Intention and volition

Canadian Journal of Philosophy

Volumn 34, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 175-193

  Jing, Zhu ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHINESE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES   (China)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 62449290479     PISSN: 00455091     EISSN: 19110820     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00455091.2004.10716564     Document Type: Article

References (69)

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2. See also A.I. Melden, Free Action (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1961), ch. 5
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18. W. Sellars, 'Volitions Re-Affirmed,' in M. Brand and D. Walton, eds., Action Theory (Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel 1975), 47-66
19. M. Brand, Intending and Acting: Toward a Naturalized Action Theory (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 1984)
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32. 'Reclaiming Volition: An Alternative Interpretation of Libet's Experiment,' Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (2003) 61-77 (No. 11)
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38. N.M.L. Nathan, Will and World, ch. 9
39. H.M. Wells, The Phenomenology of Acts of Choice: An Analysis of Volitional Consciousness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1927)
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51. See 'The Intention/Volition Debate,' 331-2 for a list of the phenomena that volitions are postulated to explain. Adams and Mele argue that trying can perfectly do the explanatory work attributed to volitions
52. Mele, 'Deciding to Act,' Philosophical Studies, 100 (2000) 81-108
53. The Principles of Psychology, Vol. 2, 1132-3
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57. J. Reason, Human Error (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1990)
58. H. Heckhausen and J. Beckmann, 'Intentional Action and Action Slips,' Psychological Review 97 (1990) 36-48
59. B.J. Baars, ed., Experimental Slips and Human Error: Exploring the Architecture of Volition (New York: Plenum 1992)
60. Baars, ed., Experimental Slips and Human Error: Exploring the Architecture of Volition; 'Why Volition is a Foundation Problem for Psychology,' Consciousness and Cognition 2 (1993) 281-309
61. W.A. Hershberger, ed., Volitional Action: Conation and Control (Amsterdam: Elsevier 1989)
62. Baars, 'Introduction,' in Experimental Slips and Human Error: Exploring the Architecture of Volition, 4
63. D. Kahneman, Attention and Effort (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall 1973), 4
64. Mele, Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, Self-deception, and Self-control (New York: Oxford University Press 1987), 26-7
65. See Mele, 'Motivational Strength,' Noûs 32 (1998) 23-36
66. Cf. I. Thalberg, 'Questions about Motivational Strength,' in E. LePore and B. MeLaughlin, eds. Actions and Events (Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1985)
67. See H. McCann, 'Intention and Motivational Strength,' Journal of Philosophical Research 20 (1995) 571-84
68. Cf. Mele, 'Motivation and Intention,' Journal of Philosophical Research 21 (1996) 51-67
69. Mele, Irrationality, 26