God's bridle: John calvin's application of natural law

Journal of Law and Religion

Volumn 22, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 225-254

  Pryor, C Scott ^a  

^a REGENT UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 84909374799     PISSN: 07480814     EISSN: 21633088     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S074808140000326X     Document Type: Article

References (199)

1. See J. Stanley McQuade & Richard T. Bowser, Marketing Natural Law: An Over-Debated and Undersold Product, 27 Campbell L. Rev. 187, 188 (2005) [hereinafter McQuade & Bower, Marketing Natural Law] (“There has been a considerable resurgence of interest in Natural Law theory among lawyers in general….”).
2. Brian Bix, On the Dividing Line Between Natural Law Theory and Legal Positivism, 75 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1613, 1614 (2000).
3. Thomas C. Folsom, The Restatement of the Obvious: Or, What's Right Got To Do With It? Reflections on a Business Ethic for Our Times, 16 Regent U. L. Rev. 301, 315 (2004).
4. J. Budziszewski, Written on the Heart: The Case for Natural Law (InterVaristy Press 1997) [hereinafter Budziszewski, Written on the Heart].
5. John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford U. Press 1980).
6. Robert P. George, In Defense of Natural Law (Oxford U. Press 1999).
7. Russell Hittinger, The First Grace: Rediscovering the Natural Law in a Post-Christian World (ISI Books 2003) [hereinafter Hittinger, The First Grace].
8. See e.g. Peter M. Cicchino, Reason and the Rule of Law: Should Bare Assertions of “Public Morality” Qualify as Legitimate Government Interests for the Purposes of Equal Protection Review?, 87 Geo. L.J. 139, 157, 162, 164 (1998) (classifying the natural law jurisprudence of John Finnis as “theology” and “essentially the same [ ] as that made by the Roman Catholic Church”).
9. See e.g. Alf Ross, Validity and Conflict Between Legal Positivism and Natural Law, in Normativity and Norms: Critical Perspectives on Kelsenian Themes 147 (Stanley L. Paulson & Bonnie Paules eds., Oxford U. Press 1998).
10. See Stephen L. Carter, The Culture of Disbelief: How American Law and Politics Trivialize Religious Devotion 9 (BasicBooks 1993) (“[O]ur public culture more and more prefers religion as something without political significance, less an independent moral force than a quietly irrelevant moralizer, never heard, rarely seen.”).
11. See generally H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (2d ed., Oxford U. Press 1994).
12. See e.g. Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 3–4 (5th ed., Aspen L. & Bus. 1998) (“The task of economics … is to explore the implications of assuming that man is a rational maximizer of his ends in life, his satisfactions—what we shall call his ‘self-interest.’”)
13. Richard A. Posner, Legal Reasoning from the Top Down and the Bottom Up: The Question of Unenumerated Constitutional Rights, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 433 (1992) (rejecting policy (“top down”) arguments in constitutional interpretation because they are indeterminate).
14. See e.g. Hittinger, The First Grace, U. Chi. L. Rev, at xvi (“Yves Simon has usefully proposed that the theories and ideologies of natural law seek to discover or assert the ‘prior premises’ of human law.”).
15. A number of sets of such premises have been deployed in the Western world. Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), Hittinger describes the currently reigning paradigm—maximal individual autonomy: “the Casey Court folds the positive law into the principle of a natural right.
16. The absence of legislative power [e.g., to regulate abortion] is established by the right of the individual to be self-norming.” Hittinger, The First Grace, U.S, at xxxii (emphasis added). Yet, individual autonomy is not and certainly has not been the only premise of legal evaluation. Natural law in one form or another has a far longer pedigree in the West as the source of law's prior premises.
17. Harold Berman is one of the few exceptions to the general rule that Protestant legal academics fail to make significant use of the concept of natural law. See e.g. Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution, II: The Impact of the Protestant Reformations on the Western Legal Tradition (Harv. U. Press 2003).
18. See e.g. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Law and Economics: An Apologia, in Christian Perspectives On Legal Thought 208, 212 (Yale U. Press 2001) (“To be clear, I am not arguing that a godly society promotes wealth maximization at all costs.”).
19. Id. at 223 (“[A] Christian legal scholar may rely on both positive and normative economic analysis with confidence that it is both a powerful analytic tool and one that is consistent with his or her walk with God.”).
20. See e.g. Karl Barth, No!, in Natural Theology 65 (Peter Fraenkel trans., The Centenary Press 1946) [hereinafter Barth, No!]
21. August Lang, The Reformation and Natural Law, in Calvin and the Reformation: Four Studies 56 (William Park Armstrong ed., Fleming H. Revell Co. 1909).
22. See e.g. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics IV. 1 140 (T & T Clark 1932)
23. See also Jacques Ellul, The Theological Foundation of Law 8 (Seabury Press 1960) (“[T]he incredible difficulties this new natural law must face … are, in my opinion, insurmountable.”). Other Protestant theologians have largely ignored the topic of natural law.
24. See e.g. Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology (Scribner's 1871)
25. Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology (W.B. Eerdmans Pub 1938)
26. Thomas C. Oden, Systematic Theology (Harper & Row 1989)
27. Wayne Grudem, Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Biblical Doctrine (Zondervan Publg. House 1994).
28. Samuel W. Calhoun, Grounding Normative Assertions: Arthur Lejf's Still Irrefutable, But Incomplete. “Sez Who?” Critique, 20 J.L. & Religion 31 (2004–2005)
29. William J. Stuntz, Book Review: Christian Legal Theory, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1707 (2003) (reviewing Christian Perspectives on Legal Thought).
30. Budziszewski, Written on the Heart, Harv. L. Rev, at 95–133 (John Locke), 207–212 (John Calvin & Martin Luther).
31. See e.g. Hittinger, The First Grace, Harv. L. Rev, at xli-xliii (connecting Pope John Paul II's teaching about “participated theonomy” in his 1993 encyclical Veritatis Splendor with the Dutch Reformed doctrine of “sphere sovereignty” articulated by Abraham Kuyper in his Lectures on Calvinism delivered at Princeton in 1898).
32. Despite the substantial efforts by the Worldwide Lutheran Federation and the Roman Catholic Church culminating in The Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification in 1999, the competing understandings of justification have not been resolved. See Ted M. Dorman, The Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification: Retrospect and Prospects, 44 J. Evangelical Theol. Socy. 421 (2001).
33. The choice of John Calvin (1509–64) as opposed to, say, Martin Luther, is not arbitrary. The theological and cultural influence of Calvin far exceeded that of any other reformer. See e.g. Philip Benedict, Christ's Churches Purely Reformed: A Social History of Calvinism xv (Yale U. Press 2002) (“Although Martin Luther towered over the initial decades of the Reformation, Calvinism superseded Lutheranism within a generation as the most dynamic and widely established form of European Protestantism.”).
34. John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion (John T. McNeill ed., Ford Lewis Battles trans., Westminster Press 1960) (1559) [hereinafter Calvin, Institutes].
35. See e.g. Calvin, Institutes Institutes of the Christian Religion, at I.xvi.3 (“law of nature”), II.ii.22, II.viii.I, IV.xx. 16 (“natural law”).
36. See also Susan E. Schreiner, The Theater of His Glory: Nature and Natural Order in the Thought of John Calvin 77 (Labyrinth Press 1991) [hereinafter Schreiner, Theater of His Glory]
37. See infra text accompanying nn. 126 & 140.
38. See also I. John Hesselink, Calvin's Concept of the Law 52 (Pickwick Publications 1992) [hereinafter Hesselink, Calvin's Concept of Law] (citing references to natural law in Calvin's commentaries)
39. Arthur C. Cochrane, Natural Law in Calvin, in Church-State Relations in Ecumenical Perspective 176, 181 (Elwyn A. Smith ed., Duquesne U. Press 1966) [hereinafter Cochrane, Church-State Relations] Calvin's writings, especially his commentaries on the Pentateuch and his sermons on the Book of Deuteronomy and the Book of Job, are so full of references to ius naturae, lex naturae, ordo naturae, sensus naturae, communis sensus, to conscience, reason and experience, that the subject [of natural law] cannot be brusquely dismissed.
40. Drawing on Calvin's works, I have concluded that he had a positive view of natural law. See infra text accompanying nn. 124–142.
41. This conclusion has been contested. See e.g. Karl Barth, No!, infra. In addition to Calvin himself, my position finds support among a number of well-regarded contemporary scholars.
42. See e.g. Richard A. Muller, The Unaccomodated Calvin: Studies in the Foundation of a Theological Tradition (Oxford U. Press 2000)
43. Susan E. Schreiner, Calvin's Use of Natural Law, in A Preserving Grace: Protestants, Catholics, and Natural Law 51 (Michael Cromartie ed., W.B. Eerdmans Publg. Co. 1997).
44. A.P. d'Entrèves, Natural Law: An Introduction to Legal Philosophy 9–10 (Hutchinson's U. Lib. 1951) [hereinafter d'Entrèves, Natural Law].
45. Hittinger, The First Grace, Natural Law: An Introduction to Legal Philosophy, at 3.
46. Id. at 14–15. We will see that grounded natural law in providence will be an important point of contact between the understandings of Hittinger and Calvin.
47. See infra text accompanying nn. 104–123.
48. Hittinger, The First Grace, infra, at 14.
49. Id. at xvi.
50. Id. at 4 (noting that natural law can be described from the perspectives of order in nature (natural law as the external-empirical) and order in the human mind (natural law as the internal-subjective)).
51. See infra n. 90 for Calvin's agreement with the priority of order in the divine mind.
52. Hittinger, The First Grace, infra, at 5.
53. Id. at 40
54. The title of Hittinger's book is taken from the so-called Second Council of Aries (c. 473) in which natural law is for the first time so described. Id. at xi.
55. While Hittinger castigates Protestants who too quickly deny the efficacy of natural law due to an overemphasis on an “epistemology of sin,” he agrees that the overemphasis on the orders of nature and the human mind by secularists and some contemporary Catholic writers is “contrary to the gospel.” Id. at 33–34.
56. Hittinger devotes a full chapter to grounding natural law as the ordinance of a divine lawgiver, not the autonomous imposition of the human mind on a uninterpreted natural order. Id. at 39–62.
57. Budziszewski, Written on the Heart, Id, at 179–186 (concluding with the remark that “[o]ur analysis must be anchored in God's Word.”). Subsequent to writing Written on the Heart, Budziszewski was received into the Roman Catholic Church.
58. See Ignatius Insight, Objections, Obstacles, Acceptance: Interview with J. Budziszewski, http://www.ignatiusinsight.com/features2005/jbudziszewski_intl_feb05.asp (Feb. 2005) (originally printed in 14 Cath. World Rpt. 50 (Jan. 2005)).
59. Budziszewski, Written on the Heart, Objections, Obstacles, Acceptance: Interview with J. Budziszewski, at 180 (“In contrast to special revelation, provided by God to the community of faith, this may be called general revelation because it is provided by God to all mankind.”) (emphasis in original).
60. Budziszewski acknowledges five forms of general revelation: “(1) the testimony of creation …; (2) the fact that we are made in the image of God …; (3) the facts of our physical and emotional design …; (4) the law of conscience …; (5) the order of causality.” Id. at 180–181.
61. Id. at 181. Budziszewski's emphasis on the conscience corresponds most closely to Hittinger's category of order in the human mind. Budziszewski also identifies categories of natural revelation that correspond to the category of order in nature. While he doesn't identify a category like order in the divine mind, there can be little doubt that Budziszewski believes such to be the case.
62. Id. at 182.
63. Id. at 183 (“[I]t is a far cry from knowing something to acknowledging it, and the human race has been in the condition psychologists call ‘denial’ ever since the Fall. Acknowledging what we really know is now an act of faith.”).
64. Id. at 184.
65. Id. at 183–184
66. See Paul Helm, John Calvin's Ideas 2 (Oxford U. Press 2004) [hereinafter Helm, Calvin's Ideas] (“[R]esearch into the medieval tradition, particularly into the world of late medieval Augustinianism,… shows it to be much more multiform than previously thought and to contain strands congenial to the incipient Reform movement….”).
67. See generally id. at 1–2 (repudiating Calvin as the rejecter of Catholic medieval traditions).
68. See Kenneth Scott Latourette, A History of Christianity: Reformation to the Present vol. 2, 751 (Hendrickson Publishers 1999) (originally published 1953).
69. See d'Entrèves, Natural Law, A History of Christianity: Reformation to the Present, at 39 (“Although Thomist philosophy was at first bitterly opposed by contemporary schools of thought, it finally won die battle. It has remained ever since the most authoritative expression of what may well be called the Catholic view of life.”).
70. See I.C. Brady, Scholasticism, in 12 New Catholic Encyclopedia 757, 761 (Bernard L. Marthaler et al. eds., Thomson/Gale 2003) (“For Thomas Aquinas, the basic problem was to discover how as a Christian scholar he could order anew the whole structure of Christian wisdom in such a way that pagan [Aristotelian] philosophy would be made tributary to the Christian faith.”).
71. See Thomas Aquinas, On the Truth of the Catholic Faith: Summa Contra Gentiles 1.7 (Anton C. Pegis trans., Image Books 1955) (1259–64)
72. See also William C. Placher, A History of Christian Theology: An Introduction 153 (The Westminster Press 1983) [hereinafter Placher, A History of Christian Theology] (“If Thomas distinguished between truths known through reason and those known through revelation, he did not think that reason and revelation can ever contradict each other, since both come from God…. Revelation … does not contradict revelation but adds to it.”).
73. See generally R.S. Clark, Calvin on the Lex Naturalis, 1998 Stulos Theol. J. 1, 3–4.
74. See e.g. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica Ia.3.5, Ia.5.1, Ia.5.2 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Christian Classics 1948) (1273) [hereinafter Aquinas, S.T].
75. Id. at Ia.91.1–2. See also J.A. Weisheipl, Thomism, in 14 New Catholic Encyclopedia 40, 42 (Bernard L. Marthaler et al. eds., 2d ed., Thomson/Gale 2003) (“The unique substantial form of man is his rational soul….”)
76. Heiko Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology: Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval Nominalism 90 (W.B. Eerdmans Pubg. Co. 1967) [hereinafter Oberman, Medieval Harvest]
77. See infra text accompanying n. 84.
78. See Allen Verhey, Natural Law in Aquinas and Calvin, in God and the Good 80, 84 (Clifton Orlebeke & Lewis Smedes eds., W.B. Eerdmans 1975) (“Both Thomas and Calvin see the natural law as dependent on a reality of meaning and value built into the world by God's purposeful creating and sustaining power…. [F]or both the wisdom of God establishes the purposes of God. They are not merely a matter of arbitrary will.”).
79. See Aquinas, S.T., God and the Good, 2a.91.1 (citing Proverbs 8:23 for the etemality of divine law).
80. See T.H.L. Parker, John Calvin: A Biography 11 (Westminster Press 1975) [hereinafter Parker, Biography] (“Terminist logic was … concerned with the analysis of language, or rather, with the analysis of the relationship between language about objects, the mental conception of the object, and the object itself.”).
81. See John Kilcullen, Natural Law and Will in Ockham, in A Translation of William of Ockham's Work of Ninety Days vol. 2, 851 (John Kilcullen & John Scott trans., Edwin Mellen Press 2001).
82. See David VanDrunen, The Context of Natural Law: John Calvin's Doctrine of the Two Kingdoms, 46 J. Church & St. 503, 506, 508–509 (2004) [hereinafter VanDrunen, Context of Natural Law] (“The traditional division of late medieval theology into two distinct and competing schools, the realist, intellectualist via antiqua and the nominalist, voluntarist via moderna is familiar to scholars of this period.”).
83. See Alister E. McGrath, A Life of John Calvin: A Study in the Shaping of Western Culture 21–50 (Basil Blackwell 1990) [hereinafter McGrath, Life]
84. Parker, Biography, A Life of John Calvin: A Study in the Shaping of Western Culture, at 10–12.
85. Calvin was certainly not illogical; he freely used the Aristotelian categories of “cause” where helpful. See e.g. Calvin, Institutes, A Life of John Calvin: A Study in the Shaping of Western Culture, at III.xiv.21
86. John Calvin, Commentary on the Epistles of Paul to the Galatians and Ephesians 201 (Ages Software 1998) (1548) (commenting on Ephesians 1:5).
87. Calvin, Institutes, Commentary on the Epistles of Paul to the Galatians and Ephesians, at I.i.1.
88. See Dewey J. Hoitenga, Jr., Faith and Reason from Plato to Plantinga: An Introduction to Reformed Epistemology 143–174 (SUNY Press 1991) [hereinafter Hoitenga, Faith and Reason] (providing an extended account of Calvin's robust theory of knowledge).
89. Parker, Biography, Faith and Reason from Plato to Plantinga: An Introduction to Reformed Epistemology, at 12.
90. Calvin, Institutes, Faith and Reason from Plato to Plantinga: An Introduction to Reformed Epistemology, at III.xxiii.2.
91. See Helm, Calvin's Ideas, Faith and Reason from Plato to Plantinga: An Introduction to Reformed Epistemology, at 117 (“Calvin repeatedly denies that his view of providence requires that God be understood, in accordance with that ‘Sarbonic dogma’, as pure will …; rather, in God will and wisdom are inseparably united in one simple essence.”).
92. Aquinas, S.T., Faith and Reason from Plato to Plantinga: An Introduction to Reformed Epistemology, at Ia.25.3 (“All confess that God is omnipotent; but it seems difficult to explain in what His omnipotence consists ….”).
93. Aquinas, S.T., Faith and Reason from Plato to Plantinga: An Introduction to Reformed Epistemology, at Ia.25.5.
94. Hittinger, The First Grace, Faith and Reason from Plato to Plantinga: An Introduction to Reformed Epistemology, at xxiii (“Thomas differs from modern philosophers who speak of inclination as mere physical appetition that provides the material for instrumental reason—reason as the slave of the passions.”).
95. Aquinas, S. T., Faith and Reason from Plato to Plantinga: An Introduction to Reformed Epistemology, at Ia.25.3.
96. See Oberman, Medieval Harvest, Faith and Reason from Plato to Plantinga: An Introduction to Reformed Epistemology, at 36.
97. Oberman, Medieval Harvest, Faith and Reason from Plato to Plantinga: An Introduction to Reformed Epistemology, at 110.
98. Peter A. Lillback, The Binding of God: Calvin's Role in the Development of Covenant Theology 46–48 (Baker Academic 2001) [hereinafter Lillback, Binding of God].
99. See also Oberman, Medieval Harvest, The Binding of God: Calvin's Role in the Development of Covenant Theology, at 245–246
100. See e.g. David C. Steinmetz, Calvin in Context 40–50 (Oxford U. Press 1995)
101. Anna Case-Winters, God's Power: Traditional Understandings and Contemporary Challenges 41–46 (Westminster/J. Kjiox Press 1990).
102. See generally Lillback, Binding of God, God's Power: Traditional Understandings and Contemporary Challenges.
103. Lillback, Binding of God, God's Power: Traditional Understandings and Contemporary Challenges, at 141 (“[T]he covenant for Calvin implies the self-binding of God through His Word of promise whereby He has chosen or adopted a people for Himself).
104. See Schreiner, Theater of His Glory, God's Power: Traditional Understandings and Contemporary Challenges, at 34
105. See also Helm, Calvin's Ideas, God's Power: Traditional Understandings and Contemporary, at 312–323.
106. But see McGrath, Life, God's Power: Traditional Understandings and Contemporary, at 169 (“God is not a law unto himself, nor is he above the law (ex lex)
107. rather, his will is the foundation of existing conceptions of morality. [Calvin, Institutes] III.xxiii.2. These terse statements represent one of Calvin's clearest affinities with the late medieval voluntarist tradition.”). Unfortunately, McGrath leaves out the following line from the same section of the Institutes that undercuts his attribution of voluntarism to Calvin: “And we do not advocate the fiction of ‘absolute might’; because this is profane, it ought rightly to be hateful to us. We fancy no lawless god who is a law unto himself.” Calvin's rejection of voluntarism could hardly be more clear.
108. John Calvin, Concerning the Eternal Predestination of God 179 (J.K.S. Reid trans., paperback ed., J. Clarke 1982) (1552).
109. John Calvin, Sermon on Job Ixxxvii (on Job 23:1–7), in Corpus Reformatorum XXXIV: Johannis Calvini Opera quae supersunt omnia 339
110. quoted in Calvin, Institutes, Corpus Reformatorum XXXIV: Johannis Calvini Opera quae supersunt omnia, at I.xvii.2 n. 7.
111. Schreiner, Theater of His Glory, Corpus Reformatorum XXXIV: Johannis Calvini Opera quae supersunt omnia, at 78 (“Calvin carefully maintained that in God's superiority to natural law his power is always conjoined with his justice.”) (footnote omitted).
112. See John Calvin, Commentary on the Gospel According to John 21 (Ages Software 1998) (1553) where Calvin writes with respect to Augustine's realistic epistemology: Augustine, who is excessively addicted to the philosophy of Plato, is carried along, according to custom, to the doctrine of ideas; that before God made the world, he had the form of the whole building conceived in his mind; and so the life of those things which did not yet exist was in Christ, because the creation of the world was appointed in him. But how widely different this is from the intention of the Evangelist we shall immediately see.
113. Here too we see that Calvin was closer to Thomas, who freely acknowledged the serious impact of sin on human reasoning (see Aquinas, S.T., Commentary on the Gospel According to John, at IIa.85.3) than to Thomas's nominalistic successors
114. see Oberman, Medieval Harvest, Commentary on the Gospel According to John, at 128–131. As Paul Helm puts it: [O]ne cannot fail to be struck by a number of evident similarities and equally evident dissimilarities between [Aquinas'] position and Calvin's. … We must make a broad and rough distinction between [1] the ontological status of natural law, what natural law is, [2] its epistemological status, how it is known, and [3] thirdly, how it is to be applied. The relation between Aquinas and Calvin might roughly be expressed as one of considerable agreement about the first, of some disagreement about the second, and agreement about the third.
115. Helm, Calvin's Ideas, Commentary on the Gospel According to John, at 370.
116. See Calvin, Institutes, Commentary on the Gospel According to John, at II.xii.4 (“Of course I admit that in the original order of creation and the unfallen state of nature Christ was set over angels and men as their Head.”).
117. See generally Hesselink, Calvin's Concept of Law, Commentary on the Gospel According to John, at 69.
118. Calvin, Institutes, Commentary on the Gospel According to John, at II.i.11.
119. Calvin, Institutes, Commentary on the Gospel According to John, at II.i.9.
120. Id. at II.i.8.
121. See Hoitenga, Faith and Reason, Id, at 151 (“For [Calvin] the ontological status of human nature and of the universe in which that nature has a place is confirmed by the revelation of God in Scripture, according to which both are objective realities that God created distinct from himself.”) (emphasis in original).
122. William F. Keesecker, The Law in John Calvin's Ethics, in Calvin and Christian Ethics 19, 20 (Peter De Klerk ed., Calvin Study Socy. 1987).
123. See also David Little, Calvin and the Prospects for a Christian Theory of Natural Law, in Norm and Context in Christian Ethics 175 (Gene H. Outka & Paul Ramsey eds., C. Scribner's Sons 1968) [hereinafter Little, Prospects] (“Calvin's reflection on these matters begins with the theological assumption that all experience is ordered according to a divine design.”).
124. See also Guenther H. Haas, The Concept of Equity in Calvin's Ethics 71 (Wilfrid Laurier U. Press 1997) [hereinafter Haas, The Concept of Equity] (“For Calvin the true moral law originates from God, not nature. It is not transparently clear to human rational ability alone”).
125. Calvin, Institutes, The Concept of Equity in Calvin's Ethics, at I.xiv.20.
126. Id. at II.ii.13.
127. See also Haas, The Concept of Equity, The Concept of Equity in Calvin's Ethics, at 76 (“Calvin the person outside of Christ does have some knowledge of the equity of natural law…. But Calvin insists that it is God who implants this ‘natural light of righteousness’ in the human heart.” (emphasis in original).
128. Calvin, Institutes, The Concept of Equity in Calvin's Ethics, at II.xii.1.
129. Id. at I.iii.1.
130. Id. at I.iii.3. Compare Calvin with nominalist Gabriel Biel who, according to Heiko Oberman, held that “knowledge [about God] is originally acquired by experience or abstraction … and is not per se nota.”
131. Oberman, Medieval Harvest, Id, at 40 (emphasis in original).
132. See Carl F.H. Henry, God, Revelation and Authority vol. 2, 136 (Word Books 1976) (“However serious its consequences and however far-reaching its effects, the fall of man … did not involve man's total loss of knowledge of God, nor of his rational competence or ethical accountability.”).
133. Calvin, Institutes, God, Revelation and Authority, at II.ii.12 (“Since reason … by which man distinguishes between good and evil, and by which he understands and judges, is a natural gift, it could not be completely wiped out…. Similarly the will, because it is inseparable from man's nature, did not perish ….”).
134. Id. at I.xvi.1.
135. Id. at I.xvi.4–6.
136. Id. at II.viii.1 (“Now that inward law, which we have above described as written, even engraved, upon the hearts of all, in a sense asserts the very same things that are to be learned from the two Tables.”).
137. See Helm, Calvin's Ideas, Id, at 373
138. Calvin, Institutes, Id, at I.xvi.1.
139. John Calvin, Commentary Upon the Book of Psalms 146 (Ages Software 1998) (1563).
140. Calvin, Institutes, God, Revelation and Authority, at I.xvi.4 (“[P]rovidence means … that by which, as keeper of the keys, he governs all events.”). Calvin does not posit a passive attitude toward creation; rather, as Paul Helm describes it: “Creation, for Calvin, is of different kinds of things, for God ‘endowed each kind with its own nature, assigned functions, [and] appointed places and stations,’ kinds of things that have different and distinctive sets of powers, such as the power to propagate.”
141. Helm, Calvin's Ideas, God, Revelation and Authority, at 99 (footnote omitted).
142. Calvin, Institutes, God, Revelation and Authority, at II.i.5.
143. Id. at I.xvii.1.
144. Id. at I.xvii.2.
145. Id. at II.ii.12.
146. Id. at II.ii.17.
147. Id. (“To sum it up: We see among all mankind that reason is proper to our nature; it distinguishes us from brute beasts ….”).
148. Id. at II.ii.16, Id (“[W]e ought not to forget those most excellent benefits of the divine Spirit, which he distributes to whomever he will, for the common good of mankind.”).
149. See also Hesselink, Calvin's Concept of Law, Id, at 70–71 (“Calvin's high evaluation of natural law and his acknowledgement of natural human achievement in several significant areas is not based on humanity's inherent goodness or worth but on God's grace.”).
150. Calvin, Institutes, Id, at II.ii.12.
151. Calvin, Institutes, Id, at II.ii.12 (“When we so condemn human understanding for its perpetual blindness as to leave it no perception of any object whatever, we not only go against God's Word, but also run counter to the experience of common sense.”).
152. Id. at II.ii.13.
153. John Calvin, Commentary on the Book of Genesis 135 (Ages Software 1998) (1554) (“[M]an is a social animal, and all naturally desire mutual intercourse ….”).
154. See Cochrane, Church-State Relations, Commentary on the Book of Genesis, at 189 (“Calvin finds the origin and basis of all offices involving superiority and subordination not in the Fall, but in the order of nature.”).
155. Calvin, Institutes, Commentary on the Book of Genesis, at II.ii.14–15.
156. Id. at II.ii.16.
157. Id. at II.ii.25.
158. Id. at II.ii.24.
159. Id. at II.ii.13.
160. See Samuel Pufendorf, De jure naturae et gentium libri octo 205 (C.H. & W.A. Oldfather trans., The Clarendon Press 1934) (1688) (“There seems to us no more fitting and direct way to learn the law of nature than through careful consideration of the nature, condition, and desires of man himself”).
161. See John Calvin, Commentaries on the Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Romans 96–97 (Ages Software 1998) (1540) (Since then all nations, of themselves and without a monitor, are disposed to make laws for themselves, it is beyond all question evident that they have some notions of justice and rectitude … and which are implanted by nature in the hearts of men.”).
162. Calvin, Institutes, Commentaries on the Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Romans, at II.iii.6.
163. But see Calvin, Commentary on Romans, Commentaries on the Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Romans, at 96–97 where he asserts that the word “heart” as used in Romans 2:15 is not to be identified with “the seat of affections, but only for the understanding. …”
164. See Hittinger, The First Grace, Commentaries on the Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Romans.
165. See Budziszewski, Written on the Heart, Commentaries on the Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Romans, at 184–186.
166. Calvin, Institutes, Commentaries on the Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Romans, at II.iii.3.
167. Id. at II.iii.4. Note that Calvin does not identify natural law as a prelapsarian (pre-fall) “grace” but simply as part of the creation order.
168. But see Id (Hittinger describing natural law as the “first grace”).
169. Calvin, Institutes, Id, at II.ii.15.
170. Id. at II.ii.24.
171. Calvin's doctrine of the “two kingdoms” explains his positive view of the natural law for ongoing civic (but not ecclesiastical) affairs. See Calvin, Institutes, Id, at III.xix.15.
172. See generally VanDrunen, Context of Natural Law, Id.
173. Calvin, Institutes, Id, at II.viii.1 (“Now that inward law, which we have above described as written, even engraved, upon the heart, in a sense asserts the very same things that are to be learned from the two Tables.” (emphasis added)). Calvin was apparently unwilling to assume a one-to-one relationship between the natural law and the Ten Commandments but did not spell out where they differed.
174. See also Haas, The Concept of Equity, Id, at 65 (“Natural law reveals His will, but because sin has affected our ability to perceive it, God gives clear witness to His will in the written law of scripture.” (footnote omitted)).
175. Calvin, Institutes, Id, at II.viii.1 (“But man is so shrouded in the darkness of errors that he hardly begins to grasp through this natural law what worship is acceptable to God…. Accordingly,… the Lord has provided us with a written law to give us a clearer witness of what was too obscure in the natural law. …”).
176. Calvin, Institutes, Id, at IV.xx.14. Given his legal training, Calvin was certainly well-acquainted with natural law.
177. See McGrath, Life, Id, at 58–62
178. John T. McNeill, Calvin on Civil Government, 42 J. Presbyerian Hist. 71 (1964) (“John Calvin [was] the son of a law clerk, a graduate in law, a classicist familiar with the political treatises of Plato and Aristotle, Cicero and Seneca ….”)
179. see generally Haas, The Concept of Equity, J. Presbyerian Hist., at 7–8 (discussing Calvin's legal studies at Orleans). Like Hittinger and Budziszewski, Calvin believed that natural law provided the contours for the laws of a civil polity, not the details.
180. See generally John Witte, Jr. & Robert M. Kingdon, Sex, Marriage, and Family in John Calvin's Geneva (W.B. Eerdmans Pub. Co. 2005) [hereinafter Witte & Kingdon, Sex, Marriage, and Family] (describing in detail Calvin's influence on Geneva's (and Europe's) development of family law through Genevan legislation, consistory (church court) cases, commentaries, and correspondence).
181. McNeill, Calvin on Civil Government, Sex, Marriage, and Family in John Calvin's Geneva, at 82 (“In areas where Christ's kingship is not thought of by ruler or people [Calvin] sees the civic order as a valid organ of the divine purpose functioning through natural law.”)
182. See also Witte & Kingdon, Sex, Marriage, and Family, Sex, Marriage, and Family in John Calvin's Geneva
183. Harro Hopfl, The Christian Polity of John Calvin 150 (Cambridge U. Press 1982) [hereinafter Hopfl, Christian Polity]
184. Haas, The Concept of Equity, Sex, Marriage, and Family in John Calvin's Geneva, at 70 (footnote omitted).
185. Calvin, Institutes, Sex, Marriage, and Family in John Calvin's Geneva, at II.iii.3.
186. See also John Calvin, Commentary on the First Epistle to Timothy 2:3 (Ages Software 1998) (1556). As Haas puts it, Calvin considers the demands of natural law to be the same as those of the Second Table, and he believes these to be the expressions of the principle of equity, the implementation of the rule of love of neighbour…. “The second [table requires that] we render to our neighbors what belongs to them and observe the natural law … of not doing anything to anyone unless we would want them to do the same to us.” For Calvin, it is equity, at least in its outward social expression and the rule of love of neighbour, that are the essential features of the natural law that God implants ….
187. Haas, The Concept of Equity, Commentary on the First Epistle to Timothy, at 68 (footnote omitted).
188. Calvin, Institutes, Commentary on the First Epistle to Timothy, at II.iii.4.
189. Id. at II.ii.27. I thus find myself out of accord with Hopfl's assertion that Calvin had no meaningful place for natural law.
190. See Hopfl, Christian Polity, Id, at 179–182.
191. For a critical analysis of Hopfl's position, see Helm, Calvin's Ideas, Id, at 363–364
192. see generally Haas, The Concept of Equity, Id.
193. Hittinger, The First Grace, Id, at xvii-xviii.
194. J. Budziszewski, What We Can't Not Know 202–203 (Spence Publg. Co. 2003).
195. Hittinger, The First Grace, What We Can't Not Know, at xv (emphasis in original).
196. See generally Pauline C. Westerman, The Disintegration of Natural Law Theory: Aquinas to Finis (Brill 1998).
197. Calvin, Institutes, The Disintegration of Natural Law Theory: Aquinas to Finis, at IV.xx.14.
198. McQuade & Bowser, Marketing Natural Law, The Disintegration of Natural Law Theory: Aquinas to Finis, at 215.
199. Hittinger, The First Grace, The Disintegration of Natural Law Theory: Aquinas to Finis, at 36.