pp. 48-49.
215. Hockstader, "A Different Take on Camp David Collapse."
216. "Third Submission of the Palestine Liberation Organization to the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee," p. 48.
217. Haniyah, "Camp David Papers," al-Ayyam, August 6, 2000, fifth installment.
218. Asfour, "Right of Reply."
219. "Third Submission of the Palestine Liberation Organization to the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee," p. 24.
220. Ibid., p. 50.
221. One Palestinian document characterizes the Sharon visit and the harsh Israeli response to Palestinian protest as the immediate cause of the intifada and the occupation and lack of progress toward peace as the underlying cause. See PLO Negotiations Affairs Department, "The Palestinian Uprising against Occupation," fact sheet, n.d., http://www.nad-plo.org/fact_sheets_faq/faq1.html.
222. "Preliminary Submission of the Palestine Liberation Organization to the International Commission of Inquiry," p. 10. See also "A Crisis of Faith: Second Submission of the Palestine Liberation Organization to the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee," December 30, 2000.
223. "Preliminary Submission of the Palestine Liberation Organization to the International Commission of Inquiry," p. 10. See also "A Crisis of Faith: Second Submission of the Palestine Liberation Organization to the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee," December 30, 2000.
224. "Preliminary Submission of the Palestine Liberation Organization to the International Commission of Inquiry," p. 10.
225. "A Crisis of Faith: Second Submission of the Palestine Liberation Organization to the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee." See also Asfour, "Right of Reply."
226. "A Crisis of Faith: Second Submission of the Palestine Liberation Organization to the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee." See also Asfour, "Right of Reply."
227. "A Crisis of Faith: Second Submission of the Palestine Liberation Organization to the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee." See also Asfour, "Right of Reply"; and Mohammed Dahlan, "We'll Choose Our Leaders," Guardian, July 2, 2002, p. 13.
228. "A Crisis of Faith: Second Submission of the Palestine Liberation Organization to the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee." See also Asfour, "Right of Reply"; and Mohammed Dahlan, "We'll Choose Our Leaders," Guardian, July 2, 2002, p. 13.
229. "A Crisis of Faith: Second Submission of the Palestine Liberation Organization to the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee." See also Asfour, "Right of Reply"; and Mohammed Dahlan, "We'll Choose Our Leaders," Guardian, July 2, 2002, p. 13.
230. Khatib, "A Palestinian View - Camp David."
231. According to the Moratinos notes on the Taba talks, the figures were 94 percent (Israel) and 96.9 percent (Palestinians). Israel, he wrote, requested 2 percent under a lease arrangement. The maps from Taba appear in Enderlin, Shattered Dreams, between pages 238 and 239.
232. Clinton, "Proposals for a Final Settlement," p. 172.
233. Ben Ami interviewed by Shavit, "End of a Journey," pp. 14-15.
234. Danna Harman and Janine Zacharia, "Barak Appeals for Public Support: Foreign Minister Levy Opts Out of Summit Delegation," Jerusalem Post, July 10, 2000, p. 1.
235. Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960, reprinted 1980), p. 28.
236. The poll's margin of error was 4.5 percent. Ma'ariv, April 26, 2002, pp. 12-13, of shabbat supplement, in FBIS. The inclusion of the phrase "with all Arab countries" might have boosted the support, given that this would appear to include an Israeli peace agreement with Syria and Lebanon. In late July 2002, 61 percent of Israelis supported the establishment of a Palestinian state given a lasting peace agreement and no Palestinian right of return to Israel itself. See Ephraim Ya'ar and Tamar Hermann, "Majority In Favor of Left's Stand on Peace, Targeted Liquidations," Ha'aretz, August 6, 2002, p. 4, margin of error 4.5 percent.
237. See Ephraim Ya'ar and Tamar Hermann, "The Majority Trusts Sharon When It Comes to Negotiation," Ha'aretz, December 9, 2002, margin of error 4.5 percent.
238. For more on this point, see Sayigh, "Arafat and the Anatomy of a Revolt," pp. 53-54. Hassan Abdel Rahman, the Palestinian representative to the United States, attended Camp David and said that Arafat refrained from countering Clinton's and Barak's post-summit assertions because (1) Arafat thought it would be a temporary phase of recriminations, and (2) he knew that he would need to work with Clinton again and did not want to jeopardize his ties to the U.S. president by engaging in a public spat with him over the details of the summit. See Abdel Rahman's comments in the sidebar to Wright, "Was Arafat the Problem?"
239. For more on this point, see Sayigh, "Arafat and the Anatomy of a Revolt," pp. 53-54. Hassan Abdel Rahman, the Palestinian representative to the United States, attended Camp David and said that Arafat refrained from countering Clinton's and Barak's post-summit assertions because (1) Arafat thought it would be a temporary phase of recriminations, and (2) he knew that he would need to work with Clinton again and did not want to jeopardize his ties to the U.S. president by engaging in a public spat with him over the details of the summit. See Abdel Rahman's comments in the sidebar to Wright, "Was Arafat the Problem?"
240. Jane Perlez, "News Analysis: Falling Short of Peace," New York Times, October 15, 2000, pp. 1, 12. Dennis Ross said that the United States refrained from lobbying Arab leaders before Camp David at Barak's request. See Jane Perlez, "U.S. Mideast Envoy Recalls the Day Pandora's Box Wouldn't Shut," New York Times, January 29, 2001, p. A4. See also Jane Perlez, "U.S. Regards Egypt as Key to Peace Deal in the Mideast," New York Times, August 27, 2000, p. 13. On July 18 and 19, 2000, Clinton lobbied some Arab leaders about Jerusalem from Camp David. See Haniyah, "Camp David Papers," al-Ayyam, August 8, 2000, sixth installment, in FBIS, August 29, 2000. The general point was also mentioned in private discussions with a U.S. official and a Palestinian non-governmental leader, April 2002.
241. Jane Perlez, "News Analysis: Falling Short of Peace," New York Times, October 15, 2000, pp. 1, 12. Dennis Ross said that the United States refrained from lobbying Arab leaders before Camp David at Barak's request. See Jane Perlez, "U.S. Mideast Envoy Recalls the Day Pandora's Box Wouldn't Shut," New York Times, January 29, 2001, p. A4. See also Jane Perlez, "U.S. Regards Egypt as Key to Peace Deal in the Mideast," New York Times, August 27, 2000, p. 13. On July 18 and 19, 2000, Clinton lobbied some Arab leaders about Jerusalem from Camp David. See Haniyah, "Camp David Papers," al-Ayyam, August 8, 2000, sixth installment, in FBIS, August 29, 2000. The general point was also mentioned in private discussions with a U.S. official and a Palestinian non-governmental leader, April 2002.
242. Jane Perlez, "News Analysis: Falling Short of Peace," New York Times, October 15, 2000, pp. 1, 12. Dennis Ross said that the United States refrained from lobbying Arab leaders before Camp David at Barak's request. See Jane Perlez, "U.S. Mideast Envoy Recalls the Day Pandora's Box Wouldn't Shut," New York Times, January 29, 2001, p. A4. See also Jane Perlez, "U.S. Regards Egypt as Key to Peace Deal in the Mideast," New York Times, August 27, 2000, p. 13. On July 18 and 19, 2000, Clinton lobbied some Arab leaders about Jerusalem from Camp David. See Haniyah, "Camp David Papers," al-Ayyam, August 8, 2000, sixth installment, in FBIS, August 29, 2000. The general point was also mentioned in private discussions with a U.S. official and a Palestinian non-governmental leader, April 2002.
243. Jane Perlez, "News Analysis: Falling Short of Peace," New York Times, October 15, 2000, pp. 1, 12. Dennis Ross said that the United States refrained from lobbying Arab leaders before Camp David at Barak's request. See Jane Perlez, "U.S. Mideast Envoy Recalls the Day Pandora's Box Wouldn't Shut," New York Times, January 29, 2001, p. A4. See also Jane Perlez, "U.S. Regards Egypt as Key to Peace Deal in the Mideast," New York Times, August 27, 2000, p. 13. On July 18 and 19, 2000, Clinton lobbied some Arab leaders about Jerusalem from Camp David. See Haniyah, "Camp David Papers," al-Ayyam, August 8, 2000, sixth installment, in FBIS, August 29, 2000. The general point was also mentioned in private discussions with a U.S. official and a Palestinian non-governmental leader, April 2002.
244. Enderlin, Shattered Dreams, pp. 189-194; private discussions with U.S. official, October 2002; and Haniyah, "Camp David Papers," August 5, 2000, fifth installment.
245. Enderlin, Shattered Dreams, pp. 189-194; private discussions with U.S. official, October 2002; and Haniyah, "Camp David Papers," August 5, 2000, fifth installment.
246. Agha and Malley, "Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors."
247. Ross, "From Oslo to Camp David to Taba"; and private discussion with U.S. official, October 2002. See also Sontag, "Quest for Mideast Peace."
248. Ross, "From Oslo to Camp David to Taba"; and private discussion with U.S. official, October 2002. See also Sontag, "Quest for Mideast Peace."
249. Kaspit, "The Army Will Decide and Approve."
250. Gideon Levy, "The People's War," Ha'aretz, April 7, 2002, p. 5. See also Gideon Samet, "Out of the Bloody Square," Ha'aretz, August 7, 2002, p. 5; and Akiva Eldar, "There Is Not a Divine Decree," Ha'aretz, February 18, 2002, p. 5.
251. Gideon Levy, "The People's War," Ha'aretz, April 7, 2002, p. 5. See also Gideon Samet, "Out of the Bloody Square," Ha'aretz, August 7, 2002, p. 5; and Akiva Eldar, "There Is Not a Divine Decree," Ha'aretz, February 18, 2002, p. 5.
252. Gideon Levy, "The People's War," Ha'aretz, April 7, 2002, p. 5. See also Gideon Samet, "Out of the Bloody Square," Ha'aretz, August 7, 2002, p. 5; and Akiva Eldar, "There Is Not a Divine Decree," Ha'aretz, February 18, 2002, p. 5.
253. Akiva Eldar, "They Just Can't Hear Each Other," Ha'aretz, March 11, 2003.