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Promises and practices
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"Promises and Practices," Philosophy 6 Public Affairs 19 (1990): 199-226.
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(1990)
Philosophy 6 Public Affairs
, vol.19
, pp. 199-226
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0003867020
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(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University mess chap. 7. The quotation is from the latter, at p. 295. All subsequent page references to What We Owe to Each Other are given in the text
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and Wha We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University mess, 1998). chap. 7. The quotation is from the latter, at p. 295. All subsequent page references to What We Owe to Each Other are given in the text.
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(1998)
What We Owe to Each Other
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3
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0004048289
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(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press
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John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 345.
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(1971)
A Theory of Justice
, pp. 345
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Rawls, J.1
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78751650795
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ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, P. H. Nidditch, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press
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David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, P. H. Nidditch, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 520-21.
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(1978)
A Treatise of Human Nature
, pp. 520-521
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Hume, D.1
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note
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Here we likely depart from earlier versions of the practice view. At times, Hume and Rawls describe the social practice of promising in ways that make it seem parallel to the revised Reindeer practice. First, there is a freestanding practice of agreement making, like the original Reindeer practice, that consists in participants' being known to adhere to its policy of fidelity out of nonmoral motivations. Second, there is a moral obligation not to undermine or exploit this practice, by appeal to the recognition ofwhich participants can (further) assure others that they will adhere to this policy. According to Hume, the freestanding practice is sustained by self-interested concern for one's reputation as a cooperator. This freestanding practice is not the practice of promising itself; the practice of promising emerges only when people acquire and begin to communicate a sense of obligation not to undermine the freestanding practice. Rawls, by contrast, labels as "the practice of promising" the freestanding practice, which is constituted by compliance with a nonmoral requirement to do X if one has uttered (in relevant conditions), "I promise to do X." But this label seems misplaced; it would imply that one can participate in the practice of promising without signaling any awareness of a moral obligation. Rawls then distinguishes this practice-constituting, nonmoral requirement from the nonconstitutive, moral obligation, under the principle of fairness, to comply with such practice-constituting, nonmoral requirements in general. It is unclear, however, whether the the initial practices really could be freestanding: that is, sustained independently of a sense of obligation. There are familiar problems-deathbed promises and the lk-with Hume's claim that promising is sustained by concern for one's reputation. Perhaps the sense of obligation is supposed not only to reinforce participants' initially self-interested adherence to the policy of fidelity, but also to extend the policy's application to cases, such as death-bed promises, in which reputation effects are not at issue? But it is obscure how the sense of obligation can do this, if it is simply a sense of obligation not to undermine the freestanding practice, which does not apply to these cases in the first place. Rawls leaves the normative force of the nonmoral requirement that constitutes the practice unexplained. If the social practice exists, then people must reliably be motivated to comply with its requirement. What supplies this motivation? It is not enough to say that the requirement is constitutive of the practice, like the rules of chess, so that anyone who regularly fails to comply with the requirement is participating in a different practice, or no practice at all. Even if we set aside the worry that this analogy would define broken or lying promises out of existence, it fails to explain why people should care whether they participate in the practice of promising. It is clear why a grandmaster would want to count as playing chess, and thus care about abiding by its constitutive rules: he finds it an engaging pursuit in its own right, it offers him opportunities to exercise and be recognized for his skills, and so on. Yet why should anyone care about abiding by the constitutive rules of promising? If the practice were already established, one might want to appear to follow its rules, in order to convince others that one will do as one says. But this is not the same thing as wanting to follow the rules themselves, and motivations of this kind would be insufficient to establish a practice constituted by those rules.
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note
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Insofar as others signal that they adhere to a policy of fidelity out of nonmoral motivations, they are not participating in the same practice. The practice of promising, to repeat, consists in participants' communicating that they adhere to a policy of fidelity out of a sense of moral obligation. It might be suggested that the appearance of bootstrappingcould be avoided by supposing that others are deceptive: that they signal that they adhere to the policy out of moral motivations, thereby counting as participants in the practice of promising, when in fact they adhere to the policy out of other motivations. We can leave aside the questions whether a practice marked by systematic deception of this kind could count as the practice of promising, or whether it could even be sustained. It would be enough of an objection to the practice view that it had to assume such deception in order to avoid the bootstrapping problem.
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9
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0043240610
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Voluntary obligations and normative powers i
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supp
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He credits this suggestion to Neil MacCormick, "Voluntary Obligations and Normative Powers I," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supp. vol. 46 (1972): 59-78.
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(1972)
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
, vol.46
, pp. 59-78
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MacCormick, N.1
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10
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Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press
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It might be suggested that even this disjunctive obligation is implausibly strong. In certain commercial transactions, for instance, it seems possible to signal an intention to do X in the kinds of circumstances described, without incurring an unqualified obligation of fulfillment or compensation. Perhaps you have bought my house in part because of my truthful claim that I do not intend to sell the adjacent property; but my circumstances change, and three years later I need the money, so I sell the property to someone who builds a gas station on it, without providing you any compensation. It has been maintained that my behavior, although perhaps regrettable, has in no way wronged you. Cf. Charles Fried, Contract as Promise (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 9. This conclusion may require some qualification: we are not certain, for instance, that there is no moral obligation to take "reasonable steps" to avert or compensate for the loss in at least some cases of this kind. But if the obligations specified in L do not seem to apply here that is because of the special nature of commercial transactions, which provide legally enforceable mechanisms for extracting commitments from both buyers and sellers. If I fail to provide a contractual guarantee that the adjacent property will not be developed without your permission, then my representations regarding my plans for the property should be taken by you merely as honest claims about my present intentions (with an implicit rider: "but of course my plans might change"), and any losses that might stem from changes in my plans are risks that you assume in buying the property on the terms proposed. Caveat emptor!
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(1981)
Contract as Promise
, pp. 9
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Fried, C.1
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0042238186
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Rules, rights, and promises
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(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press
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He attributes this objection both to Hume and to G.E.M. Anscornbe, "Rules, Rights, and Promises" in Ethics, Religion, and Politics: Collected Philosophical Papers (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), pp. 97-103.
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(1981)
Ethics, Religion, and Politics: Collected Philosophical Papers
, pp. 97-103
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Anscornbe, G.E.M.1
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12
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0004050201
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London: Methuen, We discuss Warnock's proposed solution, which does not appeal to social practices, in Section VII below
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An especially clear statement of the general worry can be found in G. J. Warnock, The Object of Morality (London: Methuen, 1971). at pp. 99-100. We discuss Warnock's proposed solution, which does not appeal to social practices, in Section VII below.
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(1971)
The Object of Morality
, pp. 99-100
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Warnock, G.J.1
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Scanlon on promising
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at p. 153
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A point compellingly made by Michael Pratt, "Scanlon on Promising," Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 14 (2001): 143-54, at p. 153.
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(2001)
Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence
, vol.14
, pp. 143-54
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Pratt, M.1
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Promises and perlocutions
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(forthcoming)
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Michael Pratt explores the possibility of a similar weakening of condition (1) of E in a draft of "Promises and Perlocutions," Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy (forthcoming). He considers the suggestion that the contractualist justification of the revised F would be at least as strong as the contractualist justification of the original E This suggestion, however, depends crucially on the premise that B's believing that A will do X, as opposed to A's actually doing X, is an insignificant aspect of the value of assurance. As we argued in Section 111, this premise is mistaken. The value of assurance, in most cases, is rooted in its role in B's deliberation and planning, a role that it has only in virtue of B's believing that A will do X. A different justification for the revised F might seem to be provided by the very value that underlies the moral practice-based obligation: the value to agents of the normative power to give themselves, by announcing an intention to do something, a compelling reason to do that very thing. Given that this normative power is something of value to agents, why can't the fact that the revised F would confer it on agents suffice to justify that principle directly, without appeal to a social practice?
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Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy
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Pratt, M.1
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0039678166
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Promises and obligations
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P.M.S. Hacker and Joseph Raz, eds., (Oxford: Clarendon Press
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Joseph Raz, "Promises and Obligations," in P.M.S. Hacker and Joseph Raz, eds., Law, Morality, and Society: Essays in Honour of H.L.A. Hart (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), pp. 210-28.
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(1977)
Law, Morality, and Society: Essays in Honour of H.L.A. Hart
, pp. 210-28
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Raz, J.1
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One such case is that of the "Profligate Pal," who habitually fails to repay debts to his friends (p. 312). Now ashamed of this and desperate for cash, the pal pleads with you to give him one more loan. He sincerely believes that "he has turned over a new leaf" and will pay you back this time. "You do not believe this for a minute, but out of pity you are willing to give him the money he needs" (p. 312). Scanlon maintains that the pal's sincere claim to have a certain intention is not enough to trigger E He needs to convince you. If the pal has an obligation to repay you, therefore, it is not an obligation under E but most likely a debt of gratitude for a "gift, tactfully described as a loan" (p. 314).
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Note, however, that as D presently reads, it does not apply to cases like the Guilty Secret, where the promisee will not "suffer significant loss as a result of relying on these expectations" and the promiser has no reason to believe that he will. It seems that Scanlon needs to add the rider, "or has good reason to believe that they would value the assurance that those expectations might constitute."
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Promises under fire
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April
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"Promises under Fire," Ethics 112 (April 2002): 483-506.
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(2002)
Ethics
, vol.112
, pp. 483-506
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Reasons, responsibility, and reliance: Replies to wallace, dworkin, and deigh
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April at pp. 527-28
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"Reasons, Responsibility, and Reliance: Replies to Wallace, Dworkin, and Deigh," Ethics 112 (April 2002): 507-28, at pp. 527-28.
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(2002)
Ethics
, vol.112
, pp. 507-28
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36749009731
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Normative requirements
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new series
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Compare John Broome, "Normative Requirements," Ratio (new series) 12 (1999):
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(1999)
Ratio
, vol.12
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Broome, C.J.1
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In the cases like the Guilty Secret, in which reliance is not at issue, the analogous question might be whether A's present intention sufficed to justify B in, say, feeling relieved 398-419. and resting easy at night, or whether those responses, given what A has given B to go on, would simply be wishful thinking
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In the cases like the Guilty Secret, in which reliance is not at issue, the analogous question might be whether A's present intention sufficed to justify B in, say, feeling relieved 398-419. and resting easy at night, or whether those responses, given what A has given B to go on, would simply be wishful thinking.
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It may seem patently false to say that farmer A has no prior reasons in this case, for surely he has the prior reason of wanting his crops harvested in a timely and efficient manner. Indeed, this is a prior reason, a reason that A has independently of any communicative action that he performs. However, it is not a prior reason to perform the promised action; it is not a prior reason to help B with harvesting his crops, nor even a prior reason to help B in harvesting his crops provided that B has helped A in harvesting his. It is instead a prior reason to assure B that A will perform the promised action. By assuring B of this, A can induce B to help him, and thus ensure that his own crops are harvested in a timely and efficient manner. This prior reason to assure B may give A reason to form an intention to help B, in order to give B some grounds for assurance. But it does not give A any compelling reason to sustain this intention until the time of action, and so it fails to give B the sort of grounds for assurance that we are now supposing that he needs.
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Note
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In a situation of this kind, it would be possible for A to resort to deception about his reasons in an effort to generate in B assurance that he will do X. Such deception may not violate D, because A may reasonably believe that B will not incur any loss as a result of relying on those false expectations. If A's deception succeeds and B is falsely assured that A intends on the basis of some prior or nmp reason to do X then A will have triggered an obligation under F to do X. If A intends to comply with this obligation should it be triggered, then A will not expect B to suffer any loss from relying on the false belief that A intends to do X on the basis of some prior or nmp reason. Nevertheless, this deception does violate Scanlon's Principle ML, that "one may not, in the absence of special justification, act with the intention of leading someone to form a false belief about some matter, or with the aim of confirming a false belief he or she already holds" (p. 318). The upshot is that in a situation in which moral agent, who abides by ML as well as D and E cannot even attempt to promise to do X, if promises indeed function by indicating the presence of prior or nmp reasons.
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Pratt rejects Scanlon's proposed solution in the following passage: "The Principle of Manipulation establishes that it is wrong to convince another that one intends to do something that one knows the other cares about and may rely on being done, if one does not actually have this intention. It is presumably also wrong to attempt to do this, and so it follows that it is wrong to utter the words 'I promise to X in such circumstances without actually having an intention to X But it does not follow that the intention of the promissory to do Xis 'settled in the sense that the promissor may not change his mind without the consent of the promisee" ("Scanlon on Promising," p. 153). Pratt's concern appears to be that although the speaker (who says, "I promise to do X," and who abides by the Principle of Manipulation) must have some settled intention to do X, the intention need not be the kind of settled intention that promisers distinctively acquire as a result of promising: namely, an intention backed by the recognition that he has incurred an obligation to do X, unless released by the promisee. (Here we read Pratt's "may not change his mind" as "may he takes himself to have no prior or nmp reason to do X, a scrupulously not, morally speaking, change his mind." It is hard to see how else the phrase, "without the consent of the promisee," would be relevant.) But it is not clear why, at this stage of Scanlon' argument, the settled intention must be of this form. As we have reconstructed Scanlon's proposal, what is communicated by the speaker (who says, "I will do X," and who is known to abide by D) is that he has a settled intention of a different kind, a settled intention which is backed by prior or nmp reasons. The fact that the speaker has such an intention should, under normal circumstances, be sufficient to assure the hearer that he will do X Given that the hearer has now been assured, and given that the speaker abides by E the hearer may reasonably conclude that the speaker has a settled intention of the kind that, in Pratt's view, goes missing: an intention that the speaker may not, morally speaking, abandon without the consent of the promisee. Our objection, to repeat, is not that this mechanism cannot succeed, but instead that it is not available to speakers in situations in which they have no prior or nmp reasons. It may be that Pratt ignores the possibility that the settled intention is based on prior or nmp reasons, because he implicitly assumes that the situation is one in which the speaker has no such reasons. But if so, then the problem is not that what the speaker has communicated is somehow insufficient, which is what Pratt's formulation suggests, but instead that what the speaker would communicate would be deceptive, and hence that it is not available to him to communicate, so long as he is morally conscientious. Immediately following the quoted passage, Pratt offers a response on Scanlon's behalf, which he then refutes. This response is roughly equivalent to the "power of positive thinking" proposal that we consider in Section IV, above.
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presents this as a solution to what is, in effect, the circularity problem
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Warnock, The Object of Moraliv, pp. 94-117, presents this as a solution to what is, in effect, the circularity problem.
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The Object of Moraliv
, pp. 94-117
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Warnock1
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(Oxford: Clarendon Press
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For critical discussion, see P.S. Atiyah, Promises, Morals, and Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), pp. 104-05.
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(1981)
Promises, Morals, and Law
, pp. 104-105
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Atiyah, P.S.1
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Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, chap. 12
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Judith Jarvis Thornson proposes what is in effect a different kind of ratcheting mechanism in The Realm of Rights (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), chap. 12. For Thomson, promising is a species of "word-giving,'w' here the promiser invites the promisee to rely on the truth of a claim, and the promisee "receives and accepts the invitation (there is uptake)" (p. 298). The question is, how are we to understand this notion of "uptake"? If receiving and accepting an invitation to rely is a matter of forming the belief that the promiser will perform, the circularity problem has not been avoided (what reason does the promiser give the promisee for forming this belief?). If on the other hand one receives and accepts an invitation to rely by performing some voluntary act distinct from forming the relevant belief, the account will face different problems. For one thing, it seems that promises often become binding without the promisee's performing any voluntary act distinct from belief. And even where an act of this kind may be performed, it is obscure what might underlie the obligation to fulfill that this act engages. At one point Thomson appeals to a kind of "natural right" or "metapower": a power to give one's hearer the power to generate a claim on one by accepting one's invitation (pp. 320-21). This is reminiscent of the account by Raz that is criticized in n. 13 above.
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(1990)
The Realm of Rights
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Thornson, J.J.1
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One qualification: If A assures B by appealing to an nmp reason, and if the nonmoral practice in question is just, then A may also incur a moral obligation, under the principle of fairness, to follow the rules of the practice, i.e., to keep his word. In such a case, A actually has three reasons to do X (i) the nmp reason (e.g., his honor as a Reindeer), (ii) a duty of fairness, and (iii) a duty under E This still differs from a promise in two respects. First, A intends to assure B primarily by appealing to his nmp reason, not to his sense of duty. Second, the social practice that A invokes is not the social practice of promising; it is not a practice of agreement making that is primarily sustained by its participants' sense of impartial duty.
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The hybrid account implies that the profligate pal, described in n. 14 above, has a practice-based moral obligation to keep his promise to repay the loan, but not an obligation under F to do so. On reflection, this seems accurate. One cannot say that the profligate pal wrongs you personally by violating the assurance he has given you, for the straightforward reason that he has not succeeded in assuring you. (He may wrong you personally, however, by violating principle D, by not taking due care to avoid leading you to expect falsely that he will pay you back. Perhaps he ought to take a sober look at his past behavior and conclude that he is unlikely to make good.) Nevertheless, he has free-ridden, albeit to limited effect, on a social practice that exists only because of the contributions of others, a practice whose direct and indirect benefits he has enjoyed on many other occasions.
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