How we trust one another

Philosophy

Volumn 83, Issue 324, 2008, Pages 161-177

  Hanfling, Oswald ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 62149136281     PISSN: 00318191     EISSN: 1469817X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0031819108000442     Document Type: Review

References (9)

1. N. Kolodny and R.J. Wallace, 'Promises and Practices Revisited', Philosophy and Public Affairs 31:2 (2003), pp. 119-154
2. For other formulations or versions of the problem see Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature 3.2.5
3. H.A. Prichard, Moral Obligation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949), ch. 7
4. G.J. Warnock, The Object of Morality (London: Methuen, 1971), ch. 7
5. T.M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge MA/London: Belknap, 1998), ch. 7; and Kolodny & Wallace op. cit
6. For further discussion of these points, see A.I. Melden, Rights and Persons (Oxford: Blackwell, 1977), chs. 2 & 4
7. John Searle, Speech Acts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 35
8. and 'How to Derive "Ought" From "Is"', in W.D. Hudson (ed.), The Is/Ought Question (London: Macmillan, 1969), p. 132. Hare's article also appears in Hudson
9. Compare A.I. Melden's critique of Rawls in Rights and Persons. 'It is not a rule that we have that provides a reason for keeping a promise, but a right that has been conferred' (P. 9). The treatment of promising in terms of games and institutions is well criticized by Melden in his chapters II and II and IV