New Trends in the Enforcement of erga omnes Obligations

Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law

Volumn 4, Issue , 2000, Pages 1-52

  Zemanek, Karl ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

^b Institut de Droit International   (Belgium)

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EID: 63049085326     PISSN: 13894633     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

References (203)

1. This is suggested by the absence of any consideration regarding this in such basic papers as Sh. Oda, "The Individual in International Law", in: M. Sørensen (ed.), Manual of Public International Law, 1968, 470 et seq., (498);
2. I. Szabo, "Historical Foundations of Human Rights and Subsequent Developments", in: K. Vasak (ed.), The International Dimension of Human Rights, 1982, 11 et seq., (21-22);
3. F. Capotorti, "Human Rights: The Hard Road Towards Universality", in: R.St.J. Macdonald/D.M. Johnston (eds), The Structure and Process of International Law, 1983, 977 et seq., (981-982).
4. A/RES/217A (III) of 10 December 1948.
5. Cf. K. Zemanek, "Does Codification Lead to Wider Acceptance?", in: International Law as a Language for International Relations, Proceedings of the United Nations Congress on International Law New York 1995, 1996, 224-229.
6. Cf. generally B. Clark, "The Vienna Convention Reservation Regime and the Convention on Discrimination Against Women", AJIL 85 (1991), 281 et seq.;
7. L. Lijnzaad, Reservations to UN-Human Rights Treaties. Ratify and Ruin?, 1995, 298 et seq.
8. The way in which the matter is treated by the Special Rapporteur of the ILC is critized by K. Zemanek, "Allain Pellet's Definition of a Reservation", Austrian Review of International and European Law 3 (1998), 295 et seq.
9. See R.St.J. Macdonald, "Reservations Under the European Convention on Human Rights", RBDI 21 (1988), 429 et seq.
10. Italics added.
11. Cf. e.g. article 144 of the Fourth Convention or article 83 of Protocol I.
12. See G. Barile, "Obligationes erga omnes e individui nel diritto internazionale umanitario", Riv. Dir. Int. 68 (1985), 1 et seq.;
13. J.A. Frowein, "Reaction by Not Directly Affected States to Breaches of Public International Law", RdC 248 (1994), 353 et seq., (395-397);
14. D. Schindler, "Die erga omnes-Wirkung des humanitären Völkerrechts", in: U. Beyerlin et al. (eds), Recht zwischen Umbruch und Bewahrung, Festschrift für R. Bernhardt, 1995, 199 et seq.
15. Cf. M.E. O'Connell, "Enforcing the New International Law of the Environment", GYIL 35 (1992), 293 et seq.
16. Ph. Sands, "Enforcing Environmental Security: The Challenges of Compliance with International Obligations", Int'l. Aff. 46 (1993), 367 et seq.;
17. R. Wolfrum, "Means of Ensuring Compliance with and Enforcement of International Environmental Law", RdC 272 (1998), 25 et seq., (56-57).
18. B. Simma, "From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law", RdC 250 (1994), 229 et seq.
19. B. Simma, "From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law", RdC 250 (1994), 300.
20. B. Simma, "From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law", RdC 250 (1994), 370.
21. A. Verdross, "Forbidden Treaties in International Law", AJIL 31 (1937), 571 et seq.
22. Cf. e.g. G. Schwarzenberger, "International Jus Cogens?", Tex. L. Rev. 43 (1965), 455 et seq.;
23. A. Verdross, "Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in International Law", AJIL 60 (1966), 55 et seq.;
24. E. Suy, "The Concept of Jus Cogens in Public International Law", in: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (ed.), The Concept of Jus Cogens in International Law, 1967, 17 et seq.
25. During the Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties initiatives were taken to establish a list of peremptory norms of international law which should have been annexed to the Convention and subjected to periodic review. The initiatives failed because, as the discussion revealed, views were too divided; see J. Sztucki, Jus Cogens and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1974, 119-123.
26. The relevant part of article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties reads: "For the purpose of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character."
27. Simma, see note 10, 288, 292.
28. Cf. also Ch. Tomuschat, "Obligations Arising For States Without or Against Their Will", RdC 241 (1993), 209 et seq., (306-307).
29. See K. Zemanek, "The Legal Foundations of the International System. General Course in Public International Law", RdC 266 (1997), 23 et seq., (32-36).
30. For a profound general discussion cf. B. Simma, Das Reziprozitätselement in der Entstebung von Völkergewohnheitsrecht, 1970;
31. cf. B. Simma, Das Reziprozitätselement im Zustandekommen völkerrechtlicher Verträge, 1972.
32. ICJ Reports 1951, 15 et seq., (23).
33. Whether they are interested in actually requesting the performance of the obligation is another matter; see B. Simma, "Consent: Strains in the Treaty System", in: Macdonald/Johnston, see note 1, 483 et seq., (500).
34. See J. A. Frowein, "Die Verpflichtungen erga omnes im Völkerrecht und ihre Durchsetzung", in: R. Bernhardt et al. (eds), Völkerrecht als Rechtsordnung - Internationale Gerichtsbarkeit - Menscbenrechte, Festschrift für H. Mosler, 1983, 241 et seq.
35. C. Annacker, "The Legal Regime of erga omnes Obligations in International Law", Austrian J. Publ. Int. Law 46 (1994), 131 et seq.
36. Cf. O. Corten, Droit d'ingérence ou obligation de réaction? Les possibilités d'action visant à assurer le respect des droits de la personne face au principe de non-intervention, 1992;
37. H.-J. Blanke, "Menschenrechte als völkerrechtlicher Interventionstitel", AVR 36 (1998), 257 et seq.
38. Simma, see note 10, 296-297.
39. See the quotation at note 20.
40. ICJ Reports 1970, 3 et seq., (32, para. 33).
41. See C. Annacker, Die Durchsetzung von erga omnes Verpflichtungen vor dem Internationalen Gerichtshof, 1994, 1 et seq.
42. Portugal v. Australia. ICJ Reports 1995, 90 et seq., (102, para. 29): "Portugal's assertion that the right of peoples to self-determination... has an erga omnes character, is irreproachable."
43. Bosnia Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia, Preliminary Objections. ICJ Reports 1996, 595 et seq., (616).
44. Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa, Second Phase, ICJ Reports 1966, 6 et seq., (32 and 47).
45. Source note 26, 48, para. 91: "... the instruments which embody human rights do not confer on States the capacity to protect the victims of infringements of such rights irrespective of their nationality."
46. Nicaragua v. United States of America, Merits, ICJ Reports 1986, 14 et seq., (134, para. 267): "However, where human rights are protected by international conventions, that protection takes the form of such arrangements for monitoring or ensuring respect for human rights as are provided for in the conventions themselves."
47. Source in note 28, 105.
48. This refers to arts 62 and 63 of the Court's Statute. Cf. also J.M. Ruda, "Intervention Before the International Court of Justice", in: V. Lowe/M. Fitzmaurice (eds), Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice, Essays in Honour of Sir Robert Jennings, 1996, 487 et seq.;
49. S. Torres Bernardez, "The New Theory of 'Indispensible Parties' Under the Statute of the International Court of Justice", in: K. Wellens (ed.), International Law: Theory and Practice, Essays in Honour of E. Suy, 1998, 737 et seq.
50. These are thoroughly discussed by Annacker, see note 27, 89 et seq.
51. Source in note 32.
52. This concept was "discovered" by the ICJ in the Case Concerning U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran, ICJ Reports 1980, 3 et seq., (40, para. 86).
53. B.Simma, "Self-contained Regimes", NYIL 16 (1985), 111 et seq., argues that human rights treaties belong to this group, (129-135); this view is not generally shared.
54. Cf. N. Valticos, "Once More About the ILO System of Supervision: In What Respect is it Still a Model", in: N. Blokker/S. Muller (eds), Towards More Effective Supervision by International Organizations, Essays in Honour of H.G. Schermers, Vol. I, 1994, 99 et seq.
55. Cf. I. Freudenschuss-Reichl, "Die Umsetzung der 'Rio Commitments' fünf Jahre nach der Konferenz für Umwelt und Entwicklung von Rio de Janeiro", in: H.F. Köck (ed.), Rechtsfragen an der Jahrtausendwende, Akten des 22. Österreichischen Völkerrechtstages, 1998, 83 et seq., (86).
56. Cf. S. Oeter, "Inspection in International Law. Monitoring Compliance and the Problem of Implementation in International Law", NYIL 28 (1997), 101 et seq.
57. This refers to the NPT, where verification of compliance is administered under safeguard agreements with the respective contracting party by the IAEA.
58. This is a reference to the "Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons" (OPC), established by the CWC.
59. L. Sucharipa-Behrmann/T. Franck, "Preventive Measures", N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol 30 (1998), 485 et seq., (524).
60. Cf. A. Cassese, "The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment Comes of Age", in: Blokker/Muller, see note 38, 115 et seq.
61. See M. Novak, "Country-Oriented Human Rights Protection by the UN Commission on Human Rights and its Sub-Commission", NYIL 22 (1991), 39 et seq., (53).
62. Cf. M. Koskenniemi, "Breach of a Treaty or Non-Compliance? Reflections on the Enforcement of the Montreal Protocol", Yearbook of International Environmental Law 3 (1992), 123 et seq.;
63. W. Lang, "L'Enquête et l'inspection", in: C. Imperiali (ed.), L'effectivité du droit international de l'environnement; contrôle de la mise en aeuvre des conventions internationales, 1998, 137-145, (143).
64. Cf. A.G. Mower Jr., Regional Human Rights: A Comparative Study of the West-European and Inter-American Systems, 1991.
65. That is to no small degree due to the "Follow-Up Procedures" adopted by the Human Rights Committee in 1990;
66. see K. Herndl, "Zur Frage des rechtlichen Status der Entscheidungen eines Staatengemeinschaftsorgans: die "views" des Menschenrechtsausschusses", in: K. Ginther et al. (eds), Völkerrecht zwiscben normativem Anspruch und politischer Realität, Festschrift für K. Zemanek, 1994, 203 et seq., (217-218).
67. Cf. in general Y.K. Tyagi, The Law and Practice of the UN Human Rights Committee, 1993.
68. See Sucharipa-Behrmann/Franck, see note 43;
69. U. Kriebaum, "Prevention of Human Rights Violations", Austrian Review of International and European Law 2 (1997), 155 et seq.;
70. J. Vessey, "The Principle of Prevention in International Law", Austrian Review of International and European Law 3 (1998), 181 et seq.
71. Source in note 32.
72. See A. Verdross, Die völkerrechtswidrige Kriegshandlung und der Strafanspruch der Staaten, 1920, 16-19.
73. See A. Verdross, Die völkerrechtswidrige Kriegshandlung und der Strafanspruch der Staaten, 1920, 84-87.
74. Cf. G.A. Finch, "Jurisdiction of Local Courts to Try Enemy Persons for War Crimes", AJIL 14 (1920), 218-223.
75. Cf. J. Graven, "Les crimes contre l'humanité", RdC 76 (1950), 427 et seq.
76. Cf. A. Marschik, "The Politics of Prosecution: European National Approaches to War Crimes", in: T.L.H. McCormack/G.J. Simpson (eds), The Law of War Crimes, 1997, 65 et seq., (100).
77. Convention I, article 50; Convention II, article 51; Convention III, article 130; Convention IV, article 147; Protocol I, article 85, para. 3.
78. Convention I, article 49; Convention II, article 50; Convention III, article 129; Convention IV, article 146; Protocol I, article 85, para. 1.
79. Cf. also C. Pilloud, "La protection pénale des conventions humanitaires internationales", Rev. ICR 35 (1953), 842 et seq.
80. See St. Paulson/J. Banta, "The Killings at My Lai: 'Grave Breaches' under the Geneva Conventions and the Question of Military Jurisdiction", Harv. Int'l L. J. 12 (1971), 345 et seq.
81. In S/RES/808 (1993) of 22 February 1993 the Security Council decided to establish the Tribunal and requested the Secretary-General to submit a draft statute, which he did in his Report Doc. S/25704 (reprinted in: ILM 32 (1993), 1191 et seq.) together with a commentary.
82. Rwanda, a non-permanent member of the Security Council at the time, voted against the Resolution, because it did i.a. not agree with the limitation in time put on the Tribunal's jurisdiction, to prosecute only violations having occurred between 1 January and 31 December 1994.
83. For an overview of the problem and of the relevant literature see K. Zemanek, "Is the Security Council the Sole Judge of its Own Legality?", in: E Yakpo/T. Boumedra (eds), Liber Amicorum Judge Mohammed Bedjaoui, 1999, 629 et seq., particularly 637-640.
84. Source in note 59, paras 125 and 126.
85. See for Austria, R. Regner/A. Reinisch, "Zur Umsetzung der österreichischen Verpflichtungen gegenüber dem Jugoslawien Tribunal der Vereinten Nationen", Österreichische Juristenzeitung 50 (1995), 543 et seq.;
86. the United Kingdom H. Fox, "The Obligations to Transfer of Criminal Jurisdiction to the UN Tribunal", ICLQ 46 (1997), 434-442.
87. Rwanda is a party to all of them.
88. Case No. IT-94-1-AR 72 of 2 October 1995. For an evaluation see M. Sassòli, "La première décision de la Chambre d'appel du Tribunal Pénal International pour l'ex-Yougoslavie: Tadic (compétence)", RGDIP 100 (1996), 101 et seq.
89. Judgement, para. 7.
90. Judgement, paras 125 and 126.
91. Judgement, para. 134.
92. It followed therein F. Kalshoven, "Applicability of Customary International Law in Non-International Armed Conflicts", in: A Cassese (ed.), Current Problems of International Law, 1975, 267 et seq.
93. Cf. e.g. Ch. Meindersma, "Violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions as Violations of the Laws and Customs of War Under Article 3 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia", NILR 42 (1995), 375 et seq.;
94. Th. Meron, "International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities", AJIL 89 (1995), 554 et seq.;
95. Th. Meron, "The Continuing Role of Custom in the Formation of International Humanitarian Law", AJIL 90 (1996), 238-249;
96. Sassòli, see note 65, 117-118.
97. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; source: http://www.un.org/index.htm
98. Cf. also A. Zimmermann, "The Creation of a Permanent International Criminal Court", Max Planck UNYB 2 (1998), 169 et seq.
99. Annex to A/RES/3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974.
100. Annex to A/RES/3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, article 4: "The acts enumerated above are not exhaustive and the Security Council may determine that other acts constitute aggression under the provisions of the Charter."
101. See text at notes 67 and 68.
102. A/RES/799 (VIII) of 7 December 1953.
103. The articles as adopted on first reading are reproduced in the Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 48th Sess. (1996), UN GAOR 51st Sess., Doc. A/51/10, 125-151. The commentaries to the articles appear in successive Reports of the ILC, from 1973 onwards, according to the session in which they were adopted.
104. For a short history see C. Annacker, "Part Two of the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on State Responsibility", GYIL 37 (1994), 206 et seq., (207-209).
105. See J. Combacau/D. Alland, "Primary and Secondary Rules in the Law of State Responsibility: Categorizing International Obligations", NYIL 16 (1985), 81 et seq.
106. The question whether "international crimes" should be maintained in the draft is to be decided in the context of Part Two.
107. Arts 41 to 46 of the draft; source see note 76.
108. On the insistence of the then Special Rapporteur the Commission included also punitive damages in the prescription (article 45, para. 2 lit.(b) and (c). For a critique see S. Wittich, "Awe of the Gods and Fear of the Priests: Punitive Damages and the Law of State Responsibility", Austrian Review of Internationaland European Law 3 (1998), 101 et seq.
109. As the ICJ stated in the South West Africa Case (Preliminary Objections), a dispute arises when "the claim of one party is positively opposed by the other": ICJ Reports 1962, 319 et seq., (328).
110. Arts 47 and 48 of the draft; source see note 76.
111. Article 50; source see note 76.
112. Article 49; source see note 76.
113. It was invoked and explained in the Naulilaa Arbitration, 1928;
114. Report of International Arbitral Awards, Vol. 1, 1013 et seq., (1028, para. c/2).
115. See Case Concerning the Air Service Agreement of 27 March 1946 Between the United States of America and France, 1978; Report of International Arbitral Awards, Vol. 18, 417 et seq., (443, para. 83): "... judging the 'proportionality' of countermeasures is not an easy task and can at best be accomplished by approximation."
116. Source see note 76.
117. See quotation at note 26.
118. Doc. A/CN.4/498/Add.4, 1999.
119. Doc. A/CN.4/498/Add.4, 1999, para. 15.
120. Doc. A/CN.4/498/Add.4, 1999, para. 33: "But these can be resolved in the framework of the consideration of Part 2, and in the case of "collective" responses to breaches of obligations erga omnes, which have to be addressed in any event, in the context of article 40 and the incidence of obligations erga omnes"
121. However, the Special Rapporteur apparently intended to propose such a distinction Second Report, Doc. A/CN.4/498/Add.2, paras 341-347;
122. repeated in the oral presentation, in: Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 51st Sess., 1999, UN GAOR 54th Sess., Doc. A/54/10, paras. 302-403.
123. The Commission, however, did not follow his suggestion (Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 51st Sess., 1999, UN GAOR 54th Sess., Doc. A/54/10, paras 406-409).
124. See the text of the articles adopted on second reading in Doc. A/CN.4/L.574 and Corr. 1, 2, 3.
125. See under, V. 2. a.
126. Cf. the Second Report of the Special Rapporteur (source in note 92), para. 290;
127. the Report of the ILC (the Second Report of the Special Rapporteur), paras 374, 379 and 383. The source for the new text quoted above and below is indicated in note 93.
128. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 32nd Sess., 1980, UN GAOR 35th Sess., Doc. A/35/10; commentary to article 33, para. 23.
129. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 32nd Sess., 1980, UN GAOR 35th Sess., Doc. A/35/10; commentary to article 33, para. 24.
130. Second Report on State Responsibility, 1999, Doc. A/CN.4/498/Add.2, para. 286.
131. Second Report on State Responsibility, 1999, Doc. A/CN.4/498/Add.2, para. 287.
132. Cf. Th. Schilling, "Zur Rechtfertigung der einseitigen gewaltsamen humanitären Intervention als Repressalie oder als Nothilfe", AVR 35 (1997), 430 et seq., (430-431).
133. The most recent decisions of the Security Council involving violations of human rights concerned the security areas in Iraq (1991), Liberia (1992), Somalia (1992) and the Former Yugoslavia (1992). On the issue cf. Y. Kerbrat, La référence au Chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations Unies dans les résolutions à caractère humanitaire du Conseil de Sécurité, 1995;
134. H. Gading, Der Schutz grundlegender Menschenrechte durch militärische Maßnahmen des Sicherheitsrates - Das Ende staatlicher Souveränität?, 1996;
135. M. Lailach, Die Wahrung des Weltfriedens und der internationalen Sicherheit als Aufgabe des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen, 1998, 183 et seq.
136. Critical M. Koskenniemi, "The Police in the Temple: Order, Justice and the UN: A Dialectical View", EJIL 6 (1995), 325 et seq.
137. Below, Part VI. 2. a.
138. The contradiction inherent in the use of force for humanitarian purposes is exposed by A. Roberts, "Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights", Int'l Aff. 69 (1993), 429 et seq.;
139. Ch. Schreuer, "Comment", in: J. Delbrück (ed.), The Future of International Law Enforcement. New Scenarios - New Law?, 1993, 147-153, (150): "... military humanitarism is a contradiction in itself."
140. Even before NATO's intervention in Yugoslavia the legal literature on humanitarian intervention was so extensive that it is not possible to deal with each view in the present context. However, W.D. Verwey, "Humanitarian Intervention and International Law", NILR 32 (1985), 357 et seq., is a carefully researched summary of the different schools of thought in well balanced form; for this reason references below are to that paper, unless a very special attitude requires reference to the original work.
141. For a good overview of the trends in the United States and of their critics cf. particularly the contributions of Baxter, Brownlie, Falk, Fonteyne, Franck and Goldie in: R.B. Lillich (ed.), Humanitarian Intervention and the Charter of the United Nations, 1973;
142. D.J. Scheffer/R.N. Gardner/G.B. Helman, Post-Gulf War Challenges of the UN Collective Security System: Three Views on the Issue of Humanitarian Intervention, 1992.
143. Verwey, see above, 371.
144. Verwey, see above, 418.
145. J.A. Frowein, "Der Schutz des Menschen ist zentral", Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Nr. 163 of 17/18 July 1999, 62.
146. Verwey, see note 104, 370.
147. Hungary/Slovakia, ICJ Reports 1997, 7 et seq., (42, para. 54): "That does not exclude, in the view of the Court, that a 'peril' appearing in the long term might be held to be 'imminent' as soon as it is established, at the relevant point in time, that the realization of that peril, however far off it might be, is not thereby any less certain and inevitable."
148. See above, Part IV. 3. b.
149. For the following summary cf. Verwey, see note 104, 378-398.
150. E.g. Verwey, see note 104, 417-418;
151. or, implicitly, Th. Franck, "Fairness in the International Legal and Institutional System", General Course in Public International Law, RdC 240 (1993), 23 et seq., (256-257).
152. Critically Schilling, see note 100, 438-444.
153. See above, Part IV. 3. b.
154. ICJ Reports 1949, 4 et seq., (35).
155. See e.g. F.R. Tesón, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality, 1988; probably the most stringently argued thesis of this kind.
156. Source in note 32, paras 181 and 190.
157. Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
158. See Roberts, see note 103, 448. The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office Foreign Policy Document No. 148, reprinted in: BYIL 57 (1986), 614 et seq., came to the conclusion that "the overwhelming majority of contemporary legal opinion comes down against the existence of a right of humanitarian intervention...".
159. F. Abiew, The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention, 1999.
160. F. Abiew, The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention, 1999, 132; see also 222 and 246.
161. F. Abiew, The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention, 1999, 256.
162. It provoked a lively discussion among scholars which is too extensive to be documented in full. Cf. e.g. B. Simma, "NATO, the UN and the Use of Force - Legal Aspects", EJIL 10(1999), No.1.
163. A Cassese, "Ex injuria jus oritur: Are We Moving Towards International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?", EJIL 10(1999), No.1.
164. K. Ambros, "Comment", in: EJIL 10(1999), No.1.
165. See above, Part V. 1. b.
166. Cf. Ch. Schreuer, "Is there a Legal Basis for the NATO Intervention in Kosovo?", International Law Forum du droit international 1 (1999), 151-154, (153).
167. See text at notes 6 and 107.
168. For an interesting discussion of the dilemma in respect of humanitarian intervention see H. McCoubrey/N.D. White, International Organizations and Civil Wars, 1955, 14-15, who see a possible justification of humanitarian intervention by force, which objectively violates the jus cogens norm banning the use of force, in the breach of the other peremptory norm of international law prohibiting genocide. But they also argue strongly that "humanitarian intervention cannot be justified within the terms of the UN Charter, except as collective right authorized by the Security Council", 15.
169. Cf. U. Beyerlin, "Menschenrechte und Intervention", in: B. Simma/E. Blenk-Knocke (eds), Zwischen Intervention und Zusammenarbeit, 1979, 157 et seq.;
170. the Resolution of the Institut de droit International on "The Protection of Human Rights and the Principle of Non-intervention", Annuaire de l'Institut de droit international 63-11 (1990), 338-345.
171. See S. Pöllinger, Der KSZE/OSZE Prozess, Laxenburger Internationale Studien 12, 1998, 110.
172. Cf. V. Dimitrijevic, "Human Rights and Peace", in: J. Symonides (ed.), Human Rights: New Dimensions and Challenges, 1998, 47 et seq.
173. Cf. S. Torres Bernardez, "The 'Uti Possidetis Juris Principle' in Historical Perspective", in: Ginther, see note 48, 417 et seq.;
174. E.K.M. Yakpo, "The African Concept of uti possidetis - Need for Change?", in: Yakpo/Boumedra, see note 61, 271 et seq.
175. For another, but similar example see I. Seidl-Hohenveldern, "Functional Immunity of International Organizations and Human Rights", in: W. Benedek et al. (eds), Development and Developing International and European Law, Essays in Honour of K. Ginther, 1999, 137-149.
176. ICJ Reports 1962, 151 et seq., (168).
177. Approving M. Bedjaoui, "On the Efficacy of International Organizations: Some Variations on an Inexhaustible Theme...", in: Blokker/Muller, see note 38, 7 et seq.
178. Cf. J.A. Frowein, "The Implementation and Promotion of International Law Through National Courts", in: International Law as a Language For International Relations, see note 3, 85 et seq.
179. Th. Franck/G.H. Fox (eds), International Law Decisions in National Courts, 1996.
180. Preventing War and Disaster. A Growing Global Challenge, 1999, para. 66.
181. See the literature cited in note 101.
182. Cf. H. Freudenschuss, "Article 39 of the Charter Revisited: Threats to the Peace and the Recent Practice of the UN Security Council", Austrian J. Publ. Int. Law 46 (1993), 1 et seq.
183. Cf. L. Fissler Damrosch (ed.), Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts, 1993;
184. E. Mortimer, "Under What Circumstances Should the UN Intervene Militarily in a 'Domestic Crisis'?", in: International Peace Academy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the Next Century, Report of the 25th Vienna Seminar, 1995, 33-34.
185. Kofi Annan, see note 136, para. 67.
186. Part II. 2.
187. See above Part II. 2. d.
188. The final decision of the House of Lords can be found in the internet: http://www.lemonde.fr/actu/international/chili/pinochet/jugem2403/jugem1.htm
189. Cf. Marschik, see note 55.
190. See R. Wolfram, "The Decentralized Prosecution of International Offences Through National Courts", in: Y. Dinstein/M. Tabory (eds), War Crimes in International Law, 1996, 233 et seq.
191. See above, Part III. 1.b.
192. Restatement of the Law Third, The Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 1987, §404.
193. Restatement of the Law Third, The Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 1987, §423.
194. For the following see G. Handl, "The Pinochet Case, Foreign State Immunity and the Changing Constitution of the International Community", in: Benedek, see note 132, 59 et seq.
195. Cf. also P.J.I.M. de Waart, "Pinochet: To Be or not to Be Immune", Benedek, 185-199.
196. Source http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm
197. Schlußfolgerungen des Vorsitzes, Helsinki, 10 und 11 Dezember 1999; II. Gemeinsame Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik. Translation by the author.
198. See Ch. Walter, Vereinte Nationen und Regionalorganisationen, Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht, Bd. 124, 1995, 289 et seq.
199. See Ch. Walter, Vereinte Nationen und Regionalorganisationen, Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht, Bd. 124, 1995, 310-317;
200. cf. also J.A. Frowein, "Legal Consequences for International Law Enforcement in Case of Security Council Inaction", in: Delbrück, see note 103, 111 et seq., (122).
201. O. Bring, "Should NATO Take the Lead in Formulating a Doctrine on Humanitarian Intervention?", NATO Review, On-line Library, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1999/9903-o7.htm
202. See above, Part V.1.b. Bring agrees i.a. that the intervention must be "in accordance with international humanitarian law of armed conflict".
203. Expressed e.g. in the wide claim of extraterritorial jurisdiction.