Keeping our distance in compassion-based social relations

Journal of Moral Philosophy

Volumn 2, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 69-87

  Smith, Steven R ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GLAMORGAN   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 61949358301     PISSN: 17404681     EISSN: 17455243     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1740468105052584     Document Type: Article

References (26)

1. For example, see N.E. Snow, 'Compassion', American Philosophical Quarterly 28.3 (July 1991), pp. 195-205
2. Especially see pp. 195-96 col. 2-col. 1. Also see A.M.S. Piper, 'Impartiality, Compassion, and Modal Imagination', Ethics 101 (July 1991), pp. 726-57
3. and M.V. Wright, 'Narrative Imagination and Taking the Perspective of Others', Studies in Philosophy and Education 21 (2002), pp. 407-416. Different cultures may acknowledge these emotions in different ways, and may not acknowledge (some or all) of them at all. To this extent, the claim above is therefore anthropological rather than purely logical
4. See especially M. Nussbaum, 'Compassion: The Basic Social Emotion', Social Philosophy and Policy 13.1 (1996), pp. 27-58
5. Also see S. Mendus, Impartiality in Moral and Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) for an interesting argument that any commitment to impartiality must be based on our partial concern for others derived from emotions such as love and compassion
6. Nussbaum, 'Compassion', p. 29
7. See Snow, 'Compassion', p. 196 col. 2
8. See, for example, Elizabeth Anderson's position and critique of pity to be explored below - E.S. Anderson, 'What Is the Point of Equality?', Ethics 109.2 (1999), pp. 287-337
9. R.J. Arneson, 'Discussion: Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism', Ethics 110 (January 2000), pp. 339-49
10. Arneson, 'Discussion', p. 343
11. Anderson, 'What Is the Point of Equality?', pp. 287-337
12. Similar conclusions are reached in other explorations made by Arneson of responsibility and deservedness. See, for example, R.J. Arneson, 'Egalitarianism and the Undeserving Poor', The Journal of Political Philosophy 5.4 (1997), pp. 327-50: '...even though many factors determine the distribution of poverty, on average we would expect that impoverished members of society tend to be cursed with choice-making and choice-following deficits, so even if their conformity to accepted standards is less than average, one cannot infer that their deservingness, all things considered, is less than average' (p. 332)
13. For example, Ronald Dworkin has made considerable play exploring this contingency in his critique of 'welfare egalitarianism' - see, for example, R. Dworkin, 'What Is Equality?' especially Part 1 in Philosophy and Public Affairs 10.3 (1981), pp. 185-246
14. Also see more recently, R. Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000)
15. M. Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 10
16. Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice, p. 19
17. See for example, Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, pp. 287-99
18. This point may be more readily appreciated in respect to race and gender, although I have argued elsewhere that disability can also be reasonably viewed in the same or similar way. See, for example, S.R. Smith, 'The Social Construction of Talent: A Defence of Justice as Reciprocity', The Journal of Political Philosophy 9.1 (2001), pp. 19-37
19. Indeed, concurring with Nussbaum, I would argue that it seems very difficult to comprehend what any human relations would be like without the presence of some degree of empathic-imagination. Given that without this capacity persons would not be able to detect relevant similarities between the behaviour of others and their own. See Piper, 'Impartiality, Compassion, and Modal Imagination', pp. 726-57, especially pp. 730-31 for a fuller exploration and defence of this claim
20. As well as this being reminiscent of a Kantian perspective there is also more than an echo here of a position often taken by Nietzsche. For example, in Gay Science (first published in 1882, expanded edn published in 1887), Nietzsche claims that: 'Our personal and profoundest suffering is incomprehensible and inaccessible to almost everyone; here we remain hidden from our neighbour even if we eat from the same pot. But whenever people notice that we suffer they interpret our suffering superficially. It is the very essence of the emotion of pity that it strips away from the suffering of others what is distinctly personal'. Cited in O. Conolly, 'Pity, Tragedy and the Pathos of Distance', European Journal of Philosophy 6.3 (1998), pp. 277-96 - on p. 284 from Gay Science, para 338. There is not enough space to discuss the complex relationship between these two highly diverse philosophers in respect to their views on agency, individuality and self-hood. Suffice it to say that despite these differences, both share a common suspicion for the claim that pity and compassion are integral to healthy social relations existing between persons
21. See especially, Rawls, Theory of Justice
22. See, for example, Arneson, 'Egalitarianism and the Undeserving Poor', especially pp. 339-40
23. B. Barry, A Treatise on Social Justice. II: Justice as Impartiality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), especially pp. 28-51
24. and G.A. Cohen, Self-Ownership, Freedom and Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 187-98 and pp. 224-56
25. For example, see S.R. Smith, Defending Justice as Reciprocity: An Essay on Social Policy and Political Philosophy (Lampeter, Wales: Edwin Mellen Press, 2003)
26. and idem, 'Fraternal Learning and Interdependency: Celebrating Difference within Reciprocal Commitments', Policy and Politics 30.1 (2002), pp. 47-59