Buyer-initiated vs. seller-initiated information revelation

Management Science

Volumn 54, Issue 6, 2008, Pages 1104-1114

  Bhardwaj, Pradeep ^a   Chen, Yuxin ^b   Godes, David ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA   (United States)

^b NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

Game theory; Information economics; Marketing communication; Product quality; Selling formats

Indexed keywords

AMOUNT OF INFORMATIONS; HIGH-QUALITY PRODUCTS; INFORMATION ECONOMICS; INFORMATION REVELATIONS; MARKETING COMMUNICATION; PRODUCT QUALITY; QUALITY PRODUCTS; SALES PRESENTATIONS; SELLING FORMATS; SELLING PROCESS;

COSTS; CUSTOMER SATISFACTION; GAME THEORY; QUALITY CONTROL;

SALES;

EID: 61849171934     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: 15265501     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1070.0840     Document Type: Article

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