Kant on conscience, "indirect" duty, and moral error

International Philosophical Quarterly

Volumn 46, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 293-308

  Timmermann, Jens ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 62449214915     PISSN: 00190365     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5840/ipq200646314     Document Type: Article

References (42)

1. Variously described as strict and wide, necessary and contingent, owed and meritorious, etc.
2. Necessity is even implied by the very concept of duty, for a duty that does not command with the force of necessity is none. See, e. g. , Metaphysics of Morals, VI:224.
3. As is customary, all quotations from Kant's works, with the exception of the Critique of Pure Reason, refer to volume and page numbers of the Academy edition (roman and arabic numerals). Translations are, for the most part, adapted from the Cambridge translation of Kant's works.
4. Notable recent exceptions are Thomas E. Hill's studies of Kant's notion of conscience, "Four Conceptions of Conscience" in Human Welfare and Moral Worth (Oxford UK: Clarendon Press 2002), pp. 277-309
5. and "Punishment, Conscience and Moral Worth," pp. 340-61
6. and Thomas S. Hoffmann's article on the development of the conception of conscience in Kant's lectures on ethics, "Gewissen als praktische Apperzeption: Zur Lehre vom Gewissen in Kants Ethik-Vorlesungen" in Kant-Studien 93 (2002): 424-43. I know of no systematic treatment of the role of "indirect duty" in Kantian ethics.
7. See IV:404, where common understanding is said to "put obstacles in the way of conscience in the way that lawyers do" (schikanieren), and IV:422, a discussion of the second illustration of the law-of-nature formula: the agent "still has enough conscience to ask himself" whether his action accords with moral principles.
8. See V:98, which stresses our consciousness of our own guilt.
9. Cf. Hoffmann, "Gewissen als praktische Apperzeption. "
10. Cf. H. Reiner, "Gewissen" in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, vol. 3, ed. Gerhard Ritter (Basel, Switzerland: Schwabe, 1974), col. 574-86. Reiner emphasizes the differences between the German "Gewissen" and the English "conscience" in that the latter often lacks clear reference to the agent's own actions, cf. col. 585.
11. Moreover, conscience is at best a problematic motive of moral action. See Thomas E. Hill, Jr. , "Four Conceptions of Conscience"; see also Joseph Butler, Sermons I-III: "Upon Human Nature," esp. Sermon I, sec. 8. , in Butler's Fifteen Sermons, Preached at the Rolls Chapel and a Dissertation upon the Nature of Virtue, ed. W. R. Matthews (London UK: Bell & Sons, 1953, first published in 1726).
12. Cf. Thomas E. Hill, Jr. , "Punishment, Conscience, and Moral Worth," pp. 346-49.
13. Alexander Baumgarten, Ethica Philosophica (1751), § 181
14. (reprinted in the Academy Edition of Kant's works, vol. XXXVII:782).
15. in Moralphilosophie Collins, XXVII:356, where he distinguishes conscience that comes "before the deed," conscience that comes "after the deed," and "accompanying" conscience.
16. This explanation of why conscience is largely absent from Kant's foundational work in ethics is compatible with that of Hoffmann, who emphasizes the fact that ethics is concerned with the examination of maxims whereas conscience concerns individual acts ("Gewissen als praktische Apperzeption," pp. 425-26).
17. However, one should bear in mind that, in the Groundwork, the ethical focus on maxims as the locus of moral evaluation is not a foregone conclusion. Rather, it is established in the course of the first section, esp. Thepassages leading up to the "second proposition" (IV:399-400). From then on, Kant has even less reason to discuss the innate judge that connects general principles and the acts of an individual in the Groundwork. The above explanation, revolving around the strictly limited role of conscience, seems to me to be the more prominent of the two.
18. In the Conflict of the Faculties Kant similarly criticizes the idea that one should pray for contrition if contrition is at the same time said to be the precondition of one's prayer's being looked on favorably by God; cf. VII:10.
19. Even though such a creature may still be able to judge moral principles of action in the abstract, he would not connect the judgment of reason and his own role as an agent who has to conform to these judgments in particular cases. We can loosely adapt a more pre-eminent Kantian thought: the "I act" must, so to speak, be able to accompany all my practical deliberations; and this is the work of conscience. For otherwise something would be deliberated which cannot be enacted, and my practical judgment would be nothing to me. Cf. VI:401, quoted below.
20. This is echoed in the essay on the Theodicy, in which Kant similarly states that one can be wrong about a judgment with respect to which one considers oneself to be in the right but not about the judgment whether one in fact judges a certain matter to be right, cf. VIII:268. We shall return to the puzzle of subjective and objective error below.
21. "Die Pflicht ist hier nur sein Gewissen zu kultivieren, die Aufmerksamkeit auf die Stimme des inneren Richters zu schärfen und alle Mittel anzuwenden (mithin nur indirecte Pflicht), um ihm Gehör zu verschaffen" (VI:401).
22. In her Cambridge translation, Mary Gregor moves it to the end of the sentence, thereby obscuring to some extent the connection between the status of something as a mere means and "indirect" duty.
23. There are two complications. First, not exposing oneself to temptation unnecessarily is itself only indirectly a matter of duty. Action contrary to a first-order duty is immoral. Consequently, taking measures that undermine the performance of one's duty is indirectly immoral in leading up to something that is directly morally bad. Secondly, Kant sometimes seems to suggest that the stronger the inclination that one fights, the more honor and merit the agent deserves. Overcoming strong natural inclinations is a paradigmatic exercise of freewill. However, this does not mean that it would be morally good to provoke such situations, or that it is morally bad to try to tame our nature in the way the Metaphysics of Morals commends. The fact that victory would be more admirable morally does not necessarily entail that the battle should be actively sought. It may be careless to do so.
24. As far as sentiments worth encouraging are concerned, the best candidate is a sense of honor, mentioned in passing in the Groundwork at IV:398. Reflection 7215 (XIX:287) offers us a hint as to why this is so: Kant writes that "honor is the only inclination that can be based on principles, because the impartial applause of others rests on principles, which is why the love of honor is akin to virtue. "
25. We wish to be applauded impartially by others, and universalization is thus "externalized," for we pay attention to the disinterested applause of others. This is reminiscent of the "sign" referred to in the second section of the Conflict of the Faculties: the spectators' explicit enthusiasm for the French Revolution in the face of prosecution (VII:85).
26. Cf. Onora Nell, Acting on Principle: An Essay on Kantian Ethics (New York NY: Columbia Univ. Press, 1975), esp. pp. 32-42.
27. Cf. Thenote on the "amphiboly" in the case of duties "involving" (rather than "towards") animals discussed below.
28. This description of the situation is in fact much more accurate. It is even possible that, contrary to our printed texts, Kant never used the phrase "indirect duty" in his published writings at all. In the original phrase of something's being "indirecte Pflicht" the word indirecte might be the Latin adverb rather than the German adjective. Only a look at Kant's manuscripts, sadly lost, could settle the question. Kant would have used German script for the German adjective and Latin handwriting for the Latin adverb. (To complicate matters, he might also have used Latin letters for as much of the German adjective as he considered Latin. ) There are occasional unambiguous references to "indirect" duties in the Vorarbeiten not intended for publication, e. g. , XXIII:401, where he calls sincerity to others an "indirect duty to the self. "
29. Kant shows a slight preference for variants of the less misleading adverbial construction. Care for happiness and wealth are said to be duties "indirectly" at IV:399 and VI:388; thankfulness towards animals is considered to "belong" to duty "indirectly" in VI:443. Care for conscience and compassionate feelings are (seemingly) straightforwardly called "indirect duties" in VI:441 and VI:457; but, again, it is entirely natural to read him as saying that they are "duties indirectly. "
30. I consciously avoid the ambiguous term "apply to," which may either mean "are valid for" or "concern. " Technical imperatives are valid for everybody and in this sense they are universal, but qua conditional they concern or address only those who will the end they presuppose.
31. It is not just our sensuous nature. There could be cases in which reason does not approve of your drinking a cup of coffee - if, for example, that would conflict with the end of preserving your health and long-term happiness, or some moral end that urgently calls for attention.
32. For Kant, duties regarding animals are revealed to be duties to the self that only obliquely involve animal welfare. Since treating animals well is just a matter of "indirect" duty, there would be nothing wrong with maltreating animals if it were not for the damage done in the course of it to the moral faculties of human agents. In other words, treating animals well is just a permissible means to supporting one's own moral integrity. I discuss, and disagree with, this controversial account of the moral status of animals in "When the Tail Wags the Dog: Animal Welfare and Indirect Duty in Kantian Ethics," The Kantian Review 10 (2005): 128-49. Kant's moral philosophy, I argue, possesses all the resources required to accord animal welfare its proper place.
33. Baumgarten, Ethica Philosophica, § 177, XXVII:781.
34. It is not entirely clear what the neutral personal pronoun (es) refers to. It could be conscience, but in that case Kant would be saying that one submits conscience to practical reason in its function as judge, which would be odd. It is more likely that "it" loosely refers back to ob etwas Pflicht sei oder nicht in the preceding sentence about objective error, and I have filled in the gap accordingly.
35. On the connection between judgment and truth, see Critique of Pure Reason A 293/B 350: 'Truth or illusion lies not in the object, in so far as it is intuited, but in the judgment about it, in so far as it is thought. "
36. Does this concern the "pure" or the "applied" part of deliberation? One would have to be quite corrupt to fail with regard to the former, moral judgment proper, which for the most part seems almost "automatic. "
37. Gewissenlosigkeit, literally "the property of having no conscience. "
38. There are some differences between the two accounts. In the Religion, conscience is said to be a consciousness that is "of itself a duty" (VI:185, stated in terms of one's conviction that an act one is about to undertake is morally permissible), a thesis that Kant seems to deny in the later Metaphysics of Morals because he regards it as inevitable, and supporting it as a mere "indirect" duty. The idea in the Religion seems to be that, owing to a duty of due care in action, acting conscientiously is a duty in itself.
39. Quite generally, as Kant argues in the Conflict of the Faculties, the wrongs of faith can never be righted by faith or Scripture alone; rather, reform must be guided by pure practical reason.
40. Kant briefly mentions and recommends this principle in the 1791 essay on the Theodicy, VIII:268.
41. See also Critique of Pure Reason A823/B851.
42. Recall that, in the Metaphysics of Morals, strengthening the voice of conscience is precisely one of the "indirect" duties recommended by Kant, VI:401.