Churches as first amendment institutions: Of sovereignty and spheres

Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review

Volumn 44, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 79-131

  Horwitz, Paul ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA   (United States)

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EID: 61949381428     PISSN: 00178039     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (547)

1. McCoHum v. Bd. of Educ, 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948).
2. Max L. Stackhouse, Religion, Rights, and the Constitution, in AN UNSETTLED ARENA: RELIGION AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 92, 111 (Ronald C. White, Jr. & Albright G. Zimmerman eds., 1990).
3. J.G.A. POCOCK, POLITICS, LANGUAGE, AND TIME: ESSAYS ON POLITICAL THOUGHT AND HISTORY 13 (1989), quoted in Note, Organic and Mechanical Metaphors in Late Eighteenth-Century American Political Thought, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1832, 1833 (1997).
4. Note, supra note 3, at 1833.
5. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, The Idea of the Constitution: A Metaphor-morphosis, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 170 (1987).
6. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring). The phrase is generally traced back to Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[T]he best test of truth is the power of thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.").
7. For critical discussion of the phrase, see, for example, Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1;
8. Paul H. Brietzke, How and Why the Marketplace of Ideas Fails, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 951 (1997).
9. See also Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821, 821 (2008) (abstract) ("If any area of constitutional law has been defined by a metaphor, the First Amendment is the area, and the 'marketplace of ideas' is the metaphor.").
10. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to a Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802), in MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, JOHN H. GARVEY, & THOMAS C. BERG, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 42 (2d ed. 2006);
11. see Daniel L. Dreisbach, Origins and Dangers of the "Wall of Separation" Between Church and State, IMPRIMIS, Oct. 2006, at 1 ("No metaphor in American letters has had a greater influence on law and policy than Thomas Jefferson's 'wall of separation between church and state.'").
12. ROGER WILLIAMS, MR. COTTON'S LETTER EXAMINED AND ANSWERED (1644), reprinted in 1 COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS, at 313, 319 (Reuben Aldridge Guild & James Hammond Trumbull eds., 1963).
13. Williams's version of the wall metaphor was most prominently retrieved and examined in MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS (1965).
14. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 104-07 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (analyzing scholarly debate).
15. See, e.g., Angela C. Carmella, Constitutional Arguments in Church Bankruptcies: Why Judicial Discourse About Religion Matters, 29 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 435, 442 (2005);
16. Angela C. Carmella, Responsible Freedom Under the Religion Clauses: Exemptions, Legal Pluralism, and the Common Good, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 403, 412 (2007);
17. Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment: The Church-State Settlement in the Early American Republic, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1385, 1592
18. [hereinafter Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment];
19. Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373 (1981).
20. Richard W. Gamett, Pluralism, Dialogue, and Freedom: Professor Robert Rodes and the Church-State Nexus, 22 J.L. & RELIGION 503, 521 (2006-2007)
21. [hereinafter Garnett, Pluralism, Dialogue, and Freedom].
22. See also Richard W. Garnett, Church, State, and the Practice of Love, 52 VILL. L. REV. 281, 292 (2007)
23. [hereinafter Garnett, Church, State, and the Practice of Love].
24. Gerard V. Bradley, Church Autonomy in the Constitutional Order: The End of Church and State?, 49 LA. L. REV. 1057, 1061 (1989).
25. See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions: Some Easy Answers and Hard Questions, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1497, 1518 (2007)
26. [hereinafter Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions].
27. Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARV. L. REV. 84, 120 (1998)
28. [hereinafter Schauer, Principles].
29. See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1061, 1142 (2008)
30. [hereinafter Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference].
31. See generally Paul Horwitz, "Or of the [Blog]," 11 NEXUS 45 (2006)
32. [hereinafter Horwitz, [Blog]] (examining the press as a First Amendment institution and exploring the relevance of this concept to the emergence of blogs and other new-media entities).
33. U.S. CONST, amend. I.
34. See, e.g., Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment, supra note 10.
35. See Thomas C. Berg, Religious Structures Under the Federal Constitution, in RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY OF IDENTITY, LIBERTY, AND THE LAW 129, 129 (James A. Serritella et al. eds., 2006) ("Churches and other religious organizations are bound to interact with government. The conditions of modern America ensure that.");
36. Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our Constitutional Order, 47 VILL. L. REV. 37, 39 (2002).
37. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
38. Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter? Towards an Institutional Understanding of the Religion Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REV. 273, 284 (2008)
39. [hereinafter Garnett, Do Churches Matter?].
40. See, e.g., Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organizations and Free Exercise: The Surprising Lessons of Smith, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1633
41. [hereinafter Brady, Religious Organizations and Free Exercise];
42. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment, supra note 10.
43. See Garnett, Do Churches Matter?, supra note 21;
44. Richard W. Garnett, Religion and Group Rights: Are Churches (Just) Like the Boy Scouts?, 22 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 515 (2007)
45. [hereinafter Garnett, Religion and Group Rights];
46. see also Garnett, Church, State, and the Practice of Love, supra note 11;
47. Richard W. Garnett, The Freedom of the Church, 4 J. CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 59 (2007);
48. Garnett, Pluralism, Dialogue, and Freedom, supra note 11.
49. Garnett, Do Churches Matter?, supra note 21, at 284.
50. Nicholas Wolterstorff, Abraham Kuyper on the Limited Authority of Church and State, Presentation at Federalist Society Conference: The Things That Are Not Caesar's: Religious Organizations as a Check on the Authoritarian Pretensions of the State 7 (Mar. 14, 2008) (transcript on file with the author) [hereinafter Wolterstorff, The Things That Are Not Caesar's]. I am grateful to Professor Wolterstorff for sharing this illuminating paper with me.
51. Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Tort Law and Intermediate Communities: Calvinist and Catholic Insights, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 486, 488 (Michael W. McConnell, Robert F. Cochran, Jr. & Angela C. Carmella eds., 2001)
52. [hereinafter Cochran, Tort Law and Intermediate Communities].
53. ABRAHAM KUYPER, LECTURES ON CALVINISM 96 (photo, reprint 2007) (1931)
54. [hereinafter KUYPER, LECTURES].
55. Wolterstorff, The Things That Are Not Caesar's, supra note 25, at 11 ("Kuyper thought that in a modern well-functioning society, the authority of an organization should be limited to activities within one particular sphere.").
56. Some modern writers have found Kuyper appealing precisely because he seems to call for a relatively weak state. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 895 (1997). Although it is true that Kuyper's concept of sphere sovereignty opposes a totalizing state, it is far from clear that the state, in Kuyper's view, cannot be vigorous or activist.
57. See, e.g., Richard J. Mouw, Some Reflections on Sphere Sovereignty, in RELIGION, PLURALISM, AND PUBLIC LIFE: ABRAHAM KUYPER'S LEGACY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 87, 89 (Luis E. Lugo ed., 2000) ("[O]ne can make room [in Kuyper's description of the state] ... for a fairly energetic interventionist pattern by government.").
58. See, e.g., KUYPER, LECTURES, supra note 27, at 92-97.
59. Much of what follows in this Part is spelled out at considerably greater length in Paul Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 461 (2005)
60. [hereinafter Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment];
61. Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions, supra note 13;
62. and Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, supra note 15.
63. See, e.g., Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, supra note 31, at 564;
64. Schauer, Principles, supra note 14, at 112.
65. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Institutions as Legal and Constitutional Categories, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1747, 1748-49 (2007)
66. [hereinafter Schauer, Institutions].
67. Id. at 1748.
68. Garnett, Do Churches Matter?, supra note 21, at 275.
69. Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, supra note 15, at 1063.
70. Schauer, Principles, supra note 14, at 119;
71. see also Frederick Schauer, Prediction and Particularity, 78 B.U. L. REV. 773, 781-85 (1998).
72. See Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, supra note 31, at 564.
73. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
74. Steven J. Heyman, Spheres of Autonomy: Reforming the Content Neutrality Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 10 WM. & MARY BUL RTS. J. 647, 650 (2002).
75. Schauer, Institutions, supra note 33, at 1756.
76. Id. at 1754.
77. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
78. See, e.g., David McGowan, Approximately Speech, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1416, 1423 (2005) (describing the view that "the intention of the government is the key to free speech analysis" as being "the most prominent free speech intuition").
79. See Dale Carpenter, The Value of Institutions and the Value of Free Speech, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1407, 1409-10 (2005).
80. See id. at 1410-11.
81. Id. at 1411. Some writers have argued that this danger has already manifested itself in the "extreme institutional tailoring" of free speech doctrine with respect to prisons, workplaces, and public schools.
82. See Scott A. Moss, Students and Workers and Prisoners - Oh, My! A Cautionary Note About Excessive Institutional Tailoring of First Amendment Doctrine, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1635, 1635 (2007);
83. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution in Authoritarian Institutions, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 441 (1999).
84. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
85. Id. at 327.
86. United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 205 (2003).
87. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 672-73 (1998).
88. See Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
89. See Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions, supra note 13, at 1512;
90. Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256, 1270-73 (2005)
91. [hereinafter Schauer, Institutional First Amendment].
92. See Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions, supra note 13, at 1507.
93. See id. at 1508-09;
94. Schauer, Institutional First Amendment, supra note 53, at 1270-73;
95. Schauer, Principles, supra note 14, at 86-87 (noting "an intractable tension between free speech theory [in general] and judicial methodology [in particular cases]" and suggesting that "the increasingly obvious phenomenon of institutional differentiation will prove progressively injurious to the Court's efforts to confront the full range of free speech issues");
96. see also Robert C. Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1250-51 (1995) (arguing that the Court's free speech doctrine is "internal[ly] incoheren[t]" and "will continue to flounder until it focuses clearly on the nature and constitutional significance of [particular social] practices").
97. Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, supra note 15, at 1142
98. (quoting Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, supra note 31, at 589). I take no firm stand on whether the doctrine that results would be highly particularistic and anti-formalist, or whether it would be as formalist as the current, institutionally agnostic version of First Amendment doctrine with different and more institutionally aware formal categories. I take it that Professor Schauer would prefer the latter.
99. See Schauer, Institutions, supra note 33, at 1763-64. My own inclinations tend somewhat toward the former approach. What matters for both of our purposes is that the linedrawing that courts should engage in ought to be more institutionally sensitive and less reliant on purely legal categories.
100. Schauer, Institutions, supra note 33, at 1758.
101. Post, supra note 55, at 1280-81.
102. Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, supra note 31, at 589. I should note that this is not the only possible version of First Amendment institutionalism. Professor Schauer, for example, suggests that an institutional approach should be more sensitive to institutions in general, and need not focus only on what I call "First Amendment institutions."
103. See Schauer, Institutions, supra note 33, at 1757 n.51 ("[A] thorough institutional approach ... would not require that the institutions marked out for institution-specific treatment be institutions, like universities, that are connected with some area of special constitutional concern.").
104. Garnett, Do Churches Matter?, supra note 21, at 274.
105. Cf. Schauer, Institutions, supra note 33, at 1762 ("[T]here may be some reason to believe that the very nature of institutions as institutions gives their boundaries a stickiness that we do not see in some of the other empirical aspects of legal rules.").
106. Again, not all versions of First Amendment institutionalism necessarily take this approach. See supra note 59 (discussing Schauer's broader account of First Amendment institutionalism).
107. See, e.g., Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, supra note 31, at 572-73;
108. Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions, supra note 13, at 1511;
109. see also Blocher, supra note 6, at 858-59, 864.
110. See Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, supra note 31, at 573.
111. See, e.g., Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions, supra note 13, at 1516-23. I have also found useful Perry Dane's account of the numerous potential forms of abstention, deference, and recognition that make up religious autonomy.
112. See Perry Dane, The Varieties of Religious Autonomy, in CHURCH AUTONOMY: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY 117 (Gerhard Robbers ed., 2001).
113. Horwitz, [Blog], supra note 16, at 61.
114. See Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions, supra note 13, at 1516.
115. See Schauer, Institutions, supra note 33, at 1753-54;
116. Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions, supra note 13, at 1516-17.
117. Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions, supra note 13, at 1518.
118. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328;
119. see Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions, supra note 13, at 1518.
120. See Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 11-19 (1983).
121. See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of Private Governments, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 144, 186-87 (2003);
122. see also, e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1998)
123. [hereinafter Esbeck, Restraint on Governmental Power];
124. Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint: Validations and Ramifications, 18 J.L. & POL. 445 (2002).
125. See, e.g., Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions, supra note 13, at 1542;
126. Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, supra note 15, at 1129-30;
127. see also Blocher, supra note 6, at 863.
128. C. Thomas Dienes, When the First Amendment Is Not Preferred: The Military and Other "Special Contexts," 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 779, 819 (1988).
129. Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions, supra note 13, at 1520.
130. See, e.g., Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, supra note 15, at 1138;
131. Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions, supra note 13, at 1555-56.
132. For a response to some potential difficulties of First Amendment institutionalism, see Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions, supra note 13.
133. See Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, supra note 31;
134. Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, supra note 15;
135. Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions, supra note 13;
136. Frederick Schauer, Is There a Right to Academic Freedom?, 11 U. COLO. L. REV. 907 (2006).
137. See Horwitz, [Blog], supra note 16.
138. See Hills, supra note 72.
139. See Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771 (1999);
140. Michael R. Siebecker, Building a "New Institutional" Approach to Corporate Speech, 59 ALA. L. REV. 247 (2008).
141. See Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism and the First Amendment, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1803 (1999).
142. See David Fagundes, State Actors as First Amendment Speakers, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1637 (2006).
143. See Michael R. Siebecker, Corporate Speech, Securities Regulation, and an Institutional Approach to the First Amendment, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 613 (2006).
144. See, e.g., Mark D. Rosen, Institutional Context in Constitutional Law: A Critical Examination of Term Limits, Judicial Campaign Codes, and Anti-Pornography Ordinances, 21 J.L. & POL. 223 (2005).
145. See generally Symposium, Constitutional "Niches": The Role of Institutional Context in Constitutional Law, 54 UCLA L. REV, 1463 (2007).
146. See, e.g., Mark D. Rosen, The Surprisingly Strong Case for Tailoring Constitutional Principles, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1513 (2005);
147. Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Doctrine and Discourse of Religious Liberty, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1810 (2004);
148. Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Federalism and Faith, 56 EMORY L.J. 19 (2006).
149. See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, The Story of Henry Adams's Soul: Education and the Expression of Associations, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1841 (2001).
150. See, e.g., Peter Widulski, Subsidiarity and Protest: The Law School's Mission in Grutter and FAIR, 42 GONZ. L. REV. 415 (2006-2007);
151. Kyle Duncan, Subsidiarity and Religious Establishments in the United States Constitution, 52 VILL. L. REV. 67 (2007);
152. Robert K. Vischer, Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance: Beyond Devolution, 35 IND. L. REV. 103 (2001).
153. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 283-88 (1998) (arguing for "a new model of institutionalized democratic deliberation that responds to the conditions of modem life," in which judicial review and other devices of government would "leave room for experimental elaboration and revision to accommodate varied and changing circumstances" while still protecting individual rights);
154. Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 961, 978 (2003) (discussing the ways in which courts can "devolve[] deliberative authority for fully specifying norms to local actors" instead of "laying down specific rules" for the conduct of various public and private actors).
155. William E. Scheuerman, Reflexive Law and the Challenges of Globalization, 9 J. POL. PHIL. 81, 84 (2001);
156. see also JEAN L. COHEN, REGULATING INTIMACY: A NEW LEGAL PARADIGM (2002);
157. GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM (1993);
158. Hugh Baxter, Autopoiesis and the "Relative Autonomy" of Law, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1987 (1998);
159. Michael C. Dorf, The Domain of Reflexive Law, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 384 (2003);
160. Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 256 (1983).
161. For an expanded treatment of the relationship between First Amendment institutionalism and democratic experimentalism, reflexive law, and autopoiesis, see Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, supra note 31, at 574-79.
162. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 5 (2001).
163. For citations to the relevant literature and a discussion of how constitutional decision rules theory intersects with First Amendment institutionalism, see Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, supra note 15, at 1140-46.
164. See Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, supra note 15, at 1145.
165. Elaine Storkey, Sphere Sovereignty and the Anglo-American Tradition, in Lugo, ed., supra note 29, at 189;
166. cf. J. BUDZBZEWSKI, EVANGELICALS IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE: FOUR FORMATIVE VOICES ON POLITICAL THOUGHT AND ACTION 55 (2006) ("A Dutch theological liberal would seem unlikely to become a major influence on conservative American evangelicals of the following century, but Abraham Kuyper was an unlikely sort of person.").
167. See, e.g., Max Stackhouse, Preface to RELIGION, PLURALISM, AND PUBLIC LIFE: ABRAHAM KUYPER'S LEGACY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 29, at xi, xii-xiii;
168. Wayne Allen Kobes, Sphere Sovereignty and the University: Theological Foundations of Abraham Kuyper's View of the University and Its Role in Society 2-3 (June 15, 1993) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Florida State University) (on file with author).
169. See, e.g., JOHN BOLT, A FREE CHURCH, A HOLY NATION: ABRAHAM KUYPER'S AMERICAN PUBLIC THEOLOGY xi (2001);
170. PETER S. HESLAM, CREATING A CHRISTIAN WORLDVIEW: ABRAHAM KUYPER'S LECTURES ON CALVINISM 1-8 (1998);
171. Nicholas P. Wolterstorff, Abraham Kuyper (1837-1920), in THE TEACHINGS OF MODERN PROTESTANTISM ON LAW, POLITICS, & HUMAN NATURE 29, 63-64 (John Witte Jr. & Frank S. Alexander eds., 2007)
172. [hereinafter TEACHINGS OF MODERN P ROTESTANTISM].
173. See, e.g., RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 175 (1984).
174. The most prominent students of Kuyper in the American legal academy are John Witte, Johan van der Vyver, and David Caudill. See, e.g., JOHN WITTE, JR., THE REFORMATION OF RIGHTS: LAW, RELIGION, AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN EARLY MODERN CALVINISM 321-29 (2007)
175. [hereinafter WITTE, REFORMATION OF RIGHTS];
176. David S. Caudill, A Calvinist Perspective on Faith in Legal Scholarship, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 19, 23 (1997);
177. David S. Caudill, Augustine and Calvin: Post-Modernism and Pluralism, 51 VILL. L. REV. 299, 300-02 (2006)
178. [hereinafter Caudill, Augustine and Calvin];
179. David S. Caudill, Disclosing Tilt: A Partial Defense of Critical Legal Studies and a Comparative Introduction to the Philosophy of the Law-Idea, 72 IOWA L. REV. 287, 333 (1987);
180. Johan D. van der Vyver, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Constitutional and International Law, 5 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 321, 344-46 (1991);
181. Johan D. Van der Vyver, Sphere Sovereignty of Religious Institutions: A Contemporary Calvinistic Theory of Church-State Relations, in Robbers, ed., supra note 65, at 645
182. [hereinafter Van der Vyver, Sphere Sovereignty]. Both Van der Vyver and Caudill are identified as much, or more, with the thinking of a student and intellectual descendant of Kuyper, Herman Dooyeweerd, as they are with Kuyper himself.
183. See, e.g., Caudill, Augustine and Calvin, supra note 98, at 301.
184. See, e.g., Armand H. Matheny Antommaria, Jehovah's Witnesses, Roman Catholicism, and Neo-Calvinism: Religion and State Intervention in Parental, Medical Decision Making, 8 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 293, 312-14 (2006);
185. Jeffrey M. Bryan, Sexual Morality: An Analysis of Dominance Feminism, Christian Theology, and the First Amendment, 84 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 655, 691-94 (2007);
186. Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Catholic and Evangelical Supreme Court Justices: A Theological Analysis, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 296, 302-08 (2006);
187. Cochran, Tort Law and Intermediate Communities, supra note 26;
188. Robin W. Lovin, Church and State in an Age of Globalization, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 9-10 (2002);
189. Robin W. Lovin, Religion and Political Pluralism, 27 MISS. C. L. REV. 91, 97 (2007-2008);
190. David A. Skeel, Jr., The Unbearable Lightness of Christian Legal Scholarship, 57 EMORY L.J. 1471, 1506-09 (2008).
191. See, e.g., Kwame Anthony Appiah, Global Citizenship, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2375, 2388 (2007);
192. Marci A. Hamilton, Religious Institutions, the No-Harm Doctrine, and the Public Good, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1099, 1181
193. [hereinafter Hamilton, Religious Institutions];
194. John Copeland Nagle, The Evangelical Debate Over Climate Change, 5 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 53, 80 & 83 (2008);
195. C. Scott Pryor, God's Bridle: John Calvin's Application of Natural Law, 22 J.L. & RELIGION 225, n. 22 (2006-2007);
196. Peter Judson Richards, "The Law Written in Their Hearts"?: Rutherford and Locke on Nature, Government and Resistance, 18 J.L. & RELIGION 151, 181 (2002).
197. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Tournament at the Intersection of Business and Legal Ethics, 1 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 909, n. 9 (2004) (discussing sphere sovereignty without referring directly to Kuyper);
198. David J. Herring, Rearranging the Family: Diversity, Pluralism, Social Tolerance and Child Custody Disputes, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 205, n. 48 (1997) (same).
199. In keeping with Van der Vyver's focus on Dooyeweerd rather than Kuyper, see supra note 98, he regularly discusses sphere sovereignty without referencing Kuyper.
200. See, e.g., Johan D. van der Vyver, Limitations of Freedom of Religion or Belief: International Law Perspectives, 19 EMORY INTL L. REV. 499, 518 & 525 (2005).
201. Skeel, supra note 99, at 1508-09;
202. see also id. at 1509 n.31
203. (noting that "several recent articles drawing on Kuyper's sphere sovereignty may foreshadow the kind of sustained treatment that the literature so far lacks" and citing Cochran, Tort Law and Intermediate Communities, supra note 26, as an example).
204. See Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225, 1226-30 (1999) (noting the dangers of "'borrowing' . . . solutions developed in one system to resolve problems in another" and introducing the concept of "bricolage" in comparative constitutional analysis, which "assemblies] . . . something new from whatever materials the constructor discover[s]").
205. Mouw, Some Reflections on Sphere Sovereignty, supra note 29, at 88
206. (quoting Jacob Klapwijk, The Struggle for a Christian Philosophy: Another Look at Dooyeweerd, THE REFORMED J., Feb. 1980, at 15);
207. see also Richard J. Mouw, Culture, Church, and Civil Society: Kuyper for a New Century, 28 PRINCETON SEMINARY BULL. 48, 55 (2007) (noting that sphere sovereignty "has much to offer contemporary discussions of civil society, but not without some serious reworking in the light of present-day conditions").
208. For a useful discussion of these issues, see Mark Tushnet, Distinctively Christian Perspectives on Legal Thought?, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1858 (2003) (reviewing McConnell, Cochran, and Carmella, eds., supra note 26).
209. See also William Brewbaker, Who Cares? Why Bother? What Jeff Powell and Mark Tushnet Have to Say to Each Other, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 533 (2002).
210. 106ABRAHAM KUYPER, Sphere Sovereignty, in ABRAHAM KUYPER: A CENTENNIAL READER 1, 461, 466 (James D. Bratt ed., 1998)
211. [hereinafter KUYPER, Sphere Sovereignty];
212. see also Bob Goudzwaard, Globalization, Regionalization, and Sphere Sovereignty, in RELIGION, PLURALISM, AND PUBLIC LIFE: ABRAHAM KUYPER'S LEGACY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 29, at 325, 333 (noting that Kuyper's definition of sovereignty departs from the usual uses of the word).
213. KUYPER, LECTURES, supra note 27, at 88.
214. HESLAM, supra note 96, at 104.
215. See, e.g., KUYPER, Sphere Sovereignty, supra note 106, at 464.
216. See, e.g., Michael J. DeBoer, Book Review, 16 J.L. & RELIGION 855, 858 (2001) (reviewing POLITICAL ORDER AND THE PLURAL STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY (James W. Skillen & Rockne M. McCarthy eds., 1991)) (noting the relationship between sphere sovereignty and the Calvinist tradition);
217. Gordon Spykman, Sphere-Sovereignty in Calvin and the Calvinist Tradition, in EXPLORING THE HERITAGE OF JOHN CALVIN 163 (David E. Holwerda ed., 1976) (same).
218. KUYPER, LECTURES, supra note 27, at 79;
219. see also KUYPER, Sphere Sovereignty, supra note 106, at 466.
220. See KUYPER, LECTURES, supra note 27, at 79.
221. KUYPER, Sphere Sovereignty, supra note 106, at 467 (emphasis in original).
222. Id.
223. Wolterstorff, The Things That Are Not Caesar's, supra note 25, at 6.
224. KUYPER, LECTURES, supra note 27, at 90.
225. KUYPER, Sphere Sovereignty, supra note 106, at 467.
226. KUYPER, LECTURES, supra note 27, at 90.
227. Wolterstorff, The Things That Are Not Caesar's, supra note 25, at 7.
228. See id.;
229. see also Storkey, supra note 94, at 191
230. (citing MAX WEBER, 1 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 41-62 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978)).
231. See KUYPER, LECTURES, supra note 27, at 90-91.
232. Id. at 96.
233. Id. Kuyper thus adds that "the social life of cities and villages forms a sphere of existence, which arises from the very necessities of life, and which therefore must be autonomous."
234. Id.
235. Id. at 96-97.
236. See id. at 91.
237. Id. at 96.
238. Id. at 91.
239. KUYPER, Sphere Sovereignty, supra note 106, at 472 (emphasis omitted).
240. Id. at 469.
241. See Wolterstorff, The Things That Are Not Caesar's, supra note 25, at 13.
242. KUYPER, LECTURES, supra note 27, at 92-93.
243. Id. at 94.
244. Id. at 97;
245. see also KUYPER, Sphere Sovereignty, supra note 106, at 467-68.
246. See Mouw, supra note 29, at 89-90.
247. Id. at 89 (emphasis in original).
248. Id.
249. Id. at 90 (emphasis in original).
250. Id. (emphasis in original).
251. KUYPER, LECTURES, supra note 27, at 93;
252. see also KUYPER, Sphere Sovereignty, supra note 106, at 469.
253. KUYPER, LECTURES, supra note 27, at 94.
254. Id.
255. See id. at 97-98.
256. See Wolterstorff, The Things That Are Not Caesar's, supra note 25, at 16 ("[Kuyper] regarded the church as fundamentally unique, and regarded its autonomy under God as more fundamental than that of any other institution.").
257. See KUYPER, LECTURES, supra note 27, at 99.
258. Id. at 105.
259. See generally id. at 99-105. Although Kuyper refers only to Christian sects, he should not be read too narrowly. In fact, Kuyper "insisted on the inclusion of Jews within the ambit of religious liberty," and at times suggested that all sects, and atheists too, are entitled to liberty of conscience.
260. WITTE, REFORMATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 98, at 323 n.7 (2007);
261. see also STEPHEN V. MONSMA & J. CHRISTOPHER SOPER, THE CHALLENGE OF PLURALISM: CHURCH AND STATE IN FIVE DEMOCRACIES 59 (1997) ("Kuyper decisively, explicitly rejected the creation of a theocracy where the state would promote Christian beliefs and values. Time and again he spoke in favor of, and when in political power worked for, a political order that recognized and accommodated the religious pluralism of society.").
262. See KUYPER, LECTURES, supra note 27, at 105.
263. Id. at 106.
264. See, e.g., Mouw, Some Reflections on Sphere Sovereignty, supra note 29, at 99 ("[Kuyper] was especially vocal.. . about the dangers of an overextended church.");
265. see also id. at 106.
266. KUYPER, LECTURES, supra note 27, at 108;
267. see also Mouw, supra note 29, at 100.
268. MOUW, supra note 29, at 100.
269. Hence one of Kuyper's most famous phrases: "[N]o single piece of our mental world is to be hermetically sealed off from the rest, and there is not a square inch in the whole domain of our human existence over which Christ, who is Sovereign over all, does not cry: 'Mine!'" KUYPER, Sphere Sovereignty, supra note 106, at 488 (emphasis in original).
270. Kent A. Van Til, Abraham Kuyper and Michael Walzer: The Justice of the Spheres, 40 CALVTN THEOLOGICAL J. 267, 276 (2005).
271. JOHN WITTE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT: ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 1 (1st ed. 2000)
272. [hereinafter WITTE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT] .
273. For relevant discussions, see Henk E.S. Woldring, Multiform Responsibility and the Revitalization of Civil Society, in Lugo, ed., supra note 29, at 175, 177-80;
274. WITTE, REFORMATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 98, at 143-207 (2007);
275. BRIAN TIERNEY, RELIGION, LAW, AND THE GROWTH OF CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT 1150-1650, at 71-79 (1982). Carl Esbeck argues that we can look back further still, to the fourth century, for the roots of religious autonomy.
276. See Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment, supra note 10, at 1392.
277. Woldring, supra note 154, at 177
278. (quoting JOHANNES ALTHUSIUS, POLITICA 21-22 (1995) (reprint of 3d ed. 1614)).
279. WITTE, REFORMATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 98, at 187.
280. Id. at 196.
281. But see id. (noting other aspects of Althusius's vision of church and state that suggest a stronger alliance between the two).
282. Woldring, supra note 154, at 178.
283. Id. at 179.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 180.
286. See WITTE, REFORMATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 98, at 203-05.
287. Id. at 203
288. (quoting Thorold Rogers, Review of William E. Griffis, Brave Little Holland, 10 NEW ENGLAND MAG. 517, 520 (1894)).
289. See WITTE, REFORMATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 98, at 203-04. Witte cautions, however, that the precise influence of the Dutch experience on the American revolutionary thinkers is "hard[ ] to document" and that, to the extent that Dutch history and ideas were well received in revolutionary America, those ideas "took on quite different accents and applications" there.
290. Id. at 204.
291. See, e.g., JAMES BRYCE, 1 THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 299 (1889) ("Someone has said that the American Government and Constitution are based on the theology of Calvin and the philosophy of Hobbes. This at least is true, that there is a hearty Puritanism in the view of human nature which pervades the instrument of 1787.").
292. See WITTE, REFORMATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 98, at 152, 205 & 324;
293. John Witte, Jr., Blest Be the Ties That Bind: Covenant and Community in Puritan Thought, 36 EMORY L.J. 579, 594 (1987);
294. John Witte, Jr., How to Govern a City on a Hill: The Early Puritan Contribution to American Constitutionalism, 39 EMORY LJ. 41, 50-51 (1990).
295. See, e.g., WITTE, REFORMATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 98, at 287.
296. Id. at 309.
297. WITTE, REFORMATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 98, at 309
298. (quoting LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY A2 (1648) (Max Farrand ed., 1929)).
299. Id.
300. (quoting LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY, supra note 169, at A2).
301. Id. at 310.
302. Id.
303. See id. at 310-11.
304. Id. at 277.
305. See id. at 292-93.
306. For discussion, see Joshua A. Dunlap, Note, When Big Brother Plays God: The Religion Clauses, Title VII, and the Ministerial Exception, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2005, 2016 (2007).
307. See id. at 2015-16.
308. Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemptions: An Historical Analysis, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915, 936 (1992);
309. see also Thomas C. Berg, The Voluntary Principle, Then and Now, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1593, 1610;
310. John F. Wilson, Church and State in America, in JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 97, 104-06 (Robert S. Alley ed., 1985) (arguing that church and state in the colonial and post-colonial period stood in a position of dual authority).
311. Michael W. McConnell, The Supreme Court's Earliest Church-State Cases: Windows on Religious-Cultural-Political Conflict in the Early Republic, 37 TULSA L. REV. 7, 42 (2001).
312. See, e.g., Lupu & Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our Constitutional Order, supra note 19, at 38 ("[The founders decided on] a new experiment-one that decoupled religious and civil institutions. This new government would have no jurisdiction over religious matters, thus ensuring the autonomy of religious institutions and simultaneously depriving these same institutions of any incentive to capture the organs of government to further their religious missions.").
313. WITTE, REFORMATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 98, at 319 (internal quotations omitted).
314. See, e.g., Woldring, supra note 154, at 182-83;
315. BOLT, supra note 96, at 133-86.
316. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 305 (Alan Ryan ed., 1994) (1835).
317. ee id. at 304.
318. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 2 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 106 (Alan Ryan ed., 1994) (1835).
319. See id. at 106-10.
320. Elizabeth Mensch, The Politics of Virtue: Animals, Theology and Abortion, 25 GA. L. REV. 923, 1100 (1991)
321. (quoting GEORGE ARMSTRONG KELLY, POLITICS AND RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS IN AMERICA 27 (1984)).
322. KUYPER, LECTURES, supra note 27, at 99.
323. See John O. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville's America: The Rehnquist Court's Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485 (2002).
324. For introductions to British pluralism, see, for example, THE PLURALIST THEORY OF THE STATE: SELECTED WRITINGS OF G.D.H. COLE, J.N. FIGGIS, AND HJ. LASKI (Paul Q. Hirst ed., 1989)
325. [hereinafter THE PLURALIST THEORY OF THE STATE];
326. DAVID NICHOLLS, THE PLURALIST STATE (1975);
327. CAROL WEISBROD, EMBLEMS OF PLURALISM: CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND THE STATE 111-15 (2002).
328. Paul Q. Hirst, Introduction to THE PLURALIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 190, at 1-2.
329. Id. at 2.
330. Id. at 17.
331. For language that echoes both Kuyper and Figgis, see W. Cole Durham, Jr. & Elizabeth A. Sewell, Definition of Religion, in RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY OF IDENTITY, LIBERTY, AND THE LAW, supra note 19, at 3, 35 ("In a pluralistic world, protection of religious freedom requires allocating the ultimate 'competence of competences' to the secular state.").
332. WEISBROD, supra note 190, at 112.
333. For a modern example of a writer proceeding from a perspective of legal pluralism who reaches conclusions similar to those drawn here, see Franklin G. Snyder, Sharing Sovereignty: Non-State Associations and the Limits of State Power, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 365 (2004).
334. PETER L. BERGER & RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, TO EMPOWER PEOPLE: THE ROLE OF MEDIATING STRUCTURES IN PUBLIC POLICY 2 (1977) (emphasis omitted);
335. see also PETER L. BERGER, FACING UP TO MODERNITY: EXCURSIONS IN SOCIETY, POLITICS AND RELIGION 130-41 (1977);
336. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 109 (1991);
337. SEEDBEDS OF VIRTUE: SOURCES OF COMPETENCE, CHARACTER, AND CITIZENSHIP IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (Mary Ann Glendon & David Blankenhorn eds., 1995);
338. Linda C. McLain & James E. Fleming, Some Questions for Civil Society-Revivalists, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 301, 309-10 (2000);
339. Yael Tamir, Revisiting the Civic Sphere, in FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 214 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1998).
340. BERGER, supra note 196, at 134.
341. Id. at 138 (emphasis omitted).
342. Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum: Encyclical Letter on Capital and Labor (May 15, 1891), in 2 THE PAPAL ENCYCLICALS 1878-1903, at 241 (Claudia Carlen ed., 1990).
343. For a later description of subsidiarity that strongly resembles sphere sovereignty, see Paul VI, Encyclical Letter Gaudium et Spes, para. 76 (1965) ("[I]n their proper spheres, the political community and the Church are mutually independent and self-governing.").
344. Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law, 97 AM. J. INTL L. 38, 43 (2003).
345. Id. at 41.
346. Duncan, supra note 89, at 72.
347. See Carozza, supra note 200, at 40-41.
348. See generally Duncan, supra note 89.
349. See, e.g., Mouw, supra note 29;
350. Woldring, supra note 154;
351. Van der Vyver, Sphere Sovereignty of Religious Institutions, supra note 98, at 657-58.
352. See, e.g., Duncan, supra note 89, at 73.
353. See, e.g., Mouw, supra note 29, at 93
354. (citing HERMAN DOOYEWEERD, ROOTS OF WESTERN CULTURE: PAGAN, SECULAR, AND CHRISTIAN OPTIONS 127 (Mark Vander & Bernard Zylstra eds., John Kraay trans., 1979)). Dooyeweerd, it should be noted, was a critic of subsidiarity for this reason, and so his description should not be taken as definitive.
355. Van der Vyver, Sphere Sovereignty, supra note 98, at 655.
356. Mouw, supra note 29, at 93.
357. Stackhouse, supra note 95, at xv.
358. See Sigmund, supra note 205, at 213;
359. see also Patrick McKinley Brennan, Differentiating Church and State (Without Losing the Church), 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 22) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1125441 ("In common parlance, . . . one hears that subsidiarity is the principle that ruling power should devolve to the lower levels at which it can be exercised effectively. In Catholic social doctrine, however, subsidiarity means what [Jacques] Maritain refers to as the pluralist principle: Plural societies and their respective authorities must be respected.").
360. See Woldring, supra note 154, at 186-87 (concluding that "the differences between subsidiarity and sphere sovereignty are in fact quite marginal").
361. See, e.g., James D. Bratt, Abraham Kuyper: Puritan, Victorian, Modern, in RELIGION, PLURALISM, AND PUBLIC LIFE: ABRAHAM KUYPER'S-LEGACY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 29, at 3, 19-20.
362. See, e.g., Mouw, supra note 29, at 100-01.
363. KUYPER, LECTURES, supra note 27, at 107.
364. Id. (quotations and citation omitted).
365. Id. at 108 (emphasis omitted).
366. Id. at 97.
367. Id. at 108.
368. BERGER & NEUHAUS, supra note 196, at 4 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
369. 2 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 185, at 108-09.
370. See id. at 103 ("The Americans have combated by free institutions the tendency of equality to keep men asunder, and they have subdued it.").
371. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923);
372. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
373. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: "The Fundamental Right" That Dare Not Speak its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1931 (2004).
374. See, e.g., Appiah, supra note 100, at 2388-89 (suggesting that sphere sovereignty "is an idea one of whose applications is federalism").
375. See, e.g., David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooky's City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 487 passim (1999);
376. David J. Barron, The Promise of Tribe's City: Self-Government, the Constitution, and a New Urban Age, 42 TULSA L. REV. 811, 812 (2008) (arguing, through the work of Laurence Tribe, for "an important constitutional vision in which urban centers are central to securing the kind of self-government that, at bottom, our founding charter is intended to promote");
377. David J. Barron, Why (and When) Cities Have a Stake in Enforcing the Constitution, 115 YALE L.J. 2218 passim (2006);
378. Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1113-17 (1980);
379. Richard C. Schragger, The Limits of Localism, 100 MICH. L. REV. 371, 371-76 (2001).
380. See Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, supra note 15, at 1145 (arguing that First Amendment institutionalism still needs to be legitimated as a "theoretically grounded alternative to current First Amendment doctrine").
381. See, e.g., Garnett, Do Churches Matter?, supra note 21, at 293.
382. Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 869, 870 (1988);
383. see also Cover, supra note 71, at n.36;
384. John Griffiths, What is Legal Pluralism?, 24 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1 (1986);
385. Bernard Roberts, Note, The Common Law Sovereignty of Religious Lawfinders and the Free Exercise Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 211, 217 n.31 (1991).
386. Wolterstorff, The Things That Are Not Caesar's, supra note 25, at 6.
387. For the same general concept, put in Kuyperian terms, see Spykman, supra note 110, at 167 ("Each sphere has its own identity, its own unique task, its own God-given prerogatives. On each God has conferred its own peculiar right of existence and reason for existence.").
388. Post, supra note 55, at 1280-81.
389. KUYPER, LECTURES, supra note 27, at 107 (emphasis omitted).
390. Cover, supra note 71, at 51.
391. KUYPER, LECTURES, supra note 27, at 91.
392. See also supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text (contrasting his earlier discussion of sphere sovereignty, which seems to allow for an almost limitless number of spheres, with the discussion of sphere sovereignty in his Princeton lectures, which suggests the existence of a smaller and more distinct number of spheres).
393. KUYPER, LECTURES, supra note 27, at 97.
394. Schauer, Institutional First Amendment, supra note 53, at 1274.
395. I assume, for now, that courts would employ these principles in deciding questions involving First Amendment institutions. For more discussion on this point, see, for example, Hamilton, Religious Institutions, supra note 100, at 1195-97 (arguing, in the course of opposing religious autonomy altogether, that courts are ill-suited to make such determinations).
396. See also Mark Tushnet, Defending a Rule of Institutional Autonomy on "No-Harm" Grounds, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1375, 1383 (responding that the arguments for institutional autonomy are more plausible than Hamilton recognizes, but suggesting that it is "a good idea to leave it up to legislatures to define the contours of the rules of institutional autonomy").
397. Schauer, Institutional First Amendment, supra note 53, at 1275.
398. Id. at 1274-75.
399. These are not Kuyper's views alone, however. Thus, Robert Post writes of the possibility of the Supreme Court refashioning First Amendment doctrine according to the "local and specific kinds of social practices" that are relevant to the broader purpose of serving the underlying values of the First Amendment. Post, supra note 55, at 1272.
400. Schauer, Institutions, supra note 33, at 1757 n.51.
401. Schauer, Institutional First Amendment, supra note 53, at 1276-77.
402. See Mark Tushnet, Defending a Rule of Institutional Autonomy on "No-Harm" Grounds, supra at note 238, at 1381 & n. 17 (suggesting that arguments for autonomy for religious institutions may overlap with arguments for autonomy for "families or other nongovernmental organizations").
403. See, e.g., Siebecker, Building a "New Institutional" Approach to Corporate Speech, supra note 81;
404. Siebecker, Corporate Speech, Securities Regulation, and an Institutional Approach to the First Amendment, supra note 84;
405. Blocher, supra note 6.
406. Brady, supra note 22, at 1710.
407. See supra note 145 and accompanying text (noting evidence that Kuyper's concern for liberty of conscience extended beyond Christian sects, such as to Judaism and non-religious individuals).
408. KUYPER, LECTURES, supra note 27, at 99.
409. See, e.g., Panel Discussion, Living With Privatization: At Work and in the Community, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1397, 1417 (2001) (remarks of Cathlin Baker) (describing the Kuyperian theory of pillarization, under which "each religious and/or moral community would have its own schools, hospitals, and social service agencies; each faith and its own institutions would constitute a pillar");
410. MONSMA & SOPER, supra note 145, at 61-62 (discussing the development and fate of pillarization in the Netherlands).
411. See Brady, supra note 22, at 1692-98 (arguing that because "the aspects of church administration that are quintessentially religious differ from group to group," particularly in a religiously diverse society such as the United States, "the only effective and workable protection for the ability of religious groups to preserve, transmit, and develop their beliefs free from government interference is a broad right of church autonomy that extends to all aspects of church affairs").
412. Cf. EEOC v. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d 455, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (stating that churches have "a constitutional right of autonomy in [their] own domain").
413. KUYPER, LECTURES, supra note 27, at 106.
414. See, e.g., Wolterstorff, The Things That Are Not Caesar's, supra note 25, at 18 (arguing that Kuyper would regard our understanding of the Establishment Clause "as founded on untenable assumptions and hopelessly confused").
415. See infra Part V.E.
416. KUYPER, LECTURES, supra note 27, at 106.
417. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 12, at 1061.
418. See Perry Dane, "Omalous" Autonomy, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1715, 1733-34.
419. 80 U.S. 679 (1871).
420. Id. at 728.
421. See id. at 729.
422. Id. at 725.
423. Id. at 727.
424. KENT GREENAWALT, 1 RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS 265 (2006).
425. Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 447 (1969).
426. Id. at 449.
427. GREENAWALT, supra note 263, at 267.
428. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 429 U.S. 696 (1976).
429. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
430. See, e.g., Arlin M. Adams & William R. Hanlon, Jones v. Wolf: Church Autonomy and the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1291 (1980);
431. Ira Mark Ellman, Driven From the Tribunal: Judicial Resolution of Internal Church Disputes, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1378 (1981);
432. John Garvey, Churches and the Free Exercise of Religion, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 567 (1990);
433. Louis J. Sirico, Jr., Church Property Disputes: Churches as Secular and Alien Institutions, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 335 (1986).
434. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990).
435. Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law? The Constitutionality of the Ministerial Exemption from Antidiscrimination Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1965, 1987 (2007);
436. see also Hamilton, Religious Institutions, supra note 100, at 1162-63 (characterizing the "neutral principles" approach as sounding in utilitarianism rather than church autonomy);
437. Jane Rutherford, Equality as the Primary Constitutional Value: The Case for Applying Employment Laws to Religion, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1049, 1119 (1996) (characterizing both Jones and Smith as cases involving "governmental neutrality" and not church autonomy);
438. W. Cole Durham, Jr., Legal Structuring of Religious Institutions, in RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY OF IDENTITY, LIBERTY, AND THE LAW, supra note 19, at 213, 220-21 (noting and criticizing this phenomenon).
439. See Dane, "Omalous" Autonomy, supra note 257;
440. see also Dane, The Varieties of Religious Autonomy, supra note 65.
441. Jones, 443 U.S. at 603-04.
442. See Dane, "Omalous" Autonomy, supra note 257, at 1743-44 ("What should be clear is that the neutral principles approach only makes sense ... in the context of an effort to effectuate a religious community's effort to specify the form that community should take through some type of private ordering. . . . [T]o confuse neutral principles of law with Smith's invocation of neutral, generally applicable law and, therefore, to employ it to reject claims of autonomy in the face of any secular and neutral regulatory regime ... is just flat wrong.");
443. see also Durham & Sewell, supra note 193, at 48 n.277 (same).
444. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2000).
445. See, e.g., Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1166 (4th Cir. 1985).
446. Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 304 (3d Cir. 2006).
447. See, e.g., Mark E. Chopko & Michael F. Moses, Freedom to Be a Church: Confronting Challenges to the Right of Church Autonomy, 3 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 387, 414 & n.200 (2005) (collecting cases).
448. See Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions, supra note 13, at 1521 nn. 142-45 and accompanying text (offering examples). Another issue in this area that has attracted considerable attention is whether the ministerial exemption is rooted in the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause, or both. In part because my sphere sovereignty-focused institutional reading of the Religion Clauses ultimately flows from both Clauses, I do not address that issue here.
449. For discussion and citation to representative positions on this issue, see Garnett, Religion and Group Rights, supra note 23, at 526-27 & nn.67-72.
450. For a position closer to my own, see Dane, supra note 257, at 1718-19 ("If the truth be told, institutional autonomy is, strictly speaking, neither a matter of free exercise nor of establishment; rather, it can most sensibly be understood as a distinct third rubric, grounded in the structural logic of the relation between the juridical expressions of religion and the state.").
451. See, e.g., Rutherford, supra note 271;
452. Corbin, supra note 271.
453. KUYPER, LECTURES, supra note 27, at 108.
454. Id. at 105.
455. Id. at 108.
456. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983) (upholding the denial of a tax exemption to a university that forbade interracial dating between students on religious grounds).
457. See generally Cover, supra note 71.
458. Although she does not mention Bob Jones, Laura Underkuffler's worries about church autonomy appear to stem from similar concerns.
459. See Laura S. Underkuffler, Thoughts on Smith and Religious-Group Autonomy, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1773.
460. See Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Group Autonomy: Further Reflections About What Is at Stake, 22 J.L. & RELIGION 153, 153 n.5 (2006-2007) [hereinafter Brady, Religious Group Autonomy].
461. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, The Voluntary Principle, Then and Now, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1593, 1613 (noting that courts often justify the ministerial exemption on the instrumental grounds of judicial incompetence, and disagreeing with this emphasis);
462. Brady, Religious Organizations and Free Exercise, supra note 22, at 1699-1706 (focusing on the contribution that religious groups make to democratic deliberation);
463. Brady, Religious Group Autonomy, supra note 285 (focusing on their contribution to the search for truth). This is an ungenerous characterization of Professor Brady's articles, whose broader argument is that our very inability to determine conclusively what is true or false requires a space for religious groups to contribute to this conversation, but it will serve for present purposes.
464. See, e.g., Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment, supra note 10;
465. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Governmental Power, supra note 72.
466. For a similar approach, see Patrick M. Garry, The Institutional Side of Religious Liberty: A New Model of the Establishment Clause, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1155.
467. KUYPER, LECTURES, supra note 27, at 97.
468. For such an argument, see, e.g., Rutherford, supra note 271.
469. KUYPER, LECTURES, supra note 27, at 108 (emphasis added).
470. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tutťle, Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1789, 1792.
471. See, e.g., Hamilton, Religious Institutions, supra note 100;
472. Marci A. Hamilton, Church Autonomy Is Not a Better Path to "Truth," 22 J.L. & RELIGION 215 (2006-2007);
473. Marci A. Hamilton, The Waterloo for the So-Called Church Autonomy Theory: Widespread Clergy Abuse and Institutional Cover-Up, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 225 (2007).
474. In addition to Lupu & Turtle's comprehensive and superb article, supra note 290,
475. see Symposium, The Impact of Clergy Sexual Misconduct Litigation on Religious Liberty, 44 B.C. L. REV. 947 (2003) and TIMOTHY D. LYTTON, HOLDING BISHOPS ACCOUNTABLE: HOW LAWSUITS HELPED THE CATHOLIC CHURCH CONFRONT CLERGY SEXUAL ABUSE (2008).
476. See, e.g., Lupu and Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our Constitutional Order, supra note 19;
477. Brady, Religious Organizations and Free Exercise, supra note 22;
478. Durham & Sewell, supra note 193, at 80.
479. See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, The Catholic Church and the Clergy Abuse Scandal: Act Three, Apr. 10, 2003, http://writ.news.findlaw. com/hamilton/20030410.html ("The so-called church autonomy doctrine is not really a legal doctrine at all ... . Rather, it is an insidious theory that invites religious licentiousness rather than civic responsibility.").
480. See KUYPER, LECTURES, supra note 27, at 97.
481. KUYPER, Sphere Sovereignty, supra note 106, at 468.
482. Some possible issues include broad questions of entity responsibility, the manner of selecting or monitoring religious officials, and questions of church structure and bankruptcy.
483. Lupu & Turtle, Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity, supra note 290, at 1816.
484. See, e.g., Nally v. Grace Cmty. Church of the Valley, 763 P.2d 948, 960 (Cal. 1988);
485. William W. Bassett, W. Cole Durham, Jr. & Robert T. Smith, 2 Religious Ass'ns & L. (West) § 8:19 n.9 (2007) (listing cases).
486. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
487. See Lupu & Turtle, Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity, supra note 290, at 1859-84;
488. see also Daryl L. Wiesen, Note, Following the Lead of Defamation: A Definitional Balancing Approach to Religious Torts, 105 YALE L.J. 291 (1995).
489. Lupu & Turtle, Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity, supra note 290, at 1860-61.
490. Id. at 1861.
491. 376 U.S. at 279-80.
492. Lupu & Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity, supra note 290, at 1862.
493. Id. at 1860.
494. See id. at 1864-65.
495. See supra Part V.B.I.
496. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990).
497. Id. at 877 (citations omitted).
498. See, e.g., Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 349 (5th Cir. 1999), EEOC v. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d 455, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
499. See, e.g., Brady, Religious Organizations and Free Exercise, supra note 22;
500. Dane, supra note 257.
501. But see Laura S. Underkuffler, Thoughts on Smith and Religious-Group Autonomy, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1773, 1775 n.11 (arguing that none of the cases cited in Smith with respect to religious group autonomy "dealt with the central question in Smith, that is, religious exemptions from 'otherwise neutral' state laws").
502. Schauer, Institutions, supra note 33, at 1756.
503. See Brady, Religious Organizations and Free Exercise, supra note 22, at 1675-76.
504. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990).
505. See id. at 878.
506. See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Prot. Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
507. See, e.g., Ronald R. Garet, Three Concepts of Church Autonomy, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1349, 1364-67.
508. KUYPER, LECTURES, supra note 27, at 97 (emphasis omitted).
509. Id.
510. Van der Vyver, Sphere Sovereignty, supra note 98, at 662.
511. Wolterstorff, The Things That Are Not Caesar's, supra note 25, at 18.
512. See, e.g., FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS, THE RHETORIC OF CHURCH AND STATE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF RELIGION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 1 (1995) (collecting examples);
513. STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 3-4 (1995) (same).
514. A third category-the interaction of the Establishment Clause and the regime of tax laws and tax exemptions-will have to await another article.
515. Wolterstorff, The Things That Are Not Caesar's, supra note 25, at 18;
516. see also Kobes, supra note 95.
517. KUYPER, LECTURES, supra note 27, at 106.
518. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002);
519. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
520. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652;
521. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 810.
522. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch. Dist., 533 U.S. 98 (2001);
523. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993);
524. Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 220 (2004).
525. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
526. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
527. See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005);
528. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
529. KUYPER, LECTURES, supra note 27, at 107.
530. See, e.g., Brady, Religious Organizations and Free Exercise, supra note 22, at 1700-04.
531. Id. at 1704;
532. see also Bradley, supra note 12, at 1084-87.
533. KUYPER, LECTURES, supra note 27, at 105-06 (emphasis omitted).
534. See, e.g., FEC v. Akin, 524 U.S. 11, 23 (1998);
535. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 180 (1974);
536. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 228 (1974).
537. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 105-06 (1968) ("[A] taxpayer will have standing consistent with Article III to invoke federal judicial power when he alleges that congressional action under the taxing and spending clause is in derogation of those constitutional provisions which operate to restrict the exercise of the taxing and spending power.").
538. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 348 (2006) (discussing the Court's "narrow application" of Flast).
539. 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007).
540. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Ball on a Needle: Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. and the Future of Establishment Clause Adjudication, 2008 BYU L. REV. 115.
541. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2566.
542. Id. at 2579, 2584 (Scalia, J., concurring).
543. Esbeck, Restraint on Governmental Power, supra note 72, at 36.
544. See generally Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Legal Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
545. Esbeck, supra note 72, at 2.
546. Id. at 40.
547. Cover, supra note 71, at 68.